

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325  
Implementation in Palestine and Israel 2000-2009

A report submitted to the Norwegian Christian Aid  
February 2010

Dr. Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian  
With the assistance of:  
Sana Khsheiboun  
Rachel Brown  
Hedaya Shamoun

## **Introduction**

### **Methods**

#### **The UNSCR 1325 around the world**

*International Implementation of UN Resolution 1325*

*Legal and Human Rights Considerations and Other Gaps*

*Feminist Critiques*

#### **The UNSCR 1325 in Palestine**

*Implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in Palestine*

*Civil Society Activities*

*Legal and Human Rights Considerations, Barriers and other Gaps*

*Palestinian Feminist Positions and Critiques*

#### **UNSCR 1325 Implementation in Israel**

*Civil Society Implementation Activities*

*Legal and Human Rights Considerations, Barriers and other Gaps*

*Israeli Feminist Positions and Critiques*

### **Interviews**

### **Discussion**

### **Recommendations**

### **Bibliography**

## Introduction

Throughout the world, incidents of gender-based violence escalate during times of conflict as rape and sexual abuse become weapons of war. Within conflict zones, larger numbers of women and children are killed and displaced, as governments, soldiers, family members and sometimes peacekeepers commit violence (Amnesty International, 2004a). As a result, women's movements around the world have struggled for greater equality and justice by pressuring the United Nations (UN) to issue and adopt new resolutions, declarations and action plans that can increase gender equality throughout the world.

One such declaration is the 1979 UN General Assembly Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which defines and delineates how to prevent unequal treatment between men and women. While an important benchmark for women's rights, the resolution failed to address the situation of women in conflict zones. In 1993 at a conference on human rights, however, the UN added articles to the Vienna Declaration and Platform of Action (VDPA) drawing attention to the violation of women's human rights in times of war. Following this declaration, in 1993 the UN adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which drew greater world attention to gender-based violence, couching women's rights as human rights. In 1995 the UN also adopted the Beijing Platform for Action, which recognizes the specific impact of war on women and acknowledges that they experience

war differently than men.

It was after the Beijing Platform for Action that the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000 and for the first time in fifty-five years “devoted an entire session to debating women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations” (Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings, 2004). It thus marked the first time that the Security Council specifically addressed the role and experiences of women in the context of armed conflict (Amnesty International, 2004).

Resolution 1325 calls for “the prosecution of crimes against women, increased protection of women and girls during war, the appointment of more women in the UN peacekeeping operations and field missions and an increase in women’s participation in decision-making processes at regional, national, and international level (Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings, 2004), while also noting “the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (UNSC Res. 1325). By focusing on four inter-related thematic areas, participation of women at all decision-making levels and in peace processes, inclusion of gender training in peacekeeping operations, protection of the rights of girls and women, and gender mainstreaming in the UN’s reporting and implementation systems (Kirk and Taylor, 2006), Resolution 1325 underscores the importance of women’s active agency and participation in politics, rather than portraying them only as victims (Amnesty International, 2004b).

Since the UNSC adopted the Resolution, women’s organizations around the world have

worked to implement its parameters. Some states have adopted national action plans to increase women's representation in decision-making activities and to fight gender-based violence, while others have incorporated language from the resolution into state policy.

In Israel and Palestine, women's organizations have lobbied legislators for greater female involvement in decision-making processes and have organized collaborative implementation and conflict resolution workshops. Despite these efforts, there is a disconnect between implementation activities among elite women who enjoy access to political power and those with less access to the political framework (Wi'am, 2007b; Moghadam, 2005; Kumpulainen, 2008) or economic resources. Many women are still unfamiliar with the Resolution, and widespread participation in implementation activity on a grassroots level remains a challenge (Nazzal 2009, Wia'm, 2007b). The continuing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the lack of a Palestinian state, cleavages between women along social, ethnic, religious, and economic lines, the centrality of the military discourse to Israeli policymaking, and forms of patriarchy and control over women in both societies continue to hinder widespread, grassroots involvement in implementation activities, despite the success women's groups have had lobbying lawmakers and creating networks among women.

This report will look at the actions taken to implement the Resolution in the Palestinian territories and among Palestinian women in Israel, and will review and analyze the feminist literature related to the Resolution and its implementation. Below is a review of

state and non-governmental efforts to implement UNSCR 1325, the main legal, social, and political obstacles to its implementation, and the arguments concerning the relevance of UNSCR 1325 around the world, and more specifically in Palestine and Israel.

## Methods

The purpose of this study is to map governments' policies, plans and strategies in Palestine and Israel towards the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and to identify the gaps in these policies as well as obstacles to implementation of the Resolution.

The information collected for this study includes:

A review of international feminist literature related to UNSCR 1325, with special attention to literature dealing with conflict zones;

A review of the existing reports and writings from and on Palestine and Palestinian women in Israel;

Interviews with Palestinian feminists from Gaza, the West Bank and Israel. Fifteen interviews were conducted in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel. More interviews were conducted in Gaza to learn about the current situation and to understand the position of feminists and human rights organizations towards UNSCR 1325 in light of the Hamas takeover and the latest war on Gaza. The field worker in Gaza interviewed eight feminists and activists who are interested in UNSCR 1325, and

conducted a poll among the directors and staff members of 12 civil society organizations. The field worker also polled 15 researchers and journalists who had no prior exposure to the Resolution.

**Table of Interviews**

<b>Name of Interviewee</b>	<b>Organization and Job</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Date</b>
Ea'timad El-tarshawi	Ministry of Women's Affairs, General Director of Department of Influence, Communication and Mobilization	Gaza	19/11/2009
Hoda Na'aem	Palestinian Legislative Council, Representative of the Change and Reform Party; Islamist feminist leader	Gaza	13/12/2009
Maysoon El-Faqa'awi	The Culture and Free Thought Association; Wissal Coalition, Coordinator	Gaza	08/12/2009
Mounir El-Bahdari	Charitable Solidarity Organization, Director	Gaza	10/12/2009
Zeinab El-Ghneimi	The International Women's Commission (IWC), resigned member; Director, Center for Legal Counseling	Gaza	13/12/2009
Nadia Abo Nahleh	IWC, resigned member; Women's Affairs Technical Committee, Director	Gaza	13/12/2009
Islam Rizek	Women's Affairs Technical Committee, Coordinator; Empowering Women for Women		

	Project and Participation of Women in Peace and Security Project		
Nibras Bsiso	IWC, resigned member; Bank Manager	Gaza	14/12/2009
Galia Aviani	Isha L'Isha, Coordinator of "women, Peace and Security" projec.	Haifa	23/11/2009
Rula Deeb	Kayan – Feminist Organization, Executive Director	Haifa	25/11/2009
Aida Toma	Women Against Violence, Executive Director	Nazareth	07/12/2009
Areen Hawari	Alsewar, Media Coordinator; Shatil, Coordinator of Women NGOs Forum; and feminist activist	Nazareth	22/01/2010
Amal Khreishesh	Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD), Executive Director	Ramallah	15/12/2009
Dr. Islah Jad	Women Research Institute, BirZeit University, Lecturer	Phone Call	12/01/2010
Najwa Sandouka\Yaghi	MIFTAH, Project Coordinator	Ramallah by mail	
Suhair Azzouni	UNIFEM - Gender Mainstreaming Consultant in Palestine	Phone Call	26/01/2010

Our five main questions were:

How were you as an activist and as an organization involved with implementation of the Resolution?

What were the difficulties, obstacles and barriers that you faced?



Are you still active in groups that work on implementation of the Resolution? If not, why?

Since the responsibility for implementation of the Resolution lies with governments, how does their power affect implementation?

How should women's and other civil society organizations promote the implementation of the Resolution in Palestine\Israel?

### **Resolution 1325 Worldwide: Implementation and International Critiques**

While Resolution 1325 could be used as a tool for mainstreaming gender issues into national policy and for transforming women's roles in decision-making processes, there is also a significant gap between the language of the Resolution and its practical application, and concern about its relevance in conflict zones and its ability to address the needs of marginalized women in these areas. Below are the major criticisms of 1325 from feminist, legal, and human rights perspectives, a summary of how states and regional bodies have attempted to implement the Resolution, and barriers that governments and women face in its implementation, particularly in areas of conflict.

#### *International Implementation of UN Resolution 1325*

Since October 2000, sixteen countries have adopted national action plans to implement Resolution 1325. Several other countries, including Israel, Colombia, Serbia, and Fiji, have decided against adopting national action plans, choosing instead to incorporate provisions from the resolution into national policy (Valasek, 2006). As of November 2009, 37 percent of country-specific Security Council resolutions have included language

relating to women and gender (The Peacewomen Project, 2009).

Regional bodies such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the African Union (AU) have all included language on women, peace and security in their policies (Valasek, 2006). While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not formally adopted the resolution, it has created a Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children, while urging member states to implement the resolution's principles.

In August 2009, Chile became the first country in Latin America to adopt a National Action Plan. Initiated by the Foreign Relations Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the National Women's Service; the plan calls for women's participation in human rights work, peace operations, and decision-making processes. Across the region the number of women in peace missions has gone up, and in Nicaragua the government has undertaken reforms to increase the number of women in the police force and implement gender-sensitivity training. Since 2000, Mexico<sup>1</sup> and Honduras have both adopted legislative quotas for the number of women legislators, while in Colombia, as Ilja Luciak notes, the government has created an action plan for "preventing and attending to gender-based sexual violence in the context of forced displacements" (as quoting Colombia-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). Despite these gains, on the civil society level Resolution 1325 remains largely unknown throughout the region, and in countries such as Argentina, "the

concepts of gender and security are (still) generally not thought of as being linked to each other” (Luciak, 2008). Women usually occupy behind-the-scenes rather than decision-making roles in peace negotiations, and despite a limited increase in the number of female legislators, defense positions are almost exclusively occupied by men in countries such as Chile and Brazil (Luciak, 2008).

Countries that have adopted national action plans have delineated the steps the government will take to implement Resolution 1325 within a given timeframe, and have explained how the government will monitor and evaluate activities focused upon women, peace and security. In Uganda, the National Action Plan (NAP) is based not only upon Resolution 1325, but also upon Resolution 1820, which calls for the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence, as well as the Goma Declaration on Eradicating Sexual violence and Ending Impunity in the Great Lakes Region. A central focus of Uganda’s National Action Plan is victims’ access to justice in the aftermath of gender-based crimes. Despite the development of Uganda NAP, women’s involvement in conflict resolution is limited and largely relegated to informal process (Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger, 2008).

Like the Uganda NAP, Liberia’s NAP calls for the protection of women and girls from violence, and is based upon the additional goals of prevention, participation and empowerment. Liberia has also created a 1325 National Steering Committee composed of women’s groups and relevant NGOs to help implement the Resolution’s parameters.

Instead of implementing an NAP in Sudan, the government has opted to “deal positively with the Resolution within the framework of what suits Sudan according to national priorities identified by the GoS” (UNMIS, 2005). Despite that women were largely excluded from the North-South peace process and the talks leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, women’s groups in the South have successfully lobbied for policies that address women’s needs. Still, knowledge of the resolution remains limited, due in part to illiteracy, lack of financial resources, and difficulty with coordination and dissemination.

In the DRC, the government has also yet to include a mechanism for implementation. Due to the lobbying of women’s groups in the DRC, women were eventually included in the Women Inter-Congolese talks. While the government adopted the Electoral Law in 2006, and while female parliamentarians from various parties have created a platform for implementation of the resolution, yet this initiative has recently faced difficulties due to “lack of political space in the DRC” (Party Parliamentary Group, 2009).

The nearly completed NAP for the Philippines is the first attempt at government implementation of Resolution 1325 in Southeast Asia. Despite a lack of national action plans in the region, women in NGO networks have nonetheless used 1325 as a framework for their lobbying efforts (Iceland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). In East Timor the Women’s Political Caucus has pushed for a greater number of female candidates on party lists, and the government has implemented gender training for its

security forces. In Burma, the Women's League of Burma has used the resolution to lobby for an end to impunity for gender-based crimes perpetrated by the Burmese military. In spite of these efforts, East Timorean women in rural areas are largely outside the reach of implementation activities, and are underrepresented at decision-making levels (Amnesty International, 2004). The lack of women in negotiating positions is also evident in Indonesia; while women played important behind-the-scenes roles in the 2005 Aceh-Indonesian Peace Agreement, they were entirely absent from negotiating teams (Quintos-Deles, 2006), a trend that is also present in Malaysia (Rahman, 2005).

In Afghanistan women's involvement has also largely been on the informal level (Whitworth, 2004, pp. 128-129). Still, although women were not included in the 2001 peace talks, they have more recently been included in discussions about reconstruction (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2003). Yet most of the women who are included in participatory processes are Persian-Speaking, while Pashto-speaking women remain less involved (Mehta, 2008). Divisions among women are also evident in India, where the caste system acts as a barrier to women's mobilization (Mehta, 2008).

Although Resolution 1325 has brought advances in gender mainstreaming, women's peace initiatives are largely "scattered and diffuse," (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2003) and the majority of UN member countries have not adopted NAPs for its implementation. In Africa, many women still do not know about Resolution 1325 on a grassroots level, and in Darfur, implementation is particularly difficult due to high levels

of violence (UNFPA, 2008). While there is a system-wide action plan in the Great Lakes region, the Resolution is largely still unknown at the local level (Mayanja, 2000). According to the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, four years after the passing of Resolution 1325, most civil society respondents believed their governments were not doing enough to implement the resolution, despite broad commitments or ad-hoc initiatives aimed at implementation (NGO Working Group, 2004). Governmental support for women's networks is limited, and in Sudan, the DRC, Uganda, and Afghanistan, women's access to power, politics, and broader women's networks remains inadequate. In Uganda, the DRC, and Sudan alike women working on 1325 are also sometimes perceived as people who are "paid to provide services but not to think," an attitude that can further hinder women's involvement (International Crisis Group, 2006).

#### *Legal and Human Rights Considerations and Other Gaps*

A major concern with Resolution 1325 is that governments may view it as "soft law" and prioritize domestic law over its implementation (Global Justice Center, 2008). This is especially of concern where existing discriminatory domestic laws may prevent women's involvement in decision-making processes (Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger, 2008). The same feminist critique that applies to international law could also be applied to Resolution 1325: it aggravates binary gender dichotomies that associate emotion, peace, and the private realm with women, while associating aggression, war, and the public

sphere with men (Vayrynen, 2004). Although some argue that Resolution 1325 bridges the gap between the public and private spheres, thus attempting to address women's needs outside the public sphere, other believes it is not a radical departure from this dichotomous and conservative analysis of gender.

As Merav Detan notes, some critics may argue that Resolution 1325 is susceptible to the same criticisms as human rights law, in that it focuses upon political and civil rights, while relegating social, economic, and cultural rights to a lower priority, despite that these are the realms in which women most often suffer from discrimination (as discussed in Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright, 1991)<sup>3</sup>. An additional consideration is whether in its statements about 1325 the Security Council fails to acknowledge the “rights-based limitations” of the Resolution, including the inability of marginalized women to take advantage of a rights-based approach, and more broadly, the lack of attention within the field of human rights to the “gendered dynamics of armed conflict” (Barrow, 2009).

Particularly for women living in conflict, logistical barriers can greatly hinder the involvement of women in decision-making and participatory processes. Barriers to movement can complicate the traveling that is required to attend meetings and workshops, especially where citizens live under military occupation, as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine (Moghadam, 2005). A lack of financial resources can also hinder implementation among women's group (Binder, Lucas, and Schweiger, 2008).

A separate concern is that the Resolution does not take into account the degree to which

the population may be highly politicized, particularly within conflict zones (Barrow, 2009). In Palestine, for example, the unsettled national question has “hardened identities,” affecting women’s roles in refugee camps and villages (Moghadam, 2005). Some critics question the ability of an externally imposed; top-down resolution to create the bottom-up, societal attitude change that could address these hardening identities.

How the resolution is perceived can also affect to the degree to which it can change “discriminatory social practices” (Barrow, 2009). As Laura Shepherd asserts, the Security Council uses the language of “global neo-liberal governance” within the resolution, and suggests rebuilding conflict afflicted societies in a “conservative” light that reinforce the notions of state and sovereignty, despite that the resolution discusses participation and representation. The result is that the resolution does little to create an alternative political model that could create the necessary social and political reforms that lead to gender equality (Shepherd, 2008).

Since 2000, the dissemination of Resolution 1325 has been facilitated by its translation into over one hundred languages. Still, the wording of the resolution remains vague, as the Security Council does not explain how “‘gender perspectives’ will be incorporated into field operations” (Naraghi-Anderlini, 2000), nor does it explain what the term precisely means. For example, the translation of 1325 into Arabic has further confounded the meaning of key concepts within the Resolution as the language has become more vague, affecting how well it is understood in regions such as Darfur.



Critical gaps in Resolution 1325 include the absence of quotas for women's involvement in decision-making positions, of a framework for enforcement mechanisms, of punitive measures for peacekeepers who exploit or abuse women, of systematic review of implementation, and of benchmarks and targets, in turn lessening the commitment of the Security Council to addressing the status of women in conflict (Naraghi-Anderlini, 2000)<sup>5</sup>. There is also no mention of policies that could address cultural stereotypes (Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger, 2008) nor is there mention of consultation with local civil society organizations as part of the follow-up process (Naraghi-Anderlini, 2000).

In addressing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) the Resolution does not clearly define who qualifies as an ex-combatant, and therefore risks excluding unarmed ex-combatants from DDR programs that could otherwise benefit them (Global Justice Center, 2008)<sup>6</sup>. As female ex-combatant Tamils in Sri Lanka demonstrate, "local negotiations with gender and feminism" do not necessarily translate into clear categories within DDR programs, given the heterogeneity of the Tamils and the diverse ways gender is employed within their national struggle (Gonsalves, 2004).

Finally, Resolution 1325 does not adequately take into consideration the needs of marginalized groups of women such as IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants, as it does not mention repatriation, reparations, and resources for IDPs, or the safety of female refugees (Barrow, 2009). The resolution similarly overlooks the unique conditions of populations in exile, and how widows, the disabled, rural women, and ethnic and linguistic minorities

can become a part of social and political processes (Adrian-Paul and Naderi, 2005)<sup>7</sup>. The marginalization of these groups is a particular risk where 1325 is only employed as a top-down approach.

Burmese women living in Thailand, for example, are excluded from implementation processes (Global Justice Center, 2008), despite their unique needs and experiences as refugees. Ensuring that women with HIV/AIDS are not excluded from conflict prevention processes is another concern (International Crisis Group, 2006).

### *Feminist Critiques*

While Resolution 1325 advocates for the inclusion of women in decision-making processes, it does not promote a deeper analysis of how the UN as an institution conceives of gender, nor does it promote an examination of how underlying patriarchies (Enloe, 2005) and constructions of masculinity and femininity affect women (Vayrynen, 2004). In other words, it may not advance a far-reaching analysis of the root causes of conflict and the “neoliberal models of masculinity and femininity” that underlie UN policy, in effect rendering Resolution 1325 a “problem-solving” tool (Vayrynen, 2004) rather than a means for radically assessing the UN’s gender assumptions. Women’s lack of adequate representation in UN decision-making positions may only exacerbate this lack of analysis and promote an “add women and stir” (Al-Ali, 2005) approach to gender equality. If, in fact, the Resolution promotes a binary model of gender, it also risks suggesting that “gender” refers only to women, rather than to the dynamic and context-

specific power relations between men and women and that often change during and after conflict (El Jack, 2003).

The inclusion of non-elite women in conflict resolution and participatory processes is another issue that the Resolution may overlook. Indeed, many women view the Resolution itself as only applicable to elite women, since there is no language that indicates how, precisely, women are to enter into decision-making positions if they do not already have access to political processes (Barrow, 2009). Similarly, there is no language discussing how women can access the human rights framework upon which 1325 in part relies. Feminist Liberian activist Leymah Gbowee, for example, notes that when she first became involved in the women's movement, elite women, most of whom were relatives of former leaders, were cautious of the involvement of non-elite women.

In Nepal, too, female NGO staff members responding to a study on 1325 noted that elite women are largely in charge of implementation, even though they do not necessarily create connections to women working on the grassroots level. As a result, women working on 1325 may have difficulty forging connections with other women internationally (Boston Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, 2006). For women from non-member states of the UN such as Burma, networking with international NGOs and becoming stakeholders in gender equality initiatives has also proven difficult (Global Justice Center, 2008).

Another concern is that the language of the resolution characterizes women as victims

and assumes a natural connection between women and peace, and in turn risks advocating for women's rights as a means of promoting security and stability, rather than because, in line with a rights-based approach, women are entitled to certain protections as human beings (Cohn, 2003-4).

The Resolution's lack of contextual specificity is another barrier to implementation, despite the range of social and cultural contexts in which it is meant to operate (Barrow, 2009). More broadly, one criticism of gender mainstreaming at large is that it lends itself to a "one size fits all" approach that is "imbued with Western norms". (Valasek, 2006). Commenting on gender empowerment in the global South, for example, Tahira Gonsalves notes that it requires "a deep understanding of how women and men in various southern communities negotiate their gender identities within structural and cultural environments...beyond standard labels of feminism, empowerment, liberation or gender" (Gonsalves, 2004). These concepts can not be separated from systems of masculinity that intersect with class, race, and religion (Gonsalves, 2004).

Returning to the example of Nepal, an ethnically heterogeneous society, minority and indigenous women who experience discrimination on multiple levels may risk sidelining any grievances they express based upon their ethnic or class identity if they also voice grievances as a woman (Barrow, 2009). Thus, the lack of nuance concerning the intersection between gender, ethnicity, class, language, and caste in Resolution 1325 means implementation initiatives may be less applicable in more heterogeneous societies

(Barrow, 2009) or in societies with polarized identities. The resolution also lacks any provisions that differentiate between women of varying ages (Kirk and Taylor, 2007).

Finally, 1325 may overlook how women's and men's roles change during times of conflict, and consequently, the difficulty women may have reintegrating into society in post-conflict settings (Barrow, 2009) where efforts to implement Resolution 1325 may have unintended consequences for women. Where people view the resolution as a Western-imposed attempt at development and democratization, or where members of society view the UN negatively, implementation can result in backlash against women.

### **UNSCR 1325 in Palestine**

Since the UNSC passed Resolution 1325 in 2000, the same year as the outbreak of the second intifada, many conflict resolution and women's rights NGOs in Palestine/Israel have included implementation activities on their agenda. These efforts have been needed in part because of the high levels of violence Palestinian women experience; since the outbreak of the second intifada, 340 Palestinian women have been killed and 600 imprisoned by the Israeli occupation forces. The number of checkpoints in the West Bank limiting the mobility of Palestinians and separating families has also increased to 630, and 60 women have given birth at checkpoints, resulting in the death of 40 newborns. Elderly women in Gaza have also died after being denied access to hospitals by the occupying forces (Rabadi, 2009), and during the war on Gaza in 2008, 403 Palestinian civilians were killed, 78 of whom were women who were in or near their homes at the

time of attack (Almezan, 2009).

According to Reema Nazzal (2008), interest in the Resolution began only recently in Palestine, as women now view it as a means of enhancing their status within the community and developing women's roles in national decision-making and political life, on the other. Feminist activists also believe the Resolution can help promote a feminist agenda and encourage cross-border feminist coalitions (Nazzal, 2008).

Despite some successful attempts at implementation among Palestinian women's groups, nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1325 the Palestinian women's movement does not fully incorporate the articles of Resolution 1325 into the nationalist and feminist struggles. Indeed, many Palestinian feminist organizations are still unaware that the Resolution exists (Nazzal, 2009).

One reason for this lack of awareness may be gender-blind national policies within Palestinian Basic Law, in addition to patriarchal systems operating within communities and families. While Palestinian Basic Law calls for equality between men and women, facts on the ground show that women are still marginalized from decision-making, especially in the areas of conflict management and peace building (Nashwan 2009). Most recently, women have been absent from negotiation delegations to Cairo, despite that they suffer most from the occupation and internal clashes (Nashwan, 2009).

*Implementation of Resolution 1325 in Palestine*

On the governmental level, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was established in 2003 in response to women's advocacy for equal rights, has helped raise public awareness about Resolution 1325 through workshops and meetings. The Ministry has also called upon President Abbas to recognize the importance of women's participation in peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and has supported the establishment of the International Women Commission (IWC) (Rabadi, 2009), a group of prominent Israeli, Palestinian, and international women leaders calling for a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and an end to the occupation. IWC activities include monitoring the amendment to the Equal Representation of Women law, meeting with local and international policymakers to advocate for women's involvement in negotiations, and writing position papers that analyze and present solutions to the conflict (IWC, 2006). The IWC first met under the auspices of UNIFEM in Turkey in 2005.

One important achievement of the Ministry of Women's Affairs and President Abbas has been the signing and ratification of CEDAW in line with the provisions of Palestinian Basic Law. The Convention amends existing laws and legislation in line with the stated terms of the agreement, and serves as a reference for legislators when drawing up new laws (Rabadi, 2009). In 2008 the Ministry also approved the establishment of the National Commission on Violence against Women, which is charged with forming a national strategy to fight gender-based violence. These initiatives complement other efforts to increase the participation of women in decision-making and in the labor market, reduce domestic and gender-based violence and the rate of poverty among women, and

increase the participation of young women in education, vocational trainings and technical support jobs.

To complement the work of the Ministry, President Abbas has also issued a decree (Decree 24) expressing support for the Resolution and recognizing the importance of the IWC to its implementation. The decree calls upon all Palestinian National Authority organizations to support the full and equal participation of women in efforts to keep peace and security, although there is still no formal action plan for national implementation of the Resolution.

In an effort to reduce violence towards Palestinian women and girls, the Palestinian Authority has also signed into action the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment project, an initiative couched under the second Millennium Development Goal. The Foundation Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy also commissioned a study of the gender responsiveness of the Health, Labor, Social Affairs and Education Ministries, a step towards institutionalizing a gender approach to budgeting within Palestinian Authority organizations (Rabadi, 2009).

Outside of the government's purview, women in Palestine have advocated for a quota for women's representation, which has resulted in the reservation of two seats for women within every local council (Moghadam, 2005). In 2005 women also achieved 20% representation in the Palestinian Legislative Council, an increase from past years of 12.7% in the Legislative Council and 18% within local councils (Nashwan, 2009).



Although the Fatah Central Council rejected the proposal for a 20 percent quota, the Women's Committee of the Fatah Central Council also lobbied for a thirty percent quota for women within Fatah's governing body (Jerusalem Center for Women, 2009).

### *Civil Society Activities*

One non-profit organization playing a central role in the implementation of Resolution 1325 is MIFTAH, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy. The majority of MIFTAH's activities focus on increasing the participation of women in decision-making, and in bolstering women's capacity to be political leaders.

MIFTAH's Women in Peace Negotiation project, for example, is "an attempt to build on MIFTAH's experience in the areas of advocating human rights and the promotion of participatory governance and to create linkages between gender equality issues, conflict management and peace building" (MIFTAH, 2007). The main goal of this project is "to enhance women's political participation in peace building and the negotiations process through networking, capacity building and simulated negotiations with Israelis" (MIFTAH, 2007).

The second initiative MIFTAH has undertaken to support women's involvement in politics is the Women's Capacity Building Project, which consists of information sessions for women on negotiation topics such as borders and water. The goal of the project is to better prepare women leaders to participate in peace negotiations. As part of

the project, MIFTAH has also created a library with information on these issues (MIFTAH, 2007).

MIFTAH has also assisted in the creation of the Women's Political Forum, "a space for women activists to discuss political, social and cultural issues from a women's perspective" (MIFTAH, 2007). Although women's ability to contact relevant Israelis involved in negotiations has been hindered by the Hamas victory, they were still able to participate in a comprehensive three-day training course in negotiation skills in February 2007. The training had four main objectives: to "stimulate participants' awareness of the complexities of negotiation"; to "equip participants with a framework for understanding, diagnosing and leading the negotiation process"; to "enhance participants' skills through hands-on experience and feedback;" and to "provide participants with a process for continued improvement and learning" (MIFTAH, 2008).

To further empower women and enhance their skills, MIFTAH has provided technical support to elected women on local councils. This training has included discussions about "how to start dialogue and ways of communication, negotiating across and behind the table, strategies and tactics in diplomacy and international negotiations (threats and ultimatums, brinkmanship etc.), asymmetric negotiations, multilateral negotiations, including the issues of sequencing, coalition building and decision-making mechanisms, and the use of media in international negotiations" (MIFTAH, 2008). To ensure that elected women work according to a code of ethics, MIFTAH offered workshops on the

principles of integrity, accountability and transparency, on relationships with voters and constituents, on regulations and laws, and on ethical and professional standards. MIFTAH also organized training sessions and workshops in which women meet with decision-makers to discuss political issues. To better mobilize women within public life, MIFTAH conducts additional trainings and workshops on the meaning and principles of citizenship, including from a gender perspective (MIFTAH, 2008).

MIFTAH's Women and Elections Project, funded by the International Republican Institute in 2008, aims at "developing a support network for Palestinian women interested in assuming a more prominent role in public life (MIFTAH, 2008). The organization created this network through the West Bank and Gaza-based Women's Electoral Support Points program, which is "devoted to training, empowering and mobilizing women in pursuit of inclusion and equality in all sectors of public life" (MIFTAH, 2008). Throughout the project MIFTAH field workers cooperated closely with elected women from Jerusalem and Hebron who submitted project proposals to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).

As part of its Enhancing the Role of Civil Society in the Legislative Process project, MIFTAH invited elected female members of the PLC to a meeting to discuss "informal justice and the rule of law" in July 2008 (MIFTAH, 2008). During the same month 20 women leaders from the West Bank participated in an exchange visit for elected women in local councils and discussed the role of women in local councils, obstacles and

challenges to fulfilling these roles, and ways of overcoming difficulties and supporting each other. MIFTAH is currently working with other women's organization on reviving the National Campaign for Improving Women's Political Participation.

MIFTAH's third initiative aimed at implementing Resolution 1325 is the UNFPA funded Gender, Peace and Security Project. The initiative creates "institutional mechanisms and socio-cultural practices that promote and protect the rights of women and girls and advance gender equality. Project activities include: strengthening networks of NGOs and journalists to create forums for dissemination of information on the role of gender equality in peace and security, capacity building and media events" (MIFTAH, 2009). The organization has also carried out a number of activities on Resolution 1325 including workshops and training sessions with women's organizations at the district level, as well as workshops in Hebron and Nablus on strengthening women's support at the community level. These activities are aimed at raising awareness among community-based organizations and identifying organizational needs for advocacy campaigns. In addition, MIFTAH organized a training course on how to write a policy paper for about gender-based violence and prenatal care, resulting in the publishing of two policy papers by the trainees, and the printing and translation of a paper on gender-based violence.

Under the same project, in December 2008 MIFTAH also printed and distributed one thousand policy briefs, organized four media events to combat gender-based violence, supported the user guide and lexicon project, and garnered support for the National

Committee for Combating Violence against Women. Finally, MIFTAH helped form two coalitions of women's organizations in Hebron and Nablus, and assisted in design action plans that will help the coalitions implement Resolution 1325.

The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center (Wi'am) has also played a role in the implementation of Resolution 1325, holding a seminar in December 2008 with Israeli, Palestinian and Swedish women about how the Resolution is applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) has likewise used 1325 as one basis for its work with women living under occupation, and as part of its broader efforts to bring a gender perspective to analyses of the conflict. Together with Bat Shalom, the WCLAC participated in the IWC's efforts to increase female participation in negotiations.

In Gaza, the Wissal Coalition and The Culture and Free Thought Association have jointly run a UNFPA funded project to raise awareness about the Resolution. The project supports networking among civil society organizations and organizes activities to protect women using Resolution 1325 as a foundation. The most important activity through this project was the establishment of the Wissal Network Coalition, a group of 20 organizations that coordinate women and human rights organizations' implementation activities. The Coalition has also organized training for 40 workers and board members of partner organizations, providing them with tools and skills to empower and protect women according to Resolution 1325. In this undertaking, 20 workers and board

members were provided with tools and skills to advocate for women's rights according to the Resolution. (Alfaqa'awi, Gaza 2010).

Wissal has also held some 150 educational workshops on violence and discrimination against women, which were attended by 6,500 male and female beneficiaries. The organization prepared a fact sheet on the health, political, economic and educational situation of Palestinian women in the Gaza Strip, and together with The Culture and Free Thought Association, organized a study day for 120 officials, women leaders and members of the media to publish their findings. Wissal also initiated two psychosocial support programs for battered women in the areas of Khan Younis and Beit Lahiya, and hosted a ten part radio series about violence against women and Resolution 1325, domestic violence, inheritance, child custody, reproductive health, and the war on Gaza and its impact on women (Wissal, Brochure, 2010)<sup>1</sup>.

To address the lack of knowledge about the Resolution, the Majed Women's Association and the Center for Women's Affairs in Gaza have jointly issued and publicized a brochure on its importance and relevance, and the need to strengthen education campaigns with women in different groups (The Majed, Brochure, 2010). <sup>2</sup>The Majed also broadcasts the weekly radio program "I Have the Right to Participate", which

---

<sup>1</sup> A Brochure that was produced by Wissal and reviewed by the field worker in Gaza.

<sup>2</sup> A Brochure that was produced by The Majed Women's Association in and reviewed by the field worker in Gaza

addresses women's issues.<sup>3</sup>

*Legal and Human Rights Considerations, Barriers and other Gaps*

The lived realities of women under occupation present the largest obstacle to implementation of Resolution 1325 in Palestine, as severe restrictions on movement impact women's livelihoods and their physical and emotional well-being. Women's lives are also "torn asunder" by the difficult physical, psychological and financial realities of occupation (Nazzal, 2008), which are only reinforced by construction of the wall, checkpoints, closures, and roadblocks. Women have also openly expressed fear of imprisonment, beating, and even death (Myrtenbaum, 2005) and have sometimes been harassed by Border Police while traveling through checkpoints. More generally, fear for personal safety and physical barriers to movement hinder women's access to health care, including obstetricians and children's health professionals (UNFPA, 2005), as well as education and employment (Wi'am, 2007b). Describing the results of a study on the impact of occupation on Palestinian women, Sama Aweida-Liftawi, Director of the Women's Studies Center notes,

We as Palestinian women have seen, and continue to feel, not just the short-term impact but the long-term implications of (the occupation)...What does it mean to a mother to lose her son, her daughter or her husband? What does such a loss mean in

---

<sup>3</sup> The Majed Women's Association, Retrieved 20/12/2009  
<http://www.almjd.ps/arabic/news.php?action=view&id=19>

terms of her daily life?...We saw mothers who suddenly found themselves forced to be the family bread winner, a role for which they were not raised, not trained and have no qualifications...We saw female students who were forced to quit their college and university studies...We saw mothers who had to give birth at various checkpoints...We saw mothers in Jenin refugee camps looking for their children's clothes and kitchen equipment in their demolished houses...(Aharoni and Deeb, 2004).

These conditions and general impoverishment in the West Bank and Gaza place extra psychological and emotional stress upon women who are heads-of-household, as they are forced to absorb the frustrations of family members embroiled in conflict, while dealing with their own trauma and their economic and social responsibilities as mothers. UNFPA notes that “as a result of the pressure within the household in general and women in particular, women have often found themselves to be the target of angry male relatives who feel frustrated that their ability to be a traditional provider for the family has been eroded” (UNFPA, 2005).

In addition to psychological stress and restrictions on movement, women's mobilization is further hindered by the “social breakdown” of society caused by the occupation (UNFPA, 2005). As violence outside the home increases, incidents of domestic violence are likely to also rise, creating another source of control over women and another barrier to their involvement in implementation activities. Maha Abu-Dayyeh Shamas, Director of



the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) notes that this patriarchal domination inside and outside of the house continues to prevent peace. This is despite that patriarchal policies "are not sustainable in the private sphere, nor are they sustainable in the public sphere" (Bahdi, 2003).

Military occupation and "non-resolution of the national question have also "strengthened patriarchal tendencies, leading to the imposition of social controls on Palestinian women in the refugee camps and villages, and the inability of the Palestine Authority to implement a women's rights agenda" (Moghadam, 2005).

Given these hardships, Resolution 1325 does not necessarily provide a framework for discussing the separation of Palestinian families due to the construction of the wall, nor does it touch upon the issue of registering children (Aharoni and Deeb, 2004), or the difficult realities of refugees (Bahdi, 2003). As Reem Bahdi notes, "Resolution 1325 must not simply bring more women to the negotiating table...it must bring the brokers of power who sit at the negotiating table to understand the lived realities of Palestinian refugees, those whose individual and collective lives are torn asunder by conflict" (Bahdi, 2003).

What is more, because Palestinian law does not adequately protect women from gender-based violence, as laws are "broad and subject to varying degrees of interpretation by legal institutions" (UNFPA, 2005), Palestinian women are not sufficiently protected from incest, rape, and femicide. In effect, this relegates the issue of gender-based violence to

the private realm, and given the lack of women's involvement in the judicial system, lessens the chances of women pursuing legal recourse when they experience violence (UNFPA, 2005).

Because there are a lack of enforcement and punitive measures for parties violating Resolution 1325, the Palestinian Authority cannot be held accountable by the Security Council if it ignores the Resolution's parameters. Although President Abbas recognized 1325 in a presidential decree in 2005, he is not legally obligated to enforce it, as Palestine is not officially recognized as a state (Wi'am, 2007b). As a result, women's organizations are responsible for enforcing a time frame for implementation; for advocating for women's participation in national security, negotiation teams and political decision-making; and for organizing campaigns to raise awareness about the Resolution (Nazzal, 2009). Against this backdrop, the lack of Palestinian statehood also means that some women choose to base their activism on the national struggle rather than feminist activism. Specifically, those Palestinian women who recognize UN Resolutions may believe that 242, 194, and 338 are more appropriate vehicles for activism, rather than Resolution 1325 (Richter-Devroe, 2009).

The dearth of financial resources among NGOs also affects implementation activity, and is often tied to political developments on the ground; in Gaza for an example, some projects aimed at empowering women have not been funded since the Hamas victory in 2006. (Trialog Information Service, 2008). Beyond funding, the disconnect between the

needs of women in civil society and the agendas of female politicians (Wi'am, 2007b) in both Israel and Palestine prevent the full incorporation of women's interests into the formal political framework. Where women do hold political positions of power, their views may still be marginalized, and their agendas must therefore conform to that of the larger party. This reality calls into question the effectiveness of holding empowerment workshops for women who may not be able to access lawmakers or politicians. As one peace activist working with the Wi'am Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center on 1325 notes,

*Providing trainings to grassroots activists is important, but they lack power and control to really change something on higher political levels. I find that difficult to deal with. Providing trainings to women that are not in the position to lobby doesn't seem to be sufficient for me anymore (DeVries, 2009).*

#### *Palestinian Feminist Positions and Critiques*

Palestinian feminists and activist women have differing position towards Resolution 1325; while some view its emphasis on women's participation in decision-making as the key breakthrough article for the Palestinian women's movement, others believe that its emphasis on protection is more important in that it addresses how occupation affects women and girls.

Nazal, for example, notes that the Resolution is important because it calls for increased women's participation in conflict management and problem-solving. She also stresses that UN resolutions addressing women's needs, together with feminist organizations,

have significantly exposed discrimination against women around the world, and have put a spotlight on the legitimate struggle of women. Moreover, she claims that these resolutions put moral pressure on member states to revisit existing laws and to adopt policies that can improve the status of women (Nazzal, 2008). Because it is similar to the Palestinian women's movement in that it addresses the lived realities of Palestinian women at the same time that it emphasizes the national liberation struggle. activists within the Palestinian women's movement can find within the contents and mechanisms of Resolution 1325 new tools for activism. The Resolution also opens the opportunity for the involvement of international women's coalitions and networks.

While some critics believe Resolution 1325 is not easily adaptable to the Palestinian conflict, members of MIFTAH hold that the Resolution can in fact be applied to the is Palestinian feminist movement at the national and social levels, and can revive a demand for the participation of women in Palestinian decision-making (Nazzal, 2009).

Coming from a slightly different perspective, Islah Jad of Beir Zeit University argues that women assume Palestine to be in the peace building phase of conflict, ignoring the ways that war continues under occupation, and its destructive impact on all levels of life in Palestine. It is this misconception, she believes, that led to the establishment of the IWC, which focuses on building peace between Israeli and Palestinian women instead of pressuring the international community to resist Israeli war crimes through boycott and by appealing to the International Court for Justice to criminalize Israeli leaders.

Moreover, the IWC brings together Palestinian and politically mainstream Israeli Zionist women who are not supportive of a boycott or imposing penalties upon Israeli leaders. She argues that most of the documents issued by the IWC give equal status to the perpetrator and the victim and treat negotiation as the only solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict while delegitimizing all UN approved forms of resistance for occupied people. Still, some NGOs have adapted the Resolution to fit their own agendas, using it, for example to fight violence against women while not addressing the external violence that results from the occupation (Jad, 2009).

Abd Elhadi, Faiha questions whether the passing of the Resolution was a watershed event at all. Commenting on the disconnect between the language of the Resolution and the lived realities of Palestinian women, she asks,

*“What is the point of celebrating the resolution that acknowledged for the first time the difficult situation women live at in conflict zones, if it does not seek to alleviate the woes of women, through their protection in war zones and conflicts? What is the value of recognizing the distinctive role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, and in peace-building, if Member States are not required to implement the Resolution? How could it reaffirm “also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts” while we are witnessing successive violations of the rights of women and girls in conflict zone?”* (Abd Elhadi, 2009).

Palestinian women have also acknowledged that due to the centralization of decision-making mechanisms, women leaders in parliament do not necessarily adopt the causes of other women or work to address their concerns (Wi'am, 2007b). A participant in a workshop on Resolution 1325 at Wi'am, for example, expressed that “to empower

women means to raise awareness amongst all women, even those that already are involved in different political parties, because most of the time women are marginalized within the frames of the political party as well. They only address the party's agenda and almost never women's issues or gender" (Wi'am, 2007b).

Another criticism is that as a top-down approach to gender equality, Resolution 1325 may be viewed in both Palestine and Israel as an externally imposed mechanism of conflict resolution that lacks the capacity to create bottom-up social change (Barrow, 2009, p. 60). Although members of the IWC have been successful in meeting with international policy makers and government leaders, for example, many Palestinian women, and especially those who are impoverished or from refugee camps or rural areas are not familiar with the Commission's work (Richter-Devroe, 2009). This lack of awareness of the IWC demonstrates that the Resolution may not be effective in creating widespread attitude change. Such ineffectiveness may be especially prevalent where a history of foreign occupation could create resentment towards externally imposed gender initiatives.

Skepticism towards Resolution 1325 is compounded by a negative perception of the UN among Israelis and Palestinians; at a workshop on 1325 in Palestine, for example, some participants questioned how Resolution 1325 could realistically be enforced given the failure of the UN to ensure compliance with other resolutions (Wi'am, 2007b). The failure of the Oslo process has similarly entrenched skepticism towards international law in both Israel and Palestine (Aharoni and Deeb, 2004).

Finally, as in other conflict zones, attempts to implement Resolution 1325 could increase discrimination against women where activism leads to backlash, as has been the case in Afghanistan, Sudan, the DRC, and Iraq<sup>10</sup>. This backlash can occur if women choose to use 1325 not only as a means of increasing female participation in decision-making, but also as a vehicle for critiquing patriarchy (Barrow, 2009). As Terry Greenblat, Director of Bat Shalom explains, “women’s groups dance between acceptance and challenging our own societies...We are struggling to maintain credibility in an increasingly divided political situation. The key question for us is ‘how do we provide direction out there?’” (Bahdi, 2003).

### **Implementation of Resolution 1325 in Israel**

Israeli women remain marginalized from peace building negotiations with Palestinians and their views are inadequately represented in diplomatic discussions, despite that they suffer from the continuation of conflict. The gender-blind approach to national security discourse in Israel means the government fails to consider the exceptional impact of war on Israeli women. This disproportionate impact is compounded by women’s social role as care takers, their exposure to gender-based and sexual violence, and their disadvantaged economic positions. Arab women, new immigrants, migrant workers, single parents and other women from weak political, social and economic groups are more vulnerable to the impact of conflict and many times do not receive the support they need (Aharoni, 2006).

Given that gender-based violence and sexual harassment escalate during times of war, it

is not surprising that the number of women in Israel who sought protection decreased during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. This decrease was due to the belief that dealing with “personal” violence is not legitimate during an escalation in “political” violence, and the lack of access to phone numbers or information (Aharoni, 2006). Support centers for victims of sexual harassment in northern Israel reported a decrease of 75-90% in the number of women's request for protection during this period, and likewise, the Women against Violence Organization (WAVO), which works with the Palestinian community in Israel, also reported a decrease in the number of women who contacted the organization.

In addition to an increase in gender-based and sexual violence, war also deepens the feelings of abandonment and neglect among women. Desperation, helplessness, alienation and lack of trust are especially traumatizing for marginalized women who possess inadequate financial and emotional resources (Buksbaum, Abramowitz, Dagan, 2007).

Part of the sense of insecurity among Arab women is because many live in parts of Israel with no protection or security alarm systems built to warn against missile attacks. This vulnerability is compounded by economical hardship, restricted mobility, and limited access to information. The effect of conflict on their psychological and physical health can therefore be devastating (Aharoni, 2006; Buksbaum, Abramowitz, Dagan, 2007).

The great distress that plagues women in Israel during conflict has worsened since the end of 2006, as the masculine-military authority has used fear as a means of



consolidating power. Fear tactics include the use of alerts and threats regarding the security of Israeli citizens, and the argument that these threats can only be eliminated through war. The economic impoverishment of Palestinians in Israel and the continued confiscation of their land in the name of national security ensures that their oppression continues (Nagar, 2006).

To address some of these barriers women face, women in Israel have lobbied legislators for greater female involvement in decision-making processes and have organized collaborative implementation and conflict resolution workshops among women's organizations. Some feminist activists in Israel believe that Resolution 1325 is therefore a "secret revolution" that can create a breakthrough in the peace building process (Saragusti, 2009).

While Israel has not created a national action plan to implement UN Resolution 1325, the Knesset has attempted to incorporate the Resolution into national programming through an amendment to the 1956 law for the Equal Representation of Women. Following the efforts of the Ishal L'Isha Haifa Feminist Center to lobby Knesset members Yuli Tamir and Eti Livni, the Knesset adopted an amendment to guarantee women's involvement in the design of peace negotiations and foreign, domestic and security policy. While the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women is responsible for monitoring this amendment, two women's civil society organizations, Itaach Maaki and the IWC also help with monitoring efforts, the former by writing letters to the Ministry of Security and

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and working with the Israeli Supreme Court, and the latter by meeting with politicians and policymakers.

Although the Knesset adopted an amendment mandating the inclusion of women in decision-making processes, lawmakers did not agree to adopt a 25 percent quota for women's participation. As a result, the criteria the government uses to determine how many women to include in decision-making committees is not clearly defined and lacks transparency (Barrow, 2009).

#### *Civil Society Implementation Activities*

Within Israel, the Isha L'Isha Haifa Feminist Center has been at the forefront of implementation efforts. In addition to lobbying the Knesset for the amendment to the Equal Representation of Women law, the organization has also held negotiation and conflict resolution workshops for women, and has created a database of women negotiators who can take part in decision-making processes. Together with the Kayan-Feminist Organization, the group has also hosted conferences on the security discourse in Israel, and how to include human security and gender perspectives within this discourse.

Isha L'Isha's program's foci include distributing the Hebrew translation of Resolution 1325; distributing and disseminating information on the Resolution to national, regional and NGO bodies involved in decision-making process; campaigning to raise public awareness through public relations work, networking, coalition work, advertisement, and

media coverage; and monitoring and documenting the impact of the conflict on women and girls.

Isha l'Isha promotes the inclusion of women from different backgrounds and sectors of society in formal and informal negotiations and in general discussions about the conflict. To provide information on 200 qualified Palestinian and Jewish women in Israel who can participate in negotiations, the group issued *Women, peace and security: Index of Women for Negotiation Teams*, which answers the claim made by men that "there are no suitable women for peace negotiations"(Isha L'Isha, 2005).

In 2007 Isha L'Isha used Resolution 1325 to raise community awareness about the disproportionate impact of war on women and girls. Their outreach activities included workshops, seminars, panels, conferences, and the writing of position papers. The group hosted two such workshops for Palestinian and Jewish women in an attempt to understand the barriers to involving women in peace negotiations. Isha L'Isha also co-organized lectures on security and peace issues, presented the group's positions and insights on the Resolution at international conferences, and published two position papers on Palestinian women and citizenship and on peace building from a feminist perspective. The group has since helped create a discourse on the security, social, economical, environmental and health implications of the nuclear weapons build-up in Israel and in the world. (Isha L'Isha, 2007)

Until 2007, Isha L'Isha's "Women, Security and Peace" project focused primarily on

amending the Equal Representation of Women law. Accompanying this effort was a deep ideological discussion within the organization about the inclusion of women in peace negotiation teams. The organization grappled with questions concerning whether any woman can bring the civil feminist vision to the negotiation table and promote anti-militarist agenda, whether promoting feminist women within the Israeli masculine occupying political system can promote political change and a gender perspective, and whether Palestinian women citizens of Israel would even wish to be a part of Israeli negotiation teams. Due to these dilemmas, Isha L'Isha decided to use Resolution 1325 not as a means of increasing female political participation, but rather as vehicle for promoting a gender perspective within Israel and the international community. (Isha L'Isha, 2007). While Isha L'Isha was successfully able to lobby for an amendment to include women in decision-making, there was still a sense among the group that a glass ceiling limits the degree to which the group can implement Resolution 1325. As Mills notes, "...we worked for a year and we passed a law and had a sense of euphoria, but then we quickly realized that it was a false sense of euphoria and that we had reached the peak of implementing 1325" (Mills, 2006).

In addition to Isha L'Isha, Itach Ma'aki has also been working on the implementation of Resolution 1325 at the legislative level. The group continues to monitor the implementation of the Equal Representation of Women law by appealing to the High Court, networking with other organizations and by making contact with governmental offices (Itach Ma'aki).

At the level of international policy and advocacy, the IWC works to inform politicians and decision-makers about the negative effects of conflict on women, including the detrimental consequences of occupation on women, children, and long-term peace. Using Resolution 1325 as a tool, the Committee attempts to increase women's involvement in negotiation processes and to raise awareness about the Resolution at the Track 1 level. The group's strategies for implementation include the "systematic issuing of IWC critical statements and position papers, advocacy in Israel and Palestine, partnership with UNIFEM and the United Nations, and advocacy with world leaders (IWC, 2006). The Committee is comprised today of 15 Israeli women, including Palestinian citizens Ghaida Rinaiwi, Shahira Shalabi, and Aida Tuma-Sliman.

*Legal and Human Rights Considerations, Barriers and other Gaps*

As in Palestine, within Israel an escalation in conflict leads to increased levels of domestic violence and the tightening of patriarchal arrangements. The proliferation of arms due to heightened security measures also increases the chance of gender-based violence; for Jewish-Israeli women, the high number of households with one family member in the military means that during periods of escalated conflict, physical violence within the home is likely to increase, as "women are expected to contain and compensate for the trauma and frustration of men" (Sachs, Sa'ar, and Aharoni, 2005). What is more, added psychological responsibilities may exacerbate already existing traumas, in addition to increasing women's levels of anxiety. As the wife of a soldier experiencing combat

reaction explained, “We, the women, are those who pay the price of war. We are the real victims and nobody thinks how to take care of **us**, to support **us**, to rehabilitate **us**” (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni, 2005, p. 13).

Indeed, in a study conducted by Isha L’Isha—Haifa Feminist Center on the impact of armed conflict on women in Israel, 26.5% of women respondents noted a deterioration in their health over a four-year period, and of this group, 34.9% identified anxiety as the main factor of the deterioration (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni, 2006).

During armed conflict, Palestinian-Israeli women are also subject to increased violence, as they may experience physical and verbal abuse and racial discrimination based upon national affiliation (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni, 2006). As Sachs, Sa’ar and Aharoni note, Palestinian-Israeli women must deal with discrimination “as second-rate citizens, as overrepresented in poverty<sup>12</sup>,” and additionally “as women in patriarchal kinship arrangements<sup>13</sup>” (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni, 2006).

In addition to the tightening of these “patriarchal kinship arrangements,” during heightened conflict military discourse becomes an even more central feature of national policy and discussion, making implementation among women’s NGOs more difficult than it could potentially be in a post-conflict setting. Increased militarization also means women could face greater risks if they openly criticize the military establishment through their gendered analysis of conflict. A Jerusalem high school teacher notes that as conflict persists, “women are not treated in the right way or aren’t treated at all. The conflict is

essentially ‘masculine’, ‘militarized’, and ‘warlike’. The roles of women are seen as marginal or banal” (Sachs, Sa’ar, and Aharoni, 2005). Feminist activist Amalia Sa’ar likewise argues that as a result of increased militarization, “political issues inside the liberal-feminist discourse” and radical feminists themselves become effectively silenced (Aharoni and Deeb, 2004), as security is ever more defined by male-dominated analyses of conflict. As a result, as Dalia Sachs argues,

*the military conflict and the occupation of the Palestinians dictate a male narrative and nothing else, pushing aside the narrative concerning (women’s) security as women in daily lives...There is no forum to present what (women) have to say on the subject, and the few women whose voices are heard at public places are those who have adopted the male perspective, such as the IDF spokeswoman and the advisor to National Security (Aharoni and Deeb, 2004).*

A participant in a study about the applicability of Resolution 1325 similarly felt that although female army officials and lawyers have participated in Track I and II negotiations, the substance of the negotiations is overwhelmingly controlled by male “security types.” The same respondent noted that while women’s presence within negotiations is an accomplishment, her own perspective was often not of central concern to the negotiations, as she was “hanging on by (her) fingertips” to remain a part of the process (Barrow, 2009).

A series of public hearings conducted by ICW Israel illustrates one reason for the exclusion of a gender perspective from security discourse: there is a lack of distinctly feminist interpretations of conflict among Jewish-Israeli women, who tend to “(adopt) the mainstream discourse in Israeli society, which is based primarily on stereotypes and

ignorance regarding the other side” (Saragusti, Limor, and Haghagh, 2009). Women who participated in the hearings also felt that their main contribution to peace could be in traditionally female domains such as “the home, education, health care systems and interpersonal encounters” (Saragusti, Limor, and Haghagh, 2009).

Women parliamentarians in the Knesset have likewise acknowledged that when they do articulate their views on security issues, male Knesset members may disregard or even mock their ideas (Myrtenbaum, 2005). With respect to this issue, former Knesset parliamentarian Naomi Chazan argues that simply appointing a few women to negotiating teams can not by itself transform the security discourse, given that “women’s perspectives and voices (become) significant when women comprise a substantial proportion of the decision-making body and are able to articulate the diversity of women’s views” (Aharoni and Deeb, 2004).

Other difficulties arise in coordinating joint action between Jewish and Palestinian activists. Although some joint Israeli-Palestinian efforts to implement Resolution 1325 have successfully led to linkage with the international community and policy makers, one barrier to collaboration between Jewish Israeli and Palestinian groups is the differing notions of what political compromises are required for peace, a difficulty that has at times arisen in the work of Israeli organization Bat Shalom and Palestinian organization Jerusalem Center for Women (JCW) in their joint initiative, the Jerusalem Link (Hochman, 2000)<sup>14</sup>. While Bat Shalom employs a “peace with care” model that



emphasizes tolerance and acceptance, JCW adheres to a “peace with justice” model that focuses upon nationalism, political rights, and the right of return (Hochman, 2000). Both groups have acknowledged that a power imbalance between the organizations could affect their work; however, they have made also attempts to address and openly discuss these issues (Bahdi, 2003).

In addition to militarization and various forms of control over women, inadequate levels of funding have been another barrier to implementation of Resolution 1325, despite the importance of financial resources in facilitating knowledge sharing between women’s groups. Because women’s peace groups within Israel are considered to be political, they are ineligible for government funding, and must therefore seek support from outside resources (Myrtenbaum, 2005).

### *Israeli Feminist Critiques*

As Taghreed Yahia Younis, discusses extensively, both liberal and radical Palestinian feminists in Israel have found grounds for rejecting the Resolution; on the one hand, liberal feminists believe that the Resolution deals with the conflict as a given reality, and on the other hand, radical feminists don’t wish to promote Palestinian women’s involvement in Israeli negotiation teams, as they prefer working outside of the Israeli establishment to create political change (Yahia-Younis, 2006). This argument underscore another criticism, namely that the language of the Resolution excludes Palestinian women citizens of Israel by representing conflict as a binary concept with only two sides, while

overlooking the unique position of women in cross-cutting identity groups.

The many “divisions and identities and ideologies” among women in Israel along racial, religious, ethnic and economic lines can also impede solidarity among women in implementing 1325 (Mills, 2006). As Paula Mills, a feminist activist who has worked with Isha L’Isha notes, “...talking about 1325 as a resolution is a high and lofty ideal. But implementing it in a country where there are so many divisions and identities and ideologies, and where all of the power is sitting in the hands of a select group of men (even though our Minister of Foreign Affairs is a women), that is a different story” (Mills, 2006).

Yahia-Younis argues that the complicated relationship between Palestinians’ citizenship and their nationality in Israel is a prime example of how cross-cutting divisions may conflict (Yahia-Younis, 2006). While they are Israeli citizens, this national status is at odds with their ethnic-national, historical and cultural belonging, as well as their kinship with the Palestinian and the Arab people. The historical and political circumstances in which Israel was established and the background of war and bloody conflict in the region only add to this tension. The conflict between citizenship and nationality is most evident in efforts to include Israeli women on negotiation teams (Yahia-Younis, 2006). In the past, Palestinian women who agreed to participate have been treated with suspicion and questioned on ideological grounds by other Palestinian women who refuse to participate (Isha L’Isha, 2005).

Another complexity stemming from the unique status of Palestinian women in Israel is the twofold relationship between unity and individuality and between the common and the different. Since 1948 the Palestinian people were divided into three groups: Palestinians in Israel, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinians in the Diaspora. These separate groups raise the question of who is authorized to represent Palestinian women in negotiations, and whether there is room to include a range of Palestinian voices within negotiations (Yahia-Younis, 2006). Yahia-Younis argues that the intersection between ethnic, national and gender identities make Palestinian women in Israel less privileged than Palestinian women in the West Bank, Gaza and the Diaspora. That Jewish women have more rights than Palestinian women and men, that men have more power than women within the Palestinian community, and that power is stratified between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Jewish citizens of Israel, means Arab Palestinian men and women are on the margins of power in Israeli society. Because politics are considered to be a man's domain, Palestinian women become even more marginalized. Efforts to include Palestinian women in peace negotiations must consider these complexities.

## **Interviews**

**We** conducted 16 open interviews in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel asking interviewees about their level of awareness regarding Resolution 1325, their perception of the

Resolution, how the Resolution applies to them, activities they have organized to contribute to its implementation, barriers and gaps to implementation, and their critiques of the Resolution. The interviews revealed the following trends:

*1. The importance of the Resolution to Palestinian Women*

All of the respondents agreed that Resolution 1325 is very important for Palestinian women in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel. Most believed the Resolution is of unique importance to women in Palestine, where women suffer not only from the Israeli occupation, but also from internal clashes within Palestinian society. At the same time that they acknowledged the pertinence of the Resolution, they felt they were unable to contribute to negotiation teams or reconciliation delegations. They therefore saw a great need for increasing women's participation in peace negotiations and reconciliation processes, as women bear the burden and the responsibilities of conflict. Most interviewees felt that although there is a great need for the Resolution, neither the Palestinian Authority nor civil society and feminist organizations adequately invest in its implementation. One respondent noted,

*"This Resolution acknowledges the importance of women's participation in making a difference in the political and international relations on the national and regional levels. The Resolution doesn't deal with women as victims but rather as players that have the power to create change. In my opinion this is an international acknowledgment of men's failure to bring human security to our world" (Khreish, Ramallah 2009).*

Another respondent similarly believed that the Resolution has potential to transform

women's roles in conflict resolution at the national level and to advocate for an end to human rights violations. at the national level. She noted that the Resolution

*"Has to be implemented on many levels to use it as a tool to promote women's participation in decision-making. The Resolution is another UNSC mechanism that can be used by Palestinian women to speak out against the practices of the Israeli occupation and violations of human rights. It gives women an opportunity to understand their positive role in peace building and conflict prevention. Moreover, it is a tool women can use to monitor the government performance in implementing what they signed for in the international document" (MIFTAH-Ramallah).*

Similarly, a respondent from Gaza stated that

*"Resolution 1325 is one of the most important international resolutions for women who live in areas and countries in conflict. Palestinian women hope it will serve their needs, and that it will be implemented through government commitments in order to protect women from political and armed violence, or through empowering women and provide them with more opportunities to take part in political life, and by building their political, economic and social capacities. Women hope that member states will do what is needed to ensure a wider space for women to be protected and free...The positive side of the Resolution is that it talks about the situation of women in conflict areas, gender-based violence, women's rights and a legislative improvement of their status in terms of civil rights, citizenship and more"(Abu Nahleh, Gaza 2009).*

All women agreed that *"the Resolution is important because it provides tools to be used in cases of human rights violations and abuse of women and children by the occupier"* (Jad, Ramallah 2010). Moreover there was a common interest among Palestinian feminists from Islamist, secular and leftist women's groups to contribute to implementation efforts through networks and coalitions. A respondent from Gaza explained,

*"I reviewed the Resolution and read the translation of its items and found that it fits with Palestinian culture. There is harmony between the Resolution's contents and the concepts of justice and fairness. Most of the articles in the Resolution support the minimum level of women's rights that women agree upon despite their varied political visions...as a representative of the Islamist women's movement I don't see any contradiction between the Resolution and Sharia'a, and my opinions about the Resolution don't diverge with those of Fatah women or leftist women. The Resolution serves women and is in harmony with the Islamic Sharia'a spirit that gives the woman all her rights, including responsibility for her personal issues, and for protection inside her own community. Having said that I can't ignore the fact that some women face domestic violence, discrimination and marginalization"*(Alna'aem, Gaza 2009).

Other participants believed the Resolution to be a breakthrough in achieving women's rights in conflict zones. One participant noted that

*"The Resolution is a turning point in the development of Palestinian women's rights and issues related to security and peace. It opens a venue for Palestinian women to express their thoughts and to pressure decision-makers to change policies dealing with violence within Palestine"* (Faq'a'awi, Gaza 2009).

A respondent from Gaza similarly argued that because the Resolution is viewed with legitimacy by the international community, it holds promise in improving women's role in conflict resolution. He therefore believed that Palestinian women must *"be part of the resolution and pressure for its implementation"* (Al-Bahdari, Gaza 2009). Another respondent similarly felt that *"Although this Resolution wasn't issued for Palestinian women only, it is important for them because they still live under occupation and in the midst of the internal division and the armed conflicts in Gaza"* (Bsiso, Gaza 2009).

As another participant noted, the Resolution calls for prevention of conflict and protection from gender-based violence; it is therefore *"important for women to*

*participate in decision-making regarding conflict solving because they see the issues from another point of view" (Azouni, Ramallah 2010).*

Another respondent felt that the Resolution is important because Palestinian women still live in a state of war. She noted that

*"... In Gaza and the West Bank we still live in wars, continuous war that is escalating sometimes and diminishing at other times but it is still a continuous war with continuous deprivation, expulsion and displacement, violation of women's rights and the harming of women on daily basis. Thus we can't stand with any international position for the protection of women in times of war or in the crises that we have since 1948" (Alna'aem, Gaza 2009).*

A Palestinian activist living in Israel also believed that the Resolution holds promise, but cautioned that *"the UN system is bad and this is clearly problematic" (Areen, Nazareth 2010).* Another Palestinian feminist activist from Israel similarly agrees that *"the Resolution is in theory excellent, but is still far from reflecting the lived realities of Palestinian women in Israel" (Deeb, Haifa 2009).*

## *2. Critiques of Resolution 1325*

Although all interviewees agreed that the Resolution can potentially be a tool for increasing the active participation of women in decision-making positions in conflict zones, some still believe implementation and enforcement mechanisms have been inadequate. Commenting on the use of Resolution 1325 as a means for increasing women's participation while Palestine is still under occupation and at war, one

respondent notes,

*"In the beginning Palestinian women activists and organizations interpreted the Resolution in a way that does not fit the Palestinian situation. They started working on implementing the Resolution as if we are in a post conflict area, but we are not. The Palestinian women and children are still living in the midst of a continuous conflict. The conflict is not finished yet. This inappropriate interpretation moved some women's organizations into implementing the Resolution and working with Israeli women on building peace. An International Women's Commission was created, bringing together women from Palestine, Israel and the world to work on building peace, which has to be done after ending the conflict, but the conflict is not over in Palestine" (Jad, Ramallah 2009).*

This critique of Resolution 1325 echoes the sentiment that UN resolutions can do little to bring a just and lasting peace to Palestinians, as all UN resolutions that have been adopted since 1948 that have been designed to assist Palestinians have been ignored by Israel. As a Palestinian activist from Gaza stated,

*"There is a problem with the Resolution and it stems from its connotation with the UN more than the language of Resolution 1325 itself. This negative connotation is due to the UN resolutions that condemn Israeli action in Palestine. They are supposed to be obligatory for member states of the Security Council, but unfortunately Israel does not respect any of these Resolutions. Like the latest war in the Gaza Strip and the deliberate killing of women, that wasn't killing by mistake; it was inhuman killing, and what did the UN do? I believe nothing. I also believe there is always ignorance of the facts in order to satisfy Israel. Hence, we hope the UN will implement all its resolution in all member states and in all areas" (Alfaqa'awi, Gaza 2009).*

Another respondent agreed that the Palestinian government, too, is responsible for giving voice to Palestinians who suffer from the occupation, and for requesting that the UN and the international community pressure Israel to respect UN resolutions, expressing *that* "the UN resolutions on Palestine have not been respected during the last years but it is



*the responsibility of our government to use the international tools and bring our voice to the world and these resolution and international laws do not do so” (Jad, Ramalah 2010).*

Palestinian women in Israel also agree that the UN does not adequately enforce the implementation of UN resolutions in Israel and Palestine. As one respondent explained,

*“Unconsciously we as Palestinian women do not use international resolutions since we don't believe in their seriousness. Because Israel does not respect the resolution dealing with Palestinian issues and because the international community does not enforce these resolutions, people have an attitude of distance and ignorance towards UN resolutions” (Tuma, Nazareth 2009).*

Indeed, there is continuous debate as to whether or not Palestinian women should use international resolutions and laws at all. As one respondent notes,

*“We haven't decided yet if we want to use international resolutions or not. The whole UN system and its resolution... we haven't decide if we want them. Some resolutions may be harmful to people of concern ... the US is controlling the UN which make things more complicated ... but (at the same time) these are important resolutions that we could use in our work with women and children” (Hawari, Nazareth 2010).*

In line with feminist critiques of international law, Palestinian women also claim that Resolution 1325 could be viewed by national governments as "soft law" and could lack the power to force member states to implement its components. As one respondent noted,

*“The resolution is not obligatory for member states and has no power for enforcement; therefore the governments do not deal with it in a positive way and there are no actions taken to monitor the way in which states use it and activate its mechanisms” (Abu Nahleh, Gaza 2009).*

Indeed, the fact that the Resolution is considered "soft law" has moved women all over

the world to pressure the international community to establish a clear enforcement strategy. One respondent clarified that

*"The resolution lacks implementation tools and mechanisms that could help women's organizations all over the world work towards its implementation. As a result the UN Secretary General will prepare a report in 2010 that contains measures on women's status around the world"* (Khreisheh, Ramallah 2009).

A different respondent emphasized that *"the Resolution must be obligatory for governments and must not only be adopted and implemented by civil society organizations. There has to be a clear government role because this would be more binding and because the civil society organizations have done all what they can and it is time for the government to join"* (Albahdari, Gaza 2009).

For others, the responsibility of implementing the Resolution is that of the government. Yet because the Palestinian Authority does not hold Israel sufficiently accountable for human rights violations, it also inadequately addresses how women are affected by conflict. One participant argues,

*"Implementation of the Resolution is the government's responsibility, which makes working on it even harder in Palestine. The Palestinian Authority has no clear position towards what Israel is doing, and it has no clear aim of using the Resolution as a tool in order to take soldiers to international courts or asking for international protection against Israeli violence. The last war in Gaza was a brutal violation of international laws, especially when UNRWA schools were attacked and bombed by Israeli missiles. If the Palestinian Authority used this case to hold Israel accountable and bring those responsible to trial by using the tools of 1325 and by asking for protection for children and women the situation may be different"* (Jad, Ramallah, 2010).

Although more recently donors have given more support to implementation projects, some women feel that these projects don't inadequately adapt the Resolution to the needs of the population. Another respondent stated,

*"I am critical of the way others deal with the Resolution. We at the center do not get to communicate to donors our ideas for implementation...so now there is a trend at the international level among donors ...everyone is interested in Resolution 1325 and the inclusions of women in decision-making... thus organizations build projects on this basis. Frankly we don't see it is worth working on implementation independently (on a project-to-project basis) and dealing with it as a private project, because if I want to convince women and communities (about the importance of the Resolution) then we need more than such project .... what happens is that we build projects for women on the Resolution and we talk and talk to them...we as individuals and as women organizations with our awareness on the Resolution, when we meet with international delegations like the Council for Human Rights and with Judge Goldstone we tell them about Israeli violations of this Resolution...but I am sure the simple, illiterate and marginalized women can't meet with these delegates and thus they can't express themselves. So I don't know what the benefit is of raising awareness about this Resolution at the national level"* (Alghneimi, Gaza 2009).

Concerning enforcement, some Israeli feminists believe that having additional ways to hold parties accountable would mean more women could occupy decision-making positions. One respondent argues,

*"Maybe having a law to enforce the implementation of the Resolution would be useful. But if we had such a law here (in Israel) that guaranteed that women would be represented ...the ones who would reach decision-making positions would be from Israeli mainstream politics like Limore Livnat, those who do not represent all women but rather a specific political view (Deeb, Haifa 2009)*

Palestinian women in Israel have also questioned the utility of spreading awareness about the Resolution when there are still no clear implementation mechanisms. As one respondent notes,

*"In my opinion we don't need to work with Resolution 1325 here unless the goal is to raise awareness among women about how to use it as a tool for advocacy, but nothing more... there will be a need for the Resolution when there is a clear mechanism for implementation ... we Palestinian women in Israel are not directly affected by the conflict like the Palestinian women in Palestine and this is weakening the work on the Resolution" (Tuma, Nazareth 2010).*

Another respondent stated that

*"One of the resolution's problems is that it is not sensitive to the unique situation of Israel with regards to the inclusion of women on negotiation teams. You can't just call for the inclusion of women...who are these women? In the end these will be Jewish Ashkenazi women connected to political parties, money, power, and to the elite group; that are already controlling our resources and our politics" (Aviani, Haifa, 2009).*

While some activists believe the Resolution can improve women's role in politics and in society, others believe the Resolution is a Western-imposed gender equality initiative that is does not display sensitivity to local cultural contexts. For example, some Islamist women interviewed see the Resolution as a Western means of destructing the Palestinian family unit. One respondent explained,

*"The Resolution is trying to separate the woman and treat her as a social unit, despite the fact that the family is the social unit. It does this in the name of women's empowerment and calls on the women's movements to change their priorities in order to postpone the social and national priority and to promote individual interests. This is contrary to our community culture and they are changing our culture, and we are against everything that wants to change the culture of good" (Altarshawi, Gaza 2009).*

### *3. The role of civil society organizations*

Interviewees in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel all stressed the importance of civil

society in implementing the Resolution. They agreed that the current efforts of civil society organizations are significant, although some felt these groups could do more. One respondent believed it important that feminist organizations in particular work intensely to implement the Resolution, noting that

*"First the active feminist organizations should take a big role in the implementation and should put the Resolution on their agenda and work on it around the year and not only in specific occasions. They have to work on advocacy and create pressure campaigns that will lead to implementation of the Resolution in the Ministry of Women's Affairs and in the education and work ministries. They have to work through religious leaders who are open minded...in addition to involving the media, and especially female media personnel ... there is also a need to involve female lawyers by training them on the Resolution and in other fields, including courts and forums that can work on the issue...lastly, advocates must activate awareness on the grassroots level and establish new networks" (Alfaqa'awi, Gaza 2009).*

Although the Resolution was adopted by the UNSC in 2000, Palestinian women have only started working on it in the last few years. One respondent believed that the reason for women's delayed interest relates to

*"the lack of awareness about its importance in the Palestinian community, where it is not known. Nowadays many organizations are creating workshops and trainings on the Resolution. There is also a lack of work on the Resolution within UN organizations based in Palestinian lands. I hope that the governmental and feminist organization work more committedly on it" (Bsiso, Gaza 2009)*

Another respondent believed that the inadequate level of implementation is a cultural issue and that partnering with religious leaders would be a good strategy for raising awareness. She noted,

*"I am convinced that women's rights are a cultural issue and that the law is part of dealing with these rights, but the law is not the entire solution. We need religious leaders to take part in awareness-raising, because the word of a religious leader is respected here and is considered equal to religious law. There is a need for such leaders in addition to politicians to take part in women's rights issues; religion is part of our culture and this is why we need a joint effort to include women in all aspects of life. There is also a need to work with women and to educate them about how their participation is not only a personal achievement but is also doing justice for a whole community of women. It is important to empower women and raise their self-confidence" (Alna'aem, Gaza 2009).*

According to a different respondent, the main task of civil society should be to document facts on the ground and bring the realities of occupation to the international community.

As she explains,

*"I believe that civil society and its organizations should work intensively in documenting rights violations of children and women by Israel and should pass this information on to the international community using the content of Resolution 1325, presenting the facts to the Palestinian government and forcing its members to act according to the Resolution and give greater protection to women" (Jad, Ramallah 2010).*

A Palestinian respondent from Israel expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress civil society organizations have made in implementing the Resolution, and stressed that it is a good tool for exposing the human rights violations that take place under occupation.

She expressed her belief that

*"Feminist organizations have not worked on the Resolution until now. Why don't we all as Palestinian organizations do joint work? For example, we could use the Resolution as a tool for our activism to expose what happens to women because of the occupation, house demolitions, and the wall, and to discuss violence against women. We can also expose the impact of sexual harassment on female prisoners. We can use it as a tool to make our voice heard...we can use it to improve the quality of the negotiations, but we need to deconstruct the Resolution and*

*restructure it to fit our special situation. Women have to take part in defending their people, so the research organizations should study the impact of occupation on women and feminist organizations should use these studies as a means to discuss Israel's violations of international and humanitarian laws in Palestine"* (Hawari, Nazareth 2010).

Another respondent believed the Resolution gives civil society power to monitor and to question the accountability of decision-makers, and that "*civil society organizations should take up their right to demand accountability and transparency in all issues related to human rights law and citizenship*" (MIFTAH, Ramallah 2010).

#### *4. The Role of the International Women's Committee (IWC)*

The IWC has been through periods of growth and challenge since its establishment in 2005, and its members have been forced to address serious issues arising out of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict amidst the continuation of war and human rights violations. After the siege of Gaza in January 2009, some Palestinian women from Gaza decided to resign from the Commission due to political differences. One member from Gaza explained,

*"My resignation was connected to the inability of the IWC to reflect on what was happening...I remember during our Beit Hanoun days when we wanted to issue a condemnation statement about the military operations and the Israeli women wanted to discuss missiles issues and such ... moreover when we had meetings in the West Bank the Israeli women members were unable to issue permits even though they were from the Israeli feminist leadership group. For over a year things were not moving so I felt the Commission was not useful and that I was part of a group in which I couldn't communicate or raise my point of view. Even our meetings were through video conference, and our numbers in Gaza were*

*small and we couldn't make any impact. So I decided it was a waste to continue so I quit" (Alghneimi, Gaza 2009)*

Concerning the internal dynamics of the Commission on the Palestinian side she noted,

*"We couldn't convince feminist activist leaders to be part of the negotiation committees with Israeli women because of their previous political positions. Palestinian members of IWC were accused of normalizing relations with Israel and were marginalized and blackmailed. We still have people who hold militant views regarding these issues but this will not prevent us from acting" (Alghneimi , Gaza 2009)*

Like Bsiso, a former member of the IWC who also resigned, explained that she left the group due to *"upheaval because of the political situation, the disadvantage of participating in meetings through video conference, the lack of permits, and the dispute between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip"* (Bsiso, Gaza 2009).

Following the establishment of the IWC Palestinian women succeeded in pressuring President Abbas to acknowledge the Resolution and to support the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and in political life; however, the negotiations did not lead to a settlement. One respondent explained,

*"Some women decided not to be part of the negotiations since there is no international patron for it and it is merely controlled by the US and Israel. Additionally, this situation was made more complicated by the Hamas victory in 2006 and the use of the election results to punish the Palestinian people, and the clear proof that there is no partner for negotiations" (Khreisheh, Ramallah 2010).*

Another respondent clarified,

*"It is obvious to members of the IWC that Israel in its current political situation does not seek peace. The situation has deteriorated into a dangerous crisis that can only be remedied through an internationally imposed solution. This is why the*



*European Union has declared Jerusalem the capital of the two countries" (Tuma, Nazareth 2009).*

Still, the members of the IWC believe they can do a lot to change the international community's views and to make Palestinians' voices heard. One respondent acknowledged that the group can still be a place for Palestinian and Israeli women who oppose the occupation. She stated,

*"The IWC is an important place of struggle that brings together Palestinian and Israeli women to end the Israeli occupation and to reach a peaceful settlement. The IWC uses political analysis and position papers and at the formal international level to reach the White House and the European Union. We are focusing on two issues: the right of return and the inclusion of women in negotiations. Another contribution of the IWC is to create a space for feminist political analysis and networking with international organizations" (Tuma, Nazareth 2009).*

Another respondent added,

*"Although I think this joint Jewish-Palestinian action has played an important role in promoting protection for women and bringing another voice to the international organizations, I refused to join the IWC because I refuse to join as an Israeli and to put my efforts on the Israeli side in the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although I have an Israeli ID and I fight for full citizenship and we are (the Palestinians in Israel) not part of the West Bank, I am not going to represent Israel. When they asked me to join I said I would join if they gave representation to 48 Palestinian women but they refused. Do I really support the participation of women in current peace negotiations when the vision is bad and I'm unsure of whether I should be there in the first place? (Hawari, Nazareth 2010)*

Echoing this response, a different participant felt that *"the role of the IWC in monitoring the status of women in Israel and in Palestine today is very limited and...it is more useful to produce reports that have a bigger effect"* (Deeb, Haifa 2010).

### 5. Barriers to Implementation of Resolution 1325

All respondents agreed that there are many political and social barriers to the implementation of Resolution 1325, the most central of which is the occupation. As one participant stated,

*"The resolution is one of the most important resolutions that has been adopted by the Security Council, but unfortunately there are always obstacles, the most important of which is the occupation that prevents the implementation of this resolution "* (Rizeq, Gaza 2009).

Another respondent agreed, explaining,

*"Sure the occupation is the biggest obstacle, as is the internal situation and political dispute. These realities create a problem for women's organizations when trying to communicate with governments, despite that the resolution is the responsibility of government's organization and the country in the first place"* (Bsiso, Gaza 2009)

A different respondent questioned the effect of the Resolution on stopping occupation practices since there are many other resolutions that call for the protection of women and children that Israel doesn't respect. She stressed,

*"There is no way to speak to a military that disregards all the international resolutions that may be implemented on behalf of Palestinians, since Israel does not consider itself an occupier and does not consider us separate from them. We are considered by Israel as a minority who live in its region that is why Israelis refuse to acknowledge international laws and resolutions or to implement them"* (Alghneimi, Gaza 2009)

The confusion of having one government in Gaza and another in Ramallah further complicates the implementation of the Resolution, according to another respondent:

*"There are sensitive issues when discussing Palestinian woman. I mean the main issue is connected to the ruling authority, such as who will include women in decision- making, and which government will allow her to sit on reconciliation and negotiation committees. The political dispute is a main reason for all women's problems. We wish we had national unity, one government and one authority. You can't issue new legislations because the Legislative Council is suspended, and you can't make decisions on the operational level because the operational authority is divided. So who will you go to? Every government will say it did all it was supposed to... for example the government in Ramallah appointed four women as ministers, as well as women in high positions... but the important question is still about how this translates into reality. Do these women get to make decisions in their new positions or do they have to support the male created government agenda? The degree to which female ministers can affect the government agenda depends on each woman's individual power and how she can impose her plans within her own ministry. But in the government and in the level of the cabinet I imagine their role is very weak. We are used to the fact that men do not listen to women and they have no trust in their views so when they give them high positions it is usually symbolic more than substantive" (Alghneimi, Gaza 2009).*

She continues:

*"Now at the government level in Gaza there is no female minister, a fact that reflects the government's view of women. In the women's affairs ministry there is only a position of associate representative. But it is obvious in the end that there is no authority for women in decision-making positions within Hamas. Even female members of the legislative council can't make an independent decision and are constrained by the political agenda of their political party... so I always say although we have seven sisters from Hamas in the Legislative Council, I consider them all as one woman or as one man in terms of political perception or position, they all represent one line. We find the same story in Fatah: eight women are representing a political vision as one woman and even one man. That's why when we speak about Resolution 1325 and its implementation we face problems ... we need a central authority to refer to (Alghneimi, Gaza 2009).*

Another respondent attributed some of the social barriers to the confidence level of women, as well as the roles as mothers and wives that they are expected to fulfill. She expressed,

*"I don't think we are dealing only with men's disapproval; there is a lack of self confidence among women as well. A woman does not want to compete because she has been socialized to generate income, marry and have children. Girls who are at the top of their class in schools and universities eventually change their ambitions and are more oriented towards the home and children" (Alna'aem, Gaza 2009)*

Proscribed social roles and a lack of resources in Palestine also mean women have limited experience working in the public sphere, and unequal work opportunities and chances to become involved in the community. As a result, there is a common sense in Palestine *"that men are better than women in decision-making because women don't have the experience or capabilities to do so"* (Azouni, Ramallah 2010).

In addition to these social barriers, donor policies that change according to political realities affect the capacity of civil society groups to implement Resolution 1325, particularly among Islamic organizations. A respondent from Gaza delineated how the constant change in the donor policies affects women's abilities to do work. She explained,

*"I will be frank with you; our problem is that Islamic organizations are all banned from receiving Western funding. Instead, our organizations work with internal funding. We want to work on the Resolution but we don't have funding. We are not against the Resolution and we are not against raising awareness among women about its importance as it protects women's rights, but we are constrained by donor policy. This is in addition to the political reality and the siege imposed on the Hamas movement" (Alna'aem, Gaza 2009).*

A Palestinian respondent who lives in Israel said she felt the Equal Representation of Women amendment was problematic in its lack of attention to the unique position of

Palestinian citizens of Israel:

*"Where will we as Palestinian feminists be at the negotiation table, on the Palestinian side or on the Israeli? If I were a Palestinian on the other side I am sure I would be more interested in the Resolution. But here our resources are small and the situation is very complicated. So as an organization should I put it in Resolution 1325 when I know beforehand that the impact of my efforts is almost zero?" (Deeb, Haifa 2009).*

Israeli Jewish feminists, too, face serious dilemmas in promoting the Resolution and trying to include women from different social groups in decision-making. Although they have succeeded in promoting the amendment to the Equal Representation of Women law, they have not been able to move beyond this achievement at the national level. One respondent shared with us one reason for this difficulty:

*"While working on the women for peace negotiation index we faced a "separation wall... who are the women we want in these negotiations, mainstream women or those who share the same vision as we do? The second issue pertained to the refusal of most Palestinian women to represent Israel in any way; we didn't know whether or not we should stand with them and stay in the margins" (Aviani, Haifa 2009).*

### *Discussion and Conclusion*

Feminist and human rights organizations and activists throughout Palestine and Israel have used Resolution 1325 to promote the protection of women, the prevention of gender-based violence, and the participation of women in decision-making. Protection initiatives include setting up hotlines, legal and psychological counseling and support, and domestic violence and rape centers. Prevention activities include awareness-raising

workshops and public campaigns, the publication of newsletters discussing violence, and the promotion of laws and legislation at the national level that can lower future instances of gender-based violence. In addition to civil society activism, both countries also have special committees that work on the elimination of gender-based violence. While women in Palestine have convinced President Abbas to issue a special decree supporting the inclusion of women in decision-making committees, women are nevertheless underrepresented in peace building and reconciliation activities, despite their presence within the Ministries. One reason for this absence is Palestinian women's reluctance to be part of current negotiations with Israel. Their absence from internal reconciliation and negotiation efforts, however, highlights that there are other factors as well.

In Israel, too, despite efforts to include women in formal negotiations, there is a gap between the feminist agenda of women at the civil society level, and that of women who become involved in negotiations. As in Palestine, the platform of female decision-makers may more closely represent their party's political priorities than that of the women they supposedly represent. This gap reflects more broadly upon the status of gender equality within both countries; while women may hold symbolic positions of power within the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority alike, they may be forced to compromise on their uniquely feminist concerns in order to be included in the government at all. In other instances, as the IWC hearings intimate, elected women in power may genuinely feel that their analysis of conflict need not be different from men or the mainstream narrative, and that as members of a weaker group, they do not in fact

possess a unique perspective on conflict. This explanation highlights the need for more workshops that teach women and men alike how to disaggregate data along gender lines, how to ask questions that reveal information about gender dynamics between men and women, and how to conduct gender analyses.

Another reason that the agendas of female decision-makers do not necessarily represent the interests of women in Israel is that women's experiences in conflict vary according to their ethnic, social, national, and economic identity. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to imagine that the inclusion of a limited number of women on negotiation teams could mean the automatic inclusion of Palestinian, Mizrahi, new immigrant, migrant worker, and low-income perspectives. As a result, Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Israeli radical feminists alike believe the Resolution in its current structure can not serve women's needs in Israel where political participation is concerned. Instead, radical activists and civil society organizations see Resolution 1325 as a call for a gender analysis of the conflict, including how militarization, the national security discourse, and changing gender dynamics within families and communities during times of conflict affect women and overall peace.

There are three main discourses among feminist and human rights activists that appear throughout our review of reports, the literature, and our interviews. The first is that of activists who believe in fully adopting the resolution and working towards its implementation. Proponents of the Resolution are largely Palestinian women living in the

West Bank and Gaza who believe its contents align with Palestinian culture and the Palestinian women's movement. Given the complex meaning of citizenship for Palestinian women living in Israel, their inclusion in negotiations poses a national and historic conflict of interest. As such, they are less likely to interpret the Resolution through a liberal feminist lens that supports women's participation in government, and more likely to see the Resolution as a way of promoting a radical gender analysis of the conflict.

Those who fully support the Resolution believe there should be joint efforts of the feminist and civil society NGOs to raise awareness about its potential impact and to lobby for its implementation at the local and international levels. However, advocates of the Resolution also believe that it can only be effective through local, regional, and international networking, as well as awareness-raising and the creation of enforcement mechanisms that can hold governments accountable.

A second group of feminists and human rights activists believe the contents of the Resolution are important, but see the need for support from the international community in its implementation. They also believe that the involvement of the UN is key to monitoring and implementation and to pressuring countries to comply. This group of respondents identifies the occupation as the most significant barrier to implementation, and believes that joint Palestinian-Israeli initiatives are problematic due to political, social, and logistical disagreements and constraints. They also critique the lack of



government initiative in implementing Resolution 1325. While this group believes the parameters of the Resolution apply to Palestinian society, they also believe that these issues must not be addressed in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the ongoing occupation. Further, implementation should not rest solely upon civil society organizations, but also upon the UN and the government, who hold an obligation to women suffering under occupation.

This second group believes that while the contents of the Resolution may be relevant, efforts to actualize Resolution 1325 need to be localized if they are to hold relevance with Palestinian women. These respondents believe implementation efforts are not useful unless they are catered to the lived realities of Palestinian women living under occupation, or inside Israel where political involvement means working with the occupier. This group recommends that the Resolution be rewritten to hold greater applicability to Palestinian women, and that further research be published about the impact of occupation, house demolitions, displacement, the wall, and sexual harassment on Palestinian women. Like the first group, respondents in this group believed that additional awareness-raising is necessary.

Finally, a third group rejects the Resolution altogether and views it as an additional hegemonic tool used by governments and decision-makers to control and marginalize women. This criticism is based upon the inefficacy of past UN Resolutions that have neither led to Palestinian statehood nor addressed the needs of refugees. General mistrust

in the UN and the belief that a true change in gender equality must come from or be connected to the grassroots level also underlie this criticism. This group believes that Palestinian women should work within Palestinian society to improve the status of women in conflict, rather than working with Israeli women whose lived realities differ greatly from those of Palestinian women, and whose allegiance to Israel would compromise efforts to end the occupation and hold Israel accountable for war crimes.

Among participants in all three groups, there was an agreement that there is a lack of knowledge about women's status within politics, the local community, and the family, which underscores the need for further research bringing women's voices to decision-makers that can meaningfully implement Resolution 1325.

### *Recommendations*

1. Enforce the quota principle to promote the inclusion of women in the Palestinian council of ministers, embassies, consulates, legislative council, local councils, corporations, political parties, and in other decision-making sites.
2. The Palestinian Authority should make radical changes to the structure of ordinary legislation to enforce the principle of equality enshrined in the Palestinian Basic Law.
3. The Palestinian Authority should prepare a National Action Plan for the

implementation of Resolution 1325 with the help of local and international organizations and researchers that takes into account the special needs of women in refugee camps and of women prisoners, and that addresses the devastating effect of family separation, barriers to movement and the separation wall on women's mental and physical health, economic status, and access to education. Create "secondary bodies at the governorate level, to ensure (the adoption of) a unified and integrated vision and agreed priorities" (Nazal, 2009), and a clear strategy for government/civil society cooperation for spreading awareness about the Resolution within different contexts.

4. The Ministries of Education in Palestine and in Israel should revamp the educational curricula on gender to address negative stereotypes about women, and to discuss how conflict affects men and women differently.
5. The Palestinian and Israeli media should bring more attention to women activists and women's organizations that take part in peace building and conflict resolution. The increased presence of women in the media can build internal peace by promoting their writings and thoughts through interviews and dialogue.
6. The government and civil society organizations should increase women's education initiatives that focus on self-confidence building by providing them with new skills on conflict resolution. In this way they will also be better prepared to act as members of negotiation teams.

7. The government and civil society organizations alike should expand awareness campaigns about Resolution 1325 among women in all areas of Palestine, and especially in periphery and marginalized communities.
8. Civil society organizations should initiate community work that encourages dialogue and internal peace among conflicting groups within Palestine.
9. The local governments, civil society organizations, international non-governmental organizations, foreign governments and relevant UN agencies should improve networking knowledge exchange, and the sharing of lessons learned at the local, regional and international levels.
10. The Israeli government, together with relevant NGOs, international and local actors, and academics, should adopt a National Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325, and ensure that mechanisms exist within the national and local governments for implementing priority areas. This NAP should be based not only upon the inclusion of women in decision-making, but also upon including a gender perspective within all policy decisions, in part by liaising with local women's NGOs. It should also address the detrimental effect of the occupation on Palestinian women, and the effects of militarization and the spread of arms on all Israeli women, from the perspective of both Jewish Israeli women and Palestinian women citizens of Israel. The NAP must and include a strategy for how the government can work with civil society organizations to

spread awareness about the Resolution within different contexts.

11. The Israeli government should make public the criteria it uses to choose how many women and which women it appoints to negotiating and policymaking teams when complying with the amendment to the Equal Representation of Women Law, ensuring greater transparency in how it decides how and which women are chosen to participate in decision-making.
12. Following the momentum created by the “Security—For Whom” conference in Israel, which has served as an alternative to the annual Herzliya Conference on national security, the European Union (who funded the last conference) should work with the Coalition of Women for Peace and other relevant NGOs to increase the attendance and coverage of future conferences that deal with inclusive security, and should work with the Israeli government to encourage greater dialogue about women’s personal security.
13. The Israeli government should fund programs that educate women in conflict resolution and negotiation and empower them to participate in decision-making teams.
14. The Israeli government should make the Equal Representation of Women law obligatory and adopt a quota for women’s involvement in Parliament, the government, the national Security Council, and other important decision-making

sites including the local councils.

15. Israeli and international advocacy groups and lobbyists should promote legislation that limits the carrying of weapons in Israel.
16. The Israeli government should acknowledge the physical and psychological violence from which women suffer in the occupied territories and should create a strategy for protecting and supporting Palestinian women and girls in accordance with international humanitarian laws.
17. The Israeli government should financially support women's organizations that work on peace building.
18. Both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government should commission studies in Palestine and Israel, respectively, to be presented to the UNSC, relevant lawmakers, academics, and women's organizations about the physical, psychological, economic, social, and political effect of armed conflict on women.
19. A coalition of women's NGOs in Israel and Palestine should work with international consultants and INGOs to document Israeli violations against women that take place under occupation, and to regularly report these violations to the UNSC

20. In response to this increased level of documentation, the UNSC should publish a report that condemns the continuation of the Israeli occupation, and the continued violations against women.
21. The IWC should hold additional hearings to learn more about perceptions of peace and women's role in conflict resolution among Israeli women, and based upon these findings, the IWC should hold workshops that train women to conduct gender analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that also raise their awareness about Resolution 1325.
22. In both Israel and Palestine, groups addressing women's issues and Resolution 1325 should hold separate workshops with male participants to discuss attitudes about gender equality and to seek the opinion of men about how to raise awareness about the Resolution among men, as well.
23. Top-level officials from the Mitchell team should meet regularly with representatives from the IWC to learn about the effects of conflict on women, and in particular the violations of human rights that women suffer as a result of the Israeli occupation. The Mitchell team should formulate a plan for how to include this gender perspective into negotiations.

24. Local governments and NGOs should encourage the participation of all students, but particularly female students, in programs that address peace and security. As Hunt Alternatives argues, “This will improve the pipeline of qualified women candidates for high-level positions and increase understanding of human rights and women’s rights.” As suggested by Palestinian women in Israel, civil society organization and women’s activists should strengthen their participation in the international movement of women for peace and should tie Resolution 1325 into this broader movement.
25. As recommended by some interviewees, feminist and human rights NGOs and activists should rewrite the Resolution to create relevance for Palestinian women in Israel who are Palestinian by way of nationality and Israeli by way of citizenship.
26. NGOs should conduct studies and research on how the occupation affects Palestinian women in Israel and in Palestine, and should use these findings to advocate for women’s rights and to provide decision-makers with information they can use in policy design.
27. Women’s NGOs working on Resolution 1325 should stress the connection between the Resolution and other UN resolutions that address the question of Palestinian statehood, and should emphasize the importance of women’s issues to the nationalist struggle (MIFTAH 2009).



28. When adapting Resolution 1325 to the Palestinian context, local governments and civil society organizations should take into consideration the recent war crimes committed in Gaza in December 2008 and under occupation, and should treat the daily situation in Palestine as a conflict rather than post-conflict situation (Jad, 2009).
29. According to Jad, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government must acknowledge the Palestinian right to resist the occupation, including through violent means.
30. According to Jad, Palestinian activists and civil society organizations should work on implementation separately from Israelis, who want Palestinians to compromise on their claims against Israel and to compromise on their position regarding a boycott of Israel. Along these lines, civil society should work with the international community to boycott and impose penalties upon Israel.
31. According to Jad, local and international advocates should support the international court decision that calls the separation wall racist and illegitimate. Israel should demolish the wall and compensate Palestinians who were affected by it.
32. According to Jad, the General Women's Union and other feminist organizations and coalitions should work together to prevent the targeting of pregnant women

at checkpoints, the demolition of houses over civilians' heads, and should organize a campaign to hold Israel accountable under the international court and through boycott.

33. According to Jad, NGOs should not implement Resolution 1325 if they only use the Resolution to address domestic and internal violence while overlooking violence committed by Israel. NGOs should build use the Resolution to build a coalition based upon the above vision, and should establish a follow-up committee with the best qualified people to ensure that activities are responsive to the Palestinian agenda.

## Bibliography

- Abd Elhadi, F. (2009). "Seven Years of Delusion or a Determination year to Implement the Resolution?". Retrieved on 17 of January 2010 from:  
[http://news.maktoob.com/article/2821378?utm\\_source=newsletter&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_content=%D8%A2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1&utm\\_term=em&utm\\_campaign=newsletter](http://news.maktoob.com/article/2821378?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=%D8%A2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1&utm_term=em&utm_campaign=newsletter) .
- Abirahfeh, L. (2005). From Afghanistan to Sudan: How peace risks marginalising women. *Forced Migration Review* 24, 46-47.
- Adrian-Paul, A. & Naderi, P. (2005). *UN SC Resolution 1325: Women, peace and security: Issues and instruments—the Afghan context*. London: International Alert and ACSF. Retrieved November 18, 2009 from  
<http://www.library.cornell.edu/resrch/citmanage/apa>.
- Aharoni, S. and Deeb, R. W (2004). *Where are all the women? U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325: Gender perspectives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*. Haifa: Isha L'Isha—Haifa Feminist Center and Kayan.
- Aharoni, S. (2006). The Impact of War in the North on the Israeli Women and Girls Lives – Gender Analysis. Submitted to the Authority to Promote Women'n Status Isha L'Isha (Hebrew).
- Al-Ali, N. (2005). Reconstructing gender: Iraqi women between dictatorship, war, sanctions and occupation. *Third World Quarterly* 26, 739-758.
- Al-Ali, N. (2007). Iraq's women under pressure. *Forced Migration Review* Special Issue: 40-41.
- Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights (2009). *Civilians without Protection: Documentary Report on the Israeli Occupation violence during Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009)*. Al Mezan, Gaza December 2009. Retrieved on 30 November 2009 from <http://www.mezan.org/upload/9350.pdf>
- Amnesty International (2004a). *Lives Blown Apart: Crimes against Women in Times of Conflict: Stop Violence against Women* (Arabic).
- Amnesty International. (2004b). *Women, Peace, and Security: Fourth Anniversary of Security Council Resolution 1325*. London: Amnesty International. Retrieved November 18, 2009 from

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR52/004/2004/en/7dcdc4b3-d575-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/ior520042004en.pdf>.

- Bahdi, R. (2003). Security Council Resolution 1325: Practice and prospects. *Refuge* 21(2), 41-51.
- Barnes, K., Chiarelli, C., Cohn, C., Johal, R., Kihunah, M., & Olson, M. *Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security: Six years on report*. New York: NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.
- Barrow, A. (2009). '[It's] like a rubber band': Assessing UNSCR 1325 as a gender mainstreaming process. *International Journal of Law in Context* 5(1), 51-68.
- Binder, C., Lukas, K., & Schweiger, R. (2008). Empty words or real achievement? The impact of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women in armed conflicts. *Radical History Review* 101, 22-41.
- BRIDGE. (2003). Gender and development in brief: Gender and armed conflict. Brighton, UK: BRIDGE. Retrieved November 9, 2009 from <http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/bridge/dgb13.html>.
- Buksbaum, Y.; Abramowitz, D.; Dagan, M. (2007). Living Testimony: Women in an Economy of War: Monitoring Report. Mahut Center – Information, Guidance and Employment for Women (Hebrew).
- Cabrera-Balleza, M. et. al. (2005). *From local to global: Making peace work for women: Five years on report*. New York: The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 2005.
- Charlesworth, H. (2005). Not waving but drowning: Gender mainstreaming and human rights in the United Nations. *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18, 1-18.
- Cohn, C. (2003-2004). *Mainstreaming gender in UN security policy: A path to political transformation? Working paper No. 204*. Boston: The Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. Retrieved November 19, 2009 from <http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/Cohn.pdf>.
- Cohn, C., Kinsella, H. and Gibbings, S. (2004). Women, peace and security: Resolution 1325. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6(1), pp. 130-140.

- Commission of the European Communities. (2009). *Progress Report: The occupied Palestinian territory*. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Retrieved November 12, 2009 from [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09\\_519\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_519_en.pdf).
- Datan, M. (2004). Women, peace and security: A feminist analysis of Security Council Resolution 1325. LLM law faculty research paper, Victoria University of Wellington.
- Devlin, C. & Theite, O. (2007). *OSCE PE Gender Balance Report*. Vienna: OSCE PA. Retrieved November 12, 2009 from [http://www.oscepa.org/oscepa\\_content/documents/Reports/Gender%20Reports/2007%20-%20Gender%20Issues%20Report.pdf](http://www.oscepa.org/oscepa_content/documents/Reports/Gender%20Reports/2007%20-%20Gender%20Issues%20Report.pdf)
- DeVries, J. (2009). Hope, doubt and strength: Words from a Palestinian peacemaker. International Fellowship of Reconciliation. Retrieved November 10, 2009 from [http://www.ifor.org/WPP/Newsitems/Hana%20Kirreh%20interview\\_final.pdf](http://www.ifor.org/WPP/Newsitems/Hana%20Kirreh%20interview_final.pdf)
- El Jack, A. (2003). *Gender and armed conflict: Overview report*. Brighton, UK: BRIDGE Institute of Development Studies.
- Enloe, C. (2005). What if patriarchy is “the big picture?” An afterward. In D. Mazurana and A. Raven-Roberts (Eds). *Gender, conflict, and peacekeeping*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Gazzar, B. (2007, April 26). Women put their mark on Mideast peace efforts. Women’s E-News. Retrieved November 9, 2009 from <http://www.womensenews.org/story/the-world/070426/women-put-their-mark-mideast-peace-efforts>
- Global Justice Center. (2006). Advancing the legal enforcement of SCR 1325: Structural and political obstacles imposed by the United Nations architecture. Global Justice Center. Retrieved November 15, 2009 from <http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/publications/Advancing-legal-enforcement-of-SCR-1325.pdf>.
- Global Justice Center. (2008). Action Items to the UN Security Council On Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding in Burma and the Implementation and Enforcement of SC 1325. Global Justice Center. Retrieved November 15, 2009 from <http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/publications/Burma-SCR-1325-action-items.pdf>

- Gonsalves, T. (2004). Gender and peacebuilding: A Sri Lankan case study. [https://idbnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/123456789/33539/1/Gonsalves\\_Tahira\\_paper.pdf](https://idbnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/123456789/33539/1/Gonsalves_Tahira_paper.pdf)
- Greenberg, M.E. & Zuckerman, E. (2009). The gender dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction: The challenges in aid development. In T. Addison and T. Bruck (Eds.), *Making peace work: The challenges of social and economic reconstruction*. United Nations University: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hill, F. Aboitiz, M. & Poehlman-Doumbouya, S. (2003). Nongovernmental organizations' role in the buildup and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325. *Signs* 28(4),1255-1269.
- Hochman, D.V. (2000). *Peace with Justice, Peace with Care: Palestinian and Israeli Women Negotiate Peacemaking Models*. Unpublished Master's Thesis. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
- Hunt, S. (2005, December 1). Israeli and Palestinian women reaching across the divide. *Scripps Howard News Service*. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from [http://www.swaneehunt.com/articles/SHNS\\_IsraeliAndPalestinianWomenReachingAcrossTheDivide.htm](http://www.swaneehunt.com/articles/SHNS_IsraeliAndPalestinianWomenReachingAcrossTheDivide.htm)
- Iceland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *Women, peace and security: Iceland's plan of action for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)*. Reykjavic: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved December 9, 2009 from [http://www.mfa.is/media/Utgafa/women\\_peace\\_security.pdf](http://www.mfa.is/media/Utgafa/women_peace_security.pdf).
- International Crisis Group. (2006). *Beyond victimhood: Women's peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda*. Washington, D.C.: International Crisis Group. Retrieved November 13, 2009 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4185>.
- International Women's Commission. (2007). IWC international event: Promoting inclusive peacemaking. <http://www.daniella.benattar.com/downloads/IWC%20Conference%20Summary.pdf>
- International Women's Commission. (2006). Work of the International Women's Commission (IWC) for a just and sustainable Palestinian-Israeli peace. Retrieved November 12, 2009 from <http://www.iwc-peace.org/iwc-work.html>.
- Isha L'Isha (2005). Women, Peace and Security. Index of Women for Negotiation Team.
- Isha L'Isha (2007). *Isha L'Isha Haifa Feminist Center Annual Report 2007*. Haifa: Isha

- L'Isha.
- Jad, I. (2009). Conceptual Frame of Resolution 1325 Implementation in Palestine. *Women's Voice*, 13 August 2009.
- Jerusalem Center for Women. (2009, August 20). No women elected for Fatah Central Council. *Kvinna Till Kvinna*. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from <http://www.kvinnatillkvinna.se/article/3742>
- Jerusalem Center for Women. (2005). *Summary annual report*. Jerusalem: JCW. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from <http://www.j-c-w.org/annualReports/2005AnnualReport.pdf>
- Kirk, J. & Taylor, S. (2007). UN Security Council Resolution 1325. *Forced Migration Review* 27, 13-14.
- Kumpulainen, H.M.K. (2008). *Keeping alive the symbol: A case study of the Israeli and Palestinian women of the Jerusalem Link*. Master's Thesis, University of Helsinki.
- Lir, Sh. (2009). Women, Peace and Negotiations. Personal Blog (Hebrew). Retrieved December 06, 2009 from <http://www.notes.co.il/lir/63066.asp>
- Luciak, I.A. (2008). *National implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Latin America: Key areas of concern and model plan for action: Needs assessment report*. New York: United Nations.
- Matundu-Mbambi, A. (2007, September 1). The U.N S.C Resolution 1325: what is its effective impact on Congolese women? *Femnet News*. <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/international-organizations/8949635-1.html>
- Mayanja, R. (March, 2009). Statement by Rachel Mayanja Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women at the Regional Conference on the Implementation of the National Action Plans on resolution 1325 (2000) in the Great Lakes Region. Bujumbura: The United Nations.
- Mehta, R. (2008). UNSC Resolution 1325: Women & conflict (from a South Asia perspective). The Peacewomen Project. <http://www.peacewomen.org/1325inaction/1325SouthAsia.pdf>
- MIFTAH. (2009). Combatting violence against women through the empowerment of

- community-based organizations. Retrieved November 15, 2009 from [http://www.miftah.org/Programmes/Briefing/PW\\_NGO2009.pdf](http://www.miftah.org/Programmes/Briefing/PW_NGO2009.pdf).
- MIFTAH. (2007). *The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy: Annual Activities Report*. Ramallah: MIFTAH.
- MIFTAH. (2008). *The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy: Annual Activities Report*. Ramallah: MIFTAH.
- Mills, P. (November, 2006). Working to promote 1325 in Israel: Opportunities and challenges facing activist women and Isha L'Isha. Medford, MA: Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights.
- Ministry of the Family, Women and Social Affairs, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNIFEM. (2008). *National Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 of the Security Council (2008 – 2010) Background Document*. Cote d'Ivoire. Abidjan.
- Moghadam, V.M.(2005). Peacebuilding and reconstruction with women: Reflections on Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. *Development* 48(3): 63-72.
- Myrtenbaum, D. (2005). *Women, Armed Conflict, and Occupation—An Israeli Perspective*. Haifa: Isha L'Isha—Haifa Feminist Center. Retrieved November 13, 2009 from [http://www.isha.org.il/files/files/File/womenarmedconflict\\_israel\\_shadow\\_reprot\\_e.pdf](http://www.isha.org.il/files/files/File/womenarmedconflict_israel_shadow_reprot_e.pdf).
- Nagar, N. (2006). *Resilience and Security for Whom? A position Paper submitted by Women for Peace Coalition and Isha L'Isha*.
- Nakaya, S. (2003). Women and gender equality in peace processes: From women at the negotiating table to postwar structural reforms in Guatemala and Somalia. *Global Governance* 9(4), 459-476.
- Naraghi-Anderlini, S.B. (2000). The A-B-C to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The Peacewomen Project. <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/ABC1325.html>
- Naraghi-Anderlini, S.B. (2001). *Women, peace and security: A policy audit: From the Beijing Platform for Action to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and beyond*. London: International Alert. Retrieved November 14, 2009 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>



- Nazal, R.K. (2008). Eight years to UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Women's Affairs Technical Committee, December 18, 2008.  
<http://www.watcpal.org/english/display.asp?DocID=273>
- Nashwan, K. (2009). The Palestinian Woman's Role in Managing the Conflict and Making Peace. The Palestinian Development Studies Center – Gaza (Arabic)
- Nazzal, R.K. (2008, December 18). Eight years to UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Women's Affairs Technical Committee. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from  
<http://www.watcpal.org/english/display.asp?DocID=273>
- Nazzal, R.K. (2009). *Palestinian Women and Resolution 1325. The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy*. Ramallah: MIFTAH (Arabic).
- NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. (2004). *Four years on: An alternative report and progress check on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325: Findings and recommendations for United Nations*. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from <http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-NGOWG-FourYearsOnReport.pdf>.
- Party Parliamentary Group Great Lakes Region of Africa. (2009). Parliamentary visit of Senator Eve Baziaba Masudi, June 9-11, 2009. [http://www.gaps-uk.org/img\\_uploaded/Report%20of%20Eve%20Baziaba%20visit\\_June09.pdf](http://www.gaps-uk.org/img_uploaded/Report%20of%20Eve%20Baziaba%20visit_June09.pdf)
- Peacebuild: The Canadian Peacebuilding Network. (2008). *Islam and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan: Meeting report*. Ottawa: The Canadian Peacebuilding Network.
- Peltz, A.T. (2006). *Gender-Based Violence in Palestine*. Jerusalem: MIFTAH.
- Quintos-Deles, T. (2006, February 10-12). Corridors of peace in the corridors of power: Bridging spaces for women in governance for peace. The Ten Year Asia Pacific Platform for Action of Women in Politics and Decision-Making. Sixth Asia Pacific Congress of Women in Politics and Decision making. Manila, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management.
- Rabadi, M. (2009). The Palestinian National Report Beijing 15+. The Ministry for Women's Affairs – Ramallah (Arabic).

- Rahman, R. (October, 2005). Statement by Ambassador Radzi Rahman, Alternate Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations at the United Nations Security Council Debate on Women, Peace and Security. New York, NY.
- Republic of Liberia. (2009). *The Liberia national action plan for the implementation of United Nations Resolution 1325*. Monrovia: Government of Liberia. Retrieved November 16, 2009 from [http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/lnap\\_gender.pdf](http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/gender/lnap_gender.pdf).
- Republic of Uganda. (2008). *Uganda action plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 & 1820 and Goma Declaration*. Kampala: Republic of Uganda. Retrieved November 9, 2009 from <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/nap/UGANDANAP.pdf>.
- Richter-Devroe, S. (2009). DRAFT—NOT FOR CITATION: UN Security Council Resolution 1325: A Framework for Palestinian Women’s Peace Activism? ISA-ABRI Conference, Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, 22-24 July 2009
- Sa’adeh, N. (2007). Palestinian Woman and the UNSCR 1325. A paper presented at the Fourth Women Conference “Palestinian Women between the Palestinian Laws and the International Legislations” (Arabic).
- Sachs, D., Sa’ar, A. and Aharoni, S. (2006). ‘How can I feel for others when I myself am beaten?’ The impact of the armed conflict on women in Israel. *Sex Roles* 53, 593-606.
- Sachs, D., Sa’ar, A. and Aharoni, S. (2005). *The Influence of the Armed Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on Women in Israel*. Haifa: Isha L’Isha—Haifa Feminist Center.
- Saragusti, A., Limor, G., and Haghagh, N. (2009). *Women Confronting Peace: Voices from Israel*. Jerusalem: The Israeli Branch of the International Women’s Commission (IWC).
- Schroeder, E. (2003). A window of opportunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Incorporating a gender perspective in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. *Peace Studies Journal* 5(5), 1-45.
- Shepherd, L.J. (2008). Power and authority in the production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. *International Studies Quarterly* 52, 383-404.

- Solhjell, R. (2009). *Combating sexual violence in the DRC: Towards a comprehensive approach*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved November 8, 2009 from <http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2009/Combating-Sexual-Violence-in-the-DRC.-Towards-a-Comprehensive-Approach>.
- The Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. (March, 2006). A conversation with women peacebuilders: Leymah Gbowee and Shobah Gautam. Medford, MA.
- The Peacewomen Project. (2009, November 3). Monitoring the gender content of the Security Council's resolutions addressing all current and upcoming peacekeeping operations: 2000-2008. The Peacewomen Project. [http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325\\_Monitor/thematicindex.htm](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325_Monitor/thematicindex.htm)
- Trialog Information Service. (2008, June 24). Donor politics and gender orders in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trialog Information Service. Retrieved November 12, 2009 from <http://trialog-information-service.blogspot.com/2008/06/donor-politics-and-gender-orders-in.html>.
- UNFPA. (2005). *Gender-based violence in occupied Palestinian territory*. New York: UNFPA.
- UNFPA. (2009). Investing in Gender and Empowerment of Women, Peace Building and Conflict Resolution (panel notes) (2008). Retrieved November 10, 2009 from [http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/panel\\_summary\\_csw.doc](http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/panel_summary_csw.doc).
- UNMIS. (2005). *Ensuring a sustainable peace in Sudan: Assessing steps forward for implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security*. Khartoum: UNMIS.
- UNSC. (October 5, 2009). Security Council urges renewed measures to improve women's participation in peace processes, reaffirming key role women can play in rebuilding war-torn societies. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9759.doc.htm>
- Valasek, K. (2006). *Securing equality, engendering peace: A guide to policy and planning on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325)*. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: INSTRAW. Retrieved November 8, 2009 from <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/gps/general/implementation-of-un-scr-1325.html>.

- Vayrynen, T. (2004). Gender and peace operations: The confines of modernity. *International Peacekeeping* 11(1), 125-142.
- Whitworth, S. (2004). *Men, militarism & UN peacekeeping: A gendered analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Wi'am. (2007a). *End Report: Operation 1325: Bridge-building Seminar in Palestine: Women as Peace Makers*. Retrieved November 12, 2009 from <http://alastah.org/2report.pdf>.
- Wi'am. (2007b). *Women's empowerment—a roadmap to peace in Palestine*. Bethlehem: Wi'am and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 11, 2009 from <http://alastah.org/1report.pdf>.
- Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling. (2009). Retrieved November 30, 2009 from <http://www.wclac.org/english/about/about.php>.
- Women's League of Burma. (October 23-27, 2006). Women demand an immediate end to war crimes in Burma. <http://www.womenofburma.org/Statement&Release/1325lobby2006.pdf>.
- Women's Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace. (2009). WLP partners discuss strategic directions and campaign tactics in Jordan. Retrieved November 15, 2009 from <http://learningpartnership.org/en/news/enews/2009/iss24/tpc09>.
- Yahya-Younis, T. (2006) The status of Palestinian Arabs in Israel: Problems and Challenges of Women Participation in Peace and Security Negotiations Teams (Arabic). Retrieved on January 21, 2010 from <http://www.arabs48.com/display.x?cid=1&sid=32&id=41440>
- Zaqout, M. (2009). Woman and the Internal Peace. A paper presented at the workshop "The Role of Women in Internal Peace Making: Between Reality and Ambitious" in 25 of November 2009 (Arabic).