



# Security Council

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## Small arms and light weapons

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### *Summary*

In its resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on the issue of small arms and light weapons, including on the implementation of the resolution.

The impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms continued to be of considerable concern to the United Nations and to the broader international community. Poorly regulated small arms are key enablers of armed conflict and a means of sustaining it. Their easy availability and the lack of adequate control systems facilitate a vast spectrum of human rights violations, aggravate poverty and impede sustainable development.

The landmark 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development crucially recognizes that only peaceful societies will achieve their desired level of sustainable development. Adequate small arms regulation and control is an important means of reducing armed violence, making communities better able to pursue sustainable development.

In an effort to operationalize many of the small-arms-related recommendations made previously to the Council, recommendations contained in previous reports ([S/2008/258](#), [S/2011/255](#), [S/2013/503](#) and [S/2015/289](#)) and suggested concrete actions to address them are set out in annex I to the present report.

Pursuant to the request made in paragraph 28 of resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#), annex II to the present report includes best practices and arrangements that could be used by the United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes and the provision of assistance and expertise to host States, sanctions committees and expert groups.



## I. Introduction

1. In its resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on the issue of small arms and light weapons. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.
2. Resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#) is the second Council resolution devoted to the thematic issue of small arms, and was adopted following the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary-General on this subject ([S/2015/289](#)).<sup>1</sup>
3. The present report provides an overview of significant developments and trends with regard to the issue of small arms and light weapons. In annex I, key recommendations made to the Security Council on this issue in previous reports of the Secretary-General ([S/2008/258](#), [S/2011/255](#), [S/2013/503](#) and [S/2015/289](#)) are examined and concrete actions to take them forward are suggested.
4. Annex II contains a set of good practices and arrangements that could be used by United Nations peacekeeping operations and other Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes (as mandated in paragraph 28 of resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#)).

## II. Significant developments and trends

5. The colossal negative consequences of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms have been indicated in previous reports of the Secretary-General on this topic.
6. The excessive accumulation and widespread availability of these weapons have increased the lethality and duration of violence. The international small arms trade was worth at least \$6 billion in 2014 alone, with ammunition accounting for 38 per cent of all global transfers.<sup>2</sup> A significant portion of direct conflict deaths are attributable to the use of small arms, and nearly half of all violent deaths between 2010 and 2015 were caused by firearms.<sup>3</sup> Significantly, the rate of firearms-related homicides in post-conflict societies is frequently higher than that of battlefield deaths. These weapons are also the dominant tools of criminal violence in ostensibly non-conflict societies.
7. Small arms continued to facilitate a vast spectrum of acts that constitute human rights violations, including killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearance, torture and the forced recruitment of children. More human rights violations and abuses are committed with them than with any other weapon. Small arms have frequently played a role in the deaths of United Nations employees and peacekeepers, as well as workers from humanitarian and non-governmental organizations.
8. Armed violence erodes legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms and undermines the rule of law. Contemporary armed conflict is the main cause of people fleeing their homes, and has become the most common cause of food insecurity, as illustrated by the crises in Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

<sup>1</sup> Security Council resolution [2117 \(2013\)](#) was the first Council resolution devoted to this theme.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi, *Trade Update 2017: Out of the Shadows* (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2017). Available from [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2017.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2017.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Firearms were used in 32 per cent of conflict deaths in the period 2010–2015 (see [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research\\_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-60.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-60.pdf)).

9. Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services and diverts energy and resources away from efforts to improve human development. Armed conflict and high levels of armed violence represent a grave impediment to economic growth. There is nothing more damaging to an investment climate as armed insecurity.<sup>4</sup> Its detrimental effect on poverty and on access to social services, development and economic growth has a profound impact on fundamental economic and social rights. This understanding dovetails with the concept of “sustainable peace”, as outlined in Security Council resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#) and General Assembly resolution [70/262](#). Sustainable peace is both an enabler and an outcome of sustainable development.

10. Of growing concern are the increased links between transnational organized crime, illicit small arms trafficking and terrorism, as well as the increasing use of the Internet, including the “dark web”, and emerging technologies for illicit trafficking and production.

11. While many challenges still exist, there have been several successes in the past two years. These include the adoption by consensus of the outcome document of the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (the International Tracing Instrument) ([A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2](#), annex). At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, held in 2016, States made progress in discussions on key areas such as technological developments in small arms manufacture and the contribution of the Programme of Action to the attainment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

12. The successes also include the recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission at its 2017 substantive session (see [A/72/42](#), annex). After nearly two decades without success, the Commission adopted measures that seek to enhance cooperation and build confidence with a view to promoting progress in arms control. The measures underscore the importance of conventional arms control to the maintenance and enhancement of regional and international peace and security.

### **III. Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**

13. Through the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the General Assembly in September 2015, Member States recognized that sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security and that peace and security would be at risk without sustainable development. In the 2030 Agenda, Member States called for peaceful, just and inclusive societies that are based on respect for human rights, effective rule of law and good governance. Target 16.4 under Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is focused on promoting peaceful societies, providing access to justice and building effective institutions, includes a call for a significant reduction in illicit arms flows.

14. By virtue of the adoption of target 16.4, States have acknowledged that arms regulation contributes to mitigating the proliferation of illicit weaponry, thus creating minimum security conditions at the community level and, as a result, promoting conditions conducive to sustainable development. Furthermore, the 2030

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<sup>4</sup> See World Bank, *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone* (Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 79.

Agenda demonstrates that arms regulation, more than ever before, should be pursued through policies and actions built on the concept of measurability.

15. At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States underlined the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument to attaining Sustainable Development Goal 16 and target 16.4. States also noted that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons has implications for the realization of several other Sustainable Development Goals, including those relating to poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality, and safe cities and communities (see [A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2](#), annex, paras. 25–26).

16. Also at the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States encouraged the development of national indicators based on the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument to measure progress made towards target 16.4. The data received from national reports on the implementation of those instruments could provide a solid basis for national indicators for progress on the target. Similarly, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime acknowledged at its eighth session the relevance of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Firearms Protocol) in supporting the implementation of target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals (see CTOC/COP/2016/15).

#### **IV. Weapons and ammunition management in peace operations and conflict-affected settings**

17. Weapons and ammunition management has become a critical component of United Nations peacekeeping operations and in the activities of the Security Council to address conflict-affected situations more generally. Attention to this issue was often reflected in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and physical security and stockpile management activities. For example, in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components have established weapon registration and marking systems to ensure the traceability of all weapons and ammunition collected during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

18. Adequate management of contingent- and civilian-controlled materiel, both arms and ammunition, is of utmost importance to ensure that these weapons are not lost, including through theft, seizure or diversion.

19. In 2010, the term “Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” was used to describe evolving practices in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.<sup>5</sup> As a result of the changing nature of conflict, the international community has recognized an increased need for “community violence reduction” approaches to complement traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. Consequently, small arms and light weapons control activities have increasingly been prioritized in peace operation settings.

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practices in peace operations: a contribution to the New Horizon discussion on challenges and opportunities for United Nations peacekeeping”, 18 January 2010. Available from [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR\\_ENG\\_WITH\\_COVER.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf).

20. Further demonstrating shifts in approaches to peacekeeping, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, in its 2015 report, recognized the complex linkages between transnational illicit trafficking in weapons and the resilience of conflict-affected and post-conflict States (see [A/70/95-S/2015/446](#)).

21. In 2016, the Security Council, in resolutions regarding United Nations missions in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur and Haiti, acknowledged the role of poor arms and ammunition management in fuelling conflict and instability.<sup>6</sup>

22. Also in 2016, by its resolution [2287 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council decided to make the Abyei Area “demilitarized” of any forces other than the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the local police. In this connection, the Force is empowered to confiscate and destroy weaponry and report on possible arms movements into the Abyei Area. This mandate is an effective response to the previous recognition by the Council of the threat posed to peace and security in the Abyei Area arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

23. With regard to the work of the Security Council concerning Côte d'Ivoire (see, for example, resolution [2284 \(2016\)](#)), the successful prioritization by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire of weapons and ammunition management, including through the registration of arms and related lethal materiel and the improvement of armouries, has been a concrete contribution to promoting stability.

## V. United Nations support for weapons and ammunition management

24. United Nations entities undertook work in cooperation with host Governments to address weapons and ammunition management in conflict-affected settings. The United Nations continued to support States, upon request, in areas such as stockpile management and physical security, marking, tracing and record-keeping. Moreover, awareness-raising on the impact of small arms and light weapons remains an important component of United Nations work in this area.

25. Examples of United Nations support for national arms and ammunition management efforts are provided in the table below. These are in addition to the long-standing, critical support provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to United Nations missions, including through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and mine action activities.

### Examples of United Nations support for national arms and ammunition management efforts

<i>Country</i>	<i>Decision/action</i>
Central African Republic	The Security Council decided that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic would support the Central African Republic authorities in developing and operationalizing a national commission for small arms and light weapons to address civilian disarmament and illicit proliferation (resolution <a href="#">2301 (2016)</a> , para. 34 (c) (iv)).

<sup>6</sup> See resolutions [2274 \(2016\)](#), [2283 \(2016\)](#), [2313 \(2016\)](#) and [2296 \(2016\)](#).

<i>Country</i>	<i>Decision/action</i>
Haiti	The Security Council requested the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti to continue to support the Haitian authorities in the control of small arms, the development of a weapons registry and the revision of current laws on the importation and possession of arms (resolution <a href="#">2313 (2016)</a> , para. 34).
Libya	The United Nations Support Mission in Libya has assisted national authorities, at their request, in establishing a national arms and ammunition management committee to improve coordination and decision-making between different ministries and agencies, as well as to ensure the consistent application of standards across government agencies, adequate resource mobilization and the development of an overarching national arms and ammunitions control framework and strategy.
Mali	The Security Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to assist Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and with weapons and ammunition management (resolution <a href="#">2295 (2016)</a> , para. 20 (b)).

## VI. Community-based initiatives

26. Several successes and lessons learned can be identified with regard to community-led violence and gun control programmes in various contexts. In the past two years, the increasing shift by law enforcement towards raising community-based public awareness on illegal firearms control has been notable. This shift has been evident in States such as Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. To further promote alternatives to gang recruitment and the use of firearms during conflict resolution, the United Nations has supported various local gun-free school initiatives through the use of culture, arts, sports, life skills, positive parenting, gender identity, ethnic cohesion and faith-based programmes. Currently, more than 12 schools in Costa Rica are running a gun-free school programme and 22 municipalities with the highest firearms homicide rates in Honduras have developed community-based prevention models around firearms use. I encourage Member States to strengthen partnerships and coordination by further allocating the necessary resources to community policing and enforcement, capacity development, evidence-building and victim support programmes.

27. Local gun-free zones — which can address pressing feelings of insecurity at the community level — can be established if there is communal demand for such measures. Gun-free zones can only be successful if accompanied by effective policing.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *The Gun-Free Zone — A Tool to Prevent and Reduce Armed Violence*, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 25 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.14.IX.6). Available from [www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-25](http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-25).

## VII. Use of existing tools and instruments in the management of arms and ammunition in post-conflict settings

28. In previous reports to the Security Council on small arms, the value of the Register of Conventional Arms in providing a national baseline inventory of arms was emphasized. In its final report, the Panel of Experts on Yemen used data from the Register (see [S/2016/73](#)). More groups of experts are encouraged to make use of the information submitted to the Register, especially as a means of establishing a baseline to monitor potential violations of arms embargoes.

29. With regard to the scope of the Register of Conventional Arms, the General Assembly decided to adapt the Register in line with the recommendations made with the assistance of the 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on the matter (see [A/71/259](#)). Furthermore, States agreed to report on small arms and light weapons in parallel with the seven categories of the Register, on a trial basis, as part of a so-called “seven plus one” model.

## VIII. Protection of civilians and human rights

30. High levels of arms and ammunition in circulation, exacerbated by poor management and controls, contribute to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (see [S/2016/447](#), para. 17). In a report submitted to the Human Rights Council in 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted the direct risks posed to the rights to life, security and physical integrity by firearm-related violence and insecurity. Such violence and insecurity also affect other civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, such as the rights to health, education, an adequate standard of living and social security and the right to participate in cultural life (see [A/HRC/32/21](#), para. 52; see also [A/54/2000](#), paras. 238–239, and [E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39](#), para. 16). The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children has noted the relationship between easy access to firearms and the denial of children’s rights and acknowledged that access to firearms facilitates the recruitment of children to engage in organized crime.<sup>8</sup>

31. Recognizing and integrating gender as a factor in all cycles of small arms control enables the creation of more targeted measures focusing on, for example, the negative impact of small arms on the rights of women or methods that address masculinity and the need for power projection of young men. Given the highly gendered nature of the topic, mainstreaming gender into small arms control efforts ensures more effective outcomes. A growing body of research has demonstrated the visible linkages between gender and small arms and light weapons, including considerations related to domestic and intimate partner abuse, masculinity and cultural norms.<sup>9</sup> At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States encouraged the collection of disaggregated data on gender and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, in particular for the purpose of improving corresponding national policies and assistance programmes (see [A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2](#), para. 60).

32. Enhancing respect for the law requires action in response to the high levels of poorly controlled arms and ammunition in circulation, which continue to contribute

<sup>8</sup> *Protecting children affected by armed violence in the community* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.I.15). Available from <http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/2016/armedviolence/Armed%20Violence%20Publication%20Web.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Dragan Božanić, *Gender and SALW in South East Europe: Main Concerns and Policy Response*, United Nations Development Programme (Belgrade, Grafolik, 2016), available from [www.seesac.org/f/docs/Armed-Violence/Gender\\_and\\_SALW\\_publication\\_eng-web.pdf](http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Armed-Violence/Gender_and_SALW_publication_eng-web.pdf).



to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (see [S/2016/447](#), para. 17). Violations have also occurred through illicit arms transfers, the diversion of arms and their transfer to States with insufficient regulations. In this regard, ratifying and complying with the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as relevant regional conventions are of key importance.

## **IX. Transnational organized crime**

33. Transnational organized criminal groups generated increased levels of harm and violence. In its resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council expressed concern about the close connection between international terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering, other illicit financial transactions, illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons and arms trafficking.

34. There remained the need to adopt integrated approaches to address the root causes of transnational organized crime, including the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in small arms, their parts and components and ammunition. These approaches should take into account, where appropriate, economic and social factors that have an impact on arms-related crime, as well as cross-border criminality and trafficking flows, in particular relating to arms.

## **X. Terrorism and violent extremism**

35. There has been growing recognition of the dangers posed by the acquisition of weapons by terrorist groups. The use of firearms in the perpetration of terrorist attacks in many countries has raised the urgency of addressing this issue.

36. The Security Council has been active in that regard. In its resolution [2370 \(2017\)](#) on denying terrorists access to weapons, the Council urged Member States to undertake a set of measures at the national level to eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists, as well as to enhance regional and international cooperation in that regard. In its resolution [2322 \(2016\)](#), the Council expressed its concern that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms.

37. In its resolution [2253 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council authorized the global arms embargo against individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. In line with the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Member States should also strengthen subregional and regional organizations in monitoring the trafficking of small arms and heavy weapons (see [A/70/674](#), para. 45 (a)). The adoption by the African Union, in January 2017, of its master road map of practical steps to silence the guns in Africa by the year 2020 constituted an important effort to enhance national capacities to prevent violent extremism, strengthen national disarmament programmes and address the illicit trafficking of arms.<sup>10</sup>

## **XI. Observations**

38. Weapons and ammunition are tangible commodities upon which concrete and measurable actions can be taken to manage and control them (see [S/2015/289](#), para. 14). On the basis of this understanding, I will consistently advocate for

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<sup>10</sup> See African Union decision contained in Assembly/AU/6(XXVIII)/Rev.1, annex.



strengthening physical security and stockpile management measures for both weapons and ammunition and encourage the Security Council to do the same.

39. I encourage the continued, regular consideration by the Security Council of the issue of small arms. While a recurring thematic discussion is of key use in prioritizing action, I also support the mainstreaming of the issue of the illicit weapons trade, misuse and excessive accumulation into all relevant Council discussions. The maintenance of international peace and security, advances in development and the realization of human rights cannot be fully achieved and sustained if illicit small arms and ammunition continue to wreak havoc on communities.

40. I encourage the Security Council to continue to address weapons and ammunition management issues in a comprehensive manner. It is evident that addressing both issues together has proven effective when discussing the challenges of conflict and post-conflict situations. In terms of peace operations, I note the benefit when peace missions include a dedicated cell dealing with weapons and ammunition control matters.

41. I underscore the indispensability of introducing measurability in all activities relating to small arms control, consistent with the indicators for measuring progress on the Sustainable Development Goals.

42. Preventing conflict and building sustainable peace on the basis of respect for human rights, including accountability and non-discrimination, must be a key priority for the international community in its efforts to address the wide-reaching harm to civilians caused by small arms and light weapons.

43. It is also essential to enhance respect for international law and ensure accountability and good practice in that regard by parties to conflict. Preventing armed attacks against civilians in conflict settings, including United Nations personnel and humanitarian actors, must remain a central objective of the Security Council.

44. I will continue to encourage national authorities to make use of existing, practical standards and guidelines such as the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, with a view to enhancing small arms and ammunition control in support of the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, I will continue to advocate for the universalization of relevant legally-binding instruments, such as the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty, and the implementation of agreed instruments such as the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument.

45. I encourage Member States to make use of the International Criminal Police Organization Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System, which facilitates information exchange and investigative cooperation between law enforcement agencies in relation to the international movement of illicit firearms, as well as licit firearms that have been involved in the commission of a crime.

46. The consideration by the Security Council of measures to restrict the supply of ammunition to countries or regions threatened by, engaged in or emerging from armed conflict is a beneficial approach (see [S/PRST/2002/30](#)). It is important that the Council remain cognizant of the recurrently destructive effect of weapons and ammunition flows into vulnerable and fragile settings, irrespective of whether a United Nations mission is present.

47. Finally, the Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms, scheduled to be held in June 2018, will provide an important opportunity for Council members and all States to demonstrate reinvigorated commitment to collective efforts at the national, regional and global levels to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

## Annex I

### Addressing past recommendations

1. The present report is the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the thematic issue of small arms and light weapons. In the four previous reports, numerous substantive recommendations have been made to address the cross-cutting and multidimensional challenges associated with the management of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition. In total, 48 recommendations have been provided to the Security Council for its consideration, relating to, inter alia, physical security and stockpile management, peacekeeping, arms embargoes, international standards and guidelines, armed violence and gender.

2. Many of the recommendations remain highly relevant in the context of the work of the Security Council and the United Nations more broadly. In this regard, particularly pertinent recommendations made in previous reports ([S/2008/258](#), [S/2011/255](#), [S/2013/503](#) and [S/2015/289](#)) are listed in the table below, and specific suggestions to operationalize them are offered.

3. The suggested actions are intended to be as concrete as possible and are directed towards specific stakeholders, namely, the Security Council and, in some cases, the wider United Nations membership. Actions to operationalize the recommendations are also identified for the Secretariat and relevant entities, where applicable.

## Small arms and light weapons: past recommendations and suggested future actions

Reference	Recommendation		Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities	
	Text of recommendation	Entity	Action	
<b>Weapons and ammunition management</b>				
S/2015/289, recommendation 1	Given the wide-ranging impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, it is recommended that the Security Council consistently address the arms situation when considering both geographic and thematic issues on its agenda.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May wish to request an assessment of:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ The treatment of small arms by the Security Council across its whole agenda, with the results to be presented in the next biennial report to the Council on small arms</li> <li>◦ The women and peace and security mainstreaming model as a point of reference for the further mainstreaming of weapons and ammunition matters into the work of the Council.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Could consider requesting relevant United Nations entities, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Mine Action Service, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, UN-Women and UNODC, to participate in thematic and issue-focused briefings. Could refer to the best practices contained in the voluntary International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.</li> </ul>	
S/2015/289, recommendation 8; S/2013/503, recommendation 3	The Security Council should consider, on a case-by-case basis, the relevance of technologies such as time limitation or geographical limitation devices or biometric or radio frequency identification, to improve weapons stockpile management and reduce the diversion of weapons.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May wish to request a report outlining specific technologies that could improve weapons stockpile management with a view to combating diversion and improving tracing.</li> <li>• Could consider supporting measures to ensure the marking and registration of all weapons, particularly in cases where United Nations entities are deployed and can assist.</li> </ul>	
S/2011/255, recommendation 1	The Security Council may wish to encourage States to strengthen their tracing capacity and to enhance international cooperation regarding tracing in these contexts [conflict, post-conflict and conflict-prone situations], including with the United Nations.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could encourage States to make use of tools to promote effective international and regional cooperation in tracing, such as with INTERPOL, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto and the International Tracing Instrument.</li> <li>• Should consider providing support to the work of groups and panels of experts on tracing requests.</li> </ul>	

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
S/2008/258, recommendation 11	The Security Council may wish to consider encouraging States to significantly enhance their efforts to verify end user certificates.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May wish to promote the practical assistance provided by the United Nations on weapons tracing, including through module 05.31 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, the work of United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament and UNODC.</li> <li>• May encourage States to share information and best practices on safe storage, marking and destruction of surplus weapons to further prevent illicit transfers.</li> <li>• May wish to consider encouraging States to keep comprehensive records of seized arms to facilitate tracing.</li> </ul> <p>May wish to consider supporting further research on various aspects of end use and end user controls, including risk assessment, end use and end user documentation, assurances and post-delivery cooperation. UNIDIR, along with other relevant research institutions, could be engaged by the Council in such tasks.</p>
		All Member States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could consider development of an international framework for the authentication, reconciliation and standardization of end user certificates in the framework of, inter alia, a General Assembly resolution establishing a group of governmental experts to further explore the issue, and/or the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Tracing Instrument.</li> <li>• Could adopt a decision to begin work on such a framework at the Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, in 2018.</li> </ul>
S/2013/503, recommendation 2	I encourage all Member States to make every effort to secure arms and ammunition stockpiles from diversion. I encourage the Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are mandated to assist host countries in their stockpile management.	United Nations system and other relevant entities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, as well as relevant tools that facilitate their use, should be integrated into the core training curricula of international peacekeeping training centres, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions should receive training as needed on the application of international standards.</li> </ul>

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
	Existing standards such the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines developed under the “SaferGuard” programme and the International Small Arms Control Standards should be fully utilized in arms and ammunition stockpile management practices. Member States in a position to do so should consider providing technical and financial assistance in this regard.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Efforts should be made to enhance the practical applicability of existing standards and guidelines to assist host countries in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings.</li> <li>• Support should continue to be provided, upon request, to States in building capacity for arms and ammunition management, including through the activities of the SaferGuard programme.</li> </ul>
S/2013/503, recommendation 11	The Security Council is encouraged to mandate United Nations peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions, in particular with respect to the disarmament aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform programmes, to support host countries’ efforts to implement their commitments under relevant global and regional conventional arms control instruments, including the development of capacities to put in place longer-term arms control and regulation measures. Such support should be considered when planning integrated peace operations missions, as well as in the day-to-day operations of the missions. To this effect, use should be made of the International Small Arms Control Standards developed by the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism and of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.	<p>Security Council</p> <p>United Nations system and other relevant entities</p>	<p>May consider consulting with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, the Mine Action Service and other relevant entities on the issue of mandating missions to assist host countries with disarmament aspects, including specific tasks related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction and security sector reform.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines should be integrated into the peace support operations planning process, as well as into the day-to-day activities of such operations, as relevant.</li> <li>• The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will appoint a Fire Explosive Safety Officer in each peacekeeping operation, where feasible, in accordance with module 12.10 of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.</li> <li>• Vulnerable States should continue to be assisted, upon request, in establishing longer-term arms control and regulation measures (legislative and operational), using the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines for guidance.</li> <li>• UNICEF and UNDP should continue to support reintegration programmes for former combatants and children associated with armed groups.</li> </ul>

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
S/2011/255, recommendation 3	The Security Council may wish to encourage Member States to provide the United Nations, on a voluntary basis, with public information on the markings applied to ammunition for small arms and light weapons by manufacturers under their jurisdiction, as well as the markings on ammunition recovered from illicit use.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could call upon all States, as appropriate, in the context of its relevant items, to provide support and ammunition marking information to the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table, the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network and the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System.</li> <li>• Could call upon States to share information submitted on national ammunition marking practices with INTERPOL for inclusion in the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System.</li> </ul>
		All Member States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May consider providing resources to the SaferGuard programme to undertake training on ammunition marking and capacity-building.</li> <li>• May consider aligning national marking practices with module 05.30 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, as appropriate.</li> </ul>
<b>Peacekeeping</b>			
S/2015/289, recommendation 7	<p>The Security Council should ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions are consistently mandated to assist host countries in the effective management of their arms and ammunition stockpiles.</p> <p>This includes, in accordance with the good practice demonstrated in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, provisions on the training of national security forces in weapons disposal, marking and recording and large-scale weapons collection and destruction programmes, in addition to the refurbishment of weapons and ammunition storage facilities and the promotion of compliance with existing standards.</p>	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May request briefings on good practices and lessons learned in peace operations mandated to assist host countries with effective arms and ammunition management (for example, in Abyei, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Haiti, Liberia, Libya and Mali).</li> <li>• May also request briefings from the Mine Action Service on its relevant activities relating to weapons and ammunition management.</li> <li>• May consider mandating United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions to assist States in their efforts to establish baselines and benchmark progress made in arms and ammunition management.</li> </ul>
		All Member States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May consider use of existing guidance on destruction activities, including the International Small Arms Control Standards (module 05.50) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (module 10.10).</li> </ul>

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
	Member States should consider the provision of adequate technical and financial assistance in this regard.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May consider means of harmonizing information collected on illicit weapons and ammunition across United Nations missions to better understand trends of illicit cross-border flows.</li> <li>• May wish to consider providing support to UNIDIR to undertake relevant studies, in cooperation with host States and relevant United Nations mission staff, to identify approaches to strengthen the management of arms and ammunition by peacekeeping missions.</li> </ul>
<a href="#">S/2008/258</a> , recommendation 9	Destruction of surplus ammunition stockpiles should be a priority for relevant peacekeeping missions and Governments.	Security Council	May wish to request a review of the mandate of the peace operations in Abyei, taking into account the destruction component, and derive good practices and lessons learned.
		United Nations system and other relevant entities	Peacekeeping operations should consider supplementary budget lines for project-specific ammunition stockpile destruction, including for relevant Mine Action Service operations.
<a href="#">S/2011/255</a> , recommendation 2	In post-conflict weapons collection programmes, weapons should be recorded in sufficient detail to ensure accountability and to facilitate their tracing in the event of diversion. Record-keeping systems should be designed in such a way as to ensure that personnel are aware of the types of information that they need to record, including ammunition markings. The International Small Arms Control Standards currently being developed by the United Nations will provide practical guidance in this regard.	All Member States	Should consider utilizing, promoting and supporting the use of module 05.30 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, on marking and tracing, and the relevant modules of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.
<b>Arms embargoes</b>			
<a href="#">S/2015/289</a> , recommendation 9	Countries subject to an arms embargo should consider reporting to the existing transparency mechanism of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May wish to request the Secretariat to organize a briefing on reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in the context of peace operations.</li> </ul>



<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May consider including language in relevant resolutions calling upon States subject to an arms embargo to report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.</li> </ul>
<a href="#">S/2008/258</a> , recommendation 5	Peacekeeping missions mandated to monitor arms embargoes should increasingly seek to assign this task to a dedicated unit equipped with the capacity to carry it out comprehensively.	Security Council	May wish to review the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to outlining good practices and lessons learned on the role of monitoring the relevant arms embargoes.
<a href="#">S/2013/503</a> , recommendation 9	The Security Council may wish to call for increased assistance for States bordering a country where an arms embargo is in place. If these bordering States themselves host a United Nations peacekeeping, political or peacebuilding mission, the Council should mandate these missions to assist their host Governments in complying with their arms embargo obligations by, inter alia, setting up arms and ammunition management cells.	Security Council	May wish to hold informal consultations with States bordering a country where an arms embargo is in place and invite an exchange of views on additional resources that may be required to assist in compliance with the embargo; discussions could include relevant implementing entities, such as the Mine Action Service of the United Nations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Department of Field Support.
<b>Community safety and law enforcement</b>			
<a href="#">S/2015/289</a> , recommendation 6	States should aim to have their relevant law enforcement officials trained in the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May request the Secretariat to provide an implementation support manual for the Basic Principles.</li> <li>• May wish to consider encouraging States to make use of the resource book on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement, developed jointly by UNODC and OHCHR.</li> </ul>
<b>Protection of civilians/gender</b>			
<a href="#">S/2013/503</a> , recommendation 4	I encourage regular information exchange between the informal expert group on the protection of civilians of the Security Council, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other relevant United Nations entities, as appropriate, including the Office of the Special Representative for	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May wish to request the Secretariat to share relevant information with the informal expert group on the protection of civilians on situations created or exacerbated by illicit arms flows, not only prior to the renewal of mandates of peace operations, but also during the consideration of new protection of civilians mandates.</li> </ul>

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
	Children and Armed Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. I also encourage the informal expert group on the protection of civilians to consider ways in which relevant Council resolutions might better respond to challenges relating to the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, in situations created or exacerbated by illicit arms flows.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May also request a cross-cutting briefing on small arms-related issues, including on gender perspectives (in the form of an Arria-formula meeting of the Council).</li> </ul>
<b>Armed violence</b>			
<a href="#">S/2011/255</a> , recommendation 5	There is a continued need to develop measurable goals on armed violence prevention and reduction to be achieved by 2015.	Security Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taking into account the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, data reported with regard to Sustainable Development Goal indicator 16.4.2 could be considered in the context of the work of the Council insofar as relevant trends and conclusions drawn from the data could inform Council resolutions and reports and the work of groups of experts.</li> <li>• Could encourage States to report on indicator 16.4.2 on illicit arms flows, for example, through their biennial national report on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and data collection on illicit firearms trafficking through the framework of the Firearms Protocol.</li> </ul>
<a href="#">S/2011/255</a> , recommendation 6	The Security Council may wish to further identify ways to increase compliance by non-State armed groups with international norms relating to the use and stockpiling of weapons and ammunition in times of conflict.	Security Council	In view of the likelihood that non-State actors may store weapons and ammunition in temporary conditions or in smaller quantities than government forces, the Council may encourage the dissemination and utilization by peacekeepers, United Nations police and other stakeholders of existing voluntary guidance, such as module 04.20 of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

<i>Recommendation</i>		<i>Suggested actions for States/actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities</i>	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Text of recommendation</i>	<i>Entity</i>	<i>Action</i>
S/2015/289, recommendation 3	More research to assist policymakers in addressing the causes and consequences of armed violence is required. The criminal violence that frequently replaces political violence in post-conflict periods is often difficult to redress through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and small arms control measures.	Security Council	May wish to request, through the Secretary-General, relevant United Nations entities to undertake research on the causes and consequences of armed violence, including links to the illicit trafficking in arms and its connection with organized crime and criminal violence, and to encourage Member States to provide qualitative and quantitative data for such research.

*Abbreviations:* INTERPOL, International Criminal Police Organization; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; UNDP, United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDIR, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UN-Women, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.

## Annex II

### **Role of United Nations field missions in supporting the monitoring of arms embargoes**

1. In paragraph 28 of its resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to examine and present best practices and arrangements that could be used by the United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes and the provision of assistance and expertise to host States, sanctions committees and expert groups.

2. Pursuant to that request, the various mechanisms instituted by the United Nations in its field missions (also referred to as peace operations) were examined and best practices drawn from those experiences for the consideration of the Security Council when mandating new missions or adjusting the mandates of current ones with arms embargo measures. These practices, which apply to all arms embargo measures, including with regard to small arms and light weapons, can be used by field missions in carrying out their mandated tasks.

#### **Arms embargo monitoring and compliance arrangements of United Nations field missions**

3. Eight field missions are currently mandated by the Security Council to support United Nations arms embargoes,<sup>1</sup> but the arrangements by which they implement their mandates to monitor the implementation and compliance with Council-mandated arms embargoes vary considerably.

4. In a peacekeeping context, highlighted in my previous reports on small arms and light weapons, an Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit was established within the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).<sup>2</sup> In addition to personnel from the Mission's military component, the Unit was staffed by specialized civilian experts (arms, customs and information analysts). The permanent presence of such staff in the country allowed for the continuous monitoring of the flows of arms and ammunition, centralized and systematic data collection and on-site analysis. The Unit established country-specific arms and ammunition profiles and other tools that greatly advanced arms embargo monitoring.

5. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), by comparison, created an arms embargo working group in January 2015 to collect and synthesize information. In October 2015, the working group was reinforced by an arms embargo cell situated within the Mission's Joint Mission Analysis Cell, with support from the Mine Action Service of the United Nations. The development of the cell is still under way, but includes arms embargo analysts and technical experts.

<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

<sup>2</sup> The arms embargo mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire was terminated in 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution [2283 \(2016\)](#).

6. Another mechanism used to monitor compliance with arms embargoes in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)<sup>3</sup> were the firearms inspection teams from the Mission's civilian police contingents, which regularly inspected the Government's armouries to ensure weapons were properly marked and stored. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, on the other hand, established a focal point within the Mission to share information on the arms embargo with the Panel of Experts on the Sudan.

7. Most missions, however, do not have dedicated units but have relied on their respective Joint Mission Analysis Cells to implement such mandated tasks. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is an example of a field mission whose Joint Mission Analysis Cell monitors arms embargo compliance.

8. In special political missions, arms embargo monitoring and compliance arrangements are generally not as extensive as those in peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, these missions have established a variety of arrangements to support relevant arms embargo regimes. The Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), for example, provides advisory and capacity-building support to the Federal Government of Somalia to help it to meet its arms embargo obligations.

9. There is no one arrangement that is appropriate for all field missions in implementing arms monitoring mandates. It is important, however, that form follow function. Some field missions are mandated to cooperate with sanctions committees and their respective expert panels<sup>4</sup> by sharing relevant information and assisting host Governments with exemption requests.<sup>5</sup> Others have been mandated to carry out a more comprehensive set of tasks that may include monitoring compliance with the arms embargo and, in some cases, actively conducting inspections to enforce the arms embargo.<sup>6</sup> On the basis of the feedback received from expert panels and other relevant stakeholders, the presence of dedicated arms embargo monitoring staff within field missions where an arms embargo is in place strengthens monitoring and compliance of the arms embargo measures. This is all the more important given that many of the expert panels dealing with arms embargo monitoring are not based in the mission area on a permanent basis.

**10. The appropriate structural arrangements and capabilities of a United Nations peace operation to carry out any arms embargo-related tasks should be factored into mission planning at the time of establishment of the mandate and whenever the mandate is reviewed. Dedicated arms embargo monitoring units, appropriately resourced with the requisite experts, should be considered in countries where the mission has an extensive Council-mandated arms embargo inspection and enforcement mandate. Where arms embargo mandates are more limited and where field missions have utilized their Joint Mission Analysis Cells to undertake arms embargo-related tasks, such missions could consider dedicating a small number of staff to assist in the monitoring of and compliance with arms embargoes. The review carried out by the Secretariat has shown that the ability of United Nations peace operations to effectively carry out the arms embargo-related tasks is largely dependent on the technical expertise and relevant skill sets in areas such as arms tracing, border control, customs and**

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<sup>3</sup> The arms embargo mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia was terminated in 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution [2288 \(2016\)](#).

<sup>4</sup> Currently, of the nine expert panels, two are based in New York, one is based in Nairobi and six are home-based.

<sup>5</sup> These missions include UNAMA, UNAMI and UNSOM.

<sup>6</sup> These missions include MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNAMID.

weapons storage. According to the review, there are therefore benefits to be drawn from Member States engaging with the Secretariat on how best they can contribute personnel with applicable technical expertise to serve in relevant United Nations field missions.

11. While the structural arrangements for missions to fulfil arms embargo-related mandates may vary, the review has highlighted the importance of consistency across field missions in undertaking arms embargo-related tasks. In this connection, the Secretariat intends to develop relevant guidelines and standard operating procedures on how field missions could be structured to undertake arms embargo monitoring and compliance tasks, where appropriate. Particularly in contexts in which the United Nations is engaged in the exercise of good offices, mediation and reconciliation efforts, the role of a mission should be considered carefully.

#### **Provision of assistance and expertise to host States**

12. Where mandated and requested, United Nations field missions provide essential and effective assistance to host States in strengthening the monitoring of and compliance with arms embargoes through technical assistance and capacity-building. MINUSCA and UNSOM, for example, provide technical assistance with other United Nations partners to host States to manage weapons, ammunition and related infrastructure. The Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon works to enhance the capacity of the Lebanese Navy, including through joint training, to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related materiel into Lebanon by sea.

13. Field missions are also well placed to raise awareness about the arms embargoes with the respective host Government. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, for example, has provided briefings to the Libyan authorities on the purpose, scope and implementation of the arms embargo, including detailed guidance on the exemption provisions. This has included the provision of simplified flow charts and checklists, as well as “model language” for drafting exemption requests and end user certificates. MONUSCO has been working with the military and justice sectors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to increase cooperation and access to information related to non-compliance with the arms embargo.

14. Regular, direct and structured engagement between the field mission and the appropriate government authorities, specifically on the implementation of the arms embargo or the provision of assistance, is critical. A good example is provided by UNSOM, which assists the Federal Government of Somalia through the Office of the National Security Adviser to build its capacity to comply with obligations under the arms embargo, including advisory support for the development of notifications and reporting, as well as longer-term capacity for the development of a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in accordance with international standards and the improvement of infrastructure for the reception and processing of weapons imports and donations and capacity-building. **Host States are encouraged to appoint national focal points through which missions can engage and channel capacity-building assistance to relevant government departments and agencies crucial to the implementation of the arms embargo. Where feasible, a joint arms embargo working group, comprising the United Nations peace operation and relevant government agencies, could also be formed to strengthen information-sharing and capacity-building assistance. Missions should also draw upon the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, which, as the repository of knowledge and practice on sanctions issues, has the responsibility to assist them in providing**

**relevant support and assistance to host countries and other Member States in the implementation of arms embargoes.**

15. **Where appropriate, the needs of and the provision of technical assistance to host States with respect to the implementation of arms embargoes should be reviewed periodically, particularly when the Council is considering adjusting the measures.** In 2014 and 2015, United Nations inter-agency missions were undertaken at the request of the Council to assess the arms embargoes in Somalia (see [S/2014/243](#)) and Liberia (see [S/2014/707](#) and [S/2015/590](#)). Assessment missions have proven to be a useful tool to bring together all relevant United Nations actors in the field and at Headquarters to provide the Council with relevant input for their reviews of sanctions measures. Relevant tools developed by the United Nations, such as the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, should be fully utilized in such assessments in order to ensure that gaps in capacity to safely and securely manage arms and ammunition are identified and addressed prior to an embargo being eased or lifted.

#### **Provision of assistance and expertise to sanctions committees and expert panels**

16. Field missions mandated to support the implementation of arms embargoes are specifically tasked with engaging with relevant sanctions committees and their expert panels. Under the Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire sanctions regimes, which have now been terminated, UNMIL and UNOCI were mandated to provide written reports to their respective sanctions committees. While current field missions do not have similar reporting requirements, information is shared directly by the mission with the committee through periodic briefings often undertaken by the Head of Mission. **The Security Council and its sanctions committees are encouraged to continue to request such briefings from the field on arms embargo monitoring and compliance to better consider the appropriate complementarity of sanctions with political, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.**

17. Feedback from host Governments, regional States and members of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies has highlighted the value of regular regional briefings as an opportunity for regional States to provide feedback on strengthening monitoring of and compliance with sanctions measures. Furthermore, visits by the Chair of the sanctions committee to countries have also been identified as useful for the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs to raise awareness about United Nations sanctions regimes and strengthen monitoring of and compliance with the specific sanctions measures. **In this regard, the Security Council and its subsidiary organs may wish to reinforce regional briefings, as well as periodic visits by committee Chairs, to concerned States and to engage directly with field missions on the ground to both promote awareness and strengthen monitoring of and compliance with sanctions measures.**

18. Given that many expert panels are not based in a country subject to an arms embargo or in nearby countries in the region, most direct cooperation on arms embargo implementation and compliance monitoring occurs between field missions and expert panels. Several good examples of ways in which missions had structured information-sharing relationships with expert panels and the Security Council Affairs Division were found in the review. **Field missions typically nominate a focal point within the mission to facilitate information exchange and logistical support with expert panels. In general, placing the focal point in the Office of the Chief of Staff is a useful modality to promote awareness of the mandate of the expert panel across the mission.**



19. While all expert panels have appreciated the cooperation with field missions, the nature of the information exchanged differs in scope and quality. Such differences are a product of many factors, including variations in the mandates of field missions, the specifics of the arms embargo sanctions regime, the receptivity of the host State to field mission involvement on arms embargo issues, the availability of resources and specialized personnel, and guidance provided to the field mission.

20. Informal guidelines developed in 2009 to enhance cooperation and information-sharing between peacekeeping missions and expert panels are now outdated. **The Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Working Group on United Nations Sanctions, have been tasked with developing uniform guidance for all field missions. These new guidelines will address the substantive and administrative aspects of cooperation, taking into account relevant challenges in relation to resources, the examination of new technologies, mandates, operational constraints, knowledge transfer and information-sharing.**

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