From military peace to social justice?

The Angolan peace process

Accord

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People in Luanda celebrate the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, 5 April 2004

Source: AFP/Getty Images

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Angola

Angola is situated on the west coast of Africa, bordering Namibia, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo. Its population is nearly 14 million, of whom the largest ethnic group is Ovimbundu (estimated 37%), and others are Kimbundu 25%, Bakongo 13%, *mestiço* (mixed European and African) 2%, European 1%, and others 22%. The official language is Portuguese, and Umbundu, Kimbundu, and Kikongo are widely spoken. Christianity is the main religion.

Angola's main exports are oil, diamonds, minerals, coffee, fish, and timber. The gross domestic product (total output of goods and services) is around $1,700 per capita.

Living conditions are hard. In the United Nations Development Programme's 2003 Human Development Report, Angola ranked 164th out of 175 countries in 'human development indicators'. Life expectancy is around 40 years, and its infant mortality rate was 154 per 1,000 live births.

Acronyms

ADRP	Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
CCPM	Joint Political-Military Commission
CMVF	Joint Ceasefire Verification and Monitoring Commission
COIEPA	Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FALA	Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FAPLA	Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GA	Gathering Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRAE	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
GURN	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LIMA	Independent League of Angolan Women
MFA	Movement of the Armed Forces
MMC	Joint Military Commission
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OMA	Organization of Angolan Women
QF	Quartering and Family Area
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UCAH	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITA-R	Union for the Total Independence of Angola – Renewed
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPA	Union of the Peoples of Angola
UPNA	Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola

Glossary

Assimilado Indigenous person 'assimilated' by the colonial regime enjoying some of the rights of Portuguese citizens

Clientelismo The practice whereby political leaders or party officials provide benefits or services in exchange for loyalty

Deconcentration The redistribution of decision-making, financial and management responsibilities to lower levels of central government structures, often to provincial and district levels

Mestiço Person of mixed black (African) and white (European) parentage

Musseques Slums in Luanda

Triple zero clause A clause in the Bicesse Accords which obliges the government and UNITA to refrain from acquiring lethal material, as well as indicating the agreement of the US and the Soviet Union to cease the supply of lethal material to any Angolan party and to encourage other countries to do the same

Troika Portugal, the US and the USSR (later Russia) in their role as observers of the Angolan peace processes

Introduction

lessons from
the Angolan 'peace process'

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On 26 February 2003, the United Nations Under-Secretary for African Affairs and then Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola, Ibrahim Gambari, said the country's "experiences in conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding would… provide valuable lessons for the rest of the world". At first glance, it is difficult to see which lessons Mr Gambari may have been referring to. Firstly, the resolution of the Angolan conflict was largely achieved through a relentless military campaign by the government forces against their National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) adversaries. Peace was only achieved after UNITA's historic leader, Jonas Savimbi, was killed on the battlefield on 22 February 2002, just a year before Gambari's comments. What valuable lessons would such a strategy of 'peace-through-war' contain, besides the realization that the world is a wild and dangerous place in which force and violence are in the end the only factors that count? Not to mention the fact that the secessionist war in the enclave of Cabinda has still not come to an end. Secondly, Angola's experiences with post-conflict peacebuilding are still very rudimentary and there are at least signs that things are not going as smoothly as one might wish, as some of the contributions to this volume amply illustrate. In this light, doing an Accord project on the Angolan 'peace process' is something of a challenge. Having decided to take on this challenge, a word of explanation may be required.

The Accord programme and Angola

Conciliation Resources' Accord programme and its publication series *Accord: an international review of peace initiatives* is based on the premise that we can all learn useful lessons from our own painful history of violent conflict and all attempts at peacemaking and peacebuilding, as well as from the experiences of others. To make this learning possible, one needs access to basic information about these

experiences, the success stories as well as the failures. This issue of *Accord* is predicated on this conviction, as well as on the assumption that documenting contemporary history in a balanced, accessible and attractive way, does provide – especially in post-war situations or in contexts of ongoing armed conflict – a useful tool for further constructive action on the part of national politicians, civil society activists, ordinary citizens, foreign diplomats and international agencies. The stories of how to end decades of war, how to overcome obstacles and take advantage of opportunities, and how to mobilize for peace and justice in seemingly hopeless situations, might help the current generation in Angola, as well as people in other conflict-ridden countries, to better undertake the tasks that now lie ahead. These are the challenges of reconstructing the country and the nation, of justice and reconciliation, of democratization and political renewal, of economic development and the creation of a better life – not just for the few, but for the nation as a whole.

The history of the armed conflict in Angola is a long and complex one. The story of peoples' attempts to bring the conflict to an end cannot, therefore, be told in a simple or linear way. Neither can an overview of the many remaining challenges inherent in moving from the end of military violence to a situation that can be characterized as genuine peace be a simple one. In light of the specific features of the Angolan 'peace process', and in particular the way the war came finally to an end, it was decided to devote more attention and space than usual in this issue of *Accord* to post-conflict issues, in other words, to the long and multi-faceted task of peacebuilding.

Emerging lessons

A number of tentative conclusions and lessons emerge from this complicated history of armed conflict and peoples' efforts at finding a way out, as presented in the contributions contained in this issue.

Transforming national liberation movements

The first point regards the problems emanating from the character of *national* liberation movements in general, in Africa as well as elsewhere in the former 'Third World'. They not only aimed to liberate the nation from colonial rule, but equally to speak for the nation as a whole, in other words, to be the only legitimate

representative of all individual subjects. There is thus in such movements a natural tendency for hegemonic pretensions and exclusion. This was often a problem during the struggle for independence itself, since not everyone necessarily identified to the same degree with the political agenda of the movement in question, even if the goal of national liberation was universally accepted. It later turned into an almost insurmountable obstacle in the context of a pluralist democratic polity, the new norm in Africa at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. In a multi-party democracy, the parties that compete for political power by definition represent only part of the population, not the nation as a whole; the traditional liberation movements, transformed into political parties, did not for the most part easily adapt to such a new role and identity.

The situation is not unique to Angola, but it was certainly more complex than in most other cases. As David Birmingham and Guus Meijer point out in their overview of the historical context, there were three movements with such hegemonic claims – the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA – all competing with each other for domestic legitimacy and international recognition. This issue could not be resolved at the moment of independence in 1975 nor when the one-party state began to crumble and multi-party elections were held in 1992. This legacy of mutually exclusionist claims of representing the whole nation lies at the heart of the failure of successive peace accords, beginning with the *Alvor Accords* signed by the three movements under international pressure in January 1975, but equally so in the cases of the *Bicesse Accords* and *Lusaka Protocol*, signed in 1991 and 1994 respectively, between the MPLA-government and UNITA. As in many other cases, the fact that the party that won power after independence and dominated the country for more than two decades had strong Marxist-Leninist leanings did not make the transition to a more open and pluralist way of doing politics any easier. In Angola – a country exceptionally rich in oil, diamonds and other natural resources – this was exacerbated by the emergence, after the 'democratic' opening of the early 1990s, of a self-enriching and largely corrupt elite with deeply entrenched interests who will not easily be dislodged.

The limitations of the 'one bullet solution'

A further point emerging from the Angolan case is that it seems dangerous to accept uncritically the thesis that eliminating the leader of the armed rebellion and militarily defeating the insurgency will provide better prospects for sustainable peace and future stability than a negotiated settlement, with the concomitant

recognition, however minimal and reluctant, of the other side's perspective as well as its inevitable compromises. This 'realist' position appears to be becoming more widely defended with regard to intractable conflicts such as the war between the Ugandan government and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). It is even being promoted in some quarters as the only viable solution. This may be due in part to the influence of the rhetoric accompanying the global 'war on terror' unleashed by the US and its allies. Most Angolans would undoubtedly agree that bringing an end to four decades of internecine warfare was in itself of the utmost importance, and that sentiment should in no way be diminished. 'Negative peace' or the absence of war is by far preferable to no peace at all. But in circumstances such as those of Angola, with its long history of bitter rivalries, mutual exclusion, one-party rule and authoritarianism on all sides, the price for the way this result was finally achieved may be very high indeed. It is a price which is only gradually becoming known as the situation develops and many of the hopes and expectations are not being met.

Previous peace efforts also had an impact on the final conclusion of the war. That it was possible to reach a ceasefire and complete peace package so quickly after the elimination of Savimbi, was certainly due in part to the fact that the parties could fall back on a series of failed agreements. Many of the issues had thus been addressed and worked out in detail on previous occasions and as a matter of fact, the *Luena Memorandum* is formally a mere supplement to the *Lusaka Protocol*, which in itself was based on the *Bicesse Accords*.

The end of the war has resulted in the victorious side – the MPLA government and the social groups which support it – getting a virtually free hand, not only in the political arena, but also socially and economically. The necessary incentive for change in order to address the issues that caused the conflict in the first place or perpetuated its continuation may be missing. Currently, more than two years after the formal end of the war, Angola shows some worrying signs that this may indeed be the case: growing social unrest, continuing mistrust and ostracization of political opponents, lack of economic opportunities and a sense of disillusionment and frustration on the part of broad sections of the population, not just people with UNITA sympathies. The process of democratization, including the elaboration of a new constitution and the preparation of elections, is a slow and cumbersome one, as Vieira Lopes indicates in his article. The social and physical rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees require massive efforts. Imogen Parsons describes the need for ongoing support for the

reintegration of ex-combatants and for programmes to disarm the civilian population. These were always going to be huge and challenging tasks, but the fact that there are few opportunities for participation, for real debate and opposition and for a free exchange of ideas does not help.

As ending the war by military means consolidates the power of the victorious party, the democratic process, which depends on dialogue, negotiation, respect for other points of view and eventual compromise, has been sidelined as a preferable means of resolving conflict, not only in the political sphere but also more generally. Force and violence seem to carry the day. This may further marginalize those groups in society who are less adept at using those means, such as women, but also all unarmed citizens in general. The habits of strength and power prevailing over justice and rights, and of 'winner-takes-all' approaches, are not challenged effectively, despite the best efforts of some church leaders and other civil society actors.

Contributions by Christine Messiant and Manuel Paulo look closely at the reasons for the failure of the peacemaking attempts at Bicesse and Lusaka and the role of the UN at the various stages of its involvement. Messiant's provocative analysis not only sheds light on the underlying reasons for the failures of both processes (too many interests of what she calls the 'real international community', combined with the marginalization of the interests of the majority of Angola's population), but equally leads her to the conclusion that the way peace has finally been achieved at Luena necessarily has a negative impact on the very nature of this peace, in the sense referred to above that real democratization and participation will be not be easily attainable. One of the signs of hope – paradoxical in the light of UNITA's history of extreme authoritarianism and the ruthless leadership of Jonas Savimbi (but then, the history of Angola is full of paradoxes) – might be that the latest congress of the party, held in Viana in June 2003, showed greater openness and democratic procedure.

Prospects for peace in Cabinda

Given its successful application of a 'peace-through-war' approach in its campaign against UNITA, the Angolan government is not particularly inclined to find a negotiated solution to the war in Cabinda. As Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali describes in his contribution, despite the many attempts at negotiation over the years and despite recent moves that seem to indicate a willingness to talk on the part of the government, there are few concrete signs that a speedy end of the war is in sight and even less a solution that might satisfy the various sides to the conflict – not least the majority of

the population of Cabinda itself. Paradoxically, but not unlike other cases of intractable conflict in which identity plays a major part (such as Northern Ireland), the rough outlines of such a solution seem to be clear: in the Cabinda case, this would involve a form of autonomy and a special status for a relatively long period of transition, to be followed by negotiations between credible and democratically legitimized leaders who are not burdened by the painful events of the past. The real problems, however, lie elsewhere, namely in designing and carrying through a process that could lead to the acceptance of such an outcome by all parties concerned.

Resources for conflict vs. resources for peace

The Angolan civil war, especially in its later stages, has often been described as principally a matter of access to the country's riches (of *greed* rather than *grievance*). Without doubt, the availability of these resources to the warring sides (oil for the MPLA-government, diamonds for UNITA – especially between 1993 and 1997) enabled them to sustain their respective war efforts, but it does not necessarily mean they were the source or the motive for the conflict. That Angola's natural resources, including its vast tracts of fertile land, can be used for reconstruction and development, as well as become a source of further conflict and turmoil, is illustrated by the contributions of Fernando Pacheco and Tony Hodges. Participation and inclusion, and transparent and accountable governance at all levels are the necessary conditions for the situation to develop in a progressive direction and for Angola's riches to be exploited for the benefit of its people.

The articles of Ismael Mateus on media, of Michael Comerford on civil society, of Carlinda Monteiro on reconciliation and of Henda Ducados on women describe some of the difficulties still being faced in this regard. Many people in UNITA and other opposition parties, in the churches and in civil society organizations, women and youth in particular, feel excluded from the possibility of participating in public affairs. This resentment may well grow if political renewal, unpartisan public service and a new spirit of genuine reconciliation are not cultivated. In the absence of other effective countervailing powers, the principal hope must lie with civil society activism and mobilization, supported by free, independent, competent and active media. The challenge ahead will be to use Angola's riches – not only the natural ones like oil, diamonds and fertile soil, but equally its cultural and social resources like motivated women, youth and other 'grassroots' activists, as well as its 'traditional' knowledge and practices – for constructing peace instead of waging war.

Angola from past to present

Guus Meijer and David Birmingham

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On 11 November 1975, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) declared Angola's independence and installed Agostinho Neto as its first President in the former Portuguese colony's capital at Luanda. This outcome had long seemed uncertain and indeed even unlikely; the MPLA had not only had to deal with its own serious internal troubles and disaffections, but had also had to take on the Portuguese colonial army and the two rival armed movements, each backed by powerful allies. Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) had initially been the most powerful of the three competing national liberation movements and in the autumn of 1975 it came close to capturing Luanda from the north, backed by a heavily armed force supplied by President Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In the south, two armoured columns of a South African invasion force, acting in military coordination with the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, almost reached Luanda before they were stopped by Cuban troops which had been rushed to the assistance of the MPLA. The independent Angolan state was thus born out of turmoil and violence and amid serious national, regional and global rivalries. This heritage with its deep historical roots was to influence the unfolding of events for a long time.

Angola, like most African countries, grew out of a conglomerate of peoples and groups each with its own distinct history and traditions. Gradually small local nations and states came into contact with each other and historical developments drove them to share a common destiny under increasing Portuguese influence. Long before the arrival of the Portuguese, Bantu-speaking communities had established a farming economy over most of the territory. They had absorbed many of the scattered Khoisan-speaking populations and developed a successful pastoral dimension to their agriculture as well as building up trading economies.

One of the most successfully diverse market centres became the town of M'banza Kongo around which the Kongo kingdom evolved. Further east the concept of state formation related to the political ideology of the Lunda peoples while in the south later kingdoms took shape in the highlands of the Ovimbundu people.

Angola under Portuguese rule

Although the first Portuguese traders, explorers and soldiers set foot on this part of the African coast from 1483, modern colonization of the whole territory was only formalized four centuries later after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Wide stretches of Angola experienced colonial rule for less than a century, and even after 1900 armed revolts broke out and resistance movements sprang up as among the Ovimbundu and the Bakongo from 1913, until the last northern resistance was put down in 1917. During its century of overrule the colonial regime left crucial marks on Angolan society. Its discriminatory legislation, particularly the *Statute of the Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea*, separated the indigenous population from a tiny elite of 'civilized'

individuals (or *assimilados*) who enjoyed some of the rights of Portuguese citizens. In 1961, after the start of an armed liberation struggle, the statute was revoked but the changes were only cosmetic. The Portuguese policy of racial and cultural discrimination had a profound and lasting impact on the later social and political development of Angola as an independent country. Social divisions created by colonialism continued to exercise a strong influence on the relationships between groups and on the attitudes of individuals. Racial mistrust manifested itself in the conflicts between as well as the tensions within the liberation movements. Deeply entrenched suspicion played a decisive role in Angola's recent political history. The conflicting interests of rural dwellers and people living in urban centres are in part another source of tension which independent Angola inherited from the colonial state.

Portugal, like the other colonial powers, was primarily interested in extracting riches from its colonies, through taxation, forced labour and the compulsory cultivation of marketable crops such as cotton. Under the guise of a 'civilizing mission', the colonial state was

heavily influenced by its own distinctive variety of Catholic fundamentalism, invented by the semi-fascist dictator António Salazar. An ideology developed under the banner of *luso-tropicalism*, a supposedly specific Portuguese way of harmonizing Portuguese manners with the customs of peoples in the tropics. In Angola economic extraction was later supplemented by migrant influences when Portugal needed to dispose of excess population. In the 1950s and 1960s Angola received many thousands of poor white peasants and entrepreneurial settlers from Portugal. They created a colony of European descent which, although smaller than the Portuguese communities in France or Brazil, was larger than the rival colonial one in Mozambique.

During the colonial period, and particularly under the corporatist 'New State' and its colonial charters perfected by Salazar when he graduated from finance minister to Prime Minister in 1932, Angola's political and economic developments were crucially linked to the motherland. In 1969 Marcelo Caetano succeeded Salazar as Prime Minister and continued to insulate Portugal's colonies, and especially the crown jewel that was Angola, from the winds of change that blew concepts of independence over Africa in the 1960s. Instead of preparing for independence, as the other colonial powers had reluctantly done after the Second World War, Portugal tried to strengthen its imperial grip. As a weak state, politically isolated and economically backward, Portugal resorted to special measures to hold on to its colonies and in 1954 it euphemistically renamed them 'overseas provinces' in an attempt to avoid the attentions of United Nations inspectors. Economically, both Portugal and Angola were always at the mercy of trends and developments in the wider global economy, determined by powers beyond their control. It had been the world economic crisis of the 1930s which had led to the impoverishment of Portugal and to the crystallization of Salazar's authoritarian regime. In the 1950s, when Portugal aspired to become a member of the United Nations and yet keep its colonies, it was agricultural crises and opportunities that caused impending upheavals. The relative poverty of the southern highlands and the boom in coffee prices in the north drove thousands of Ovimbundu peasants to become migrant workers on the coffee estates. There they were subjected to humiliation by white colonists and to resentment by the Bakongo who lived there.

Continuous rivalries between various elites have played an important role in Angola's recent history. The FNLA embodied the aspirations of the northern elite focused on Kinshasa but with some cultural links with the old Kongo kingdom. The MPLA had its heartland in the territory of the Mbundu people of the Luanda hinterland but included many groups in the urban centres including some who descended from the old assimilated families of black Angolans and others who were the mixed-race children of modern colonization. UNITA became the expression of a third political tradition and embodied the economic aspirations of the Ovimbundu and their merchant leaders on the southern *planalto*. To a large extent the ethnic identification of these movements has come about as a result of conscious political manoeuvring by each leadership rather than as a genuine expression of popular sentiment and aspiration. Over time the social and political factors of identity and cohesion have become real.

Angola's historical society can be characterized by a tiny semi-urbanized elite of Portuguese-speaking 'creole' families - many black, some of mixed race, some Catholic and others Protestant, some old-established and others cosmopolitan - who are distinguished from the broad population of black African peasants and farm workers. Until the nineteenth century the great creole merchants and the rural princes dealt in captive slaves, most of whom were exported to Brazil or to the African islands. The black aristocracy and the creole bourgeoisie thrived on the profits of overseas trade and lived in style, consuming large quantities of imported alcoholic beverages and wearing fashionable European costumes. In the early twentieth century, however, their social and economic position was eroded by an influx of petty merchants and bureaucrats from Portugal, who wished to grasp the commercial and employment opportunities created by a new colonial order.

Although effective occupation only had a relatively short duration and elements of pre-colonial continuity persisted, colonialism nevertheless brought major social changes in urbanization, in formal education, in religious practice, in farming techniques and in commercial linkages. These changes affected all sections of society and all parts of the country, albeit to an uneven and variable degree. There is a tendency noted above to view Angolan society, and indeed other African societies, as fundamentally split between a 'modern' sector, influenced by 'Western' (or European) values, and a 'traditional' one governed by pre-modern systems of unchanging norms and historic ritual practices. Such views, expressed in political and public discourse, tend to over-simplify the socio-cultural base of both the MPLA and UNITA when in fact each had to manage its relations with appropriate 'traditional authorities'. Angola presents a rich variety of influences and mixtures all deeply marked by the colonial experience as well as by the so-called Afro-Stalinism of the post-independence years. 'Traditional' concepts are now being transformed to adapt to the challenges

of life in the present and the future. There is no part of Angola, however remote, and no sector of Angolan society, however 'traditional', which is not in some way linked to the 'modern' world of a globalized economy and its culture and communication systems.

The struggle for national liberation

While colonial rule never went unresisted, a more focused armed struggle for independence only started in 1961, after the Portuguese had bloodily repressed a mass protest against colonial conditions in the north. Hundreds of white planters and traders (estimates vary between 250 and 1,000) and thousands of black farm workers were killed, and many more fled the country, forming a fertile recruiting ground for an emerging anti-colonial cause.

Nationalist political activity and resistance occurred initially under the banner of the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA), a predecessor of the FNLA. In Luanda and the coastal cities much older associations had long expressed the nationalist sentiment of Angola's African population. This urban-based nationalism also incorporated *assimilados* and *mestiços* of Luanda and Benguela who had organized the Angolan League in the 1910s and the Let's Discover Angola (*Vamos Descobrir Angola*) movement in the 1940s under leaders such as Viriato da Cruz who later became founders of the MPLA.

The 1960s saw a major military and political confrontation between the Portuguese colonial regime and Angolan nationalism. The country also experienced the early manifestation of divisions within the nationalist movement that were to mark political life in Angola for many years. The protagonists were the FNLA, the MPLA, which subsequently tried to claim responsibility for an attack on a Luanda prison on 4 February 1961, and UNITA which emerged in the mid 1960s. The date of the prison attack was later officially celebrated as the beginning of the armed struggle.

The anti-colonial struggle launched in 1961 was fought with guerrilla tactics, gradually increasing in scope to reach from the north to the east of the country. On the diplomatic front nationalists worked from bases in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Conakry and Brazzaville, as well as from Lisbon and Paris. The FNLA received political and military backing from African countries and from China and the US. In 1962 it formed a Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) which the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initially recognized as the legitimate successor to colonial rule. Some African countries later transferred their allegiance to the MPLA which, though its military record was poor

and its leadership continuously suffered from internal conflict, gradually outmanoeuvred its rivals politically and diplomatically to gain pre-eminence in 1975.

The FNLA was no freer from internal dissent than the MPLA and in 1964 Jonas Savimbi left the 'government in exile' in which he had served as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He accused the FNLA leaders of being militarily ineffective and heavily dependent on the US. He also denounced nepotism and the authoritarian leadership of Holden Roberto. After visiting a number of mainly communist countries Savimbi founded UNITA in 1966. By exploiting the feelings of exclusion in Angola's largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu, Savimbi built up his own constituency in the centre and south of the country. Initially he conducted small guerrilla operations inside Angola before establishing a network of supporters abroad.

None of the armed movements succeeded in effectively threatening the colonial state in Angola. The end of this 'first Angolan war' was brought about indirectly through domestic pressure in Portugal and the growing dissatisfaction of the Portuguese military fighting the colonial wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In April 1974, junior officers belonging to the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) toppled the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal and began the process of decolonization. In 1974, however, a frenzy of diplomatic and political activity at home and abroad mitigated against a negotiated independence. In 1975, as the will to retain imperial control over Angola dwindled, fighting broke out in many provinces of Angola and also in the capital, Luanda, where the armies of the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA were intended to maintain the peace with joint patrols. In January 1975, under heavy international pressure, the colonial power and the three movements had signed an agreement in Alvor, Portugal, providing for a transitional government, a constitution, elections and independence. This *Alvor Accord* soon collapsed, however, and the transitional government scarcely functioned. In the subsequent confrontations the FNLA received military support from Zaire with the backing of China and the US, while under Agostinho Neto the MPLA gained ground in particular in Luanda with support from the Soviet Union and from Cuban troops. On 11 November 1975 Angola became independent. The FNLA and UNITA were excluded from the city and from government and a socialist one-party regime was established which eventually gained international recognition, though not from the United States.

Angola under one-party rule

From 1975 until the late 1980s Angolan society was moulded along 'classical' Marxist-Leninist lines. A dominant, but increasingly corrupt state sector was controlled by the ruling party. Private business, with the exception of the activities of foreign oil companies, was restricted and organized religion, including the Catholic Church, which had held an official place under the colonial regime, was suppressed. No freely organized 'civil society' emerged and the state controlled the media and mass organizations for youth, for women, for workers and for some of the professions.

One event had a crucial impact on the political climate during Angola's socialist era: the failed coup attempt by Nito Alves and his followers on 27 May 1977. Alves was a minister in President Agostinho Neto's government but also had his own constituency of supporters in Luanda's *musseques* (slums). The *nitista* crisis was fuelled by personal ambitions but also by ideological battles within the ruling socialist camp. Some leaders were loyal to the 'bureaucratic' line practised in the USSR while others preferred a more 'revolutionary' Chinese approach. The coup itself was bloodily repressed and it is alleged that thousands of supposed sympathizers were jailed or killed in the following days, weeks and months. The episode had a profound effect on the President, and his regime became ever more authoritarian and repressive. Angola's population lost its innocence and henceforth lived in fear.

Subsequent wars

By the end of the 1970s, UNITA took over from the FNLA as the main civil war opponent of the MPLA government. A *rapprochement* had been achieved between the MPLA and President Mobutu of Zaire. The FNLA's cadres, led by Mobutu's protégé Holden Roberto, were gradually integrated into Angolan society as the free-market acolytes of the one-party state.

The FNLA army, once a foreign-armed force with thousands of recruits, disintegrated without being formally disarmed or demobilized.

Agostinho Neto died of cancer in 1979 and was succeeded as President by José Eduardo dos Santos, a young petroleum engineer trained in the Soviet Union. By this time the superpower conflict in Vietnam had ended and Angola became the seat of a new war by proxy between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each side was not so much defending a specific interest in Angola as playing out geo-political rivalry. The regional allies of the US continued to be Zaire and South Africa, while Congo-Brazzaville aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Cuba stepped up both military and civilian support to the MPLA government and contributed significantly to the rehabilitation of social sectors such as health and education.

Diamonds, and more especially oil, provided the MPLA with the necessary revenue to function as a government. Foreign income also funded the lifestyle of the ruling elite and financed the ongoing war against UNITA. During the war years economic links between the coastal cities and the agrarian hinterland weakened almost to the point of extinction. Sometimes backed by South African forces, UNITA spasmodically occupied parts of the country, which became inaccessible to both government and merchants. The cities, especially Luanda, survived on imported food rather than home produce. Consumer goods were paid for by oil royalties. The neglected countryside was left to its own subsistence strategies. Over the years many people fleeing the war migrated to the towns. The lack of opportunities in the rural areas made prospects in the urban centres seem more attractive despite the poverty of the great slums. The city of Luanda grew to an estimated population of four million.

The 'second Angolan war' reached its peak in the mid-1980s. One of its enduring ironies concerned the dollar income generated by American oil companies, which paid for Cuban troops to protect the Angolan government and its oil installations from attacks by South African forces working for UNITA and partly financed by the US. In this phase of the war the battle for the small but strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point. In 1987-88, South African and UNITA forces were pushed back by MPLA and Cuban troops after a long siege. The South Africans conceded that no military solution to the security of their northern border was possible and they started to explore political alternatives. The ensuing peace initiatives, orchestrated by a troika of Portugal, America and Russia, finally resulted in the *Bicesse Accords* of May 1991 between the MPLA and UNITA. The peace was followed by the

holding under UN auspices of Angola's first and only general election. Savimbi expected to gain power through the ballot box in September 1992. When he failed to do so he rejected the voting results and returned to war.

The 'third Angolan war' was even more brutal than its predecessors. Whole cities were reduced to ruins, hundreds of thousands of people were killed or died from war-related deprivation and disease, and millions were displaced, some for the second or even the third time. Extended talks in Lusaka finally resulted in another peace agreement, the *Lusaka Protocol*, signed in October 1994, but even then the war was not over. Despite international sanctions against UNITA's supply networks, Savimbi was reluctant to surrender the military option. After four years of neither peace nor war, the war erupted again with full ferocity in December 1998. The Angolan government, on paper a 'government of national unity and reconciliation' in which some UNITA dissident politicians participated under MPLA domination, pursued an offensive that culminated in the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. On 4 April 2002, the *Luena Memorandum* marked the end of four decades of war and the ultimate defeat of UNITA. In October 2002, UNITA declared itself a fully disarmed and democratic political party and UN sanctions against it were lifted.

Peace has characterized mainland Angola since April 2002, but in Cabinda, the enclave between the two Congo republics which accounts for sixty per cent of Angola's oil production, a war has continued unabated. The government has tried to replicate the strategy of scorched earth and starvation that had proved successful against UNITA. Many Cabindans nevertheless still support the rival movements demanding independence. The Angolan government, determined to preserve major economic assets, could never offer more than some form of provincial autonomy for the enclave. In October 2002, a major offensive against the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) led to serious accusations of human rights abuses. Towards the end of 2003, after some FLEC defeats and defections, the Luanda government signalled that it was prepared to talk peace or even consider a referendum. So far, however, the silencing of the guns in mainland Angola has not reached Cabinda and the conflict remains unresolved. Peace in Angola remains incomplete. The physical and psychological scars of war are still evident. The democratic deficit has not been remedied. The regime is still marked by its predatory history.

Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba with President
Dos Santos (left) and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi (right)
in Lusaka following two hours of talks on 6 May 1995

Source: AFP

Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail?

a critical analysis

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It has taken three peace accords – and, in February 2002, the killing of Jonas Savimbi – for the arms to be silenced for good in Angola. There are several ways to look at this trajectory, extended over 12 years. The simplest observation is that the two first agreements – those of Bicesse in May 1991 and Lusaka in November 1994, both reached under the auspices of the international community – resulted in a resumption of the war, with ever more deadly consequences for the civilian population; while the third one – the 2002 *Luena Memorandum* – in which the international community played a minimal and largely symbolic role, not only succeeded in formalizing a cessation of the fighting but effectively brought an end to the cycle of wars that has devastated Angola since its independence in 1975. This is how the Angolan government has chosen to portray the course of events, while the international community has opted to see *Luena* as also resulting from its patient efforts to bring peace.

How should these failures and this success in reaching peace be interpreted? Looking back, the answers seem to lie in the combination of two factors: a deadly pursuit of military victory and hegemonic power by the two warring parties, and a situation of 'too many interests' among the 'real' international community. In Angola the interests of this 'real' international community of great powers and transnational corporations have always provided the context for and strongly influenced the attitude of the 'official' international community (the United Nations); this was the case firstly with respect to the *Bicesse* and *Lusaka* accords and their implementation, and later in relation to the 'real' international community's support not just for the Angolan government but also, silently, for the military option, and the abandoning of any attempts at negotiations.

These interests provide the basic explanation for the shortcomings and failures of international interventions. Although they certainly changed over time, they remained constant in reinforcing the sidelining of the

needs for peace and democracy of those forces that one may call 'unarmed' – the Angolans who did not recognize themselves in the hegemonic intentions of the warring parties (including a number of members of those parties). These interests made it possible for both 'armed parties' to treat society as they wished in their attempts to achieve total power by any means.

This article will briefly indicate which issues were at stake for the national and international players with regard to the *Bicesse* and *Lusaka* accords, and how they developed and changed following the end of the Cold War. It will also assess their impact on the 'peace process', up to the point where it was replaced by a 'war process'. Ultimately, the precious result of peace was achieved, but the way it came about has obvious implications for the very nature of this peace.

The interplay between foreign interests and internal forces

Foreign interests have played a crucial role from the war for independence onwards. Yet they themselves did not create the divisions within Angolan nationalism – divisions that stem basically from a power struggle between different elites – although they certainly exacerbated them. During and after the great civil and international war of 1975-76 that brought the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to power, Angola became embroiled in foreign interests, both regional and international. For essentially strategic reasons, the importance of this 'regional conflict' for the two patrons of the Cold War explains the war's ferocity. It also explains the situation and the state of mind of the main protagonists at the start of the negotiations in the

late 1980s: both had been able to wage a 'rich man's war', thanks to the resources at their disposal – oil for the government; and the military, political and financial support of their allies for both. Although very different, both possessed the means to dominate society and did not need to care much for the population. They were reluctant to democratize and had no inclination towards mutual accommodation. In particular, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), formed by the war and a totalitarian culture, was in a victorious mood, because it had forced its enemy to deal with it, and 'its side' had won the Cold War. It believed in force as the ultimate means of gaining power. As for the MPLA, under the mantle of a militarized party-state, it had for some years been involved in a kind of 'wild socialism' based on arbitrariness, privilege and massive corruption by the ruling clique, and the abandonment of the people to growing misery. It had been hugely discredited even in the eyes of its own supporters, making a failure of every attempted economic reform and rejecting any political change. Its power rested on widespread opposition to UNITA or Savimbi and the control of the country's oil riches and the resources of the state, and thus on the maintenance of the one-party system.

The first accord, signed in New York in December 1988, was an international one. It did not tackle the internal dimension of the conflict nor even entail a cessation of some of the ongoing foreign interventions: indeed, surprisingly for an agreement aimed at solving a 'regional conflict', it did not include a single clause on ending the support from the USSR and the US to either side. It took place in the context of the final decline of the Soviet Union and while the US (the mediators of the agreement despite being themselves a crucial

party to it) had the upper hand internationally. Under mounting military pressure from UNITA and with the international tide against it, the MPLA reluctantly entered into negotiations.

The peace accord signed in Bicesse in May 1991 closely resembles other accords of that time in many of its features, such as the objective of democratizing the political institutions and deciding between the two warring sides through an electoral process preceded by a 'transition'. Obviously, the Angolan players, the MPLA in government and the UNITA rebels, were bellicose and dictatorial, but no more so than their counterparts in places like Cambodia or Mozambique. What makes the Angolan case different is the interplay of national and international issues at stake. This also helps to explain why there were no corrections or adjustments to the intrinsic shortcomings of this general model, common to the 'first wave' of peace processes, which could have prevented the bloody failure of *Bicesse*.

Bicesse: a short and careless 'interlude'

Official negotiations opened in Portugal in 1990, under the auspices of a Troika composed of Portugal, the USSR and the US, with the latter pulling most weight. The negotiations forced the MPLA to abandon Marxism-Leninism early on and adopt a multi-party system, and eventually, in May 1991, and despite remaining 'the government', to sign a peace agreement with a UNITA that was recognized as a 'party' on the same footing as itself. The accord forced the MPLA to hold elections after a transition period during which the demilitarization of the two forces and the formation of a single army should take place, to ensure that the vote would be respected.

The unarmed actors in Angola ('moral', political, civic, etc.) had no role in the negotiations or any say in the implementation of the accords. At the time, the principles of conflict management did not generally acknowledge them, as it was more a matter of using electoral means to settle the scores left by the Cold War. However, in Angola, this scheme was more complicated, and resulted in an even more peculiar situation: although the UN had been involved in the successful implementation of the *New York Accords*, it was not called upon until the very end of the negotiations. *Bicesse* came at a time when there was a lot of talk about a new international order and when the UN, after the Cold War, could regain its prominent role. Yet the international organization remained marginalized in the negotiations and in the process established by the peace agreement: in the text itself, it merely had the status of 'invitee'! The Troika, on the other hand, installed itself in the driving seat of the process, the CCPM (Joint Political and Military Commission), and thus the interests of the three member countries and even more the

balance of power between them, greatly in the US's favour, prevailed over the UN. The influence of the Troika could thus continue to dominate up to the end.

Neither of the belligerents with whom the Troika and the UN were to share the responsibility for the peace process had yet abandoned its search for hegemony. Neither the MPLA nor UNITA were interested in reconciliation or democratization. Above all, the MPLA wanted to avoid defeat, and it had only accepted certain conditions reluctantly and under pressure. UNITA only wanted peace because it was certain – as was almost everyone else at the time, including the MPLA – that it would win the elections, and achieve its aim of gaining state power. The three countries 'managing' the accords could not have had any illusions. In such circumstances, one can see the importance of the international community's role during the transition period if it were to succeed in establishing lasting foundations for peace.

What, then, can be said of this accord, described as exemplary by some of its international promoters, and greatly welcomed by the Angolan population; and why did it fail?

Why Bicesse failed

The failure can be analysed in different ways. The external 'crafters' retrospectively pleaded that they lacked a good understanding of the two Angolan sides, particularly of the 'loser' in the process: UNITA. Yet this is only credible with regard to the UN and its belatedly appointed Special Representative, Margaret Anstee. She was also the first to accept the international community's responsibility, but emphasized the lack of resources (people, money, mandate). The conclusion she reached was serious: the UN should never have conducted a peace process under such conditions. But why, then, did the external actors behave so irresponsibly? An analysis of the reasons for their intervention in the Angolan peace process in the first place may shed light on their establishment of a process that was 'not quite' identical to others in that period and on its failure. In particular, it will also explain why corrections and adaptations that could have avoided its eventual collapse were not made during implementation.

The transition was placed entirely in the hands of the two armed parties. Transitory political rules were not established, nor was a coalition government (which would have avoided the dangers of a 'winner takes all' outcome) decided on for the period following the elections. The parties themselves, and particularly an influential UNITA, rejected the option of a coalition government *before* the elections that could have secured minimum standards of impartiality in preparing the elections.

Bicesse incorporates features of other peace agreements of that time, features that have elsewhere caused some difficulties during their implementation as well as in the post-election period. But in Angola the problems lay beyond the weaknesses and ill-conceived ideas of this first wave of peace processes. In fact, for the US (with the consent of the two others), peace was not the first and only aim. The peace process was perceived more as a route for UNITA to come to power. This outcome, almost taken for granted, would be achieved with minor political and financial costs, thanks to the central role attributed to the Troika. That is mainly why the UN's mission was so marginal, and the means at its disposal so derisory, especially in comparison with its contemporaries in Namibia and Cambodia. That is why an early date for the elections was set, despite being a totally unrealistic time frame for the completion of all the necessary tasks. That is why there was indifference about the type of pre-election government, enabling the MPLA to paradoxically maintain its grip on government (total in relation to any other Angolan actor, and only mitigated by the clauses and organs of the peace process) until the elections, as UNITA did not want to risk losing the credit it had by taking responsibility in government. The only thing that mattered to the US was to 'accompany' the victory predicted for UNITA, while for the other international actors the involvement of the US was a sufficient guarantee that events would run smoothly.

The structure of the agreement enabled the different parties to 'preserve their current status'; out of government, UNITA had no negotiating power other than its military force, while all the reins of transitory power and resources of the party-state remained in the hands of the MPLA. The international community did not push either side to change during the implementation of the agreement. UNITA maintained control over some of its areas and 'its' people and had no intention of losing its only asset by disarming, and the international community turned a blind eye. Meanwhile, noting the international community's lack of interest in its democratic obligations, the MPLA quickly mobilized its forces to avoid losing everything by losing the vote: it went on to victory thanks to its access to funds, total control of the administrative apparatus and the state-owned media, the mobilization of legal and illegal resources, and the establishment of a paramilitary force. Violations multiplied and went unpunished; amid the laxity of the international community, a logic of radicalization set in. This provoked growing scepticism within the population, transforming UNITA's assets (its arms and the 'culture' associated with them) into liabilities: its arrogance, its blatant retention of its weapons, and its thirst for revenge. Coupled with the enormous efforts (in expenditure and means) of the 'party in power', these factors rallied support to the MPLA that it did not have at the time of *Bicesse*. In these circumstances,

the postponement of the elections would have been desirable (which is what the UN subsequently did in Mozambique), as the minimal political and military conditions for them to take place and be respected had not been met. Yet the opposite decision was made. Regardless of the fact that the UNITA army had not been dissolved and that the government had set up a new special police force, the date initially agreed for the elections was considered untouchable. Thus, the UN solemnly declared the two armies dissolved, put a so-called single army in place and went to great lengths to accelerate the process of voter registration.

The elections took place at the scheduled time and gave the MPLA a clear victory (54 per cent of the votes) over UNITA (34 per cent). José Eduardo dos Santos (49.7 per cent) recorded a smaller and insufficient victory over Jonas Savimbi (40.7 per cent). The UN – whose credibility was now increasingly questioned – finally labelled the results "generally free and fair". A significant number of voters believed the accusations of fraud made by UNITA and other parties, even if on the part of UNITA's leadership the claim represented a denial of *any* possibility of defeat. Of course, those who voted MPLA demanded that the ballot be recognized, and – as others also still wanted the vote to be respected, and the war to be avoided – the government easily managed to mobilize and galvanize its supporters with this UN backing. Powerless, the international community tried to negotiate at least a modification of the conditions for the second round of the Presidential vote, to make the playing field less unequal. But UNITA had already put itself on marching order throughout the whole country and was using this as blackmail and preparation for war. For the MPLA, it was unthinkable to be held back on its journey to victory, or, now that it had national and international legitimacy, to consider any kind of power-sharing.

The events afterwards were and still are very contested but documentary and oral evidence allows them to be described as follows: while the discussion over these conditions was taking place, and UNITA was building its war machine throughout the country, the government denounced an attempt by UNITA to take power in the capital city and organized a 'pre-emptive coup' in Luanda and several provincial capitals. As UNITA had legal and illegal weapons in Luanda, there was heavy fighting, and in three days thousands were reportedly killed. An enormous majority of the dead were connected to UNITA and included a number of the organization's Luanda-based politico-military leaders as well as soldiers and civilians (militants and even ordinary voters).

Having failed to ensure respect for the outcome of the elections, the international community simply ignored these killings in an attempt to restart negotiations. But

an armed power struggle had already broken out – for the 'ratification' or the 'rectification' of elections that had been viewed by the two contestants simply as the final battle for ultimate power. And the international community was at that point in no condition to stop those confrontations from ushering in a resumption of the war. It chose on one hand to confirm its past actions, i.e. the elections and their outcome, and thus to hold UNITA responsible for the war, and on the other to try in vain again and again to present the two parties with new proposals for the resumption of negotiations (these early proposals being the basis of those which would finally be accepted at Lusaka).

The war unleashed tremendous violence. As UNITA had remained armed while the government army had disintegrated, and with paramilitary forces clearly insufficient to face the rebellion, it initially gained considerable advantage. As long as UNITA retained military superiority, it rejected any new terms of agreement proposed by the international community. But times changed, and the government used its increased legitimacy to urge the international community for support. The end of the Cold War and the discovery of considerable offshore oil reserves that had hitherto been exploited in partnership with the MPLA government were strong additional factors in its favour, while it seemed clear that UNITA would be unable to maintain control over the capital even if it won on the battlefield. It was thus time to take this new situation into account in all respects (legal status, business prospects). The US, fully supportive of UNITA until the elections, now gave the signal for change. When by mid-1993 UNITA again rejected an accord (the *Abidjan Protocol*), the US finally recognized the Angolan government, opening the way for UN sanctions on UNITA. This general re-alignment in favour of the 'legitimate government' led to a gradual reversal of political, diplomatic as well as military forces in its favour.

Lusaka: from make-believe agreement to military 'solution'

Under pressure from the international community and from a reversal of military fortunes, UNITA issued a communiqué in October 1993 reaffirming the validity of the *Bicesse Accords*, opening the way for talks between the two sides in Lusaka in November. Over the next twelve months, and amidst continuing heavy fighting (and much death), the two sides conducted talks facilitated by a team led by new UN Special Representative Alioune Blondin Beye and representatives of the Troika.

In November 1994, after a series of considerable military setbacks, UNITA (but not Savimbi personally) was forced

to sign the *Lusaka Protocol*. This agreement did not however constitute the ratification of a defeat: the international community ensured that military defeat was avoided, and had learned some lessons from the failure of *Bicesse*. First, the vanquished party should have a place in power for the outcome to be politically acceptable. Second, the armed factions involved should not have the military means to change the course of events. And additionally, disarmament should be taken seriously and adequate resources allocated to it. The outcome of the elections was not reconsidered, and only the second round for the Presidency was on the agenda.

In the context of the election results, UNITA was now considered an illegitimate rebellion, thereby ending the symmetry between the two parties that characterized *Bicesse*. Only UNITA was urged to disarm and demilitarize in order to be integrated in a government army left intact by the accord. The quasi-exchange that structured the accord – disarmament for participation in the government – conformed to this change in legal status and to the lessons learned. Two other elements further increased the government's legitimacy. Firstly, despite the agreement, the sanctions imposed in 1993 to compel UNITA to negotiate were not lifted. Secondly, the 'triple zero' clause contained in the *Bicesse Accords* (repeated in an annex to the *Lusaka Protocol)* – a clause forbidding both parties to re-arm themselves and other countries to supply them with arms – was not part of the *Protocol* itself. This meant that, in terms of the text of the accord and of the 1993 UN resolution imposing sanctions, re-armament constituted a real breach for UNITA, while it was no longer a problem for the government, at least not in legal terms. Furthermore, there was nothing in the texts of *Lusaka* prohibiting foreign countries from re-arming the 'legitimate government'. In other words, there was not just a structural asymmetry, but also an actual disequilibrium of rights and obligations with respect to the crucial issue of demilitarization.

While this agreement, with its somewhat improved mandate and resources for the UN than at *Bicesse*, could have helped avoid the failure of 1991, it still exhibited important shortcomings. It gave no role to the unarmed forces – those not part of the struggle for power, who were the ones primarily concerned with peace. And although the UN was attributed a larger role, the Troika was still at the heart of the operation. Most importantly, the agreement was signed in a context of absolute mistrust between the parties, and it overlooked the fact that both parties were utterly determined not to abide by the rules of the game if necessary. The UNITA leadership still believed in the force of arms. The elimination of its leaders and supporters in 1992 only served to further radicalize it politically and consolidate

this conviction. It would disarm neither in advance nor unilaterally, as long as its survival and political position were not secured as it wished. For Savimbi and a part of the leadership, this meant being in power. As for the government, for two years of war it had succeeded in functioning just as before even under a multi-party system (and had soon after elections created a so-called but hollow 'government of national unity' with small allied parties). It therefore completely rejected the notion of being held accountable and only agreed to share power formally with UNITA in the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) set up by *Lusaka* so as not to alienate the international community. Under the new and very favourable circumstances, it embarked on highly profitable but predatory and opportunistic business practices. Despite the war, it managed to attract partners interested in oil, war imports and any other viable trade. These practices of wild enrichment and corruption went unpunished and were accompanied by utter and increasing misery for the general population.

Now forced to rely solely on the diamonds under its control to preserve its military apparatus, and determined not to disarm, UNITA systematically procrastinated and violated an agreement that it deemed unfavourable and hoped to be able to renegotiate on the basis of its continued military strength. Abusing its position, the government subverted and bypassed the *Protocol* and did not fulfil some important obligations with regard to the police and the military. In the words of a UN official, "UNITA violated the agreement by day, the government by night". These unpunished infringements fuelled mutual distrust and led to re-armament on both sides. UNITA did this secretly with the help of arms and diamond dealers, as well as some remaining friendly governments. Initially, the government bought arms through illegal or covert channels too, but soon it did business and cooperated with governments, albeit in a discreet manner. The main preliminary condition of the peace process remained the disarmament of UNITA. Of course, the international community 'understood' – given the nature of the Angolan political economy – that UNITA needed both economic and political guarantees before it would disarm. Partly for this reason, it twice accepted the notoriously false 'declaration' of disarmament by UNITA, as it also chose, despite all evidence to the contrary, to accept that the GURN really was a government of 'national unity and reconciliation'.

At its formation in April 1997, this government was 'united' and 'reconciled' only in name. It contained 'UNITA members' who had been co-opted, through the terms of the agreement, into a government in fact led exclusively by the MPLA. The power-sharing was therefore as fictitious as the demilitarization of the

rebel movement. While numerous heads of state once again praised the step reached with its inauguration, the Angolan population did not celebrate this time. It knew its masters or its enemy, and no longer had faith in the international community. Given the structure of the accords, with their fundamental imbalances, and the implicit but notorious agendas of the 'Angolan parties', one would have needed a highly political as well as a resolute and balanced international community to avoid the hardening of the impasse. The situation turned even sourer when the government decided to intervene militarily in the neighbouring Congos (moves prohibited by the *Protocol*) to help bring friendly governments to power, without provoking an international reaction.

Both parties undeniably prepared for a new confrontation and tensions on the ground increased. In 1998, the government judged that it would be politically, diplomatically and militarily capable of waging a real war. Recognizing the failure and futility of its policies, the international community admitted that both sides were violating the terms of the agreement, and reiterated that the primary responsibility lay with UNITA for not disarming in the first place. Without the power to stop the downward spiral of militarization or the violations by either side, this reiteration had absolutely no implication for preserving peace. It did

have implications, though, for increasing the political legitimacy of the government. In June 1998, the Security Council reinforced sanctions once again, this time to include diamonds, the nerve of UNITA's war machine. Finally, at the end of 1998 the government launched what it called its 'war for peace', a war against an enemy "who had never respected the accords" and whose leader, Savimbi, the government did everything to have internationally criminalized.

The international community at an impasse

It is impossible to understand the government's objectives in this 'last' war without considering its 'internal' policies. Four years of 'neither peace nor war' had enabled the MPLA, which dominated all the 'democratic institutions', to intensify the pillaging of public resources with impunity. In partnership with foreign interests and under the auspices of a Presidency with reinforced powers, it was able to partly privatize them for its own profit. There was in fact intense international competition for the benefits firstly of oil and also of all other viable business. But this exercise in *clientelismo*, which has as its corollary the poverty and the necessary absence of rights (even those recognized by law) of the overwhelming majority, was only possible

if real democratic processes were 'neutralized', to prevent opposing political forces from capitalizing on the growing dissatisfaction. To the extent to which the MPLA controlled all the wheels of the state, the public and private economy and the media, the 'unarmed opposition' was neutralized, caught between co-option, repression and impotence. This left the armed opposition of UNITA. The ultimate aim of the government's military strategy was to neutralize UNITA *politically*, since a militarily annihilated UNITA would be unable to negotiate, and inevitably therefore, incapable of weakening the control of 'the party in power' under the pretext of a transition process. A military solution would thus be most effective in creating the conditions in which the MPLA alone could determine, firstly the very terms of peace, as well as the time frame for elections and the political, economic, social future of Angola, without encountering the 'normal' threats to its system of power that peace would bring.

To achieve this, the government could rely on the fact that it was the legitimate power and that the rebellion was refusing to disarm. To the extent that the international community was both guarantor of this legality and of the accords, and indifferent to the realities of the MPLA's governing practice, the government could count on its close ties with a series of powerful foreign partners and on the acquiescence of an important section of the 'real' international community in its war – involving substantial political support, but also direct though discreet military support from certain friendly countries. But it wanted more: in pursuit of its ambitious – and ultimately political – objectives, it also needed the official international community to confer legitimacy on the war and abandon all attempts at dialogue. The UN did not completely follow this line, refusing to recognize *UNITA Renovada* – formed by dissidents claiming to 'replace' Savimbi's UNITA, but with no autonomy from the regime – or to declare Savimbi a war criminal. But it did break off all contact with UNITA, whose foreign missions were ordered to close, and the Security Council's Sanctions Committee even attempted to cut off its means of political expression.

Anxious to play a role in a future process to end the conflict and not to leave Angola as a failure, and consequently concerned not to antagonize the government, the UN abandoned its mandate – to search peace through negotiations – and even ceased its efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to areas under UNITA control (its obligation under international humanitarian law). Sanctions were enforced with remarkable tenacity, in particular from 2000 onwards, after the first military victories by the government, and justified by continued reference to the 'principal

responsibility' of UNITA for the impasse, and by the very sanctions agreed. These soon began to constitute a real contribution to the government's war effort, making it difficult for UNITA to get supplies and forcing it to 'survive by its own means'.

The result was first a humanitarian tragedy, with heavy use of a scorched-earth policy either as a means of survival by UNITA or to achieve military victory by the government. After the greatly desired elimination of Savimbi and the military victory it reinforced, the result was also a 'make-believe' negotiation. This did not give way to any kind of political transition, and thus, as desired, the government retained sole control over the future of Angola, with the most favourable terms it could hope to secure for itself in the context of peace.

Conclusion

In the early 1990s, the international community chose to ignore the hegemonic interests of the two parties and the militarization of a UNITA that wanted power at all costs. At the end of the decade, it was the same indifference to the needs and aspirations of Angolans, and then towards the military and predatory nature of governance in Angola, that gave free rein to the game of economic and strategic interests. These interests had not weakened, but rather reoriented themselves and, once in conformity with the election results, inclined more heavily to the government's advantage. But what remained at the end of the process in the eyes of many Angolans was the powerlessness and disrepute of the UN: once the 'political UN' was no longer of any use to it, the government's camp strongly reproached it for not having done enough during or after the war, and for wanting to meddle with its 'sovereignty'; UNITA condemned its partiality during the second period (but avoided mentioning the first). The civic forces that had mobilized to bring an end to the war by peaceful means, but with whom the UN did not engage, resented having been abandoned in their efforts to reach a goal that should have been shared by the international organization. The result was not only harmful to the UN. More seriously for Angolans and Angola, it also meant that the minimum conditions for a militarily achieved peace to be converted into democratization and a just and durable civil peace were not met. The foreign investors and partners, and their governments (the 'real' international community) were not too concerned: they were not bothered at the height of the war and there was now sufficient stability for their business requirements, not to mention the fact that the reconstruction of the country provided a huge opportunity to make even larger profits.

The end of the war

the Luena *Memorandum of Understanding*

Aaron Griffiths

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On 22 February 2002 the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) Jonas Savimbi was killed by government military forces, and soon after television images of his corpse were being beamed around the world. The government's military drive to defeat UNITA had claimed its most prized victim. Having resisted increasing calls domestically and internationally for new talks with UNITA, the government stood at a crossroads, apparently in a strong position to choose whether to try to force a complete UNITA surrender or to engage in some form of peace talks. UNITA, fractured and reeling, faced even tougher choices. This article examines how the parties responded to the chance to end the war, and asks how the decisions that led to the signing of the *Luena Memorandum* on 4 April 2002 might have shaped Angola's future.

Steps towards talks

Three days after Savimbi's death, while military operations continued in Angola, President Dos Santos was in Lisbon discussing the situation with the Portuguese government. There he made a public statement indicating that a ceasefire was the next step, before flying to Washington, where he would meet President George W. Bush and other high ranking US officials, and then Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under Secretary for African Affairs. On 2 March, the government confirmed that it would contact UNITA to prepare the ground for a ceasefire.

Initial reports following Savimbi's death had suggested UNITA was determined to fight on, but the sense of impending defeat deepened with the news of Vice President António Dembo's death. There were rumours that he was killed by fellow UNITA fighters because not being Ovimbundu made him an unacceptable choice as leader, but other reports claimed that he was diabetic and had lost his medication. UNITA's Secretary-General

and reputed hard-liner, General Paulo Lukamba "Gato", effectively became leader, in his role as 'coordinator' of a newly formed Management Committee.

Discreet contacts between the warring parties followed, and a public breakthrough came on 13 March when the government declared a unilateral cessation of offensive military movements and presented a 'Peace Plan' (see *Key texts and agreements*). It called for the resolution of outstanding military issues in accordance with the *Bicesse Accords* and *Lusaka Protocol*, UNITA's demilitarization and reintegration into political life, and an amnesty for all crimes committed in the framework of the armed conflict. It also pledged to work with all of society, especially the churches, political parties, and civil society groups. The plan came as a surprise but was widely welcomed. The National Assembly had not been consulted or involved. The UN Secretary-General's Representative in Angola, Mussagy Jeichande, expressed satisfaction with the peace plan, considering it "conciliatory". The Catholic bishops welcomed the government's "benevolent language and gesture", and the independent media also reacted warmly.

The UNITA problem

The move appeared to bolster the prospects of a settlement. However, there was more than one UNITA to deal with. The government approach was nominally a two-track policy of discussing military issues with UNITA commanders in the bush and political issues with the UNITA-Renovada (UNITA-R) faction of the rebel

movement, whom they had long recognized as the legitimate UNITA. However, UNITA-R, who were widely seen as stooges who had been co-opted into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, had little legitimacy with the organization's members in the bush, UNITA's external (overseas) representatives or other MPs. In practice, the absence of a coherent and unified UNITA was an opportunity for the government to limit any agreement to a narrowly military one with military counterparts, putting political issues on the backburner.

A communiqué from UNITA-R announced a commission for the reunification of the party, but this was little more than posture. Meanwhile there was a serious split between UNITA's Management Committee in the bush and its external wing. While the government recognized UNITA's military leadership as its negotiating partner, many in the party feared that they were little more than prisoners with no choice but to sign a surrender dressed up as a peace agreement. 46 of UNITA's 70 MPs issued a statement backing the external wing as the only body with sufficient legitimacy to represent the movement to the UN in order to conclude the peace process.

The wider public also began to express reservations about the nature of imminent negotiations. There were calls for national and foreign journalists and civil society activists to have access to the talks and to the UNITA people involved, or at least to have UN or Troika observers, to increase credibility. Three days after the

announcement of the government peace plan, the Angolan Civic Association (ACA) called in an open letter for the elaboration of a plan that went beyond a military agreement and the accommodation of UNITA to address the problems of the nation in the current phase of the transition to democracy.

A government spokesman responded that the presence of third parties such as the church or the UN would be confusing at this stage, but left the possibility open for later involvement. Speaking for UNITA's Management Committee, General Dachala backed this position.

Preliminary talks in Cassamba

Preliminary talks between the FAA and UNITA Generals started on 15 March in the town of Cassamba in Moxico province. One newspaper reported that FAA General "Implacável" had had two days exploratory meeting with Gato at the UNITA base in Moxico, but it was General Samuel Chiwale who led the UNITA delegation at the talks. Importantly, a former UNITA General who had changed sides in 1993 and had led recent military operations, Geraldo Sachipenda Nunda (Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAA) led the government delegation for the preliminary talks. He reportedly was able to establish a good rapport with his former colleagues.

The government characterized the situation as one of working out technical military matters. The sides agreed that the FAA should be responsible for the organization and provision of all logistical and technical means necessary for the talks, including the transport of UNITA delegates to the venue. It was agreed that the provincial capital Luena, the town with government facilities closest to the battlefield, was a practical place to hold further negotiations. The prospect for a definitive cessation of hostilities appeared promising. The FAA's General Nunda and UNITA's Chief of Staff General Abreu "Kamorteiro", signed a ceasefire 'pre-accord' at Cassamba on 18 March. There continued to be reports of fighting in different parts of the country, but the government minimized their importance, insisting it was due only to a "lack of information" getting to the fighting elements.

However, at this point UNITA's military wing had not yet managed to pull the rest of UNITA's disparate elements into line. UNITA's external wing was not prepared to remain in the dark. A member of the external wing in Lisbon, Carlos Morgado, said soon after the Cassamba talks began that they were "a farce. … That entire scenario … was intended to be sold to the international community as if there was an agreement coming". He said that the negotiating UNITA representatives had been captives and not attended voluntarily to the talks.

UNITA sources in Portugal also indicated that their representative in Paris, Isaías Samakuva, had been elected as interim UNITA leader.

An apparently conciliatory move from Samakuva came on 18 March when he appealed to churches, civil society and opposition parties to guarantee a dignified peace and asked for clarification from the government about the status of Gato and other UNITA Generals negotiating with the FAA. After a long phone conversation with Gato, Samakuva admitted to having more confidence in the seriousness of the talks though he complained that UNITA had no means of communication between its internal and external elements.

The organization's Europe-based elements eventually issued a statement expressing their full support to the leadership of General Gato and giving the negotiating team a clearer mandate to come to an agreement. By 25 March, 55 of the 70 Luanda-based MPs backed a declaration in full support of Gato and his Management Committee – the other 15 being followers of Eugénio Manuvakola of UNITA-Renovada.

Progress in Luena

The second round of talks began on 20 March in Luena. Both sides were optimistic that peace was within their grasp. Kamorteiro said that "many politicians have used the same expression, but I am not a politician, I am a soldier, so when I speak of peace I really mean it."

The UNITA team included the main Generals, and this time was headed by Marcial Dachala, Information Secretary, and Alcides Sakala, Secretary for Foreign Affairs (both earlier considered dead). Gato was again absent, but later claimed that the UNITA negotiating team was in regular contact with him at his base somewhere in Moxico in order to harmonize their positions.

During talks, the government news services reported a very good atmosphere between the negotiators, with UNITA delegation members in free and friendly chats with their FAA partners and with members of the public. Kamorteiro was reported seen openly driving around Luena roads in his jeep, and his colleagues spotted at discos and night clubs.

On 23 March FAA regional military commanders joined the talks, and on 25 March the talks were suspended for consultations. There was still some nervousness from abroad. The 'external mission' asked the government for the venue of the talks to be changed to a location with better access for press and other observers (i.e. Luanda), and with greater scope for monitoring by the UN and the Troika as foreseen in the *Lusaka Protocol*.

Talks were dominated by the technicalities of a ceasefire and the detailed definition of all aspects related to the quartering and demobilization of UNITA's forces. A Joint Military Commission (CMM) was formed, with observer status for the UN and the Troika as well as a technical group consisting of military experts from the FAA and UNITA, and UN and Troika representatives. In accordance with the status of the negotiations as military talks, political issues such as the role of UNITA leaders in state and government structures, vacant parliamentary seats, and longer-term issues such as elections and the constitution were left for later.

The military agreement was signed on 30 March, paving the way for the official signing on 4 April. It had been widely expected that Gato would sign for UNITA, but he failed to attend. Journalists in Luena were initially told that the helicopter sent to fetch him could not land because of heavy rain. When the helicopter arrived, it was carrying the former UNITA Commander-in-Chief General Samuel Chiwale who claimed that Gato "had too much work" to allow him to attend. Chiwale assured reporters that General Gato would be present at the ceremony in Luanda on Thursday 4 April which would be witnessed by Gambari and the Troika ambassadors. On that day, the two Commanders-in-Chief (Armando da Cruz Neto and Kamorteiro) signed the Memorandum. Dispelling any fears of a Savimbi-like snub to the agreement, Gato attended and was received by Dos Santos after the ceremony.

The sense that the *Luena Memorandum* had been a pact between two parties to the exclusion of other political forces remained. While it succeeded in ending the war, and not withstanding the warm words of the peace plan, it left other political and social forces out in the cold. On 3 April, the eve of the signing ceremony, President dos Santos gave a speech to the nation about forgiving and forgetting, national reconciliation, reconstruction, and care for those in need. In response, the leader of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, Holden Roberto – the only surviving leader of Angola's three original liberation movements – called for a commission to prepare "a national dialogue without exclusion" to guarantee peaceful transition to democracy and national reconstruction.

The agreed amnesty provisions heightened the sense of an exclusive two-party pact. UNITA and the FAA were granted a blanket amnesty by parliament, approved unanimously days before the signing. It was the first time that a proposal was passed unanimously by the Assembly, but the reaction from observers was less warm. On 11 April Gambari met with Gato and reiterated that the UN would not recognize the amnesty since war crimes had to be prosecuted. The amnesty was also questioned by 63 smaller political

parties in a letter to the President. Gato (and even Holden Roberto) considered Gambari's intervention unwelcome and as potentially destabilizing of the prevailing positive mood.

The new era

The *Luena Memorandum* marked the end of the war. A period of further engagement between the sides began. Following the first meeting of the CMM soon after the signing, Nunda reported that there had been no violations of the ceasefire. Members of the CMM and technical group were presented to the press, and the UNITA contingent confirmed the report. Eventually the CMM was deemed inadequate to complete all tasks beyond those of a military nature, so the Joint Commission from Lusaka was resurrected for a few months in late 2002, being wound up in November, soon after which the UN lifted the remaining sanctions on UNITA.

While UNITA had entered the talks divided, the path to its reunification as a coherent political party was becoming clear. The UNITA delegation that arrived in the capital for the formal signing met with UNITA-R leader Manuvakola, who publicly pledged not to interfere with the talks, reportedly allowing "UNITA to represent UNITA". Over the following months, UNITA moved towards reunification.

Although some may say it is a dubious claim, the day before the ceasefire was signed Gato warned that "the war could have continued". It is not possible to know whether he was right, but the reasons to negotiate were compelling. The events following February 2002 can be seen as the logical adjunct to a military campaign, where both sides had something to gain by negotiating an end to military activity. The government's restraint in not openly declaring victory was judicious. The course of events could be interpreted as a series of skilful manoeuvres by the MPLA government, who managed to convey the impression of a conciliatory conclusion to the war without conceding any power.

The question for Angola is what could have been if the process had been defined in broader terms – as an opportunity not just for ending military hostilities in a negotiated manner, but for opening the process to broader political renewal – in consultation with the unarmed political parties and civil society. Would this have been a better foundation for more profound democratization and deeper reconciliation, which could have addressed Angola's underlying problems more successfully? Given the structures of power, this kind of opening was probably never really on the cards, but it may be Angola's loss that such a process was never given a chance.

The role of the United Nations in the Angolan peace process

Manuel J. Paulo

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Throughout the cycles of war and peace of the last decades, the United Nations has played different roles in Angola. Its political involvement started in the late 1980s, when the Security Council agreed to oversee the independence of Namibia – since 1915 illegally occupied by South Africa – which the *New York Accords* of December 1988 linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops stationed in Angola. In the second part of the 1990s, as its peacemaking and peacekeeping roles became increasingly compromised, the UN was limited to humanitarian relief operations and the promotion of human rights.

UNAVEM I (1989-1991)

After many years of deadlock, a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa was signed under the auspices of the UN in New York on 22 December 1988, leading to the withdrawal of some 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia, both to be supervised by the UN. Security Council Resolution 626 established the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) comprising 70 military observers and 20 civilian officials from ten countries. UNAVEM I was brought to an end with the signing of the *Bicesse Accords* by the Angolan government and UNITA in May 1991, brokered without UN participation by a Troika of 'observers' consisting of the United States, Russia and Portugal.

UNAVEM II (1991-1995)

Following the *Bicesse Accords*, UN Security Council Resolution 696 established a second Angola mission, UNAVEM II, on 30 May. Its duty was to observe and verify the disarmament process and support the creation of a new single national army. It also oversaw de-mining, provided humanitarian aid and facilitated the extension of state authority to the whole of Angola's territory. UNAVEM II was staffed with 350 unarmed military

observers, 90 unarmed police observers (later increased to 126) and 100 electoral observers (increased to 400 during the elections period). The initial budget was US$132.3 million, later increased by $18.8 million in recognition of its election duties. The UNAVEM II operation in Angola was meant to build on the success of UN involvement in Namibia and elsewhere. However, whereas the UN role in Namibia involved organizing the elections, UNAVEM II's role was merely to observe and verify them. Whereas in the smaller and less devastated Namibia the UN had mounted a full-scale operation involving more than 6,000 personnel, the Angola mission was undertaken in a country affected by 16 years of civil war, wrecked infrastructure, and buttressed by two large and mutually suspicious armies.

In effect, the UN's mission, intended to be a small and manageable operation vaguely defined as verification and monitoring, was neither peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee argued that "the countries most closely concerned with Angola genuinely wanted peace to be restored, but they wanted a 'quick fix', particularly the two superpowers, the main protagonists of the Cold War. … The result was an agreement flawed from the start, and a marginal role for the UN that was doomed to be ineffectual." Anstee concluded that the UN should never again accept a role in the implementation of a peace accord unless it had been involved in the negotiations of its terms and mandate.

The UN also sought to use Angola as a case study in low-cost post-conflict management, building on its success in Namibia (which in fact benefited from a much higher budget of US$430 million). When Security Council Resolution 747 expanded UNAVEM's mandate and authorized the election budget of US$18.8m, Margaret Anstee famously described her mandate in Angola as like "flying a 747 with only enough fuel for a DC3".

The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the *Bicesse Accords* by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the *Bicesse Accords*, were spared any blame.

Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed. At Namibe both sides agreed to fully implement the *Bicesse Accords* but the deal and all subsequent attempts at peace talks collapsed, arguably because UNITA sought power at any cost. Both parties were willing to talk only when the balance of power was out of their favour. As Anstee noted, "Angola is on a tragic seesaw. When one side is up they don't want to talk and when the other is up, they don't want to talk." The Security Council's lack of interest was also to blame. With attention focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina, it refused to send 1,000 Blue Helmets demanded by UNITA as a precondition for signing the Abidjan protocol – leaving Anstee as a mediator with empty hands.

In 1993 the UNITA leadership demanded that the UN Special Representative be replaced, implying Anstee was pro-government. Anstee, who had asked to be relieved of her Angolan duties at the end of 1992, was kept on because the UN did not want to appear to be dictated to by UNITA. She departed after the failed Abidjan talks and was replaced by former Malian Foreign Minister Alioune Blondin Beye, who was optimistic about brokering a peace deal. Backed by some African leaders and the Troika of observers and after arduous shuttle diplomacy, he succeeded in bringing the government and UNITA together for preliminary talks in Lusaka in June and November 1993. The US Special Envoy Paul Hare praised Beye's diplomatic experience, intelligence, unflagging energy and tenacity, his willingness to enforce discipline, and the team spirit he instilled amongst the Troika observers. Coupled with the immense military pressure on UNITA, Beye's approach led the parties to finally put pen to paper. The *Lusaka Protocol* was signed on 20 November 1994.

UNAVEM III (1995-1997)

Beye and Anstee had rather different approaches to their mission. Moreover, unlike the *Bicesse Accords*, the *Lusaka Protocol* was negotiated and facilitated by the UN with the support of the Troika. With only limited resources and a weak mandate, Anstee had been left with the task that the *Bicesse Accords* had failed to address, namely to build confidence amongst the warring parties. Beye picked up where she left off, building on the May 1992 Abidjan talks and backed by an expanded mandate and more resources. He misconceived the process of confidence building, however, by failing to create opportunities for key players to find common ground. Unlike his predecessor, who sought direct involvement from the leadership of the warring parties whenever there was a stalemate in the negotiations, Beye was more inclined to engage regional leaders to lean on and persuade the

protagonists instead of directly engaging them himself. Beye's failure to create common ground for the key players was underlined by Savimbi's refusal to attend the signing ceremony: "Mr Beye, he disappointed me. It was not his place to say that I did not come to Lusaka for the signature of the agreement on 20 November because I was 'a beaten man' or because I did not want to be humiliated. He talks too much! Now he wants to come here to meet with me. It is not longer worth the trouble. It is over. I do not want to talk to him any longer". Beye's tragic death in an air crash in June 1998 prematurely ended his involvement in the Angolan peace process.

Under the *Lusaka Protocol* both sides were to conclude the 1992 election process under UN supervision, with the Special Representative chairing the Joint Commission to oversee the implementation of the protocol, including a ceasefire, quartering of UNITA soldiers and disarmament. The power-sharing clause also provided assurances to the UN that both parties had the political will to restore peace. They agreed to obey all previous Security Council resolutions and UNAVEM III was established to have a presence of 7,000 Blue Helmets (about ten times the size of the UNAVEM II force in 1992). Nevertheless, most Angolans saw UNAVEM III and its smaller successor, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), as useless, unable as it was to deal with UNITA's relentless pursuit of power or to halt transgressions of the accords, including re-armament, by both sides.

MONUA, UNOA and UNMA (1998-2003)

When UNAVEM III's mandate expired in June 1997, MONUA was created, with a heavily reduced military component of only 1,500 troops. The rapidly deteriorating military situation across Angola undermined MONUA's efforts to prevent open conflict and the shooting down of two UN planes by UNITA in December 1998 and January 1999 quickened its slide into irrelevance. Both the government and UNITA demanded UN withdrawal. Attempts to re-start dialogue with Savimbi by Beye's successor Issa Diallo were blocked by the government, which refused to provide security guarantees and threatened to end all contact with him. In February 1999 the Angolan government called for the closure of MONUA and the Special Representative's office was consequently moved from Luanda to New York. A 30 person United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) remained, mandated to "liase with political and civilian authorities with the view to exploring measures for restoring peace". Yet Diallo failed to persuade the government to enter into negotiations because this time the balance of power was in its favour, and it was determined to pursue its 'peace through war' policy. Angola's oil wealth strengthened the government's ability to raise funds, ensuring that UNOA was restricted to humanitarian issues and institutional capacity building.

Following the *Luena Memorandum* of April 2002, Security Council Resolution 1433 of August 2002 established the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) to replace UNOA. UNMA's was mandated to chair the reinstated Joint Military Commission, to provide 30 military observers to monitor the quartering areas as guarantors of the agreement, and to coordinate the humanitarian efforts of all other UN agencies.

However, the UN's past failures undermined its ability to play a major role, as did the fact that the agreement was signed between a winner (the government) and a loser (UNITA). The victorious government was able to restrict UNMA's role in the post-Luena period to merely blessing the agreement, and as a means to signal its commitment to the *Lusaka Protocol* to UNITA. Indeed, quartering areas were managed and controlled solely by UNITA and the FAA without the presence of the 30 observers stipulated under the *Luena Memorandum*. Ibrahim Gambari, Under Secretary for African Affairs, raised concerns at the official signing ceremony regarding the validity of the Amnesty Law passed by the Angolan national assembly, on the grounds that the UN does not recognize any amnesty as applicable to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Management of sanctions

From 1993 to 1997 the UN adopted a series of sanctions against UNITA. Among these were a ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127); restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones; freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of illegal diamonds (Resolution 1173). A Sanctions Committee was established but remained largely ineffective against UNITA's constant violations and the complicity of many countries, companies and individual traders. Indeed it was under the sanctions regime that UNITA's diamond sales netted some US$1.72 billion between 1994 and 1998. Its officials travelled unimpeded especially in Africa and continued to be vocal throughout the world through their 'unofficial' representatives.

Soon after his appointment in 1999, the Sanctions Committee Chairman, Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, described the sanctions against UNITA as traffic rules that nobody enforced: "People drove where they wanted and parked all over the place. It was a complete disaster". He recommended the establishment of a panel of experts "to trace violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds abroad". In May 1999 the Security Council established two expert panels to carry out those investigations (Resolution 1237) and Fowler presented their findings in March 2000. His strategy of naming and shaming a series of 'sanctions-busters', both

countries and individuals, had never been seen before in the UN's history and provoked quite an uproar among member states accused of helping UNITA to contravene the sanctions regime. The report identified government officials of those countries and named five serving or former heads of state as personally implicated in sanctions busting. The Fowler report led to an improved sanctions-monitoring mechanism and UNITA claims that sanctions contributed towards its defeat in the last phase of the war. They were only fully lifted in late 2002.

Humanitarian challenges

Besides its political role in Angola, the UN and its agencies have been active in humanitarian affairs. The UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) was established by the Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1993 to coordinate all UN humanitarian operations, including, at the time, the repatriation of 300,000 refugees; assistance for some 800,000 internally displaced persons; provision of emergency food and medical assistance; and the quartering of soldiers.

Unlike the UN verification and monitoring missions that were under the same command, UCAH played a positive role at a time when there was no sign of an imminent ceasefire and humanitarian conditions were deteriorating. It succeeded in reaching those in need, initially in Kuito and Huambo and later in other parts of the country. UCAH's success was down to its purely humanitarian mission. However, it was slowly phased out under the *Lusaka Protocol* and when the country returned to war, UNITA and the government refused to open new humanitarian corridors and provide security for humanitarian personnel. This resulted in a worsening of the humanitarian crisis, which had already reached catastrophic levels in mid-1993. After UCAH's closure, the DHA's successor, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), continued work in Angola until June 2004, coordinating relief to quartered troops and their families, displaced persons and returnees.

Conclusion

The UN's activities in Angola were compromised from the outset. Margaret Anstee noted that, "as the Cambodian experience demonstrated, even with the strongest mandate, and resources to match, it is virtually impossible for a peacekeeping force to demobilize and disarm fully a wily guerrilla army in a vast country with porous frontiers." As a consequence, the UN's role became increasingly restricted to humanitarian operations and a small human rights division. Its shortcomings offer the organization many salutary lessons.

Alternative voices

the Angolan peace movement

Michael Comerford

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Throughout the 1990s, the emergence of civil society peace actors and the promotion of new peace initiatives were of considerable significance. Within a polarized political arena dominated by the Angolan government and UNITA, this development, which later became a peace movement, effectively led to the creation of a third 'national' voice. It helped break down simplistic notions that one either had to be a supporter of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) or of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and in effect created a 'vehicle' for mobilization outside these political structures. Particularly towards the end of the 1990s, a visible 'civic' constituency emerged that sought to influence political decision-making.

At first glance it would appear that this movement failed in its objective to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict, as the war was resolved militarily. A deeper analysis however reveals that the civic movement always differentiated between 'the ending of the war' and 'peace'. In many respects one of the greatest strengths of the Angolan peace movement is that it effectively understood 'peace' as the creation of an equitable and just society. Certainly peace meant an end to warfare, but it was also understood as inclusive political structures, accountable transparent government, economic and social development, freedom of opinion and association, the safeguarding of human rights, the elaboration of a representative national constitution, and so on. In other words, the Angolan peace movement adopted a broad peacebuilding approach to the question of the national conflict, an approach that remains valid and urgent beyond the cessation of military hostilities.

The key component institutions of this peace movement are undoubtedly the Angolan churches, the private media, civic organizations, associations or NGOs, and the coalition of 14 Civil Opposition Parties (POC). There is much continuity and similarity between these in terms of the activities and arguments promoted, and collectively they have played a most important role in opening up new political 'space' within which the peace movement itself developed. In fact, in assessing the impact of this peace movement, it is important to adopt a perspective based within recent Angolan history. The political space that the Angolan peace movement developed within was, and still is, a traumatized space that has been shaped by a number of factors.

Firstly, a repressive colonial history created little opportunity for popular participation, and certainly left few democratic institutions behind upon which the independent state could develop. Secondly, the attempted coup of 27 May 1977 led by Nito Alves in conjunction with the repressive state response created

terror across Angola, and instilled a fear of political participation that still echoes within national consciousness. Thirdly, the legacy of years of Marxist government did little to encourage public participation beyond or outside the official structures of the Party and its 'mass organizations'. Finally, the country's own experience of violent conflict has deeply marked the Angolan psyche. Each of these aspects of the past in its own way has taught Angolans that 'political activity' is dangerous and to be avoided. Collectively these factors provide some indications as to why such a peace movement did not emerge earlier in Angola. Arguably, one of the most serious challenges faced by the Angolan peace movement was the breaking of a self-imposed silence that had been adopted because of the above experiences, and the casting aside of learned behaviour. This challenge remains today and has been intensified by the ending of violent conflict in 2002, and a widespread belief that the war is definitively over.

The churches

The Angolan churches have played a key role at the forefront of the peace movement. Their legitimacy and influence are strong within urban and rural areas, and also reach to grassroots levels, a factor which

differentiates them from the majority of other civil society organizations, whose legitimacy and influence is generally greater in urban areas among professional and working class Angolans.

Three church organizations have been influential in promoting peacebuilding initiatives. The Council of Christian Churches of Angola (CICA) and the Angolan Evangelical Alliance (AEA) are umbrella organizations which represent the major Protestant Churches (Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, etc), while the Angolan Catholic Church is known as the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST). While the churches have clearly played a positive peacebuilding role, a major criticism has been the lack of a shared ecumenical approach to such a vital national question. Until the formation of the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) in 1999 by CICA, AEA, and CEAST, each church organization preferred to act and advocate for peace individually. Historical tensions and rivalries are often cited as reasons for the absence of a joint approach prior to 1999.

As an ecumenical peace forum, COIEPA has had mixed fortunes. It was successful to some extent in bringing the Angolan churches together structurally to work

for peace. It also provided a focus for dialogue with the international community and became the key advocacy institution of the Angolan peace movement. COIEPA won international recognition in 2001 when the European Union awarded the Zakharov human rights prize to COIEPA's president, Archbishop Zacarias Kamwenho (who accepted the award on behalf of all Angolans working for peace). However this international success was not shared at home as few Angolans had heard of COIEPA or its activities. The churches failed to raise the national profile of COIEPA after it was founded, and rather quickly decided it was most effective to employ COIEPA for international communication, but rely on their own institutions nationally. The churches were also involved in the creation of the Peacebuilding Programme (PCP) in late 1998, where CICA, AEA, CEAST are founding members (along with various other civic and religious organizations). PCP seeks to promote practical local responses in Angola's provinces and strengthen sustainable conflict management capacities at the grassroots level.

A key theme of the churches' analysis of the Angolan war has been that its causes lay in deep historical divisions within Angola's nationalist movement. While the international dimension was clearly evident in various stages of the conflict (Cold War dynamics, and indeed alliances forged by UNITA and the MPLA government in particular post-1992), the churches have consistently argued that the internationalization of the conflict was due to the inability of the nationalist parties to overcome their differences and reach consensus. Internal rivalries and divisions predate the forging of international alliances. It is this analysis that underpinned the solution proposed by the churches, namely that dialogue was the only means to achieve lasting peace. In fact the churches offered to mediate between the parties on various occasions (CEAST 1986; COIEPA 2000; church-based mediation 2001), so as to facilitate the envisaged dialogue. Although Jonas Savimbi did on one occasion in 2000 write to CEAST to encourage the churches to continue their search for peace through dialogue, these offers were never taken up by either of the parties to the conflict.

The creation by COIEPA in 2000 of the Peace Network (*Rede da Paz)* is located within this peace analysis. Membership of the Peace Network was premised on a shared belief in 'inclusive dialogue' as the preferred option for ending the war, envisaged as a process involving support and mediation by Angolan civil society and possibly the international community. The Peace Network brought together an interesting range of pro-peace actors; in addition to the churches, NGOs, private media institutions, women's organizations, and so on, a number of traditional authority figures and elders, including some of Angola's kings, expressed

their support and willingness to collaborate. Unfortunately, after its promising beginnings, the Network has virtually collapsed.

A further key theme in the churches' analysis which is shared by the peace movement as a whole is that those entrusted with securing peace in Angola have gained their place at the negotiating table through the use of arms. These players have in turn marginalized those who have fought for peace through non-violent means, frequently with the consent of the international community. At no point in the negotiation of any of the peace agreements (*Bicesse*, *Lusaka, Luena*, and indeed the earlier *Alvor Accords*) has there been a mechanism for civil society involvement either as negotiators or observers. The peace movement has argued that this deprived the various peace processes of a necessary 'domestic' Angolan perspective that could have helped 'monitor' the agreements, and of a moderating influence that could have been beneficial in building greater consensus.

The churches were a powerful force in the July 2000 Peace Congress held in Luanda under the auspices of CEAST's *Pro Pace* movement. The four-day conference was the first dealing with Angola to be held within the country (the previous month, an international conference with broad Angolan participation was held in the Mozambican capital, Maputo). It brought together representatives from the Angolan government, from political and parliamentary parties, from twenty-two churches, NGOs and civil society organizations. The congress was critical of both sides in the conflict, and among the numerous recommendations was a call for a ceasefire as a "first step towards peace". It also advocated the establishment of some form of permanent dialogue to include "the most representative levels of civil society, such as the churches, political parties and other institutions". The congress was highly criticized within the state media, where it was portrayed as a forum for "those who wanted peace at any price". By contrast, the private print media was very supportive and published many of the conference speeches. *Rádio Ecclésia*, the church run radio, broadcast the event live. Some have argued that the importance of the event is best measured, not with reference to the content of speeches or recommendations, but in relation to its influence on public opinion and its contribution to "breaking the taboo of silence regarding the road to peace", enabling Angolans to discuss the conflict in an open way.

Media

The Angolan private print and broadcast media have been important instruments and allies of the peace movement. The emergence of private newspapers throughout the 1990s, and the (re)launch of *Rádio Ecclésia*

in 1997 created new arenas for communication and debate, above all in relation to the conflict. The print media published 'opinion pieces', and radio schedules included debates and phone-in programmes where key issues were discussed. The issues had generally not been open to public debate within the state-run institutions, and their public consumption on private radio especially, was something totally new and engaging. Generally speaking, the state-run media considered the peace movement as anti-government because of its public rejection of government military policy in pursuing the post-1998 war.

Civic organizations and associations

The growth and visibility of national civic organizations and associations has been a most noticeable feature of change in Angola over the past ten years. The political reforms which preceded the signing of the *Bicesse Accords* in 1991 legalized the creation of independent associations. Among the first civic organizations to be formed were Angolan Action for Development (AAD) and Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA), which both focused initially on reconstruction and agriculture, and the Angolan Civic Association (ACA), which was concerned with civil and political rights. The outbreak of war in late 1992 severely restricted the activity and development of these and other organizations, and also saw the arrival of a great number of international organizations responding to the humanitarian emergency. After the signing of the *Lusaka Protocol* many new national organizations emerged, often with the financial support of international organizations, revealing a particular engagement with human rights awareness programmes.

With the resumption of war in 1998 something quite new happened in Angola, as civic organizations, churches, and private media institutions stepped forward to express disagreement and outrage. It is from this time of frustration and anger that the birth of the 'Angolan peace movement' can be dated. A broad alliance of religious/secular, political/civic actors were opposed to the war. In the words of one organization, the Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace (*Grupo Angolano para Relfexão sobre a Paz*), the war was described as "the will of half a dozen Angolans immune to the sufferings of an entire people and estranged from … the majority of the people. This re-ignited war is about disguising a deliberate process of disengagement from issues related to the identity and the unity of the Angolan people. The current war, imposed on the Angolan people, is nothing but a disguise for the lack of political and ideological arguments".

Other groups also published similar reflections severely criticizing the return to war. Does the fact that these criticisms did not bring about a change of policy by the government or UNITA reflect negatively on the peace movement, highlight a weakness in their approach? Perhaps so, but as we have seen in the case of the 2003 war in Iraq, mass rallies, appeals from churches, civil society organizations and others mostly fail to change the minds of the political and military leaderships. The real issue at stake here is the nature of 'power' enjoyed by governments (executive and military) and civil leaders (public opinion and influence).

While the peace movement continued to advocate renewed dialogue and negotiation throughout the conflict, other themes were promoted within its broad peacebuilding approach. For example, there was emphasis on the promotion of human rights, undertaken through the training of human rights activists and through constructive use of the media, both state and private. Radio programmes, especially on *Rádio Ecclésia*, were particularly effective in this regard, as was the publication of material in the print media. All of this served to build citizen awareness of a most crucial issue. This was reinforced by increased civil society commitment to the importance of influencing the content of the new Angolan constitution. At the initiative of AAD, ADRA and *Mosaiko* Cultural Centre, civic organizations met from December 1998 and put forward position papers to the constitutional commission dealing with 'rights, freedoms and fundamental guarantees'. Also around this time, the question of land rights became a key concern of the peace movement and other actors, and continues to be so today.

The end of the military conflict has presented the Angolan peace movement with new challenges, while the work begun during the years of conflict continues to be equally valid in peace time. In November 2003 CEAST and *Mosaiko* organized the second National Social Week on the theme of political participation, followed by similar initiatives in various provinces. Several coalitions of civic organizations, church groups and political parties launched or revived campaigns for peace in Cabinda, democracy, transparency, human rights, land rights and other peace-related issues and they are beginning to have some resonance. One such coalition is Jubilee 2000, which played an important role in galvanizing Angolan civil society, initially around the issue of debt relief, but later taking on wider social and political themes.

Angolan civil society is becoming an important force for change in the country. While the movement remains heavily dependent on international financial assistance, and key institutions need strengthening, it also reveals the presence of important national capacities committed to building a more peaceful and just society.

Cabinda between 'no peace' and 'no war'

Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali

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To understand the current conflict in Cabinda, we should take three essential factors into account. The first is the enclave's colonial history alongside the history of Angola; the second relates to socio-economic and identity issues; and the third is linked to natural resources, namely oil, and its national, regional and international impact.

Historical and socio-economic roots

The historical roots of the Cabinda question, and of the lengthy conflict in this enclave, lie in the colonial occupation sparked off by the scramble for Africa, and more specifically by the so-called 'internationalization of the Congo question'. Portugal had already included Molembo and Cabinda in its empire in these rivalries, a right recognized by the Portuguese British Alliance Treaty of 1810, and reconfirmed by the Convention signed by both countries in 1815. The Portuguese Constitution of 1826, reconfirmed in 1838, firmly declared that "Angola, Benguela and its dependencies Cabinda and Molembo" belonged to Portugal. More than four decades later, on 1 February 1885, Angola's Governor-General, Ferreira do Amaral, would endorse the famous Simulambuco 'treaty', which is the present-day cornerstone of all independence discourse. Signed in the presence of the Portuguese marines, it was in reality a subtle territorial occupation by the Portuguese, allegedly at the local leaders' request. Furthermore, the concept of 'effective occupation' (which in this context implied military presence) was one of the conditions for recognition of colonial aspirations and territorial claims in the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. It was from this struggle for territory in Central Africa that the enclave of Cabinda was born, situated between the Congo Free State of Leopold II of Belgium (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire) and the French Congo (now the Republic of the Congo, or Congo-Brazzaville).

Cabindan identity and characteristics

The identity issue evolved essentially from these factors – the Simulambuco 'treaty' and the creation of the enclave as a result of European rivalries in the 'scramble' for Africa. Previously independent and scattered communities (even though culturally and linguistically related) were united within the same territory and under the same colonial authority, with their new borders decided by Europeans.

The geographical factor – combined with decades of almost total neglect by the colonial system of what became the 'Portuguese Congo', and the Cabindan tradition of economic migration to both countries – undoubtedly created for the people of Cabinda points of identification strongly rooted in the cultures of the

Congos. The presence of Cabindans in the former French Congo is so significant that since independence a substantial number of Cabinda's elite has participated directly in Congolese political life, occupying high-level positions such as Prime Minister (Alfred Raoul, and Antoine Dacosta) and President (Alfred Raoul as an interim President after the fall of President Massamba-Dedat's regime in 1968), as well as being active in youth movements

Origins of the independence movement

It is from the elite that emigrated to or was born in the Congos that Cabinda's independence movement emerged in the late 1950s, in the form of associations of Cabindans residing in these neighbouring countries. Some of these associations had a regional character, as was the case of the Mayombe Alliance. However, Cabinda's aspiration for independence came clearly to the fore in the early 1960s, with the creation of the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC), led by Ranque Franque. The MLEC joined forces with other separatist groups to create the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) in 1963.

Although no military action was attributed to FLEC until some time after its foundation, the organization did attempt to enter the political scene in 1963 by establishing a 'Government of Cabinda in Exile' in Kinshasa. Its headquarters in the Cabindan border town of Tschela, did not however undertake any guerrilla

activities. It was not until after the collapse of the Salazar regime in Portugal in April 1974 that there was a real 'explosion' of separatist sentiments, emerging from a long period of lethargy. This upsurge of nationalism took place against the backdrop of an extremely complex context in Angola, characterized by confrontation between the three armed nationalist movements (the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA) on the one hand, and the aspirations of some sectors of colonial society for a Rhodesian (white-dominated) type of independence, on the other.

The MPLA leadership blamed the rebirth of Cabindan separatism in the Kinshasa- and Brazzaville-based media on the oil companies, in particular the French company ELF, and on the local political leaders. The connection between ELF and the Congolese wing of FLEC was clear to Angolans: the separatist leader Alexandre Tchioufou, a highly-qualified Congolese of Cabinda origin, was ELF's administrator for their Congolese operation. With some foundation, they also accused Zaire's President Mobutu of preparing to annex Cabinda, in particular after his meeting with Portuguese leader General António de Spínola in Cape Verde in April 1974.

The negotiation process since the 1980s

Although never entirely severed after independence, official contacts between the Angolan government and Cabinda's separatist movements resumed during the 1980s. To assist with this, prominent figures of

Cabindan origin with high posts in Angola's political and administrative structures were committed to that issue, and the prestigious positions they occupied constituted a real attraction to most Cabindans.

If this situation caused serious embarrassment to the separatist movement, it was not, for that matter, a great success, for it failed to persuade the most important figures to subscribe to Angola's "policy of national reconciliation". In fact everything indicates that the two sides did not share the same spirit or philosophical approach to this process, as illustrated by records of the proceedings of some of these meetings from the 1980s onwards. While the separatist delegates presented the future status of Cabinda as a priority item on the agenda, the government representatives for a long time attempted to deal with the issue solely within the framework of its policy of forgiveness and national reconciliation. While the separatist movements attempted to discuss the future of the enclave, the government tried to conduct the meetings as dialogue between "Angolan brothers", causing the repeated breakdown of rounds of negotiations.

Between 1986 and 1989 Gabon and Congo hosted a series of meetings between the Angolan government and the various Cabindan independence factions, in Pointe-Noire, Brazzaville (Congo), and Libreville (Gabon). The talks were a genuine 'dialogue of the deaf' and dealt mostly with questions of protocol. The Cabindan delegates, who appeared increasingly divided, complained constantly that they were treated with less respect than their Angolan counterparts.

After overcoming these issues, the parties addressed the question of what the first agenda item should be. When the Angolan government finally agreed in the 1990s to discuss the issue of Cabinda's future status first, another problem emerged that the government treated as an obstacle to solving the Cabinda question: the constant divisions between the separatist movements. Their differences ranged from strategic issues to simple questions of personality and leadership struggles. The fact that some of these divisions resulted in desertions and in some separatist leaders allying with the Angolan government (whether through choice or persuasion), seems to corroborate accusations by the independence movements of attempts to "undermine them from within". The Angolan government has since argued, with increasing insistence, that the alleged lack of interlocutors caused by the separatist movements' constant divisions is the main obstacle to dialogue.

Sources of divisions

Several factors can be identified as the origins of these divisions. Firstly, a close examination of Cabindan

separatism reveals tendencies related to the different formative experiences of the Cabindan diaspora in Central Africa. Franque, Tchioufou, Raoul and other figures of Cabindan origin were not educated within the same intellectual or socio-political context as each other. They were too intimately involved in the socio-political processes of the countries where they were formed as people and political activists to remain immune to the conflicting aspirations and strategic interests of the two Congos.

There are also divisions between inhabitants of the Mayombe forest and those of the coastal areas, specifically Cabinda City, with the former accused of denying Cabindan 'legitimacy' to the latter. Still further divisions exist between Francophone and Lusophone communities, creating a particular challenge for the new generation of activists, whose education took place in the post-colonial Angolan context. Their cohabitation with peers whose socio-political and intellectual roots lie in the two Congos is not always peaceful. Finally, there are complex personal interests and aspirations. These divisions have provided the Angolan government significant room for manoeuvre, both in provoking desertions and in simply promoting "understanding" of its position.

The end of the war against UNITA and the new strategy

Since the end of the war with UNITA, the war in Cabinda has increased in intensity, with the government conducting "mop-up operations". Angolan civil society organizations and opposition parties have traded accusations with the government concerning events in the enclave in recent years. In October 2002, the government sent an estimated 30,000 new troops, including recently incorporated ex-UNITA soldiers, into the province in an effort to repeat their military success against UNITA. Several reports have accused the government of gross human rights abuses, without, however, giving equal attention to the behaviour of the Cabindan factions. At the end of 2003, half a dozen high-level FLEC commanders handed themselves in to the Angolan authorities and were subsequently integrated into the national army, but even this serious blow has not brought the skirmishes to an end.

What is the short and medium term impact of the government's new strategy? Will it mean further radicalization, completely dismissing the principle of negotiations, even if only for a special status for Cabinda? And what is the strategy of the separatist movement as a whole?

In summary, the Angolan government's strategy is based on two active pillars, and a further absent one.

The limitations of the two active pillars of this strategy have already started to become apparent. The first pillar consists of the continued 'search' for a 'valid interlocutor', who is understood in advance to be non-existent. The government is supported – or supports itself – in this endeavour by the separatist movement's constant internal divisions

The second and more prominent pillar is the military defeat of the separatist movement. Despite the government's justifications of its right to defend any part of its national territory on the basis of sovereignty, the fact remains that military violence not only increases resentment among the population, but also puts the government in a difficult position internationally due to the flood of reports about human rights abuses. In addition, experience illustrates that fighting against movements whose bases are located over the border has high-risk regional geopolitical implications. Furthermore, this violence provides greater media exposure for the the separatist movement and their cause, until now little known abroad.

The absent pillar of the government's strategy is the socio-economic re-investment of the petrol-dollars in Cabinda, which was expected to be the first 'trump' to be utilized in such psycho-social war games. Some Angolans claim that if the post-independence government had invested oil revenue in socio-economic and infrastructural improvements, this would have decreased the grievances of the more moderate protagonists of the Cabindan cause (including those accepting only limited autonomy) and minimized the impact of separatist discourse. Although the government decided in the early 1990s to allocate 10 per cent of the annual oil revenue to the province's budget, this measure was not part of a consistent policy framework. There are already several groups in Cabinda – including some not in favour of independence – protesting against the profound degradation of the province, the absence of basic infrastructure, the pollution of the sea, and the increasingly precarious livelihoods of local fishing communities.

However, even the intelligent use of these reserves as a socio-economic and psycho-social pillar of the war against the Cabindan separatists will be insufficient if the fundamental issue – the assertion of Cabindan identity, sharpened by socio-economic frustrations and interests – is not resolved.

While the war and the militarization of large parts of Cabinda's interior continue, the Angolan government keeps publicly reaffirming its willingness to work towards dialogue and a negotiated settlement, or even to hold a referendum on self-determination. Yet the

endless postponement of broad dialogue with the separatist movements surely coheres with the strategy of maximizing their fragmentation and minimizing the small chance of meeting the so-called valid interlocutor the government keeps on 'searching' for. The Angolan authorities have failed to appreciate the recent, growing role of the Cabindan Catholic clergy in this matter and risk further alienating an interlocutor and potential moderator – the Church in Cabinda.

In early 2004, the Angolan authorities twice prohibited the launch of the civic association *Mpalabanda*, finally launched in March 2004 under the auspices of the Catholic Church in Cabinda. These events further radicalized public opinion in the enclave and demonstrated again that the position of the Church hierarchy had shifted from purely humanitarian concerns to a much more openly political stance.

The situation of the separatist movement is much less clear-cut and it is hardly possible to formulate joint strategies within such a divided universe. Everything indicates, however, that the main strategy is the internationalization of the Cabinda question. To achieve this, there have been a number of efforts to involve Portugal in the process again, with the declared aim of persuading the Portuguese state to resume its supervisory role in accordance with the famous *Simulambuco Treaty*. The second component of this strategy is to get the UN involved. This would mean that Portugal, as the 'supervising power', would act as it did in Timor. Meanwhile, the most radical factions attempt to maintain the military pressure on the ground, seeming to accept the resulting deterioration in the current situation and the excesses perpetrated by both sides.

The combined components of this strategy have little chance of success. Whoever may be in power in Lisbon, Portugal cannot afford to openly confront Angola on this issue given the increasing Portuguese commercial interests at stake in the country and both countries' membership of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). Furthermore, Portugal is bound by the *Alvor Accords* of January 1975, even if their validity changed after the MPLA unilaterally seized power on 11 November 1975.

The government strategy of forever looking for the non-existent interlocutor may eventually prove to be a double-edged sword; all this 'looking' gives increasing exposure to the separatist movement, while it pushes the Cabindan clergy to take a radical political position. This may lead to a situation in which a compromise solution based on a broad consensus (far-reaching autonomy) becomes less likely. It also perpetuates the risks of instability for the region as a whole.

Beyond the silencing of guns

demobilization, disarmament and reintegration

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Since the end of the war in April 2002 the official process of demobilization and disarmament has come to a close and the emphasis shifted to the reintegration of almost 500,000 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) ex-combatants and family members. While the process is largely judged a success by the Angolan government and the international community – at least in having avoided predictions of widespread insecurity and broken the patterns of the past – its implementation reflects the government's military and political advantage and has failed at times to pay sufficient attention to the needs of the ex-combatants themselves. It has given insufficient attention to the 'reintegration' component of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process, the absorption of ex-combatants into society, and their transformation into civilians. It is this process that will be crucial for the consolidation of peace over the longer term.

The Luena Memorandum of Understanding

Although the *Luena Memorandum* was not a new peace accord but a revival of the *Lusaka Protocol* (itself built on the *Bicesse Accords*), demobilization and disarmament in 2002-03 differed significantly from both *Bicesse* and *Lusaka*. The new framework again contained provision for the quartering and demobilization of UNITA's military forces, the integration of a number of UNITA personnel into the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) and Police, and the demobilization and reintegration of the remaining combatants. The number of UNITA personnel for integration into the FAA was, however, limited to around 5,000, to be accommodated in accordance with existing structural vacancies. Whereas the *Lusaka Protocol* had stipulated a number "to be agreed between the Angolan Government and UNITA for the composition of FAA" and under *Bicesse* equal numbers of troops had been stipulated for both sides, *Luena* represented only the conclusion of the process of integration of the two

armed forces from *Bicesse* onwards. This process allowed the government to consolidate its advantage; by prioritizing those deemed a potential 'threat' to the peace process, senior generals and officers could be 'bought off' and the rank and file definitively separated from their leaders – an effective strategy on the part of the government.

In many ways, the DDR process under *Luena* thus reflected the nature of the ending of the war more than the original *Lusaka Protocol* – a victory by the Angolan government rather than a negotiated settlement. Whereas *Lusaka* had called for increased UN participation, on this occasion the Angolan government stressed its determination to carry out the DDR process alone. It took full responsibility for administering and funding the demobilization and disarmament processes (US$187m by January 2004) with no provision for formal third party monitoring and verification, as there had been under the *Lusaka Protocol*, and notably no presence of the UN or other international bodies within the Quartering Areas. A new body, the Joint Military Commission was created to oversee the implementation of *Luena*, presided over by the government and comprising military representatives of the government and UNITA, with military observers from the UN and Troika permitted. A new UN mission was only authorized by the Security Council in August 2002, after formal demobilization was already complete. Although a Joint Commission comprising representatives of the

government, UNITA, UN and the Troika was subsequently created (or resumed) to oversee completion of outstanding issues of the *Lusaka Protocol*, the Angolan government pushed for this to be wound up as soon as possible. It was disbanded in October 2002, despite some UNITA complaints that its work was unfinished and fears this would reduce incentives for the government to ensure the proper completion of DDR processes.

Demobilization

UNITA's armed forces were demobilized at an astonishingly fast rate. Initial plans were based on a UNITA estimate of 50,000 combatants, but this proved to be less than half the number eventually reporting to the Quartering and Family Areas (QFAs). Indeed, people continued to arrive in the QFAs even after the formal conclusion of the demobilization process, and right until their eventual closure. The numbers placed additional strain on logistical and supply capacities, and prolonged registration and demobilization from 80 days to around four months, also delaying reintegration activities. It is widely believed that many reporting had not been active in the last stages of the conflict, an assertion that is to some extent borne out by the low number of light weapons handed in by ex-combatants, around 30,000.

Demobilization formally took place on 2 August 2002, by first integrating all former UNITA soldiers into the FAA, and then demobilizing them. Ex-combatants were

to receive 5 months back payments of salaries according to military rank, a US$100 reintegration allowance and a 'kit' of basic household items and tools, as well as full identity and demobilization documentation.

Demobilization support was made available only to ex-combatants, however, with women eligible to receive only humanitarian support as civilians (only around 0.4 per cent of the total number of ex-combatants registered were women). Child soldiers were not generally registered as combatants but mainly transferred to Family Areas, and as such are not eligible for official reintegration programmes. While separating them from adult combatants was in their interests, it made them particularly vulnerable if they did not have family structures to assist them.

The delivery of humanitarian aid created further complications for the reintegration of child soldiers and children separated from their families. Aid was distributed by family, according to the number of family members (by international agencies at least, government distributions seem to have been less orderly), meaning it was in a family's interest to take in any 'stray' children such as child soldiers or orphans. Once out of the Gathering Areas (GAs), however, this rationale no longer held, leading to a number of unaccompanied children being 'lost' from the system. NGOs and child protection agencies are working with the Ministry for Social Assistance and Reinsertion, a civilian body, to try and correct this problem caused by a lack of long-term planning in what was essentially a military process.

The Quartering and Family Areas / Gathering Areas

The Quartering Areas themselves were established in broadly the same locations as under the *Lusaka Protocol*, with houses, meeting centres, schools and hospitals built by the ex-combatants themselves. Initially 27 were planned, increasing to 35, with an extra 7 satellite areas. They were generally divided into three sections: the Quartering Area, where ex-combatants were located; a separate though usually adjoining Family Area for women and dependents; and a further area housing primarily disabled ex-combatants and older people. Initially conditions were poor and levels of malnutrition frequently critical and even reaching famine levels in some areas. Assistance to combatants was the sole responsibility of the FAA and Angolan government, with the UN humanitarian agencies able to assist only families and dependents. Before providing any relief, however, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) went through a long process of negotiating access to the QFAs, leading to accusations of negligence against both OCHA and the government. Presence was eventually established as

near as possible to the QFAs and in most places conditions soon stabilized. Indeed, visitors to the QFAs were frequently surprised by the level of order and tidiness, reflecting UNITA's renowned military discipline. Although rarely reported to the outside world, tensions within the QFAs were certainly present, fuelled by long delays between arrivals of food and supplies, confusions and irregularities in registration and demobilization, frequent 'false alarms' of camp closure and general feelings of insecurity. Similarly there were reports of resentment from surrounding communities in some areas at the level of support that UNITA ex-combatants were perceived to be receiving.

The QFAs were renamed Gathering Areas in October 2002, to reflect the completion of the demobilization process and the civilian status of inhabitants. Although in some GAs management of the military and non-military areas was separate, in practice the areas were not closely delineated and movement between them was common. Increasingly, they became settlements in their own right, with functioning markets, schools, (very basic) hospitals, and new arrivals as UNITA ex-combatants from other areas sought to locate their family members. This process was also encouraged by the distribution of seeds and tools for subsistence agriculture by some agencies and churches, a policy heavily debated for this very reason, with some focusing on short-term emergency needs, while others looked to the longer-term political and social reintegration of the country. It was feared that ex-combatants would be less motivated to return to their areas of origin and that mini 'UNITA enclaves' would be created. This, largely speaking, has not proved to be the case, although the continued cultivation of crops has slowed the return of ex-combatants and internally displaced people (IDPs) in some areas.

This was also a major fear of the government, and dates were set for the closure of the GAs, from October 2002 onwards. Persistent administrative delays made these deadlines impossible to meet, with the effect, if not the intention, of demoralizing camp residents, who reported their frustration and powerlessness "in the hands of the government". Those who had received seeds and tools did not know whether to plant them in the GAs or wait until they had returned home. Those without identity documents could not leave even if they wanted to attempt the journey independently, and even short journeys to local markets could result in police harassment.

By mid 2003, the majority of the GAs were emptied. The first stage in the journey was generally to transit areas, which were often IDP camps that had sometimes been recently vacated or still had IDP populations living in them. Problems recurred here as ex-combatants were frequently forced to abandon belongings and goods

they could not fit into the badly overcrowded planes and trucks. By early 2004, the majority were believed to have left these transit areas and returned to their 'areas of origin', or moved on to other destinations. Concentrations may exist around certain urban centres, and in temporary locations, either because of ongoing crop cultivation or the wait to rejoin family members once they are re-established. The number is uncertain however, and there may be future population movements following agricultural cycles. Furthermore, there may also be a partial reversal of this trend if ex-combatants perceive greater economic incentives and opportunities such as training programmes around urban areas.

Disarmament

While the number of arms handed in by UNITA ex-combatants was surprisingly low, this may, as already mentioned, reflect the severe depletion of UNITA's active fighting forces at the end of the war. It has been estimated that the weapons handed in represent around 90 per cent of the total possessed by UNITA, with the remaining 10 per cent in the hands of the civilian population. It was feared that the remaining weapons would quickly be turned to use in banditry and localized violence, but widespread insecurity has so far failed to materialize.

It should be remembered however that, while UNITA ex-combatants were fully disarmed, the civilian population remains highly armed, with the Angolan Police citing a figure of 3-4 million small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians. To many people, possession of a weapon has become linked to personal security as well as being a sign of political allegiance. In March 2004, the government announced a plan for the disarmament of civilians, but with the exception of some civil society initiatives, little practical action has so far been taken. During the war, armed militia known as the 'civil defence' were formed in virtually any government-controlled area, armed and loosely directed by the FAA. Participation was virtually compulsory for young and middle-aged males, and refusal would be interpreted as lack of political support for the government, if not outright sympathy for UNITA. It is not clear what their role in peacetime will be. Demobilization and reintegration plans do not provide any formal support for them, although they often feel themselves to have fought legitimately in defence of their homes and communities and thus equally deserving of assistance as the UNITA ex-combatants.

Reintegration

With demobilization concluded, reintegration constitutes one of the biggest challenges to peacebuilding in Angola. Government plans for

reintegration were not revealed until late in 2002, and then only partially. It had been hoped a World Bank funded 'Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Programme' (ADRP) would become quickly operational, but negotiations stalled over its financial management. The ADRP was finally launched in April 2004, but disbursal of funds to implementing organizations is likely to be slow. Actual projects are unlikely to become active until later in 2004-05. This is expected to cover some 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants and 33,000 government soldiers (to be demobilized to reduce the size of the army) but excludes the 'old caseload' ex-combatants from *Bicesse* and *Lusaka* the government had initially hoped to include. In addition, other donors have committed to funding specific initiatives, including US$54m from USAID alone. There is a risk, however, of weak capacity to handle and coordinate these reintegration-focused projects, especially outside Luanda. Institutions and bodies established to handle resettlement, return and reintegration have a fairly weak presence in the provinces, and there is little effective coordination between the activities of the various national and international NGOs. Reintegration is also taking place in the context of the return of around 3-4 million IDPs and almost half a million refugees, often to areas with weak state administrative capacity, and serious constraints on access to areas of resettlement.

At present, it is all but impossible to know how the reintegration process is going. Although the general consensus is that the situation is relatively stable, and that 'worst case scenario' predictions of widespread banditry and insecurity have not emerged, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch have identified abuses and human rights violations, and the 'norms' on return and resettlement are rarely met. In addition, more than two years since *Luena*, which promised access to vocational training and economic support, few programmes have actually materialized and it appears that neither central nor provincial governments have the means or will to support these over the longer-term. Yet reintegration is of crucial importance, not only among ex-combatants themselves – who may or may not live up to their reputation as potential threats to peace – but to the effective consolidation of peace among communities and society more broadly. While UNITA ex-combatants should not be seen to benefit unduly from their participation in the war, neither should they become a burden on their families and communities and a source of economic and social tensions. Rather reintegration presupposes their integration into a community and the development of that community *as a whole*, not as individuals or 'target groups'. Balancing the two is certainly a challenge, but one which must be addressed.

Recently-returned refugees farming
their land in Malanje
Source: Anders Gunnartz/Panos

The land issue in the context of peacebuilding

development or conflict?

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L and is a cross-cutting theme that encompasses many aspects of Angola's political, economic, cultural and social life, especially in the ambit of reconciliation and reconstruction processes aimed at the consolidation of peace.

The potential for land to cause conflicts was until recently under-appreciated. The country's urban-based politicians, preoccupied with an oil-based economy, have long been alienated from rural development issues. The end of the war and the debate around a new Land Bill has changed this. Now the land issue is at the centre of national debate, the subject of many broadcasts, and the cause of more contact between the formal world of laws and elites and the real world of most Angolans. This article will focus on the land issue as it affects the country's rural population, although the urban dimension is equally relevant.

The roots of the problem

Like many other African countries, Angola inherited from its colonial period a 'dualist' structure regarding the possession of land, based on two distinct agrarian systems with differing cultural, sociological and economic patterns, geared to differing objectives. They are characterized as 'family' and 'commercial' agricultures, although in reality the distinctions are far more complex. Family agriculture is not synonymous with subsistence agriculture, and sometimes requires informal hiring of labour; nor does commercial agriculture relate only to very large properties.

The dualist structure derives from the racial and 'civilizational' discrimination inherent in the *Statute of the Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea* (the last version dated 1954) that essentially identified two categories of Angolans: the 'assimilated' and the 'natives'. Angolan socio-political life remains marked by this system even today, despite the various transformations that have occurred since.

Land tenure existed within this legal framework, which recognized the 'natives' right to use the land for agriculture and dwelling according to their habits and customs, but did not recognize their ownership rights. Even after the Statute was abolished in 1961 – a direct consequence of the beginning of armed struggle for independence – rural populations continued to be subjected to a discriminatory regime. In the last twelve years of colonialism, Angola underwent remarkable economic growth thanks to an accelerated modernization process, accomplished largely at the expense of Angolan peasants. About one million rural families saw the average land area they occupied reduced from a little more than 9 hectares per family in the mid-1960s to about 4 hectares in 1973, whilst 6,000 commercial farmers had an average of 700 hectares of which only 10 per cent was actually cultivated. It is not surprising, then, that in areas of higher demographic concentration (such as the central highlands), family agriculture degenerated and poverty levels rose, forcing the internal migration of a growing number of men. This had disastrous consequences, and later influenced the civil war scenario.

Despite the significant social mobility that evolved after independence – ensuing from the revolutionary context and a remarkable effort in the field of education – Angolan society did not free itself from this dualism. In fact, successive MPLA governments have opted for policies that privilege the urban centres to the detriment of rural populations, who are subjected to growing social, political and economic exclusion. This

had a significant influence on the development of UNITA's guerrilla war between 1976 and 1991. While independence allowed farmers to reclaim a large part of their lands (with only a portion going to the emerging state-owned companies), the colonizers' withdrawal led to a decline in the assimilation of the rural domestic economy into the market place – one of the main objectives of colonial policy in its final stages. This rural alienation created conditions where guerrilla fighters could operate relatively freely, even if the population's support for UNITA's political message fluctuated.

Privatization in the 1990s

The collapse of the socialist model at the end of the 1980s triggered many changes in MPLA policies and strategies, although these were not always made explicit. The development of a market economy demands a dynamic entrepreneurial class, and in Angola's case this was to be formed from the military and political elites, who would be the main beneficiaries of a reallocation of state properties. Reallocation implies both privatization and matching the company size to the technical and managerial abilities of its new owners; this latter component was, however, 'forgotten'.

In the case of the state farms, the absence of an up-to-date land register (the 1975 register is still used) determined that assets would be privatized according to their prior situation and dimensions, even if the land was granted only in terms of rights of use. Half of the

total area that constituted the commercial sector during the colonial period had already been distributed to new large landowners by the end of 1999. As the Portuguese had only been able to exploit about 10 per cent of the area at their disposal, and with the new Angolan businessmen still in a very unstable position, it is easy to see how the vast majority of the land granted remains unproductive. This is compounded by the fact that, because of the war, the new 'owners' have only very recently taken over 'their' properties, which have remained occupied in many cases by the nearby population or by former workers.

This privatization of companies took place before and after the first post-independence Land Bill was passed in 1992. This law has positive aspects concerning the safeguard of rural communities' interests, but still retains the 'dualism' without providing tools to overcome it. It leaves the conflict between customary laws and formal land tenure unresolved, with the result that, on one hand, community rights are again being ignored (the first ever legal recognition of community land tenure occurred only in 2001, in Tchicala, Huíla) and on the other hand, that certain citizen's rights – such as women's rights to land inheritance – continue to be overshadowed by the aforementioned customary rights.

Moreover, implementation of this legislation was disorganized and lacked transparency, with various consequences: (i) communal lands, which are intended for rural populations (sort of communal 'reservations') continue to await demarcation, making rural families very vulnerable; (ii) title holders are basically MPLA leaders, current and former government members, high-ranking state officials and members of the armed forces and businessmen – in short, all social groups with access to the ruling or developing elite (or at least those who know their way around the relevant institutions), leaving out the disadvantaged and uninformed population and further reinforcing their exclusion; (iii) the land that is granted is usually unproductive, but the titles are not withheld as required by law; (iv) although still embryonic, a land market is developing, which may lead to the impoverishment and growing vulnerability of families; (v) signs of social conflict are emerging due to conflicting interests between the commercial and family sectors; (vi) displaced persons are returning to their areas of origin due to fear of having their lands occupied; (vii) concern is growing among families with land titles, given what they represent in terms of security, as well as gradual understanding of the supremacy of formal land tenure over customary rights.

New land conflicts

There are worrying signs in provinces such as Kwanza Sul, Huambo, Huíla, Kunene, and even in the outskirts of

Luanda that conflicts will grow and intensify following the end of the war and the lack of adequate legal and others means for land distribution. Two cases from the late 1990s demonstrate the sort of conflicts that have arisen in the last few years and that may be expected in the future:

In Gambos, in the province of Huíla, there had been a rush to former demarcations by new entrepreneurs. Pastoral populations reacted negatively to this movement, as they believed that new farmers made it difficult to access certain water sources and pastures. The authorities of Huíla province revealed that many of these farmers held more land area than was registered or than they needed. The subsequent reorganization allowed the communities to recover more than 5,000 hectares for their collective use. This case was partly settled in a negotiated manner, but elsewhere in Gambos there are similar situations where there is more radicalism on both sides.

Kenguela Norte, in the outskirts of Luanda, is another example. After land cultivated by a Portuguese company was abandoned in 1975, few people remained in this dry area. Although the land was nationalized, the state did not assume effective ownership. Gradually the war drove people there from the interior, and at the same time individuals from the private sector started settling to raise cattle. The new entrepreneurs had not referred to the land register, and local residents considered themselves the legitimate 'owners' for historical reasons. Local authorities were granting land allocations to the entrepreneurs or displaced people independently of the register and, in establishing the lot limits, entrepreneurs had not consulted traditional authorities. Different users were exploiting the land in incompatible ways – peasants growing cassava and raising small cattle, entrepreneurs raising oxen and sometimes goats, which intrude upon the peasant uses. The Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development dealt with the case, with support from the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization. Their proposed solution combined the demarcation of the communities' plots, whereby cohabitation and land rights were established, with compensation whereby the communities surrendered land in exchange for assistance in community development projects.

Much of the land under some form of cultivation before the war was abandoned. It is unlikely that the abandoned land in the family sector (recognized in colonial and later legislation, but without a registry) will become the cause of a wide-scale conflict, unless poor peasants develop a greater capacity for self-organization. It is more likely that modern producers who abandoned land will come into conflict with peasants or new 'owners' who are occupying or using

the land. Another form of latent conflict exists in attempts by new 'owners' to remove peasants from the lands that they have been granted. Without adequate processes for land identification and demarcation, some of the new 'owners' may resort to the use of force.

A new Land Bill

The process of approving a new draft Land Bill began in 2002. The draft aims to address some of the gaps in the previous legislation, but it does not resolve the issues identified here and may even create new problems. Some critics say it is designed to make it easier for the relatively well-off to secure urban property rights, but does little to address land held informally.

However, public debate of the draft bill has at least resulted in the land issue being at the heart of national debate (limited in practice to urban centres) and led to more widespread broadcasting on a subject that was practically unknown to the public in general and even to authorities and opinion makers. It has stimulated greater contact between the real world where life takes place – often the informal world of the excluded – with the formal world of the laws and elites. It has led to greater clarity on central issues including (i) the right claimed by communities to titles that grant them ownership rights (and not only rights of use) of the land they consider ancestrally theirs; (ii) the rights of these same communities to recover land taken unlawfully during the colonial period; and (iii) the recognition of the importance of land ownership as a legitimate ambition and necessity for those who intend to dedicate themselves to agriculture and its modernization, which must include regulations such as area delimitation, its effective utilization, and the introduction of heavy fines to those who do not cultivate. In short, the debate has resulted in the more effective exercise of their citizenship for a large part of the population.

Contribution to a strategy of peace and development

Angola is undergoing a process of change in which the consolidation of peace, national reconciliation and the construction of democracy are central elements. It is therefore crucial to defend those who have been victims of injustice for many decades and ensure that they have access to land titles, whether communal or individual; this should apply to women irrespective of their status (married, widowed or single). For this reason, there must be guarantees that land will not be usurped by an absent and inept entrepreneurial elite with no means of exploiting it, while facilitating access to land for those who can work it effectively as well as live from it and on it. This on its own requires a huge effort on the part of the state institutions and civil society.

History has shown that it is not enough to declare that the law respects habits and customs as well as recognizing customary rights, because that does not offer security to poor farm workers. What matters is that customary practices are incorporated into formal laws, and that citizens, without being subjected to any kind of discrimination, have access to institutions in order to validate their rights. That will allow the development of a modern land policy, in which land use will not be based on sociological differentiation between the family and commercial sectors, but on the size of a property. To paraphrase Mozambican José Negrão, the definition of land ownership will not determine the advancement of the development process, but it is the process itself that will demand more complex ways of defining land ownership.

It is wrong to think that the rehabilitation and modernization of Angolan agriculture can be achieved solely on the back of the commercial sector. It does not have the technical, financial or managerial skills required, and its references are colonial companies, the majority of which had production levels and profit margins little different to the family sector. However, it is also wrong to think that the family sector is (or was) purely concerned with subsistence. In fact, statistics show that there were few agricultural products produced in larger volume by the commercial sector than by the family sector. In short, it is naive to imagine that the commercial sector will benefit from substantial medium-term external investment, because the political climate, costs and legislative, bureaucratic, and infrastructural shortcomings discourage investment in Angola for the time being. There must be recognition that, in the present conditions, the family sector in Angola can guarantee more jobs in the short and medium term than the commercial one.

For all these reasons the solution to the rural question must go beyond competition between the two sectors and use them both as a base for development that is simultaneously locally-rooted and modernizing. The best option for capital investment (national or foreign) will be the establishment of partnerships in which poor rural families contribute land and labour, and investors contribute capital, technical expertise and market knowledge. This would be a good strategy for dealing with the problem of 'dualism'.

Angola is experiencing a crucial period of its history. A policy of inclusive agrarian reform could enable participative and sustainable democratic development. However, if Angola chooses a model that excludes the 80 per cent of the rural population who are living in poverty, fresh ingredients for new conflicts are potentially emerging.

The role of resource management in building sustainable peace

Tony Hodges

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Angola presents a graphic example of how developing countries with large natural resources – in particular oil and other minerals – are among those most prone to poor governance, armed conflict and poor performance in economic and social development. This hypothesis, backed by evidence from many parts of the developing world, postulates that countries with weak institutions (a characteristic of most developing countries) are poorly able to withstand the destructive forces of corruption and conflict unleashed by attempts to control and appropriate the rents accruing to the state from the taxation of oil and other mining operations. Mineral exports drive up the value of the local currency, undermining the competitiveness of the rest of the economy (such as agriculture and manufacturing) because imports are cheap. Often, these factors feed on and exacerbate other social cleavages, such as ethnic, regional or religious divisions.

An exceptional resource endowment

Angola does indeed have an exceptional resource endowment. It is Sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer (after Nigeria), with output currently running at over 900,000 barrels a day (b/d), almost entirely from offshore oil fields along the northern coast. It is also the world's fourth largest producer of diamonds (by value), accounting in 2000 for about 15 per cent of the world's production of rough diamonds. The diamond resources, both alluvial and kimberlite, are concentrated mainly in the north-east of the country.

Angola also has deposits of numerous other, yet-to-be exploited minerals and, in the colonial period, it was a medium-sized producer of iron ore. Substantial gas deposits have been found, but are yet to be productively utilized: most of the gas associated with producing oil fields is still being flared.

The 'resource curse'

If its resources were properly harnessed, Angola would be one of Africa's most prosperous countries. With a relatively small population of only 14.5 million, it should be able to boast indicators of human well-being among the very best in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, war and mismanagement have led to the massive squandering of oil resources, while severely hindering the effective use of most other resources (notably in agriculture).

Although various non-economic factors were important in generating and fanning the conflict in Angola, from the early 1990s, the conflict became a raw struggle for power between rival domestic elites, in which minerals provided both the prize of victory and the means for achieving it. Due to the increase in oil production, government oil revenue, which had been less than $1 billion a year for most of the 1980s, was running at an average of just over $2.5 billion a year by 1995-2001. As for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), its success in controlling the most valuable diamond mining areas in the north-east of the country enabled the rebels to market up to $3.7 billion worth of diamonds between 1992 and 1998, generating an estimated $2 billion in net revenue with which to bankroll its war.

Oil has undoubtedly also been at the heart of the Cabinda conflict. This small province accounts for more than 55 per cent of Angola's oil production. As a result, the cause of separation, championed over many years

by various factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), is bolstered by the prospect of financial viability. For the same reason, however, no Angolan government could ever accept Cabindan secession.

Rising oil revenues and post-war recovery

There is nothing inevitable about the 'resource curse'. Indeed, Angola now has an unprecedented opportunity to overcome the legacy of war. First, the peace agreement of April 2002 consecrated what amounted to a military victory by the government over UNITA, leaving little scope for the losers to return to war in the short to medium term.

Second, the rapid rise in oil production and government revenues in the next few years will provide exceptionally favourable conditions for reconstruction, development and poverty reduction – if these resources are managed well and put to better use than in the past. Following major new oil discoveries in deep water off the Angolan coast since the mid-1990s, investments currently underway will more than double oil production in the next few years, to 2.2 billion b/d in 2008. This will take Angola's oil production to about the same level as Nigeria's and it is quite possible that Angola will eventually overtake Nigeria as Sub-Saharan Africa's main oil producer. The potential benefits are all too evident given that Angola has only about one tenth of Nigeria's population.

The direct benefits of this industry to Angolans are actually quite limited. Capital-intensive, it employs only about 15,000 Angolans. Domestic backward and forward linkages to oil supply industries and refining within the country are also weak. The economic importance of oil therefore lies almost entirely in its role in generating fiscal revenue for the state. Indeed, 80 per cent of government revenue came from the oil sector in 2001 and this revenue is set to rise spectacularly in the next few years, as shown in Figure 1, which is based on projections made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Assuming oil prices between $20 and $24 a barrel, the IMF projects that fiscal revenue from oil will rise above $4 billion in 2004 and climb steadily thereafter, reaching about $8 billion by 2008.

Ultimately, the quality of resource management is likely to be the decisive factor in whether Angola succeeds in achieving long-term sustainable peace or succumbs once again to new forms of conflict, generated by factors such as a failure to develop the non-mineral sectors of the economy (and thus provide jobs and sources of income), frustration and anger at continuing high levels of poverty and social inequality and/or rivalries within the elite over access to the oil rent and other economic opportunities. There are two major issues here. The first is the question of where the government's expenditure priorities lie. The second is transparency in the management of public finances.

Resource allocation

In the past, security imperatives have resulted in extremely high shares of government expenditure going to defence and security. As a percentage of GDP, defence and security expenditure peaked at 26 per cent (by far the highest level in the world) in 1999, but then fell back to 7 per cent in 2001 and 2002, although this is still very high by international standards. It must be stressed that the Angolan figures are likely to be large under-estimates, since they exclude substantial expenditure on defence and security that is off-budget (taking place outside the government's established rules and procedures for payments and not properly recorded in the government accounts). It is also worrying that the government is continuing to give high priority to defence and security, which were allocated 32 per cent of the budget for 2004.

Over the years, high defence and security expenditure has crowded out expenditure on the social sectors, notably education and health, and on basic infrastructure, such as roads and water supply. These are all critical for economic growth, job creation, poverty reduction and improved human well-being. There has been some recent improvement, with the social sectors' share of total classified expenditure rising from 9 per cent in 1999 to 22 per cent in 2002 – although these figures would be much lower if unclassified expenditure was included, because very little, if any, of that expenditure goes to health, education or other social services. It is also important to note that, within the social sectors, resource allocation has been biased by elite interests, such as funding for overseas scholarships and overseas medical evacuation, at the expense of the most elementary needs of the population (primary health care and basic education).

Figure 1. **Oil production and Government oil revenue, 2001-2008**

(actual for 2001-2002, IMF forecast for 2003-2008)

Oil production (barrels per day)

Government oil revenue ($ billion)

Source: IMF, Angola: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation, July 2003.

The problem of transparency

The second major issue is the inadequate transparency in public finances, which means that it is not totally clear how much revenue the government receives and how it is spent. According to IMF estimates, in 2002, 31 per cent of government expenditure was off-budget. This was the case for 36 per cent of government expenditure between 1998 and 2002. Furthermore, 11 per cent of expenditure in 1998-2002 could not be accounted for at all. This was the discrepancy (calculated by the IMF) between the government's known expenditure (recorded and unrecorded) and known revenue, including financing.

There are other closely related transparency issues concerning government revenue and the external debt. With respect to revenue, there are large discrepancies in the data on oil taxes. This problem results partly from the fact that oil companies' taxes (and the 'signature bonuses' for new oil blocks) are sometimes not paid directly to the Treasury but pass through off-shore accounts held by the state oil company, Sonangol. Sonangol's delays in passing on tax payments to the Treasury and the failure to index them (against the dollar), in a context of high domestic inflation, have resulted in large losses to the state. Furthermore, the fact that Sonangol's accounts have never been independently audited means that it is impossible to verify that all taxes paid by the oil companies eventually reach the Treasury.

Regarding the external debt, over the past decade the Angolan government has resorted to oil-guaranteed loans to cover its continuing large deficits. By the end of 2000, there was an outstanding stock of about $5 billion of these loans (accounting for roughly one half of Angola's total external debt), which are repaid with earmarked oil shipments. Often these loans, raised by Sonangol on behalf of the state, have not been recorded in the government's debt database and have been used for off-budget expenditures.

The lack of transparency makes it difficult for the Angolan government to rally international support for reconstruction. There is a feeling among donors that, given the scale of its oil revenue, the government should be doing more for its own people and, as a minimum, should be able to account properly for the use of its own resources. By way of comparison, it should be noted that the unexplained discrepancy between known revenue and financing on the one hand and recorded expenditure on the other, which averaged $490 million a year in 1998-2002, is more than net overseas development assistance ($359 million a year in 1997-99).

Figure 2. **Off-budget expenditure, 2002**

Source: IMF, Angola: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation, July 2003.

The lack of transparency also means that the government cannot provide the credible data required for negotiations in the Paris Club on the restructuring of Angola's large external debt, which, as of December 2002, included $5.3 billion in arrears.

Resource management and corruption

Along with weak government procurement and auditing systems, the lack of transparency about revenue, expenditure and debt creates conditions in which corruption can thrive. Suspicions and accusations abound. In December 2000, the French authorities arrested a Franco-Brazilian businessman, Pierre Falcone, and Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the son of the former French president, on charges of arms trafficking related to an arms-for-oil deal with Angola in 1993. The charges were later dismissed on legal technicalities, but 'Angolagate', as the affair came to be known, helped to create an aura of suspicion about the opaque world of Angolan oil-guaranteed loans, trade finance and arms contracts. A new scandal broke out in 2003 when the Angolan government appointed Falcone, still under investigation and banned from France and the United States, as its representative at UNESCO. The investigations continue.

A further controversy arose early in 2002 about the use of oil-guaranteed loans in the restructuring of Angola's bilateral debt to Russia. Suspicions regarding these transactions, through bank accounts in Geneva, prompted the Swiss judicial authorities to open an inquiry, which revealed that hundreds of millions of dollars had been paid into the private bank accounts

of senior Angolan officials (including the head of state) and foreign businessmen, at the expense of the Russian and Angolan states. Several accounts were frozen. It is hardly surprising, given such high profile incidents, that Angola is widely regarded as one of the world's most corrupt countries: it ranked 124th out of 133 countries in Transparency International's corruption perceptions index in 2003.

In a broader sense, going beyond outright fraud, corruption encompasses a wide range of practices which, in a system characterized by the absence or non-enforcement of clear rules and procedures, enable well-connected individuals to obtain privileged access to resources and benefits, at the expense of wider societal interests. In Angola, where the dispensation of patronage has been one of the key strategies for conserving political power, such practices have been commonplace, particularly with respect to diamonds and commercial farmland. Corruption has also 'trickled down' and is common in many everyday encounters, such as those between teachers and students, police and citizens. It is common practice in many transactions to ask for a *gazosa* (literally a 'soft drink'), meaning a bribe, although this so-called petty corruption is not just a case of lower level officials copying their superiors, but is a survival strategy adopted by extremely poorly paid Angolan officials.

Of course, corruption is not a one-way street. It involves both the 'corrupter' and the 'corrupted' and, as Angolagate and other scandals show, foreigners as well as Angolans are deeply involved. For this reason, international action is needed to prevent international criminal elements colluding with corrupt government officials to divert resources illicitly from countries where the institutional framework to prevent, detect and punish corruption is weak. Ultimately, however, Angola needs to defend itself by building just such an institutional framework, including rigorous Treasury, public accounting, procurement and auditing systems, effective scrutiny of public finances by the National Assembly and an independent judicial system.

Diamonds

Quite apart from their role in sustaining UNITA during the 1990s, diamonds have been one of the main sources of enrichment of senior government officials and military officers over the past decade. The regime has awarded diamond concessions as a means of rewarding loyalty, creating classic rent-seeking situations in which the Angolan concessionaires act as 'sleeping partners' with foreign companies, which bear all the prospecting, development and operating costs (and thus all the risks), while sharing the profits.

Meanwhile, smuggling of diamonds has remained a major problem: the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA estimated that, in 2000, about one third of the estimated $1 billion worth of diamonds exported from Angola were smuggled, including about $100 million worth of diamonds originating from UNITA and $250 million worth of other illegal diamonds. Despite rising somewhat in recent years, government revenue from the diamond industry remains very low.

The 'scramble' for diamond wealth, which has been conducted mainly by outsiders, has fostered resentment among the local Lunda-Chokwe population in the diamond-rich provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. This has been reflected in the rise of a regional party, the Social Renewal Party (PRS), which came second in both provinces (behind the MPLA but ahead of UNITA) in the 1992 parliamentary elections.

The role of external actors

Due to the destructive nature of past external involvement in Angola, foreigners are rather poorly placed to influence resource management practices for the better. Generally, they have little credibility within the country: most Angolans assume that foreign involvement is motivated entirely by the desire to profit from the country's oil, diamonds and other resources.

This is of course absolutely true for the multinational corporations engaged in Angola. By the very nature of their commercial interests (and their fear of losing mineral concessions or business permits), they are in a weak position to question government policies or practices. Most would argue that in any case this is not a legitimate role for them to perform.

However, large international companies have increasingly come under pressure in the developed world to act within the norms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Most of the major international companies operating in Angola have tried to cultivate an image of CSR by engaging in small-scale philanthropy. At its most misguided, this has taken the form of support to the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA), a body with a purportedly charitable purpose whose main function is to promote the beneficent image of the head of state. Most of the oil companies channel some of their philanthropic assistance through a 'social fund' managed by Sonangol (a so-called 'social bonus' has to be paid to this fund alongside the signature bonuses paid to the state for new oil blocks), while some also finance projects sponsored by NGOs and UN agencies, for activities ranging from demining to localized community development projects. Worthy though many of these activities are, in financial terms

they represent a minuscule fraction of the profits these companies make (or hope to make) from their investments in Angola and they also do not directly address the resource management issues that ultimately are far more important to the Angolan people's well-being.

More far-reaching are the initiatives that have been taken, at an international level, to curb the trade in 'conflict diamonds' and to promote transparency in the oil industry. Although worldwide in scope, both initiatives have been strongly influenced by the situation in Angola.

In the first instance, the work of the British-based NGO Global Witness helped to strengthen implementation of the UN sanctions against UNITA imposed in 1998 (a ban on the purchase of unofficial Angolan diamonds and the freezing of UNITA bank accounts). Although not fully effective, the efforts to give teeth to the sanctions by setting up a monitoring regime did contribute to raising UNITA's transaction costs and thus diminishing its resources for war.

Significantly, this was accompanied by a major shift in the role played by De Beers, which controls about 65 per cent of the world trade in rough diamonds. During the 1990s, De Beers had been systematically buying up smuggled diamonds from African conflict zones, including Angola, in accordance with its policy of acting as buyer of last resort, a role it had played since the 1930s to stabilize the world diamond market. Fearful that it would become the object of an international consumer backlash, De Beers decided in 2000 to take a strong stand against conflict diamonds and joined the Fatal Transactions campaign in efforts to curb the smuggling of these diamonds, through the introduction of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The scheme was finally launched in January 2003, after three years of negotiations among governments, the diamond industry and NGOs, although both De Beers and NGOs criticized the failure to set up an effective, independent monitoring mechanism, an omission which could fatally undermine the scheme's credibility.

Little, if any attention, has been given meanwhile to the resource management issues affecting the Angolan diamond industry, such as the patrimonial nature of diamond concessions and the potential for conflict between outside interests (Angolan concessionaires, foreign mining companies and traders) and local communities in the diamond rich areas.

Apart from the issue of conflict diamonds, the main focus of international attention has been on the need for full and open disclosure of the tax and royalty payments made by oil and mining companies in the developing world. Internationally, this has been championed by the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition of NGOs and by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promoted by the British prime minister, Tony Blair. However, consultations among governments and oil and mining companies have resulted in the rejection of a compulsory international framework, such as the one demanded by PWYP, which would require companies to disclose all their payments.

A voluntary scheme, advocated by EITI, is unlikely to have any practical effect, as individual companies will not risk disclosing their payments unless all their rivals are obliged to do the same. Indeed, the potential risks of individual voluntary disclosure were brought home starkly to one oil company, British Petroleum (BP), in Angola in 2001. When BP decided unilaterally to publish the value of taxes paid to the Angolan government, Sonangol accused the company of breaking confidentiality clauses in its agreements and threatened to terminate its contracts.

Full disclosure of tax payments would go only part of the way to improve transparency. While it would help clarify how much revenue is received by the Angolan state, it would not necessarily result in transparent management of those resources. On this broader issue, the IMF has been trying to bring about reforms in the management of public finances, notably through two 'staff monitored programmes', in 1995 and 2000-01. Both were unsuccessful, due in large part to the failure to bring all expenditure on-budget.

Over the years, large and rising oil revenues have enabled the Angolan government, unlike the governments of poorer African countries, to keep IMF conditionality at bay and avoid fundamental reforms in public finance management, despite serious macroeconomic imbalances and the large external debt. This already weak external leverage will become even weaker as oil revenues soar in the next few years. Ultimately, fundamental change in resource management in Angola will come not from outside, but from within, as Angolans assert their right to benefit from the exploitation of their country's natural resources.

However, by providing access to information and greater awareness of the nature of the problems facing resource-rich countries, the international pro-transparency campaign can assist those within the country (whether in parliament, in the press, in the churches, in professional associations, trade unions and NGOs) who are beginning to press for full transparency and better use of the rapidly rising resources available for reconstruction and poverty reduction.

The challenges of democratization

Filomeno Vieira Lopes

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From the struggle for independence to the ongoing separatist war in Cabinda, control of the state and natural resource wealth have been at the root of Angola's conflicts. All peace accords essentially tried to solve the question of the political regime and the exercise of power. At independence in 1975, a 'one-party regime' was established, which suppressed citizens' rights and left no space for democratic development. However, Angola was not left behind when the end of the Cold War sent a wave of democratization across Africa. Democratization was one of the main pillars of the political negotiations leading to the *Bicesse Accords*, and elections took place in September 1992. But the 'winner takes all' model of the elections and the refusal of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to accept the victory of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), combined with an incomplete demobilization process and the absence of established national organizations capable of mediation, led to the resumption of war. The fact that this war was finally brought to an end in 2002 by military force means that political negotiation and democratic processes have still not been sufficiently consolidated as generally accepted norms for managing the country. From this perspective, the creation of a truly participative democracy continues to be the crucial challenge for the construction and consolidation of peace.

The restrictions on democracy during the post-1992 conflict

During the war that followed the 1992 elections, the government argued that restrictions placed on the budding democratic opening were exceptional steps necessitated by the armed conflict. While a state of emergency was never declared, the government adopted an array of measures, postures and inactions that hindered the development of the same democratic regime that was supposedly being defended.

Both sides used the conflict to justify the violation of human rights. The mutual radicalization involved practices such as the indiscriminate mobilization of children for military action, in violation of international human rights conventions. Human rights violations outside the theatre of war also went unchecked. Military and paramilitary forces, police and politicians enjoyed impunity on the grounds that unity had to be preserved. The government's approach targeted and criminalized independent journalists, who faced intimidation or even assassination for publishing news about corruption or articles of a military or 'security' nature. One case that inflamed public opinion was the government offensive against journalists and newspapers that published the interview given by Jonas Savimbi to Voice of America in March 2001.

A number of measures also impeded the foundation and development of civil society activities and associations (such as the Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy (AJPD)). Changes of the law in 1995 regarding political parties' access to the airwaves and the right to reply hindered their political participation and the transmission of their positions through the major state-owned media outlets. The government accused civic associations of being anti-patriotic (for welcoming international organizations' human rights reports), of working for 'the enemy', and of behaving as political opponents – allegations that created an atmosphere of intimidation and sanctioned heavy-handed security measures against their leaders.

The constitutional right to expression became a virtual 'decree' requiring police authorization for everything, and several political activists were imprisoned during this time for exercising this right. Any opposition to government that had the capacity to influence the masses was treated as a "way of facilitating the enemy's penetration". On the other hand, the government was unable to bring into effect the constitutional and legal institutions linked to the defence of citizens' fundamental rights, such as the Court of Accounts (implemented only in 2002), Constitutional Courts, the Attorney-General, the Ombudsman and the High Authority against Corruption. Organizations with greater socio-political balance, such as the National

Council for Social Reconciliation and the National Media Council that were established in the 1992 constitutional review, did not function. Combined with the submission of legal power to a 'single command' under the pretext of the war, such 'gaps', omissions and lack of functionality completed the net of restrictions on the emergence of democracy, and constituted a closed circle of obstructions to the democratic process.

This restricted democracy fuelled the belief among some citizens that, with a political class dependent on the existence of war, peace was indispensable to the emergence of democracy. This led the political and social movements to prioritize the struggle for peace, on the basis that war was clearly a powerful pretext for impairing democracy, which at the time amounted to little more than the existence of a constitution, an array of formal laws, a multi-party parliament and some independent newspapers, as well as the inhibited emergence of a few civic associations.

Throughout the war, the MPLA's focus on consolidating its own position was evident, whether through the increasingly narrow politicization of institutions and society or the privatization of the economy for the benefit of the political elite. These phenomena have hindered the emergence of a democratic state after the war.

Post-war trends

After the signing of the *Luena Memorandum* by the government and UNITA in April 2002, the nation witnessed a military peace, allowing the silencing of the guns. In reality, arms were laid down because one of the parties was defeated, not as a result of a ceasefire which anticipated political negotiations, nor as a direct and explicit result of the struggle by the democratic political parties and those sectors of civil society that were against the war. Two years after the *Memorandum*, the reduction of peace to a military logic has hindered the development of the democratization process, as the latter is entwined with social peace, a condition that in turn makes democracy effective. The lack of transparency, sincerity and political will to reach real peace is apparent in the pervasiveness of war in Cabinda.

The delay and restrictions on democratization, combined with the transfer of state property to sectors of society with close links to political power, and the policy of secrecy with regard to public finances and the rendering of state or state-owned company accounts, are hampering the implementation of a 'social peace'. Thus the absence of effective democratization endangers the consolidation of peace, as peace can only exist alongside freedom, the capacity to share, transparent political competition and social justice – realities that are in opposition to absolute control of society through the politicization of institutions and the privatization of the state.

Two symptoms are emerging in the post-war situation. The first regards the difficulty in satisfactorily completing the tasks envisaged in the *Luena Memorandum,* such as the demobilization and social reintegration of soldiers, the disarmament of the civilian population, and UNITA's own participation in public office; this is combined with the re-emergence of political intolerance, which is evident in several statements addressed to the government by UNITA officials. The second symptom is evident in people's sometimes violent reactions against government policy and abuses of authority, such as the compulsory transfer of housing from one zone to another to accommodate real estate interests, the demolition of markets without new structures being built, blatant theft from *kinguilas* (informal money changers) and *zungueiras* (street sellers) by policemen, and other repressive behaviour. In the provinces especially, there is generally little political freedom or public debate, nor any questioning of anti-democratic government measures. Fear continues to be citizens' normal frame of mind.

In the context of a multidimensional crisis including extreme poverty (about 70 per cent of Angolans live on less than a dollar a day), very high unemployment, and a lack of investment in social sectors such as health and education, the protests – some of which are already becoming violent – are a sign that peace has not been consolidated. This calls attention to the lack of a 'pact' (demanded by both civil society and political opposition parties) between the different political and social forces, to address the causes of the war and the continued violence, such as hunger, glaring social inequalities and lack of freedom. Instead, the government continues to create obstacles to the activity of organizations defending citizens' interests, such as *Mãos Livres* (*Free Hands*), SOS Habitat, Cabinda's civic association *Mpalabanda* and Jubilee 2000. A crucial component of this strategy of restricting democratic space is the refusal to allow *Rádio Ecclésia*, linked to the Catholic Church, to extend its signal to the whole national territory unless it changes its editorial line, as demanded by the President. 'National reconciliation' has been restricted to the distribution of political positions among UNITA members formerly at war with the government.

The policy of restricted democracy has led to the marginalization of the role of the opposition parties (viable only within democratic contexts) and the absence of an active civil society. Whether they are in the Assembly or not, political parties have been unable to stop the rampant corruption in the state apparatus, demand the rendering of accounts, or enforce the constitution through the enactment of its institutions. Given that both political parties and organized civil society play the role of *mediating forces* in the political arena, since they channel citizens' concerns in a constitutional manner, their ineffectiveness compels the mass of citizens to directly confront the regime, which is personified for them in a repressive police force. This situation reinforces the MPLA's conviction of the need for increased investment in means of repression, which is obvious from the General State Budget, which in 2004 still allocates 32 per cent for defence and security, a higher percentage than that spent by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The elections and the new Constitution – a difficult birth

Angolans have voted only once in their lives, in 1992. The MPLA has a majority in the National Assembly and can pass any law it pleases. In 1996, the MPLA voted to extend its mandate on the pretext of the war. Despite the official end of the war on 4 April 2002, the party in power is unwilling to set a date for elections on the grounds that it is first necessary to meet 14 requirements; a goal not achievable, in its view, before 2006. These requirements range from the adoption of a new Constitution and a new electoral law to the revitalization of the rural economy, in addition to reaching a national consensus on

Angola's development until 2025. The opposition parties, including UNITA, and sectors of civil society have called for elections in 2004 (especially the FpD) or 2005, in order to prevent the National Assembly from extending its mandate without popular legitimacy, and to bring an end to the autocratic style of the MPLA and the President. The President's failure to consult any political parties about the forthcoming elections has already resulted in a walkout by the opposition members of the Constitutional Committee, until this body carries out the consultation prescribed in the Constitution.

There is general weariness regarding the system of government, and the vast majority sees the election as an opportunity for change. The great political challenge of the elections, whenever they are held, will be to ensure a more even playing field than in 1992 – a significant challenge, given the party-in-power's omnipresence not only in the government and state structures but in all sectors of society. In this context, there is continuous concern about the need for de-politicization of institutions and of society, as MPLA cells are still present in work places, mostly in the state sector, and the party's direct control over Resident Committees and Neighbourhood Coordinators is only being dismantled partially and gradually. The politicization of the judiciary, police and other state services, public companies, banks, sports clubs, foundations, etcetera, is an additional obstacle to overcome.

In January 2004, the Constitutional Committee approved the basic principles for a 'Draft Constitution' elaborated by a technical committee. This draft envisages a presidential model of government without any countervailing powers; according to Article 47 of the Draft Constitution, "The Head of Government is the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces". In line with this, among other powers, the Head of Government appoints and dismisses provincial governors, the President of the National Bank and juridical bodies, as well as guiding their activities. The President also dissolves Parliament. However, Article 9 of the Draft Constitution states that, "The Republic of Angola is a unitary and indivisible State that respects in its organization the principles of autonomy of the organs of local power and of administrative decentralization and deconcentration". The Constitution does not include provision for the election of provincial governors; instead governors are nominated in accordance with the proposal of the largest party in the provincial legislative elections, which will rule in a *deconcentrated* form, in other words, where local bodies represent central power. The MPLA ceded this point to UNITA, which fought with the rest of the opposition parties for governors to be elected, as a

counterweight to the presidential system. Only at local level (i.e. municipalities and communes), are bodies elected and administrative powers decentralized. Apart from that, the Draft (Article 227) provides for a 'National Council for Local Affairs', as a consultative and non-permanent body of the National Assembly.

Without democratization there can be no social peace

In conclusion, the democratic process in Angola is experiencing a difficult and dangerous period, given that peace and democracy are interdependent yet neither is fully realized. The war provided the justification for the restriction of the democratic process, and this persists in the idea that the military victor can shape the political system at its discretion.

That the democratic process is incomplete and somehow stalled is demonstrated by the failure to fully enact constitutional institutions, as well as by the postponement of electoral competition, while autocratic structures are maintained. It can also be detected in the existence of arbitrary and coercive systems, as well as an increased militarization of society and obstructions to the existence of associations and unions, all of which are stirring riots and leading to violence. With the prevailing party-state relationship and the concentration of wealth within a political minority, there is a continued failure to share resources and power. The state is in fact currently an appendix to the party in power, which in turn absorbs it through an undeclared oligarchy (or 'kleptocracy'). The 'democratic deficit' is also visible in the paralysis of the National Assembly, which is incapable of legislative initiative and of monitoring the action of the executive. Finally, it is evident in the non-existence of a continuous and inclusive dialogue able to formulate proposals to overcome the great national challenges, such as genuine national reconciliation, the fight against poverty, environmental degradation and sustainable development.

In March 2004, 30 civic associations and parties including UNITA launched a campaign called 'Peace without democracy is fantasy' under the sponsorship of Open Society-Angola. The campaign is not limited to the capital, but organizes meetings and demonstrations in the provinces, from Cabinda to Huambo and the Lundas, based on a Manifesto for Democracy, which states, among other things, that "at present (…) the exercise of liberties and rights is the greatest challenge facing the Angolan people."

If Angolans intend to preserve and consolidate peace, they must have the courage to face these challenges and to make the democratic process real.

Angolan women in the aftermath of conflict

Henda Ducados

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F our decades of violent conflict have inflicted serious harm on the Angolan population and on women in particular. The gendered impacts of conflict and poverty in Angola are evident, as reflected in lower human development indicators for women than men. With lack of human security still an everyday reality, women and children comprise the most vulnerable groups, and along with old men, have typically comprised up to 80 per cent of the internally displaced population. In the aftermath of the war, Angolan women face new challenges as they struggle to overcome these obstacles and participate fully in their society. Yet, it seems the government has so far failed to address the changing role of Angolan women and the transformation of gender relations.

Women's participation in the war

Women's recent history remains largely unacknowledged in public discourse on the war. The paths walked by women as soldiers, leaders, activists, survivors and victims of one of the most tragic wars in the African continent have yet to be widely discussed and their implications understood.

The Organization of Angolan Women (OMA), created in 1962 as the women's wing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) played a crucial role in supporting the guerrilla forces from both inside and outside Angola. Reports on OMA's activities show that its members contributed to food production for the guerrilla army, organized literacy campaigns and basic health care and carried arms and food over long distances. There are no figures on how many women participated in the MPLA guerrilla army but oral testimonies indicate a substantial number.

OMA saw women's involvement and participation in the independence struggle as being "a testing ground where all who took part were called upon to make their utmost effort and develop their talents and abilities". As in other women's organizations linked to liberation movements, the OMA leadership comprised mainly

educated women with strong family or marital links to the political leadership of the party. Nevertheless OMA's main supporters were ordinary women from all social and ethnic backgrounds, who became involved in political activism and community work. Consequently, by independence, OMA had gained enough popular support to have delegates in every province and had an estimated 1.8 million registered members in 1983.

In turn, the Independent League for Angolan Women (LIMA), the women's wing of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was created in 1973 and also played an important role in the liberation struggle. It is said that women who witnessed the work of women's wings of other African national liberation movements instigated the creation of LIMA. In contrast to OMA, women in leadership positions in LIMA had no kinship ties to the UNITA leadership, due to fear of repercussions against men if women failed in their endeavours.

Women's role in UNITA during the liberation struggle involved the transport of materials, food and arms to men on the front line. Carrying was done on the head and involved long distances. Political activities consisted mainly of mobilizing people and particularly youngsters to join the armed struggle. Women were also trained as political activists. During the post-independence civil war, women remained active on all fronts and the leadership of LIMA was visible in political rallies both inside and outside the country.

The legacy of war

Women suffered the direct effects of war in distinct ways. In addition to the large number of women who died as a result of combat operations, it is also acknowledged that many were raped by fighters on both sides. While soldiers were supposed to protect the population, many used their position to further subjugate women. Their behaviour and its impact on power relations between the sexes may have undermined the population's trust in those men. Women have also suffered most from landmine accidents, due to their responsibilities for gathering food. Many have lost their husbands and sons through the war, thus increasing the number of female-headed households.

The war and its impacts have increased women's workloads, as they have taken greater responsibility for activities usually performed by men, such as providing for the household, disciplining male children, building and repairing houses, dealing with community leaders and government officials, and fulfilling religious and social obligations. Many continue to perform these tasks even in peacetime, mainly because husbands have died or deserted the household. Women's earnings in the informal sector of the economy have started to pose a serious cultural challenge to men's income-earning abilities and to gender relations in the family. These changes may partly explain increasing evidence of an upsurge in domestic violence against women and children since the early 1990s.

At the household level, the long years of conflict have also created situations where women find it difficult to marry and remarry, especially if they have suffered sexual abuse. The shortage of available men also means that marriage is associated with accepting polygamous arrangements, which continue to be a common and socially acceptable practice in Angola. In situations when men had to fight in a different region for a few years, the forming of secondary households was seen as legitimate.

The interaction of thousands of soldiers in front-line regions with the destitute population also has tremendous long-term gendered impacts. For instance, young women who engaged in prostitution for survival during the conflict may suffer from serious health problems, poor self-esteem or social exclusion if they have become pregnant and/or contracted sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

Following the *Luena Memorandum*, the government agreed a large demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programme. However, against the advice of the World Bank and other institutions, non-combatant women were excluded from any direct benefit as the programme covered only a set number of UNITA and Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) soldiers and failed to make specific provisions for vulnerable groups like widows and UNITA wives.

Women who were abducted by UNITA face the dilemma of whether or not to leave their UNITA husbands and return to their original homes, where they risk being rejected. In addition, the social reality of UNITA's supporters is critical for both men and women; relationships with non-UNITA supporters remain difficult, with people still suspicious of each other and some reluctant to provide UNITA supporters with jobs.

Further evidence suggests that women from UNITA who lived through the guerrilla years in the bush now have difficulty relating to men. Those in urban areas reveal that they can now enjoy expressing their feelings more openly but are not used to doing so; long years spent under a repressive system have made them reluctant to show their feelings in public.

Participation in political life and women's involvement in peace initiatives

As in so many other conflict situations, Angolan women were excluded from meaningful participation in the formal peace negotiations between the warring parties. Neither OMA nor LIMA was able to play effective roles in bringing an end to the war.

Women's most vocal participation in political life has been their promotion of women's rights. Both during and since the end of the war, they have been in constant negotiation with the political leadership, lobbying for their concerns to be taken seriously by policy-makers and government officials. In the past, OMA played a decisive role as a policy-driven outfit dedicated to fighting for the improvement of women's legal status as well as their economic empowerment, and above all, the integration of women's issues into mainstream policies.

Arguably, OMA's most significant achievements occurred in the 1980s. Their efforts led to the introduction of the Family Code and formulation and implementation of a policy to provide free family planning to women. The main features of the Family Code are the recognition of consensual unions as marriage, the protection of children born out of wedlock and the encouragement of a fair division of tasks and responsibilities within the family. OMA also provided technical assistance to women and encouraged debate and discussion on previously taboo subjects such as customary marriage and abortion.

Although OMA played an effective role in promoting these reforms, the reality is that the majority of women are still fighting for their rights to be respected in practice. And while OMA is still a strong reference point for the women's movement in Angola, it is no longer the leading group representing the women's agenda. Membership has gone into decline as the organization's continued ties to the MPLA have contributed to undermining its public credibility and ability to attract funding from the international community. Some members decided to create their own NGOs as a means of functioning independently of the party and have been more active and resourceful in responding to women's needs, through the instigation of development programmes and campaigns on issues such as reproductive rights and child vaccination.

It is important to note that some women's organizations have been visible in peacebuilding efforts. For instance, Rede Mulher has been an advocate for peace and campaigned against violence against women, and Women, Peace and Development (MPD) has also been active in peacebuilding. These initiatives have contributed to building a women's platform on peace and more importantly revealed that it is possible for women from different political parties and social sectors to combine efforts towards the same goal.

Nevertheless, the women's movement in general is weak. Like other social movements in Angola, it lacks capacity, influence and coordination. Many women's NGOs are unfocused in their role and objectives, reflecting a more general weakness in Angolan civil society, with the result that they have had little influence on policies that could improve women's lives.

Criticism has also been made of the movement's failure to represent the interests of women at the grassroots. Leadership is often in the hands of privileged women who have separate agendas due to their strong links with political parties.

One of the reasons why the women's movement has failed to unite on a common platform stems from the fact that the war has not meant the same to all women. Women have used a variety of means to survive and the social reality of poor women, whether in rural or urban areas, differs greatly from that of more privileged women. Larger numbers of poor women have lost their husbands and sons in the war and been displaced. These women are left with little hope for immediate improvement of their living conditions considering their low level of education and the fact that little is done politically to address their special needs.

In addition, women's organizations suffer from the same constraints as other civic organizations in funding and undertaking activities independently of the government. The non-governmental sector is still emerging and NGOs do not have much experience or capacity to respond to the enormous needs of many communities. The majority of civic initiatives are donor-driven rather than community-driven and have so far implemented short-term humanitarian emergency activities to the detriment of long-term development activities. In this context, significant assistance needs to be provided to local groups for them to start implementing sustainable long-term activities. At present, these are mostly left to international organizations, thus contributing to a wide disparity between the capacities of local and international actors.

Current challenges

Today, Angolan social policies remain largely male orientated. Despite recognition of women's rights in the Constitution, these are rarely fully upheld in practice, as demonstrated by issues such as child support, where the government has no mechanisms in place to ensure men's compliance with their duty of parenthood. The right to inheritance is also an area where women continue to lose out, although this is more complex due to customary practices that place widows in a vulnerable situation after their partners' death.

The major obstacle to the realization of these constitutional provisions is that Angolan society remains predominantly a 'male preserve' in which women's rights are often violated for the preservation of a patriarchal structure inherited from African 'traditional values'.

Although higher than elsewhere in the continent, the number of women in positions of power and influence remains grossly inadequate. Although 54 per cent of the population are female, women are under-represented in all decision-making bodies. Just 34 of 183 parliamentarians and 3 of the government's 27 ministers are women and there are only 2 female Ambassadors, 3 General Consuls, and 3 Deputy Ministers. Women's participation in local government is also limited. This can be explained by many factors, including their comparative absence from the hierarchies of the political parties and time constraints that prevent them from competing on an equal footing in the political sphere.

Women involved in national decision-making are separated from the majority of ordinary women by life style, class and agendas. And although many women see the creation of the Ministry for Family and Women as a real advance in gaining political space, it can also be perceived as an institution that has helped to separate women's issues from the government's policy agenda. Many would argue that the government leadership does not take the Ministry seriously, allocating it one of the lowest budgets with the immediate consequence of under-staffing and limited capacity.

The Angolan media has also played a role in reinforcing gender-stereotyped images of masculinity and often providing rationalized support for the perpetuation of violence. Women are exploited through images of the female body. This can be seen through the highly publicized Miss Angola events, endorsed by the First Lady and greatly appreciated by many provincial Governors who in some cases provide large amounts of public funding for the spectacle.

Conclusion

Despite the leadership shown by many women in adapting to new roles during the war, full gender equality in Angola remains a long way off. In some ways it is daunting to even talk about gender politics and balance in an environment where economic and social disparities are the only references left to the new generations.

However there are some practical steps that can already be taken. In the first instance, there need to be greater efforts to analyse and understand the gendered impacts of the war and their legacy for Angola. This would provide the basis for developing gender-sensitive policy and practice, which could enable greater participation by women in all spheres of society. This would in turn re-adjust gender relations to the needs of both women and men, as a fundamental component of the long-term process of peaceful and sustainable development.

The role of the media during the conflict and in the construction of democracy

Ismael Mateus

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The Angolan media is currently facing the enormous challenge of transforming itself into a force for democratic change and national reconciliation after decades as a weapon in the country's ideological and military conflicts. The importance of the media to political struggle and control can be traced to the colonial period, when the Portuguese authorities and the anti-colonialists of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) transferred their differences to the airwaves. At the time, the programme *Angola Combatente*, for instance, was broadcast from Congo Brazzaville and secretly listened to in various parts of the country.

1975-1991: controlling the media

After independence, the warring parties used different media strategies to further their cause. The government developed a rationale of 'state journalism' stemming from Marxist-Leninist ideology. With the exception of the first years of revolutionary zeal, pressure and censorship were not applied through the prior authorization of articles. The archaic 'red pen' method of censorship was seldom used, but instead officials interfered directly with the decisions of editors and heads of news programmes.

In the name of war, media organizations were filled with people without the minimum technical or ethical qualifications to practice the profession. All that mattered was the political criterion; as long as political directives were adhered to, any worker, member of the military or political commissar could be a 'good journalist'. Conversely, no journalist would be considered adequate unless guided by the government's socialist ideology or conveying the political directives of the regime. The news agency (Angop), the state newspaper (*O Jornal de Angola*), the national radio (*Rádio Nacional de Angola*) and the public television station (*Televisão Pública de Angola*) all became vehicles for political rhetoric and attacks on the enemy.

The political and military instrumentalization of the media was a dominant feature of the first 16 years of independence. Its use for public mobilization was apparent at the first national information conference in 1982, which was responsible for defining the strategies to be followed by the media and which concluded that "the media must endeavour that the South African aggression is felt, in its real proportions, to be a problem for all Angolans." The media was full of propagandistic interviews about military events, denunciations of opposition attacks and excited appeals for the defence of the nation against 'the enemy' – meaning Angolans belonging to the opposing side. Press reports reflected the government's presentation of the state of the war, whether for purposes of improving troops' morale, celebrating an important victory, or covering up a serious defeat. In times of more intense fighting, articles were more inflammatory, with long and aggressive editorials. At other times, there could be military battles or attacks known to the whole population, with hospitals full of wounded people, whilst the media calmly continued reporting trivial events or sporting victories.

1991-2002: liberalization and continuing war

This picture was slightly modified in 1991 with the regime's switch to a multiparty political system. Soon the private media appeared: first the weekly *Correio da Semana* and then the radio station *Luanda Antena Comercial-LAC*. Unfortunately, this period lasted less than a year due to the general climate of the electoral campaign. Once again, the conflict dynamics determined journalistic practice. The state media (the newspaper *Jornal de Angola*, the radio programme *Angola Combatente* and state television) adopted a partisan discourse, as did UNITA's media outlets, *Rádio Vorgan* (the Voice of the Black Cockerel), broadcast from Jamba, and the paper *Terra Angolana*.

If the campaign saw a return to partisan discourse in the press, the resumption of the war after the 1992 election triggered a resurgence of even more aggressive language. Viewing the media as an ideological party tool, government and UNITA-controlled institutions used the airwaves and public

space to exchange insults. Both parties reverted to inflammatory language, editorials, accusatory statements and intolerance.

As the war intensified, the press became more aggressive, not only towards the belligerents, but also towards the mediators and the international community. Margaret Anstee, then the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola, describes several instances of often personal hostility by outlets such as *Rádio Vorgan*: "Among the carefully selected remarks were accusations that I was corrupt, in the pay of the 'Futungistas' (that is, the presidential entourage) and had betrayed my own country, Angola, and the trust of the United Nations."

The military regularly used the state media to broadcast communiqués and programmes directed at the army. The battle for Huambo (UNITA's headquarters) in 1993 provided television with horrific moments, dreadful images and descriptions of bombardments, shocking killings, and inhumane treatment of people. *Rádio Nacional* journalists, reporting from the main cities affected by the war, followed suit with similar stories. The only deviation from this general picture came from the independent press, to begin with the bi-weekly magazine *Folha 8*, which reported on attacks and military plans neglected by the official press. Other weekly papers followed, mainly *Agora* and *Angolense*, gradually providing a voice for those segments of civil society, including clergymen and politicians, who opposed the war. Along with the churches, the independent press helped create a critical consciousness regarding the war within Angolan society. The re-inauguration of *Rádio Ecclésia* in 1997 by the Catholic Church encouraged this critical mass by opening its microphones to the public. While the end of the war cannot be attributed to mounting critical public opinion, society at least manifested a greater diversity of views in the late 1990s, challenging the myth of so-called 'popular unanimity' behind the war effort that the official media ceaselessly reiterated.

International media organizations also played a growing role. To monitor the Angolan situation in more detail, *Voice of America* set up a special office in Luanda and created a programme, named *Open Line* (*Linha Aberta*), specifically directed at Angolans. Many other foreign news agencies, radio stations and newspapers placed special correspondents in Luanda. Angolan matters merited the most headlines and reporting space in Portugal; in some instances the interviews, articles and commentary in the Portuguese press had great repercussions in Luandan political circles, as well as in the independent press, which sometimes used articles and quotes published in the Portuguese papers as a means to bypass the pressure against reporting war news.

The Angolan media today and the construction of democracy

Paradoxically, the war helped to accelerate the crystallization of more critical and communicative journalism. In the final years of the conflict, the MPLA government itself signalled that it wanted to leave behind the militaristic slogans that dominated the period following the 1992 post-electoral crisis. In the aftermath of this long and ambiguous period there is mounting social pressure for a more critical media.

The journalism practised by the state media has visibly improved, but not yet enough to drive away a sense of political bias or the old practice of government manipulation. The situation for radio stations has not changed much, but the introduction of new independent stations may be expected. New press legislation drafted in 2000 is still under review, but there is a consensus that the new law will allow for independent television. However, there is a lack of clarity on the concept of public broadcasting, poor understanding of the definitions of 'private' and 'community' broadcasting, and no provision in the draft law for the existence of community radio stations. *Rádio Ecclésia*, meanwhile, accused of 'radio terrorism' by the government in 2003, faces serious obstruction by the authorities in its plans to extend its signal to the whole country.

In the independent sector, around eight magazines are published every week, a remarkable achievement in a country without a paper industry and where one printing press prints all private newspapers.

Unfortunately, there is no regional press except for small initiatives too marginal to have much impact. These include NGO initiatives such as Development Workshop's Umbundu language community newsletter *Ondaka* in Huambo. Independent newspapers circulate mainly in Luanda, and only three other provinces have private radio stations (*Rádio Morena* in Benguela, *Rádio 2000* in Lubango and *Rádio Comercial* in Cabinda), which are no substitute for pluralism in the press and real freedom of expression.

The quality of Angolan journalism nowadays reflects the long years of silence – whether imposed or consented to – and the practice of patriotic rather than public interest journalism. There is a lingering sense within some political and journalistic circles

that the media is intended to protect the government and that whoever does not comply with this view intends to bring it down. The old practice of managers undermining editorial control is so deeply ingrained that there is currently a permanent clash between some editors, who seek to become more professional, and some heads of services and managing directors who insist on subjecting the rules of journalism to political dictates.

There have been a few cases of harassment of journalists by the government. The most well-publicized case was that of Rafael Marques, who was illegally detained for several weeks in 1999 on charges of defaming the President (calling him a "dictator"), and later given a suspended six-month sentence after a trial marred by irregularities. Ironically, the international publicity surrounding this case ultimately afforded Marques exceptional latitude for criticizing the government, and he became coordinator of the Open Society Institute for Southern Africa office in Luanda.

The Angolan media is currently in a transition period. In the aftermath of the war, there is a need for a strategic redefinition that ensures a balanced variety of media outlets across the country, as well as a need for improvements on technical issues.

The current crisis cannot be blamed exclusively on the incorporation of non-professionals into the media during the long period of violent struggle. The sector's weak educational and training foundations are equally responsible. There are no Faculties of Journalism and a training centre was only opened in 2003. There are also no professional identification cards, nor mechanisms for self-regulation, a code of conduct or a press law. Furthermore, many of the more capable journalists are drawn into political and diplomatic careers.

Increasing the media's participation in the democratic development of the country will include reversing its conceptual understanding of the idea of public service. In a development-orientated media, journalistic programming priorities need to be redirected towards informative and educational content, oriented to both nation building and the local development of each region.

The media can accomplish civic education and provide people with knowledge of their rights, duties and safeguards. Through the media, whether community radio stations, local newspapers or television programmes, it is possible to take development to the country's farthest regions as well as to build bridges among the different cultural groups that make up the emerging Angolan nation. Further consideration needs to be given to whether more indigenous language broadcasting and local content is required, as well as to more careful use of the national language, Portuguese, including more serious training of journalists as disseminators of this language.

One of the elements of modern journalism that makes the greatest contribution to the democratization of a society is investigative journalism. It is a valuable mechanism for monitoring the performance of democratic institutions, and promoting accountability in governmental bodies, civic organizations and public companies. Due to the poor levels of both journalistic training and audience demand, many so-called 'investigative' stories published are of dubious worth. They fall far short of the mark, and their output is often a set of unconfirmed statements of questionable reliability based on anonymous sources. On the other hand, some of the more important opportunities have been missed. When the International Monetary Fund found that huge amounts of money were missing from government coffers in 2002, it was the BBC that exposed their leaked report.

Despite the shortage of true investigative reporting, some organizations, mainly newspapers, frequently divulge cases of alleged corruption, injustice, and abuse of power. But as a rule, these accusations bear no consequences, not only because there is little political will to investigate the leads provided by the press, but also because the information in question lacks sufficient detail, leaving the political power holders with room to get away. Notwithstanding important ongoing work in denouncing abuses of power, the greatest contribution by the media towards the democratization of society in the current post-war period is still to come.

Conclusion

The challenge faced by the media and the institutions that have committed themselves to supporting democracy in Angola is great. However, although professional structures like the Union of Angolan Journalists (SJA) and the Luanda-based press centre exist, they require strengthening. Combined with poor professional training, this situation constrains the media's capacity to provide an immediate answer to this challenge. Yet, in the aftermath of war, when corruption is rife and when the country is trying to reconstitute itself with new ethical and moral values, Angola cannot afford to postpone such an urgent task.

Peace and reconciliation

Carlinda Monteiro

Source: Margit Coppé

Cemetery in Kuito

Carlinda Monteiro is Deputy Director of Christian Children's Fund-Angola. She has been trained in social work and specializes in the treatment of war-affected children and families, combining African and Western approaches.

Reconciliation has long been recognized as a key element of a just and lasting peace. Yet there are no specific formulas for reconciliation processes. The meaning given by individuals and groups to experiences of violence and the ways they deal with their impact are intrinsically linked to specific social and cultural contexts.

The majority of the Angolan population has been severely affected by the war and as a result, fear and distrust are now embedded in relationships among Angolans. Many people feel permanently threatened and have developed psychological defence mechanisms to cope with fear. These responses are reinforced by cultural and educational values that discourage the expression of grief or pain. Although the war and its consequences have been extensively written about, individual traumas and collective suffering are scarcely mentioned either in private or in public.

Annex 6 of the *Lusaka Protocol* reads: "In the spirit of National Reconciliation, all Angolans should forgive and forget the offences resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future with tolerance and trust". As such, it expresses something common to all conflicts – the desire to forget. Although 'national reconciliation' continues to be invoked as an important aspect of consolidating peace in Angola, in the political arena it has basically amounted to the reconciliation of the warring parties without exploring the causes of the conflict. Little attention has been paid to the social processes that enable individuals and communities to address and overcome the distrust, polarization and pain caused by the conflict.

Culture and reconciliation

Culture plays a crucial role in the psycho-social welfare of populations, as people manage their pain through strategies, which are at least partly based on cultural perceptions. Angola can use a great diversity of cultural resources to facilitate reconciliation. Among them are the traditional beliefs and practices of African cosmology as well as resources stemming from different churches and the numerous ideological influences that were absorbed during and after colonial domination. However they entered, they are now part of Angola's cultural heritage, working at different levels and sectors of society, and intersecting with and complementing each other. The careful combination of Angola's greatest cultural assets can offer a solid foundation for peacebuilding and reconciliation, which in turn will constitute the basis for the country's development.

Whereas western practices are characterized by a focus on individual healing, African cultural elements

emphasize the collective, the social, and the community. Most Angolans still come from a rural background and will probably be reintegrated into their communities of origin, where the way of life is deeply rooted in a traditional value system. Even populations that are more exposed to urban life continue to turn to tradition, especially in times of personal and/or social crisis.

Rituals and ceremonies are the way in which specific situations are honoured or dealt with. As a result of the war and frequent population displacement, many traditional practices and rituals have fallen into disuse. However, some continue to take place and have great importance, such as rituals linked to death and mourning, rituals for those who have taken part in the war, and rituals for the reintegration of missing people and orphaned children.

The war and funeral rites

A central theme of traditional African cosmology is its deep belief in the dynamic and interdependent relationship between natural, spiritual and social forces. The visible and invisible worlds are indivisibly linked. Ancestral spirits are responsible for promoting the welfare, health and good fortune of individuals and communities. The living are in constant fear of upsetting their ancestors and so try to gain their protection. These beliefs underscore the importance of social harmony. Since vital bonds cannot be broken, after death the person will continue to exist among the living. The visible world will only be safe if the individual really 'dies' through funeral rites and is received into the ancestors' community. The deceased person must be welcomed in the world of the dead and his or her residence there 'set up' in order to avoid the risk of wandering aimlessly. Family and community 'promote' the dead to ancestor category, thereby re-establishing solidarity and social order. When these funeral rites are not properly fulfilled, the spirit will be lost and insulted, and may take revenge on the living. Failure to perform the rites can be seen as a challenge to the community's solidarity, which is sacred and must always be protected.

Although funeral rites are very important, in difficult circumstances such as war it is very difficult to bury the dead with dignity. A great number of people died and did not receive proper funeral rites. There are also many people whose whereabouts are unknown, so one cannot know whether they are dead or alive. Consequently, all of the dead are taken as displeased and restless spirits. This fact makes the necessary reconciliation between the living and dead difficult and as a result, hinders reconciliation among the living.

Truth

Understanding the truth of past events is a crucial factor in reconciliation. In war there are victims and perpetrators, people who suffered and those who caused the suffering (often themselves victims as well). Truth concerns the recognition by the perpetrators of the damage they inflicted on victims. Victims must also know how to deal with the horrific events they experienced. For this to happen, there should be opportunities for victims and perpetrators to talk about these events, and for the events to be acknowledged by whoever caused them. To know the truth, it is vital that people talk about and discuss past events.

Truth, as understood here, does not necessarily have to be underpinned by the creation of commissions or any other type of official structure. Yet painful memories are part of the collective memory and cannot be worked out individually. Most important is a public recognition of the suffering caused by the war translated into a public apology to the population, and for those involved to sit together to talk about past events, about what divided them and caused so many years of fighting. It is important, most of all, to reach an agreement on how to manage these differences in the future.

To forget and to remember

Talking about the truth is not only about being informed; above all it is about being moved by the horrific stories told and being able to identify with those who have suffered or still suffer. It means feeling rage, pain, indignation and sadness. But the most frequent reaction by society and/or individuals – given the horrors perpetrated – is to refuse to acknowledge the truth. Typically, there is an enormous desire on the part of the people going through these situations to forget, and all efforts are made to that effect. However, forgetting without processing past events would mean putting an end to a story that remains unresolved. It is necessary to create a 'space' so that all aspects of the conflict can be identified and recognized, the fear partially exorcized, and the notion that we all enjoy the same rights regained. Hence the importance of performing collective acts and rituals for honouring those who died during the war, of exhibitions, publications or other materials referring to past experiences, of monuments, as well as celebrations and meetings that help deal with the past.

What is the truth about the war in Angola? There is not just one truth; each individual and community has his or her own truth, his or her version of the events, and a full picture would be composed of pieces from each one. Such a historical picture may be a pre-requisite for all Angolans to face the present and the future in a more constructive way and practice 'national reconciliation'.

Key texts and agreements

Unofficial translations or summaries of the texts in bold are printed here. Full versions and additional materials are available at www.c-r.org/accord/ang/index.shtml

- *Alvor Accords*, agreement between the MPLA, UNITA, FNLA and the Government of Portugal, 15 January 1975. Alvor, Portugal.
- *Lusaka Accord*, agreement between the Governments of Angola and South Africa, 16 February 1984. Lusaka, Zambia.
- *New York Principles*, agreement between the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, 20 July 1988. New York, USA.
- *Geneva Protocol*, agreement between the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, 5 August 1988. Geneva, Switzerland.
- *Brazzaville Protocol*, agreement between the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa, 13 December 1988. New York, USA.
- *Bilateral Agreement*, (or *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola for the Conclusions of the International Mission of the Cuban Military Contingent*), 22 December 1988. New York, USA.
- *Tripartite Agreement* (or *Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa*), 22 December 1988. New York, USA.
- **Bicesse Accords** (or *Peace Accords for Angola*), agreement between the MPLA and UNITA, 31 May 1991. Bicesse (Estoril), Portugal.
- **Lusaka Protocol,** agreement between the MPLA and UNITA, 15 November 1994. Lusaka, Zambia.
- Government of Angola's **Peace Plan,** 13 March 2002. Luanda, Angola.
- **Luena Memorandum of Understanding** (or *Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol*), agreement between the Government of Angola and UNITA, 4 April 2002. Luena, Moxico, Angola.

Key points of the Bicesse Accords

Full text available at
www.c-r.org/accord/ang/index.shtml

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola (GPRA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with mediation by the Government of Portugal and the participation of observers from the Governments of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),

Accept as binding the following documents, which constitute the *Peace Accords for Angola*:

a) The Ceasefire Agreement (including annexes I and II thereto);

b) Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola (including the annex thereto regarding the Joint Military Commission);

c) Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA;

d) The Protocol of Estoril.

These peace accords were initialled on 1 May 1991 by the respective heads of delegation and subsequently approved by the GPRA and UNITA (as evidenced in the communication addressed to the Prime Minister of Portugal not later than 12 midnight on 15 May 1991, which entailed the de facto suspension of hostilities in Angola beginning on that date), and will enter into force immediately following their signature.

[Signatures]

President of the People's Republic of Angola

President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Ceasefire Agreement

The **definition and principles** define the ceasefire as the cessation of hostilities between the GPRA and UNITA with a view to attaining peace throughout the national territory. It indicates the ceasefire must be total and definitive throughout the national territory, and must guarantee the free circulation of persons and goods. Overall supervision of the ceasefire will be the responsibility of the GPRA and UNITA within the framework of the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) created pursuant to the annex to the *Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola*. The UN will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the GPRA. The ceasefire includes the cessation of all hostile propaganda between the parties at domestic and international levels, and obliges the parties to refrain from acquiring lethal material. The US and USSR's commitment to not supplying lethal material to any Angolan party and to encouraging other countries to act similarly is noted.

The section on **entry into force of the ceasefire** indicates that strict observance of the commitments assumed by the parties is required, as well as of the decisions made by bodies with authority to verify and monitor the ceasefire. Among the issues addressed are logistical supplies of non-lethal material, the release of all civilian and military prisoners detained as a consequence of the conflict (verified by the International Committee of the Red Cross), and the application of the ceasefire to all foreign forces present in Angolan territory. The section lists all activities to be ceased. Failure to observe any of the provisions set forth above constitutes a violation of the ceasefire, without prejudice to decisions made by the verification and monitoring groups.

A Joint **Verification and Monitoring** Commission (CMVF) will be formed prior to entry into force of the ceasefire. Its composition is indicated, and it is stated that the CMVF will report to the CCPM. It will have the authority to create the monitoring groups necessary for full observance of the ceasefire. Such groups shall be subordinate to CMVF. The establishment and composition of monitoring groups is addressed, and some details of UN monitoring of the groups are provided. The bodies and mechanisms created to verify and monitor the ceasefire will cease to exist at the end of the ceasefire. Other provisions related to ceasefire verification and monitoring are set forth in annex I.

Regarding **regulating the verification and monitoring measures**, it is stated that the CMVF will have the authority necessary to ensure the effective observance of the ceasefire, and its particular duties are listed. The CMVF will decide on its own regulations, and also has the authority to define the functions and approve the regulations of any monitoring groups it establishes. The monitoring groups will make "on site" verifications of observance of the ceasefire to prevent, verify and investigate possible violations.

The **timetable of the ceasefire** (detailed further in annex II) gives dates of key events including the initialling of the Accord, the *de facto* suspension of hostilities, the signature and entry into force of the ceasefire, the establishment of monitoring groups, the installation of the UN verification system, and the movement of forces to areas of assembly. On the date of the elections, the ceasefire process will be completed and the verification and monitoring bodies will be abolished.

Annex I: Verification and monitoring of the ceasefire

Annex I specifies the provisions regarding the verification and monitoring of the ceasefire agreed by the parties.

The **mandate and regulations of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF)** establish that the CMVF is responsible for the implementation and functioning of the ceasefire verification mechanisms. Its specific responsibilities are detailed. The composition, locations and guidelines for the CMVF are indicated, as are the frequency of its meetings, which will be presided over alternately by the GPRA and UNITA. The decisions of the CMVF, binding in nature, shall be made by consensus between the parties. In the event that CMVF does not reach a decision, or that CCPM objects to that decision, the final decision shall rest with the latter body.

Details on the **verification and monitoring system** are provided. On-site monitoring of the ceasefire is assured by the GPRA and by UNITA, through monitoring groups subordinate to the CMVF composed of 8 to 12 individuals from each party, in accordance with *Appendix 1, Monitoring System, Organizational Charts*. The sites for the groups are referred to in *Appendix 2, Areas of Assembly* (listing the 27 areas of assembly for GPRA troops and 23 areas for UNITA troops) and *Appendix 3, Airports and Ports* (listing 32 airports and 22 ports). Liaison between the CMVF and the monitoring groups is assured by regional monitoring groups from six specified regions and sub-regions. UN personnel will verify whether the monitoring groups are assuming their responsibilities. Further details on the their role, responsibility for their security, and the support they require is provided.

The arrangements for the **areas of assembly** are stipulated. Among these are that all the armed forces shall be assembled 60 days following the entry into force of the ceasefire, in the areas specified in *Appendix 2*. The forces of both parties shall fully respect the rules of conduct contained in *Appendix 4, Rules of Conduct for the Troops in the Areas of Assembly*, The next sections address arrangements for **supplies** for the areas of assembly of each of the parties, and the **border control posts** listed in *Appendix 5, Border Posts* (listing 37 posts).

The **paramilitary or militarized forces** of both parties shall have been demobilized or integrated into the respective regular military forces by the time the ceasefire enters into force, verified by the CMVF. Other sections deal with the exchange of the **military information** listed in *Appendix 6, Military Information to be Exchanged between the GPRA and UNITA* (in which items of military information under the headings of Personnel, Equipment and Armaments, and Others are listed) and investigations into the existence of **chemical weapons arsenals.**

Annex II: Sequence of Tasks in the Different Phases of the Ceasefire

The Annex elaborates the timetable described in the agreement, the phases being: Preliminary Phase (1-15 May 1991); Phase I (15 – 29/31 May 1991, signature and entry into force of the agreement); Phase II (31 May – 30 June 1991, implementation of the monitoring system); Phase III (1 July – l August 1991, transfer of forces); Phase IV (1 August 1991 – date of elections, verification and monitoring of agreement).

Fundamental Principles for the Establishment of Peace in Angola

Point 1: Recognition by UNITA of the Angolan State, of President José Eduardo dos Santos and of the Angolan Government until the general elections are held.

Point 2: At the moment the ceasefire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy.

Point 3: The GPRA will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning the proposed changes in the Constitution. The GPRA will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

Point 4: Free and fair elections for a new Government will take place following voter registration conducted under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced. At the time of the signature of the ceasefire, the parties will determine the period within which free and fair elections must be held. The exact date of said elections will be established through consultation with all political forces in Angola.

Point 5: Respect for human rights and basic freedoms, including the right of free association.

Point 6: The process of creating the National Army will begin once the ceasefire comes into force of the ceasefire and will be concluded on the date under terms to be agreed on between the GPRA and UNITA. The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group.

Point 7: Declaration and entry into force of the ceasefire throughout Angolan territory, in accordance with the agreement to be concluded on this subject between the GPRA and UNITA.

Annex

The annex contains the agreement between the parties to form the CCPM, at the time of the signature of the *Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola*. The composition, tasks and authorities of the CCPM are indicated. The CCPM is to see that the peace accords are applied, and to make the final decision on possible violations of those accords. It shall have the authority necessary to approve all the rules relating to its functioning, particularly its own internal regulations. Its decisions will be made by consensus between the GPRA and UNITA.

Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and UNITA

1. At the moment the ceasefire enters into force, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities in accordance with the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy. At the time of the signature of the ceasefire, the parties will determine the period within which they must hold free and fair elections. The exact date of said elections will be established through consultation with all political forces in Angola.

2. The GPRA will hold discussions with all political forces in order to survey their opinions concerning

proposed changes in the Constitution. The GPRA will then work with all the parties to draft the laws that will regulate the electoral process.

3. The ceasefire agreement will oblige the parties to cease receiving lethal material. The USA, the USSR, and all other countries will support the implementation of the ceasefire and will refrain from furnishing lethal material to any of the Angolan parties.

4. Overall political supervision of the ceasefire process will be the responsibility of the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM. Verification of the ceasefire will be the responsibility of the international monitoring group. The UN will be invited to send monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the GPRA. The Governments that are to send monitors will be chosen by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM.

5. The process of creating the National Army will begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and will be concluded on the date of the elections. The neutrality of the National Army in the electoral process will be guaranteed by the Angolan parties, acting within the framework of CCPM, with the support of the international monitoring group. The Angolan parties reserve for later negotiations the discussions on the foreign assistance that may be necessary in order to form the National Army.

6. Free and fair elections for the new Government will take place under the supervision of international elections observers, who will remain in Angola until they certify that the elections were free and fair and that the results have been officially announced.

Protocol of Estoril

Elections

It is stated that elections will take place. For the President of the Republic they will be by direct and secret suffrage, through a majority system, with recourse to a second round if necessary. For the National Assembly they will be by direct and secret suffrage, through a system of proportional representation at the national level. A process of consultations involving all Angolan political forces will determine whether they are held simultaneously, and also the duration of the official election campaign period. A technical opinion (non-binding on the parties) on the desirable duration will be obtained from a specialized international body such as the UN. Voting will be secret, and special provisions will be made for those who cannot read or write. These provisions will be included in the election law, to be drafted following the ceasefire, after a process of consultations between the GPRA and all Angolan political forces. All political parties and interested persons will have the opportunity to organize and to participate in the elections process on an equal footing, regardless of their political positions. Total freedom of expression, association, and access to the media will be guaranteed.

The parties have accepted the tripartite proposal by the delegations of Portugal, the US and the USSR, to the effect that elections will be held between 1 September to 30 November 1992. The parties have reached an understanding that the following tripartite declaration is to be taken into consideration in the discussion of the precise date: "Taking into consideration the logistical difficulties in organizing the elections process, specifically the desirability that the elections be held during the dry season, and the need to reduce the high costs that the international community will have to bear in monitoring the ceasefire, the delegations of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union heartily recommend that the elections be held during the first part of the suggested period, preferably between 1 September and 1 October 1992."

Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM)

Regarding the CCPM, the document notes that according to the *Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the GPRA and UNITA* and he annex to the *Fundamental principles for the establishment of peace in Angola*, the CCPM's mission is the overall political supervision of the ceasefire process. It will have the duty to see that the Peace Accords are applied, and to make the final decision on possible violations of those Accords. Its decisions will be made by consensus between the GPRA and UNITA, after hearing the opinion of the Observers. The CCPM does not seek to replace the GPRA, and its mandate ends on the date the elected Government takes office. The tasks for which the CCPM should structure itself to fulfil are listed, the composition the CCPM is stipulated, and it is indicated that its meetings shall be presided over alternately by the GPRA and by UNITA, without prejudice to the principle of consensus in the decision-making process. Details are given regarding support from advisors, and the CCPM's responsibilities for internal regulations and budget.

Principles relating to the issue of internal security during the period between the entry into force of the ceasefire and the holding of elections

It is indicated that all Angolans shall have the right to conduct and participate in political activities without intimidation, in accordance with the revised Constitution and pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy, and the provisions of the Peace Accords. Measures to verify and monitor the neutrality of the police through monitoring teams are set out, and the teams' composition, mandate and proposed quantity per province specified. The monitoring teams are subordinate to CCPM, and must submit reports of their activities to that body.

Consonant with the invitation from the Government, UNITA will participate in the police force that is responsible for maintaining public order. Guarantees are given regarding the availability of vacancies and training for UNITA recruits. UNITA will be responsible for the personal safety of its highest-ranking leaders, and the GPRA will grant police status to the UNITA members in charge of guaranteeing that safety.

Political rights to be exercised by UNITA following the ceasefire

According to the provisions contained in the *Concepts for resolving the issues still pending between the GPRA and UNITA*, at the time of entry into force of the ceasefire, UNITA will acquire the right to conduct and freely participate in political activities, according to the revised Constitution and the pertinent laws for the creation of a multi-party democracy. They particularly include: freedom of expression; the right to present, publish and freely debate its political programme; the right to recruit and enrol members; the right to hold meetings and demonstrations; the right of access to the government media; the right to free movement and personal safety of its members; the right to present candidates in the elections; and the right to open headquarters and representative offices anywhere in Angola. Without prejudice to these stipulations, which permit UNITA to exercise those rights immediately, UNITA must, after entry into force of the ceasefire, satisfy the formal requirements for its registration as a political party pursuant to the 'Political Parties Law'.

Administrative structures

Both parties accept the principle of the extension of the Central Administration to those areas of Angola that are presently beyond the range of its authority. Both parties recognize that such extension must not be made abruptly or endanger the free circulation of persons and goods, the activities of the political forces, and the execution of the tasks related to the electoral process. Both parties agree to leave for a later date the study of the implementation of such extension, which will be carried out within the framework of CCPM by competent teams composed of representatives of the GPRA and UNITA.

Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

Regarding *Identification and General Principles*, the parties agree that an Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) shall be formed. The FAA's overall mission is specified as the defence and safeguarding of independence and territorial integrity. The FAA's

composition shall be exclusively Angolan citizens, its organizational structure unitary. It shall have such composition, high command structure, troops, mechanisms, and equipment as determined in accordance with foreseeable external threats and the country's socio-economic conditions. The FAA are non-partisan and obey the competent organs of sovereignty within the principle of subordination to political authority, and swear publicly to respect the Constitution and other laws of the Republic. Members of the military on active duty shall enjoy active voting status, but may not use their duties or the structural units of the FAA to interfere in any other partisan political or union activities.

The process of formation of the Armed Forces shall begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and end on the date of the elections, and shall evolve simultaneously with the assembly, disarmament, and integration into civilian life of the troops being demobilized. Recruitment into the FAA during the period prior to the elections shall proceed in accordance with the principle of free will, drawing from the ranks of FAPLA and FALA. It is mandatory that all military personnel incorporated into the FAA prior to the date of the elections attend professional training courses with a view to achieving unification in terms of doctrine and procedure that is conducive to the development of an essential *esprit de corps*. By the time the elections are held, only the FAA shall exist; there may be no other troops whatsoever. All members of the present armed forces of each party who do not become members of the FAA shall be demobilized prior to the holding of elections. Additionally, assurances are given regarding the neutrality of the armed forces during the period prior to the holding of the elections, and the individual rights of military personnel and safeguarding of units created in the period.

Regarding *Troop Strength*, troop numbers of the Army, Air Force and Navy are specified, and it is agreed that each of the parties shall provide the Army with 20,000 men (15,000 soldiers, 3,000 non-commissioned officers, and 2,000 officers). The first

troops assigned to the Air Force and Navy shall be furnished from the respective branches of the FAPLA, inasmuch as FALA does not have such units. As soon as the process of training the FAA begins, UNITA will be able to participate in the Air Force and Navy under terms to be defined within the framework of Joint Commission on the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFA). Among further provisions made with regard to the Air Force and Navy are that they shall be subject to verification and monitoring, and shall be subordinate to the High Command of the FAA.

Regarding the *Command Structures of the FAA*, general principles are given indicating that the CCFA, subordinate to the CCPM, shall be created specifically to direct the process of formation of the FAA. Provisions are made for the non-partisan nature of the FAA Command Structure, which is shown in the annex. Appointments to the High Command and the commands of the three branches of the FAA are to be proposed by CCFA and approved by CCPM. The CCFA constitutes the transitional body, until the date of the elections, between the political-military echelon and the FAA echelon. Further details of its composition and duties are provided. The latter include among others proposing the criteria for selecting personnel from FAPLA and FALA for purposes of forming the FAA, and proposing the names of the principal commanding officers of FAA.

The overall mission and composition of the High Command of the FAA are indicated, as are the principles for structuring the Army Command of the FAA and forming Air Force and Navy (details to be contained in directives issued by the CCFA). The creation and functioning of a Logistical and Infrastructure Command is addressed, and its particular responsibilities, command structure and the units of its General Staff are detailed further.

The timetable for the process for forming the FAA is listed in five phases. Immediately following the appointment of each command, the General Staffs are to be organized.

Technical Assistance from Foreign Countries. The parties will inform the Portuguese Government, not later

than the date of notification of their acceptance of the Accords, as to which country or countries will be invited to assist in the FAA formation process.

Demobilization. The accommodation of the demobilized forces constitutes a national problem that must be studied jointly by the two parties and submitted to CCPM for review and a decision. The same treatment should be given to the problem of people who have been physically disabled by the war.

Annex: Diagram of the Structure of the FAA

Key points of the Lusaka Protocol

Full text available at
www.c-r.org/accord/ang/index.shtml

Lusaka, Zambia, 15 November 1994

The Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with the mediation of the United Nations and in the presence of representatives of the Observer States of the Angolan peace process (United States of America, Russian Federation and Portugal) are mindful of the need to conclude implementation of the *Bicesse Accords*, enable the smooth functioning of institutions resulting from the 1992 elections and establish a just and lasting peace within the framework of national reconciliation.

They accept as binding the following documents, which constitute the *Lusaka Protocol*:

Annex 1: Agenda of the Angola Peace Talks between the Government and UNITA

The agenda lists the order in which issues are discussed in the negotiations, which is subsequently reflected in the sequencing of the annexes to the agreement.

Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments

The Government and UNITA reaffirm their acceptance of the relevant legal instruments, namely the *Bicesse Accords* and the relevant Security

Council resolutions. The Government's position takes the form of a letter to the UN's Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye.

Annex 3: Military Issues – I

The annex covers three issues: re-establishment of a ceasefire; withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of UNITA military forces; and the disarming of civilians

The definition and general principles indicate that the ceasefire constitutes the cessation of hostilities between the Government and UNITA and that it should be total and definitive throughout the whole territory. It indicates that UN will be responsible for the overall supervision, control and verification of the ceasefire.

Specific principles include: the bilateral nature of the ceasefire and the establishment of verification and monitoring mechanisms by the UN; the withdrawal and quartering of UNITA forces as per UN Security Council Resolution 864; provision of information to the UN by both parties on the composition, armament, equipment and locations of their forces; FAA disengagement from forward positions to allow UN verification and monitoring; the repatriation of all mercenaries; free circulation of persons and goods; collection, storage and custody of UNITA armaments by the UN within the framework of a selection process of personnel for the FAA; collection, storage and custody of armaments in civilian hands; and the release of civilian or military prisoners detained or withheld as a consequence of the conflict, under the auspices of the ICRC.

The modalities relating to these principles are listed in sequence.

A timetable for the bilateral ceasefire modalities is outlined. Phase One consists of five steps to be taken by both sides within 45 days of the initialing of the Protocol. Phase Two consists of six further steps.

Annex 4: Military Issues – II

The annex relates to the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization.

General principles include the aim of completing the formation of one

single, national, nonpartisan armed forces, under the verification and monitoring of the United Nations. The composition of the armed forces will reflect the principle of proportionality between the Government and UNITA forces agreed in the *Bicesse Accords*. Excess military personnel will be demobilized and integrated into civilian society, within the framework of a social reintegration programme.

Specific principles outline the decisions regarding the process and sequencing the integration of UNITA forces into the FAA, their training and the UN's role in verifying compliance. It details the establishment of a Joint Commission comprising the Government, UNITA, the UN and the observer countries.

The modalities are outlined in three phases. Phase One details the establishment of a working group of the Joint Commission, which will monitor aspects of the completion of the formation of the FAA, including selection criteria, size and composition of the FAA. This working group is dissolved in Phase Two and a new working group established to oversee the planning and implementation of the process. Phase Two also sees the initial movement of selected UNITA personnel to be incorporated into the FAA and of members of the FAA and UNITA who will be demobilized. Phase 3 incorporates the selection and integration of UNITA military personnel into the FAA, selection of those to be retained, total demobilization of excess personnel and final verification by the UN.

Annex 5: The Police

The annex covers the role of the Angolan National Police, the functions and scope of the Rapid Reaction Police and the incorporation of UNITA members into both bodies.

General principles outline the role of the Angolan National Police as an organ of the Angolan state administration, governed by current legislation and the relevant provisions of the *Bicesse Accords* and *Lusaka Protocol*. Its activities shall not restrict citizens' exercise of their political rights to favour any political party. As a non-partisan institution it shall be an instrument for reinforcing national reconciliation. In accordance

with the *Bicesse Accords*, a significant number of UNITA members shall be incorporated into it.

Specific principles include the role of the UN in monitoring the activities of the police and the independence of the police from the FAA. The functions and scope of the Rapid Reaction Police are outlined. All other surveillance or policing organs are forbidden.

The modalities indicate the specific numbers of UNITA members to participate in the Angolan National Police and the Rapid Reaction Police, and the sequencing of their incorporation.

Annex 6: National Reconciliation

The annex refers to the specific tasks and processes envisaged to pursue the imperative of national reconciliation, including the role of the mass media, the implementation of administrative decentralization and deconcentration and the roles of the Provincial authorities. It also indicates provision for UNITA participation in government and state institutions.

The general principles of Annex 6 indicate the will of the Government and UNITA to live together within the Angolan constitutional, political and legal framework, reaffirming their respect for the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections and the right to opposition. They include provision for the participation of UNITA members at all levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity. They imply the administrative decentralization and deconcentration of the country, and condemn the use of violence to settle disputes. They identify the role of the mass media in supporting a process of coexistence and democratic consolidation. They refer to the granting of an amnesty for crimes committed during the conflict.

With regard to specific principles, it is agreed that the Government and UNITA will conduct a public awareness campaign to promote tolerance, coexistence and trust. The freedom of speech, association and organization, as well as press freedom are guaranteed. The right of access to state press, radio and television is guaranteed to all political parties complying with current legislation. Radio Vorgan, UNITA's radio station, is allowed to broadcast for nine months after D-Day, at the end of which it will have completed its transformation into a non-partisan radio station.

Administrative decentralization and deconcentration will be carried out, so that provincial authorities have their own powers in the fields of administration, finance, taxation and economy (including the power to attract foreign investment), under the terms of existing legislation. In accordance with the law and with Annex 5 of the *Lusaka Protocol*, the Provincial Commands will bear responsibility for the Police at the level of the province, in matters of administration, coordination and supervision of its activities. Office holders of local government organs shall be elected in accordance with legislation to be passed under the provisions of the Constitution.

The President of UNITA shall be granted special status. The first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates in the 1992 elections shall be installed in the National Assembly and shall constitute the UNITA parliamentary group. Appropriate security will be granted to high-ranking members of UNITA who do not enjoy special status by virtue of their posts.

Those Angolans prevented from exercising their labour rights by circumstances prior to the *Lusaka Protocol* shall be given due consideration by state institutions.

The principle of the participation of UNITA members shall be implemented through their incorporation into appropriate professional functions, as far as possible and with due consideration to their technical and professional skills.

Social welfare and reintegration programmes shall be implemented throughout the national territory. A National Entrepreneurial Support Fund will provide assistance and encouragement in the establishment of private enterprises.

The Government shall undertake the management of all state property in the conditions in which it is found. All property belonging to UNITA shall be returned to UNITA in the condition in which it is found.

UNITA will be allocated adequate party facilities and appropriate residences for its leaders.

The fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are guaranteed through the independence of the judiciary.

The revision of the symbols of the Republic of Angola shall be considered important within the framework of the competent institutions.

The modalities outline the practical responsibilities of each of the parties with respect to the implementation of the principles. They contain three distinct documents, relating to the security guarantees for UNITA leaders; UNITA's participation in local government and diplomatic missions abroad and the norms of participation of UNITA members in the government of national unity and national reconciliation.

Annex 7: Completion of the Electoral Process

This annex refers to the process for completion of the second round of the presidential elections and the roles of the state institutions, the candidates and the UN.

The general principles indicate the importance of citizens' participation in choosing the country's leaders and the necessity of concluding the 1992 elections with a second round of presidential elections. These will be held once the UN has declared that the requisite conditions have been met. Angolan state institutions will organize the elections, with UN verification and monitoring and the participation of international observers.

Specific principles refer to the relevant legislation for the elections and the role of candidates and their agenda in controlling the conduct of the elections. The National Assembly will decide the time frame for the elections once the UN has determined that the requisite conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions are described as being guarantees of safety and free circulation of people and goods and public freedoms; effective guarantees of the functioning of the State administration; and normalization processes such as the rehabilitation of communications

and the resettlement of displaced persons. State resources, including finances, shall be used equitably during the process. Polling officers will be afforded protection by the National Police and through UN verification and monitoring. Publication of elections results shall be in accordance with national legislation. Within 48 hours of the declaration of the national results, the UN shall issue a statement regarding the free and fair nature of the elections.

Modalities describe the UN's role and functions in the process, including the verification and monitoring of the preparation of voting material and the preparation of the electoral registration rolls. It also refers to the conduct of a civic education campaign on the objectives of the second round of the presidential elections.

Annex 8: UN mandate and the role of the Observers and the Joint Commission

A. The United Nations Mandate

The general principles refer to acceptance by the Government and UNITA that the successful completion of the peace process is primarily their responsibility, and that they undertake to cooperate fully with the UN to this end. They invite the UN to play the role outlined in the *Bicesse Accords* and the *Lusaka Protocol*, including chairmanship of the Joint Commission.

The specific principles provide details of the UN's functions in relation to 1) Military issues; 2) Police activities; 3) National reconciliation activities; and 4) Completion of the electoral process. Each of these sets of tasks is referred back to specific agenda items and annexes of the *Lusaka Protocol.*

B. The role of observers in the implementation of the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol

The Governments of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Portugal are the observers of the peace process and sit on the Joint Commission in this capacity.

Their functions are to attend meetings, monitor implementation of outstanding provisions of the *Bicesse Accords* and provisions of the *Lusaka Protocol.* Decisions at all meetings shall be taken after hearing the opinions of the representatives of the observer nations.

C. The Joint Commission

The Joint Commission shall comprise the Government and UNITA, with the UN acting as chairperson and the Troika attending as observers. Its function is to watch over the implementation of outstanding provisions of the *Bicesse Accords* and all the provisions of the *Lusaka Protocol.* It shall monitor implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and make final decision on possible violations. Its headquarters shall be in Luanda. The Joint Commission shall establish its own internal regulations and take decisions by consensus. It shall take office on the day of the signing of the *Lusaka Protocol.* Once the Joint Commission is satisfied that all relevant provisions of the *Bicesse Accords* and *Lusaka Protocol* have been implemented, it shall dissolve itself.

Annex 9: Timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol

The timetable maps out the sequencing of activities from D-Day (the signing of the *Lusaka Protocol*). It outlines 10 stages, each designated a specified period of days during which tasks should be accomplished. At the final stage (D-Day + 455) a number of tasks are outlined for completion. It is observed that the detailed timetable will be worked out by the Joint Commission, that no task shall be initiated until the previous one has been concluded, and that, where conditions permit, the timetable can be brought forward by agreement between the Government and UNITA.

Annex 10: Other matters

The *Lusaka Protocol* shall be signed on 15 November 1994 at Lusaka, Zambia.

Signatories

The *Lusaka Protocol* was initialled on 31 October 1994 by the heads of the Government and UNITA delegations, Fernando Faustino Muteka and Eugenio Ngola "Manuvakola" and by the United Nations Special Representative, Mr Alioune Blondin Beye. It was subsequently approved by the competent constitutional bodies of the Republic of Angola and the competent UNITA authorities.

Key Points of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding

Full text available at www.c-r.org/accord/ang/index.shtml

Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol

Preamble

The Delegation of the Angolan Armed Forces, mandated by the Government of the Republic of Angola; the Delegation of the UNITA Military Forces, mandated by its Leadership Commission; in the presence of the United Nations and the Observer States;

Considering that the *Lusaka Protocol*, the legal and political instrument for the resolution of the Angolan conflict, was unable to experience the positive evolution expected for its definitive conclusion;

Considering that, the growing and pressing need to secure peace and national reconciliation in Angola has become imperative and urgent, and calls first of all for the cessation of the armed conflict between UNITA and the Government, promoting, to this end, appropriate initiatives for the definitive conclusion of the implementation of the *Lusaka Protocol*;

Conscious of the fact that, the end of the internal conflict leads to peace and national reconciliation and constitutes a challenge for which a determined commitment needs to be made for the benefit of the Angolan people;

Inspired by a will to confer on their relations a new and positive dimension, sustained by the fact that in the spirit of reconciliation, all Angolans need to pardon and forget the griefs resulting from the conflict and face the future with tolerance and confidence;

Accordingly, in order to implement their commitments and obligations under the *Lusaka Protocol*, hereby adopt the Memorandum of Understanding, in the following terms:

Object and principles

Object

- A commitment by the parties to a ceasefire, the resolution of military issues and, subsequently, the definitive resolution of the armed conflict.

- The resolution of the negative military factors that blocked the *Lusaka Protocol*, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.

Fundamental principles

- Respect for the rule of law, the democratic institutions in Angola, the observance of the Constitutional Law and of other legislation in force.

- Unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the legal and political instruments relevant to the peace process, in particular, the *Lusaka Protocol* and the UN Security Council Resolutions.

- A recognition that respect for democracy is essential for peace and national reconciliation.

Agenda of the memorandum of understanding

National reconciliation

Amnesty

The Government guarantees approval and publication of an Amnesty Law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict.

Cessation of hostilities and pending military issues under the Lusaka Protocol

Ceasefire

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with all their commitments and obligations relative to the task of re-establishment of a ceasefire (in the spirit of Annex 3 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues I of the *Lusaka Protocol*). Parties will issue and comply with a declaration of the re-establishment of the ceasefire. This task includes:

- The definitive and total cessation of military actions throughout the national territory and the non-dissemination of hostile propaganda.

- Not conducting force movements to reinforce or occupy new military positions, and not undertaking acts of violence against the civilian population and the destruction of property

- The regular reporting on the situation of positions the units and other paramilitary structures of UNITA military forces in areas of possible military tension

- The guarantee of protection of persons and their property, of public resources and property, and the free circulation of persons and goods.

Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of UNITA military forces

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments and obligations relative to the task of quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of the UNITA military forces in the spirit of Annex 3 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues I of the *Lusaka Protocol.*

In this regard, the Joint Military Commission, with the support of the General Staff of FAA, will proceed to quarter and demilitarize all units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces. To include:

a) The reporting, by the High General Staff of the UNITA military forces, to the Joint Military Commission, on all data relative to the composition and location of the units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces.

b) The establishment of monitoring mechanisms of the demilitarization process of the UNITA military forces.

c) The identification of the units and the paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces, the establishment of quartering are as for the same.

d) The definition of the respective itineraries and means of movement and the conduct of the military units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces and paramilitary structures to quartering areas.

e) The disengagement and the movement of the UNITA military forces and paramilitary structures to quartering areas.

f) The reception, accommodation and feeding, and the registration of the personnel of the UNITA military forces in the quartering areas.

g) The handing over and the collection, storage and destruction of the entire armament and equipment of the military units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA armed forces.

Integration into FAA of UNITA military personnel

The Government will proceed to integrate UNITA military personnel into the FAA, in accordance with existing structural vacancies. This process will include training and commissioning.

Integration into the National Police

The Government will proceed to integrate some UNITA Generals and Senior Officers into the National Police, in accordance with existing structural vacancies. This process will include training.

Demobilization and extinction of the UNITA military forces

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments relating to the demobilization of the UNITA military forces and their extinction in the spirit of Annex 4 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues II of the *Lusaka Protocol.*

The Joint Military Commission, with the support of the United Nations, shall proceed with;

- The individual demobilization of the excess personnel from the UNITA military forces.

- The formal and definitive extinction of the UNITA military forces.

- The placement of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces at the administrative dependency on the General Staff of FAA, through the FAA Military Regions and Operational Commands.

Social and vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military forces

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments relating to social reintegration of the demobilized personnel in the spirit

of Annex 4 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues II of the *Lusaka Protocol.*

In this regard, the Government through the General Staff of FAA and with UNITA participation and with the assistance of the international community, shall proceed with the reintegration of the demobilized personnel into civil society, within a program of vocational reintegration.

To include: the protection, accommodation and feeding of ex-UNITA military personnel in the training centres; the professional training of ex-UNITA military personnel to capacitate them for the labour market, through a program of special and urgent social reintegration.

Coordination and application of the memorandum of understanding (MoU)

Coordination of the MoU

The institutional structures of coordination:

Joint Military Commission

Composition and Management:

- Executive Member and President: Military Representative of the Government
- Executive Member: Military Representative of the UNITA Military Forces
- Permanent Observers: the Military Representative of each of the USA, Russia, Portugal and the UN

Functions:

- To promote and oversee the application of the MoU
- To analyse and resolve issues likely to impede the application of the MoU

Rules of operation:

- To decide, by consensus of the parties, adopting recommendations binding on the parties
- To assume duties on the day of signing of the MoU and cease operation when all provisions of the MoU have been complied with
- To establish its headquarters in Luanda, and being able when necessary to hold meetings in other locations of the national territory.

Technical Group

Composition and Management:

- Military experts of the FAA and of the UNITA military forces (up to 20 for each of the parties).
- Military experts of the UN (up to 10) and of the countries of the Troika of Observer States (up to 10 for each).

Functions:

- To assist the Joint Military Commission in the performance of its duties
- To oversee the application of the provisions of the MoU
- To organize ad hoc meetings of the military experts to study the causes of possible difficulties blocking the execution of the MoU or other issues considered to be of interest by the Joint Military Commission
- To draw up a detailed timetable and define activities to be executed as part of the application of the MoU

Rules of Operation:

- To meet periodically to prepare the meetings of the Joint Military Commission and, any time such a meeting is deemed necessary, to meet to analyse issues emanating from the Joint Military Commission
- At the regional level, to meet daily under the chairmanship of a FAA military expert

Timetable of application of the memorandum of understanding

The timetable consists of 7 distinct phases, beginning with D-Day and continuing until the completion of the final phase after 262 days.

Final provisions

Differences of interpretation of application of the MoU shall be submitted to the Joint Military Commission for resolution, in a spirit of friendship, tolerance and understanding.

Signatories

On behalf of the delegation of the Angolan Armed Forces: General Armando da Cruz Neto, Chief of General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces

On behalf of the delegation of the UNITA military forces: General Abreu Muengo Ucuathcitembo Kamorteiro,

Chief of High General Staff of the UNITA Military Forces

On behalf of the United Nations: Chief of the UN Mission in Angola

On behalf of the Observer States of the Peace Process:

Ambassador to the USA in Angola

Ambassador of Russia in Angola

Ambassador of Portugal in Angola

Annexes

1: Quartering of the UNITA military forces

The annex provides details of general points on the quartering, and specifically on the structure, management and location of the Quartering Areas.

1/a: Quartering, disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces within areas territory under UNITA control

The annex recognizes the existence of foreign military forces in UNITA-controlled territory and indicates how the parties will proceed to quarter and disarm the forces.

2: Integration of UNITA military personnel into the FAA in accordance with the existing vacancies

The annex provides a military staffing list to guide the incorporation of 5,007 UNITA military personnel into the FAA.

3: Integration of UNITA Generals and Senior Officers into the national police in accordance with the existing vacancies

The annex provides a National Police staffing list to guide the incorporation of 40 UNITA military personnel into the National Police.

4: Vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military personnel into national life

The annex addresses the vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military personnel and the guarantees and methods required for the task.

5: Considerations regarding the conditions for the conclusion of the Lusaka Protocol

The annex considers that conditions have been created to guarantee the continuity of UNITA participation in the process of conclusion of the implementation of the *Lusaka Protocol*,

and recommends to UNITA the need to rapidly establish the necessary internal consensus to participate in this process.

Annex 6: Considerations relative to special security under the Lusaka Protocol

The annex records that the parties consider valid and applicable the provision in the Document Relative to the Special Security Regime guaranteed to UNITA leaders, in application of paragraph 3 of the Modalities of National Reconciliation of the *Lusaka Protocol*.

Angolan Government's Peace Plan

Luanda, 13 March 2002

The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation of the Republic of Angola considers that the country is experiencing a unique moment in its history to take joint action leading definitively to the end of the current armed conflict, in which the issues of peace and national reconciliation should be seen in a legal and political framework, respecting the constitution, the legal order and state institutions, and unequivocally accepting the validity of the peace accords and United Nations Security Council resolutions on Angola.

In order to achieve peace, the government has set out an agenda that necessarily involves the solution of all military issues resulting from the armed conflict that started after the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, in accordance with the *Bicesse Accords* and the *Lusaka Protocol.*

With the aim of encouraging and promoting the confidence of the entire Angolan nation in this opportunity for peace that must not be wasted, the government has instructed General Staff headquarters of the Angolan Armed Forces, FAA, to cease all offensive movements as from midnight on 13 March 2002, so as to permit the establishment of on-the-spot contacts between the military commands of FAA and UNITA's military forces.

This step opens the way to dialogue and cooperation between the military commands, in order to achieve a general ceasefire as soon as possible and the consequent ending of all movements of forces aimed at reinforcing or occupying new military positions, acts of violence against the civilian population, the destruction of public or private property and the obstruction of the free movement of people and their belongings.

The government considers the demilitarization of UNITA, in accordance with the law, to be fundamental and decisive. In the interests of national reconciliation, the government will present a programme for the integration in national life of generals, officers and privates from UNITA's military forces.

With regard to issues related to the full integration of UNITA into national political life, as a political party whose action is important to the consolidation of the democratic process, the government intends, within the framework of its public responsibilities, to help to create conditions in the country to permit UNITA members, internally and freely, to solve the problem of the leadership of their party and its reorganisation and functioning in accordance with the law.

The government will propose to the National Assembly the approval of an amnesty for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict, the aim of this measure being to ensure the requisite legal and political guarantees for promoting and achieving the process of national reconciliation.

Within the framework of implementing the outstanding administrative tasks of the *Lusaka Protocol*, extending the establishment of state administration to the whole national territory and the appointment of UNITA personnel to the posts provided for should be completed. At the same time, safe conditions should be created for displaced persons to return to their home areas, so as to permit the gradual revival of the economy everywhere in the country. To this end, the government, with the support of the international

community, will promote a large-scale mine clearance programme to make the free movement of people and goods possible throughout the national territory.

The government considers it necessary to find a political and legal solution to the electoral process not completed in 1992, and declares that it will implement the relevant political, legal and administrative measures for the holding of the next elections. To this end, in addition to completing the process of approving a new constitution, the government will engage in amending the electoral legislation, resettling displaced persons and electoral registration and census operations.

The government will work with all of society, especially the churches, political parties, civic associations and social and professional associations, in this whole process, continuing to hold regular consultations with these bodies, with the aim of securing their valuable contribution to action to be undertaken to consolidate peace and democracy in the country and, especially, to calm people's minds, ensuring tolerance and mutual respect and the mobilization of resources and wills for the rapid resolution of the problems affecting war victims.

The consolidation of peace requires timely and effective action in tackling the immediate effects of war on the most affected strata of the population, working to make humanitarian assistance reach all needy people, without discrimination. Within this context, the government is preparing an Emergency Programme to support the social reintegration and resettlement of four million displaced persons, the integration in society of 150,000 demobilized soldiers from the various wars in Angola as well as ex-servicemen, the reintegration of 100,000 disabled people and provision of shelter for 50,000 war orphans.

The government recognizes the effort that has been made by the international community in respect of humanitarian aid and reaffirms its appeal to national and international donors to muster resources to support the said programme, the implementation of which should be with the effective participation

of churches, non-governmental organizations and others in civil society, who will make their experience available to ensure transparency and the rational use of available resources.

Within the framework of its commitment to the rapid reconstruction of the country, the government will fulfil the immediate outstanding tasks in its Programme to Overcome the Crisis, an integral and essential part of which is the Public Investment programme, PIP. The implementation of the PIP will make it possible to rehabilitate economic and social facilities making possible economic activity, the provision of medical assistance to the population, raising schooling levels, the movement of people and goods and better links between provinces, municipalities and communes, and the installation, organization and capacity building of local administration. With the aim of mobilising additional resources for the great task of rebuilding Angola in peacetime, the government has taken the initiative, with the assistance of friendly countries, to hold an international donors' conference on a date to be determined.

The government appeals to all political forces and civil society as a whole, in this crucial period in which the nation's destiny is once again being decided, for every citizen to maintain a high sense of responsibility in his or her acts and words. The government encourages the propagation and consolidation everywhere in the country of a climate of mutual tolerance in which debate and the confrontation of ideas are possible without recourse to physical or verbal violence, insults or slander.

The government urges all Angolans to unite, so that we may together turn an important page in our history. This is a time for reconciliation, mutual forgiveness and unity. Let us bid a final farewell to arms and war and dedicate ourselves fraternally to the reconstruction of a prosperous and modern Angola, capable of guaranteeing the physical, material and spiritual well-being of all its citizens and of occupying its rightful place in the concert of nations.

Lessons for the UN from UNAVEM II (1991–93)

After completing her assignment as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Angola in 1993, Margaret Anstee formulated the following list of lessons for UN involvement in peace processes:

In for the long haul	There is no quick fix for a long standing deep-rooted conflict. The international community must be prepared for the long haul or not at all.
Involved in negotiations	The UN should always be involved in negotiating peace accords it is expected to monitor.
Clear mandate	The UN must have a clear, strong mandate and adequate resources, commensurate with the task, and provided on a timely basis.
Commitment to peace	The antagonists' commitment to peace is essential but they need a strong referee.
Just say no!	The Secretary-General ought to be able to refuse operations for which the conditions, mandate and resources are not right. This is easier said than done in the face of Security Council heavyweights.
Elections	Elections should not be held until minimal conditions established in the peace agreements are fulfilled. There should be no arbitrary deadline.
Nobody takes all	Avoid a 'winner takes all' approach to electoral systems.
Bigger picture	It is essential to undertake concurrent confidence-building and peace-building measures (i.e. human rights, neutral police force, economic and social measures, social reintegration).
Media	The importance of the media internally and externally should be appreciated. An effective UN public information set-up is essential.
Logistics	Logistics are a political factor (e.g. elections airlift)
Carrots *and* sticks	The Security Council's verbal condemnations of UNITA in 1993 achieved nothing. The September 1993 sanctions were too little too late and easily bypassed. It would have been better to have tested UNITA's sincerity by meeting their demands in Abidjan for a symbolic presence of 1,000 Blue Helmets.
Genuine concern	The international community must be genuinely concerned and committed. Angola was at a disadvantage as Yugoslavia and Somalia were priorities; there was growing disenchantment with peacekeeping and Angola; and it was no longer a priority for those who exacerbated the conflict during the Cold War.

Source: Margaret J. Anstee

Profiles

Government

Executive

The President is both head of state and head of government, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President appoints the Cabinet and the position of Prime Minister holds little power. The government is effectively junior to the Presidential Office and many have argued that the office controls the apparatus of the state without being held accountable by parliament or party. Among the powerful figures within the Presidency are the Chiefs of the Civil and Military Houses (*Casa Civil* and *Casa Militar*).

Since 1997 there has been a cross-party Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The main opposition party, UNITA, has had a number of ministers in the GURN, and has no plans to withdraw as of mid 2004.

Legislature

The national legislature is the National Assembly of 220 seats. Since the end of the war, it has established a Constitutional Commission to develop a new Constitution.

Local government

Angola is divided into 18 provinces, 164 municipalities, and 578 communes. A governor heads each province, and administrators head the lower levels. There is no formal state representation at the level of villages or urban neighbourhoods. The President appoints all these officials.

The 1990s saw partial political liberalization coupled with the government's growing revenues from oil, allowing it to remain insulated from public accountability and able to continue to wage war against UNITA. As the international community largely blamed UNITA for the continuing war, the MPLA-government finally won international recognition from the United States and other erstwhile adversaries. After the collapse of the *Lusaka Protocol* in 1998 the government pursued a strategy of achieving peace through military victory.

Presidents

Agostinho Neto
(1975–1979)

José Eduardo dos Santos
(1979–)

Security forces

The MPLA's military wing during the liberation struggle, the **Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA)**, became the national army after independence. The military were extremely powerful – with civilian control diminishing after the South African incursions in the early 1980s. They managed to secure many of the government's resources, spending heavily on military hardware.

As a result of the *Bicesse Accords* the military was reformed to integrate a portion of UNITA's forces into the newly named **Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)** in late 1992. When the country returned to war, the government relied heavily on the paramilitary Rapid Reaction Police (PIR), or 'Ninjas' (created in 1992) and armed partisans to combat UNITA and its supporters. Integration was unsuccessfully attempted again after the *Lusaka Protocol*. Despite this, many FALA officers and soldiers joined the FAA in the course of the 1990s as a result not only of the demobilization and integration agreements, but the haemorrhaging of support for Savimbi as UNITA ground towards defeat.

The FAA is one of the largest and most experienced armies in Africa, with an estimated strength of around 100,000. The FAA absorbs a large portion of national income. Defence and security spending accounts for 32 per cent of the government's 2004 budget. It has been active outside Angola's borders, for instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 when it helped Laurent Kabila overthrow President Mobutu (returning in summer 1998 in Kabila's defence against Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels). The government announced their full withdrawal in January 2002.

Angolan movements

MPLA

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has governed Angola since independence. Its roots lie in the growing movement for Angolan independence that evolved in the 1950s in clandestine activity in Luanda and among Angolan students studying in Lisbon. It is generally said that Ilídio Machado, Viriato da Cruz, Matias Migueis, Higino Aires and André Franco de Sousa formed the MPLA out of existing groups (notably the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola and the Communist Party of Angola) in December 1956. Others question whether the MPLA as such can be said to have really existed before 1960.

Activity began to flourish after violence broke out in February 1961 when a Luanda prison holding political prisoners was attacked. The MPLA later claimed to have been behind the attack, although it is more likely that the attack was carried out by unconnected elements.

The MPLA established its first base in exile in Leopoldville, Zaire (now Kinshasa in the DRC) in 1962. In the same year, Viriato da Cruz was replaced as Secretary-General by Mário Pinto de Andrade, who ceded the presidency to Agostinho Neto, who had established nationalist and populist credentials – helped by being black rather than *mestiço*. In mid-1963 Da Cruz had led a defection from the MPLA to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), causing fighting on the streets of Leopoldville. These tensions contributed to the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) recognition of FNLA leader Holden Roberto's self-styled Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) as the sole Angolan liberation movement in 1963, leading to the MPLA's expulsion from Leopoldville. Using Brazzaville (Congo) as a base, the MPLA gradually re-established itself. In 1964 the OAU recognized the MPLA as a legitimate movement and gradually transferred support away from the GRAE. Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA started in the 1960s.

The MPLA's internal problems re-surfaced in 1973-74. The 'Eastern Revolt' led by field commander Daniel Chipenda unsuccessfully challenged Neto's leadership, resulting in Chipenda joining the FNLA and taking his forces with him. A different kind of revolt followed the next year: the 'Active Revolt' was a political critique of Neto's leadership, a non-violent attempt by Mário de Andrade and other intellectuals to change the direction of the movement. Many of the protagonists were imprisoned or exiled until an amnesty in 1978.

As conflict with Portugal subsided after the revolution in 1974, the MPLA signed the *Alvor Accords* with its rivals in January 1975. Tensions between the liberation movements ignited soon afterwards, and the MPLA spent most of 1975 struggling for control of the country. Cuban and Soviet support helped it achieve control of the capital at the moment of independence. In 1976 the OAU and UN recognized the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola.

In May 1977 Nito Alves, a charismatic military commander and government minister with a militant following in Luanda's *musseques* (slums), led a *coup d'état* attempt against the MPLA leadership. The Alves faction came out in support of a more African-centred focus in the party rather than the perceived *mulato* domination. The purging of this faction and the

restructuring of the party meant dismantling evolving popular democratic structures. The leadership set about building up a political system centralized around the party's Central Committee and the President.

At the MPLA's first congress in December 1977, the movement transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist party comprising "workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals" re-named the MPLA-PT (*Partido de Trabalho* - Workers' Party). Mass bodies like the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA), and the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA) became a key feature of its organization. At the same time, membership was declining and was most concentrated in Luanda and other Kimbundu regions. By the time José Eduardo dos Santos succeeded Neto after his death in 1979, membership had declined to 16,500 from 60,000 in 1975.

In the late 1980s Dos Santos began to consolidate his personal power over the party and the government. But even at the signing of an accord at Gbadolite in 1989, he did not have important parts of the party behind him in accepting the need to negotiate with UNITA.

With the demise of the Cold War and the wave of democratization in Africa, the MPLA made numerous reforms in the 1990s. In 1990 it dropped Marxism-Leninism in favour of 'social democracy'. In 1991 civil society organizations outside the party were legalized and a special congress attempted to broaden the party's appeal. Marcolino Moco, an Ovimbundu, and reformer Lopo do Nascimento were elected to senior posts. In May, as the *Bicesse Accords* were signed, one-party rule formally ended.

UNITA

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was formed in 1966 after founder Jonas Savimbi broke away from the FNLA. Savimbi, an Ovimbundu, was dissatisfied with the Bakongo dominance of the FNLA, its military ineffectiveness, the American influence and the authoritarian leadership of the party's founder, Holden Roberto. UNITA established itself as an 'Africanist' party emphasizing ethnic and rural rights in contrast to the urban and 'Westernized' outlook of the MPLA. UNITA's international support swung from China, to South Africa, Zaire and the US. In the early years, Savimbi's charisma and his image of standing up for the underdog gave him extensive support in central and southern Angola, especially among the Ovimbundu, who make up 40 per cent of the Angolan population.

After signing a ceasefire agreement with the Portuguese in June 1974, Savimbi established his headquarters in Nova Lisboa (now Huambo), and began to create a local party apparatus. He built up an array of supporters, including some of the white settlers. Several foreign media reports, reiterated by the MPLA, alleged that during the first half of the 1970s UNITA had been cooperating with the Portuguese military based in eastern Angola, as well as with some white timber merchants and the Portuguese secret service. Above all Savimbi anticipated that extensive Ovimbundu support would be the basis for post-independence electoral victory. His promotion of Ovimbundu ethnic consciousness became more pronounced as his support base became more regionalized in the clash between liberation movements. Savimbi cultivated a relationship with the Protestant leadership and co-opted many Ovimbundu organizations, widening the division between the Ovimbundu elites and the state.

When the *Alvor Accords* broke down and the country was engulfed in civil war, UNITA received support from South Africa, but was driven from Luanda, and lost the initiative. Following the MPLA's victory, UNITA was initially forced away to its base in Huambo. However, it regrouped and began an economic sabotage campaign in 1977, broadening with the direct support of South Africa after 1983, and the US.

From 1979, UNITA established a self-styled 'autonomous region' called the Free Lands of Angola, with Jamba as the capital. By 1989 it reputedly had a population of 800,000 to a million, and education and health services were delivered. While the centralist MPLA 're-educated', UNITA mobilized village communities by working through 'traditional' leadership. On the other hand, UNITA could also be very brutal, terrorizing rural populations and starving out besieged towns.

UNITA had the features of a party, with a central committee, a political bureau, a Secretary-General, and 'mass organizations' for women and youth. As a fighting organization, UNITA and its military wing, the **Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA)** were closely connected, with its highest military officers in the political bureau. However, the most important feature was the concentration of authority in the figure of Savimbi, both President of UNITA and Commander-in-Chief of the FALA. He kept a tight grip on power, and was ruthless in exercising it. There were regular purges of the leadership, with long serving figures removed, sometimes tortured and killed.

Some non-Ovimbundu members resented the power of the inner circle of ethnic Ovimbundu loyal to Savimbi, particularly family members (e.g. his nephew General "Ben-Ben") and others from Andulu, the area of his birth (e.g. General "Bock"). There were some dissident factions in the mid-1980s that also complained that he had 'sold out' to South Africa. Former high-ranking leaders like António da Costa Fernandes accused Savimbi of using witchcraft trials, and the dismemberment, drowning and burning as witches of political critics. On the other hand, his manipulation of folk beliefs, especially those dealing with witchcraft, enhanced his appeal among rural supporters. International support, though, was damaged, especially after allegations that Savimbi had been behind the killing of former aides Tito Chingunji (negotiator at the *New York Accords* in 1988), Wilson dos Santos, commander António Vakulukutu and others.

UNITA's strategy for the 1992 elections was an 'us' against 'them' campaign (rural poor against educated urban) which did not run well in more politically sophisticated towns such as Luanda, Malange and Benguela. But UNITA proved it could organize a campaign and field candidates across the country, and win sizeable majorities in core provinces. Meanwhile the MPLA was able to run a campaign of inclusion, welcoming Fernandes and fellow dissident Miguel N'zau Puna – who had left UNITA accusing Savimbi of secretly planning to return to war if he lost – into the party. When the MPLA won, Savimbi alleged that the elections had been fraudulent, and amidst large-scale street violence, UNITA returned to war. It was soon in command of much of the country, but was increasingly isolated internationally and gradually lost ground, leading to the signing of the *Lusaka Protocol* in November 1994.

UNITA's engagement with peace initiatives such as the Lusaka negotiations reflected Savimbi's leadership style. The protocol and rank of negotiators changed frequently, as Savimbi manoeuvred for maximum leverage, and punished people not seen to be perfectly loyal. Notable figures in the teams were mainly drawn from UNITA's military, including for Lusaka Vice-President António Dembo, Chief of Staff General Arlindo Pena "Ben Ben", General Paulo Lukamba "Gato", Jorge Valentim, Eugénio Ngolo "Manuvakola", but also overseas representatives (e.g. London's Isaías Samakuva) and a Portuguese lawyer, António Oliveira. Savimbi did not personally sign the *Lusaka Protocol*, leaving it to Manuvakola (who was later put in prison by Savimbi for three years). UNITA's 70 opposition MPs did not take up their seats in Parliament as Angola once again moved back towards war.

With many of its members increasingly disillusioned, UNITA fractured. The main body (Savimbi's followers) fought on from 1998-2002. A Luanda-based group calling itself UNITA-*Renovada* ('renewed') broke away in September 1998, led by Manuvakola and Valentim. The government considered UNITA-R the only legitimate interlocutor to complete the peace process, but most saw the group as a stooge of the MPLA. 54 UNITA deputies disassociated themselves from UNITA-R and reaffirmed Abel Chivukuvuku (formerly Savimbi's personal envoy to the President) as their leader.

UNITA's ability to compete militarily with the government gradually collapsed in the 1998-2002 phase of the war as it lost more and more territory and suffered increasingly from defections. A return to more dispersed guerrilla tactics did not turn the tide, as improved enforcement of UN sanctions started to hit its supply networks.

Savimbi was finally killed in February 2002. Vice-President Dembo died days later, allegedly of natural causes. Secretary-General Lukamba Gato took over. Chief of Staff Abreu "Kamorteiro" signed the *Luena Memorandum* in April. Demilitarization occurred quickly, beginning in August 2002 with the integration of UNITA's troops into the FAA, followed by the demobilization of all but 5,000 of them.

In July 2002, the different UNITA factions reunified under a single authority, the 'Political Commission' and in June 2003, at the first party congress after Savimbi's death, Isaías Samakuva easily defeated Gato to be elected UNITA's new leader.

FNLA

In the 1950s Bakongo émigrés originating from the north-west of Angola established the Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA), which soon became the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA) as it became more oriented towards Angolan nationalism. Leader Holden Roberto had established a far higher international profile by the early 1960s than the more dispersed MPLA leadership, and already had links with the US. He had also turned to armed resistance and in the late 1950s the UPA was a known name among young militants in many parts of the country. After the MPLA had successfully – if dubiously – claimed responsibility for the 4 February 1961 prison attack in Luanda, the UPA led attacks in the north in March. From the UPA base in Kinshasa, Roberto set up the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in 1962. He was also the first to establish a Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) the same year.

Supported by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, the FNLA waged a low-key guerrilla war in north-western Angola. Support waned in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the OAU transferred support to the MPLA. Its fortunes revived in the early 1970s with renewed support from Zaire and the US, but Zairean and South African military backing was not enough during the 1975-76 war, and the FNLA was virtually destroyed as a fighting force.

Roberto was exiled to Paris in 1979, and although a few thousand troops remained in northern Angola, they did not control territory. In 1984 many accepted a government amnesty. Roberto returned to Angola and stood in the 1992 presidential elections, obtaining only 2.1 per cent of the vote, while the FNLA won five Assembly seats.

The FNLA is now largely irrelevant. In September 1998, a 51-strong caretaker committee publicly removed Holden Roberto and replaced him with Lucas Ngonda. In response, Roberto expelled the members of the caretaker committee, calling their actions unconstitutional. After various failed mediation attempts, the party was re-united in April 2004.

FLEC

The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) was formed in 1963 from a number of smaller organizations fighting for Cabindan independence from Portugal, including the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC) and the Alliance of Mayombe. FLEC was led by Luís Ranque Franque, and created a 'Government of Cabinda in Exile' in 1967.

FLEC was banned by Portugal in 1974, and responded by developing a military wing. After exclusion from the Alvor talks in 1975, it attempted to seize control of Cabinda in November with support from Zaire. MPLA and Cuban forces defeated the separatists, who have since operated a low intensity guerrilla war, including abduction of expatriate oil, construction and timber workers.

The Cabindan insurgency has been characterized by factionalism, and FLEC has fragmented numerous times. In 1977, a split led to the creation of the Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda (CMLC). In 1984, FLEC divided into FLEC-FAC (Armed Forces of Cabinda) led by Henriques Nzita Tiago and FLEC-*Renovada* (FLEC-R), led by António Bento-Bembe.

Other factions have included the Democratic Front of Cabinda (FDC), the UNCL (based in Libreville, Gabon), UNALEC and FLEC-Lubota (led by Francisco Xavier Lubota). Attempts to reunite the movement have failed. All factions have their bases outside Cabinda. The Paris-based **FLEC-FAC** is more militant and has more fighters than FLEC-R. Numbers can only be estimated, but it was thought FLEC-FAC had 600-1000 men under arms in the mid-1990s. It claims a Federal Republic of Cabinda under the Presidency of Tiago, which, however, seems to exist only on paper and on the internet.

FLEC-FAC escalated its activities after the 1992 elections, taking control of much of the rural interior, while the government increased troop numbers in Cabinda to 15,000 by mid-1993. UNITA supported the insurgents during 1993-94. The government announced talks with FLEC-FAC in March 1994, but these never took place. Recently further divisions have arisen over whether to discuss autonomy instead of full independence.

Bembe's **FLEC-R** has a history of attempting negotiation, such as the ceasefire it signed with the government in September 1995. This led to a further agreement in May 1996, but conditions deteriorated as the FAA pursued the FLEC-FAC, and in response to the government's lack of interest FLEC-R carried out numerous attacks in 1997.

FLEC-R has split again, with Bembe's FLEC Platform claiming to be the natural descendent of Franque's original FLEC. Franque reportedly participated in exploratory talks with the government in Luanda in August 2003.

FLEC-R, now calling itself FLEC, has created a government in exile, based in France. Like all FLECs, FLEC-R sees the territory as a Portuguese protectorate that was not legally integrated into Angola, and in 2003 called on Portugal to help it conduct a referendum on its future.

Since the government launched a major offensive in late 2002, a number of FLEC officers have publicly defected to the FAA, but rumours of FLEC's downfall have not yet translated into a tangible reality, and the secessionist groups continue to be active. Civil society groups in Cabinda and Luanda mobilize around human rights abuses in the FAA campaign.

International involvement

Portugal

Portugal was awarded the colony of Angola at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, 400 years after its first contact with people in the Kongo basin. With the settler population growing, it had no intention of allowing Angolan independence until a bloodless *coup* in Lisbon in April 1974 by leftist elements of the armed forces.

The new regime helped to negotiate the *Alvor Accords* between the competing liberation movements in January 1975. MPLA-sympathizers within the transitional administration were hostile to certain white settlers whom they saw as the worst face of Portuguese colonialism, leading to a deep crisis of authority. There had been long-standing connections between the anti-fascist forces in Portugal centred around the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) who supported the MPLA.

Relations between Portugal and Angola were strained in the ten years following independence, as Angola suspected the former colonial power, and especially Prime Minister Mário Soares (one of the architects of the *Alvor Accords*) of encouraging the US not to recognize the MPLA and to support UNITA. There were also many *retornados* (returned white settlers) in Portugal unhappy with decolonization and the Marxist MPLA-regime. Lisbon increasingly became UNITA's second base.

Relations began to improve after Cavaco Silva became Prime Minister in 1985, enabling Portugal to assume the role of mediator. Silva set out to gain the MPLA's trust, whose leaders increasingly saw Lisbon as a vehicle for *rapprochement* with the US in an era when lasting Soviet support was looking less guaranteed. Silva's resistance to the strong pro-UNITA lobby in Lisbon achieved this goal, but after the failed Gbadolite talks in 1989 it became clear that the Portuguese government also needed to come to a new accommodation with UNITA if it were to assume a larger mediating role. Savimbi was allowed to visit Lisbon in early 1990, and media restrictions were eased.

With the MPLA's preferred 'African solution' exhausted after *Gbadolite*, it was faced with the unappealing prospect of negotiations with UNITA under US mediation. Instead it looked to the Portuguese, an option equally acceptable to the two superpowers, as Portugal was not in a position to alter international events nor did it have a clear vested interest in the victory of either belligerent.

The Portuguese team, led by Secretary of State Durão Barroso, organized several rounds of talks between April 1990 and May 1991 that led to the signing of the *Bicesse Accords*. Portugal remained a member of the Troika of countries assisting in and monitoring the Angolan peace process. It continues to have closer ties with Angola than other European countries.

USA

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, US involvement in Angola was guided by Cold War considerations. Attracted by the oil and diamond wealth, the US supported Portugal in its struggle to control Angola for most of the 1960s. For a while under President John F. Kennedy, however, there was also a degree of support for anti-colonialism as well as anti-Communism, which led to the establishment of links with the FNLA.

The US assisted the anti-Communist movements in Angola during the civil war of 1975-76. However, at a crucial stage, in December 1975, the Senate passed the Clark Amendment, terminating covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. With the FNLA effectively defeated, and acceptance of the Marxist regime inconceivable, US support began to turn towards UNITA around 1977, and in 1985, with the repeal of the Clarke Amendment, substantial US aid was brought in via Zaire.

With the Soviet Union weakening, the US took the opportunity to play mediator, hosting talks in New York between Angola, Cuba and South Africa in December 1988. However, US policy remained strongly in favour of UNITA and support reached around US$90m in 1990. While the US promoted an end to the war, a stronger UNITA was presented as necessary for the transition to political pluralism. The US helped guide the parties towards the *Bicesse Accords* in 1991, and fully expected UNITA to win the 1992 elections. UNITA's return to war after its controversial defeat was the beginning of the end of its friendship with the US, and after failed peace talks in Addis Ababa and Abidjan in 1993, the US finally established full diplomatic relations with the MPLA government.

The US played a role in bringing UNITA back to the negotiating table for Lusaka, but was the MPLA government's most important ally by the end of the decade, partly due to the growing importance of Angolan oil.

USSR/Russia

Soviet financial, diplomatic, and arms delivery assistance to the MPLA began in the 1960s, but remained covert and insufficient to allow the MPLA to challenge the Portuguese. Support reached a low ebb in 1973 in the midst of two revolts against Neto's leadership, and was resumed only once his position was secure. During the civil war of 1975-76, the USSR airlifted heavy armaments to the MPLA in the crucial months just before and immediately after independence, helping to secure the fledgling regime. With its superpower rivals still reeling from Vietnam, the USSR established closer relations with the MPLA from 1976 with a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The USSR provided essential financial and military support to the Angolan government throughout the 1980s. Relations with the regime were not always smooth, with suspicions of Soviet support for the Alves coup attempt in 1977, and a purge of the more pro-Soviet figures in the 1985 party congress. In the late 1980s it became clear that the MPLA government could not rely on Soviet support indefinitely, as the USSR began to seek a *detente* with the US. The USSR (and later Russia) took its seat as one of the Troika countries that assisted the peace agreements of 1991 and 1994, a role that continued up to the *Luena Memorandum* of 2002.

Others

Angola's neighbours have played significant roles. Ethno-political ties between Bakongo peoples were among the reasons that led President Mobutu's **Zaire** (now the **Democratic Republic of Congo**) to support the FNLA. Mobutu's influence with other African leaders like Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania was crucial in the FNLA's revival in the early 1970s. Roberto also used Zairean support to strengthen ties with China, and even to control the FNLA internally, when Zaire sent troops to put down a mutiny in the FNLA's armed forces in 1973. Mobutu intervened directly in the conflict of 1975, sending troops to support the FNLA against the MPLA. Zaire provided a channel for renewed US support for the FNLA, and helped draw in South Africa, which welcomed the opportunity to be seen fighting alongside a black African nation.

After his effective defeat in the civil war, Mobutu soon came to terms with the MPLA government, sealing the demise of Roberto as a serious player in Angolan power struggles. Relations declined again after 1981, as Mobutu began to assist US destabilization policies and Zaire became an important 'rear-base' for UNITA,

especially after 1986, when it served as a conduit for illegal diamond sales and an entry point for equipment. Mobutu took the opportunity to assume the role of mediator in 1989 when he hosted the Gbadolite talks, but Portugal took over this position in the lead up to the *Bicesse Accords*. Mobutu's fall in 1997 was a serious blow to Savimbi.

Zaire also gave considerable support to FLEC, as did **Congo** (**Republic of Congo – Brazzaville**), both of which had aspirations to dominate an independent Cabinda, if not annex it. Both countries reacted positively to the proclamation of independence of the 'Republic of Cabinda' by the Kinshasa-based FLEC at an OAU summit in August 1975. Yet Brazzaville was supporting N'Zita Tiago's rival FLEC faction, and also the anti-secessionist MPLA (as a Soviet-backed regime, this was part of Brazzaville's rivalry with US-backed Zaire which supported the FNLA). Both countries eventually dropped their support for Cabindan independence and to the various FLEC factions.

Apartheid **South Africa** also intervened against the MPLA on several occasions, motivated by the desire to have a friendly non-communist regime in Luanda that would not harbour SWAPO (South-West African Peoples' Organization, Namibia's liberation movement) guerrillas. It began small-scale military intervention in 1975 in the name of protecting its investments in the Cunene River hydroelectric project, but increasingly trained UNITA and FNLA groups. In October, South African Defence Force (SADF) troops joined the UNITA/FNLA offensive. At first the strategy was to help UNITA reclaim as much territory as possible in the run up to possible negotiations, and then withdrawing, but the focus became instead the push up to Luanda as Zaire/FNLA pushed down from the north (worrying Savimbi who feared a plot to get the FNLA into power). The operation failed to prevent the MPLA retaining control of Luanda, and critically undermined geopolitical support for the MPLA's rivals.

The SADF pulled out in March 1976, but South Africa sustained low-level aggression for many years after and became a major player in the war during the 1980s. UN pressure led to the *Lusaka Accord* of 1984, in which the South Africans agreed to withdraw and Angola to stop assisting SWAPO, but the SADF was back again in 1985 to support UNITA forces against a major Cuban-backed FAPLA drive. In 1987-88, fighting in the south of Angola culminated in the siege of Cuito Cuanavale by South African and UNITA forces. The brutal military stalemate that followed was a fatal blow to its hopes of military victory in Angola. The *New York Accords* of December 1988 saw the independence of Namibia.

On the opposite side of most of South Africa's interventions was **Cuba**. Cuban interest in the MPLA had begun with Che Guevara's visit to Central Africa in 1964-5. In the 1975 war, Cuba intervened on the MPLA's behalf by sending first military advisors, and then troops, supposedly in response to South African intervention (although the decision to do so probably came earlier, as had the MPLA's requests for help). They increased troop numbers from around 1,000 in October, to 14,000 by February 1976. The first elite troops dispatched helped hold Luanda in time for independence on 11 November. Cuban support also helped consolidate the USSR's commitment. In the years after independence, Cuba provided indispensable non-military support to the MPLA regime, sending architects, engineers, teachers, doctors, civil servants and others to build the new country. Cuba's military presence gained added importance for the government in the 1980s when Cuban forces were often engaged in fighting with the South Africans and troop strength reached around 50,000.

By the 1990s, Cuba was no longer of much use to the MPLA. The change in the MPLA's priorities was signalled once and for all in December 1995 when Angola controversially failed to vote in the UN General Assembly against the US's blockade of Cuba, infuriating President Fidel Castro.

Multilateral actors

The **United Nations** adopted a monitoring and verification role after the *New York Accords* in 1988. The United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) (December 1988 - May 1991) was established to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola. UNAVEM II (May 1991 - February 1995) was intended to verify the arrangements agreed by the Government of Angola and UNITA for monitoring the ceasefire and the Angolan police during the ceasefire period, and to observe and verify elections. In February 1995 UNAVEM III was authorized by the Security Council to assist in the restoration of peace and the process of national reconciliation. It was replaced by the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) on 30 June 1997, which was closed down in July 1999 after being forced to pull out as the last hopes of peace evaporated.

A small UN Office in Angola (UNOA) was established in 1999, replaced after the *Luena Memorandum* by a larger mission (UNMA) for six months. After February 2003 the head of the UN's Development Programme (UNDP) became the most senior official of its reduced presence in Angola. Progress in implementing peace is no longer brought before the UN Security Council.

The UN imposed an important set of sanctions against UNITA from 1993, tackling among other things UNITA's military supply lines, travel by its officials, the freezing of its bank accounts, and the prohibition of uncertified diamond exports. The sanctions were poorly enforced until 1999 when a report by new sanctions committee chairman Robert Fowler recommended more stringent enforcement procedures. Sanctions were fully lifted in November 2002.

Other active UN agencies have been the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The **World Bank** and the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) have had difficult relations with the Angolan government, while succeeding in pushing for numerous structural reforms. In the early 1990s, the World Bank channelled much of its aid through international NGOs, both because it considered the government corrupt and because it was trying to seek legitimacy at a time when its structural adjustment policies were under fire. This contributed to the large growth of the humanitarian sector, which by the end of 1995 was one of the biggest employers in Angola. The IMF has been at the forefront of efforts to increase governmental transparency in recent years. In 2004 the government is seeking an agreement with the Fund on economic reforms that would open the door for an international donor conference and make Angola a credible borrower again on the international financial markets.

Chronology

Early history
The Khoi and San live in Angola from 25,000 B.C. and the first sedentary populations settle by the Kongo river from 7000 B.C. Bantu populations arrive from around 800 A.D., with a greater influx between 1300 and 1500 A.D. when more centralized societies emerge.

European settlements
The Portuguese anchor in the Kongo river in 1482-83 and initiate contacts with the Kongo kingdom. In 1491, Portuguese missionaries, soldiers and artisans are welcomed in the capital, M'banza Kongo.

The Kongo kingdom begins to disintegrate in the 16th century, weakened by the slave trade. The Portuguese increase contact with the Mbundu-speaking people to the south, notably the growing Ndongo kingdom, and found Luanda in 1575. They name the area Angola, from the Mbundu word for ruler, *ngola*.

In the face of increased resistance to attempts to conquer Mbundu lands in the early-mid 17th century, the Portuguese land further down the coast and found Benguela. The Dutch occupy Luanda between 1641-1648 and also ally with the Bakongo and Ndongo Queen Nzinga.

Portuguese settlers increasingly exploit African slave labour. With international abolition, Portugal formally abolishes the slave trade to the New World in 1836. But the effective abolition of slavery in the colonies only takes place in 1878 and is replaced with a system of forced labour.

1884-1885
The Berlin Conference draws Angola's northern borders with the Congo Free State and assigns the territory to the south, plus the Cabindan enclave, to Portugal. It takes until the 1920s for Portugal to 'pacify' the whole country and finalize its eastern and southern borders.

1912
Diamonds are discovered in Angola.

1950s
Several nationalist movements are formed in Angola in the late 1950s. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is formed from smaller resistance movements in Luanda, although the precise date is disputed.

1961
A peasant protest against forced cotton cultivation in Malange in January is violently suppressed. Subsequent events – an attack on a Luanda prison in February

(which the MPLA later claim credit for), and an armed revolt in March in the north by the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA) – mark the beginnings of the armed struggle for independence.

1962
The UPA merges with the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) to become the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under the leadership of Holden Roberto, who quickly establishes a Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE).

1963
The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) is formed.

1966
Jonas Savimbi, having left the FNLA and its government in exile, establishes the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Oil is discovered in Cabinda.

1974
April
In Portugal, units of the Portuguese armed forces seize power. General António de Spínola is appointed leader of the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA) regime.

June
Portugal suspends military activities against Angolan nationalists.

July
As Portugal acknowledges Angola's right to self-determination and all its consequences, a left-winger, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, is appointed as High Commissioner in Angola.

September
Without Coutinho's knowledge, Spínola hosts a secret meeting in Cape Verde reportedly with President Mobutu of Zaire, Roberto, Savimbi and MPLA dissident Daniel Chipenda in an attempt to establish a provisional government that excludes Agostinho Neto's MPLA. Two weeks later Spínola resigns with the radicals in the ascendancy within the MFA.

1975
January
Portugal invites the MPLA, UNITA and FNLA to participate in a transitional government, the details of which are worked out in the *Alvor Accords*, signed on 15 January.

The transitional government is inaugurated on 31 January. It includes a 'troika' presidency of the three independence movements, and ministerial posts divided between the movements and Portugal. The arrangement fails and fighting soon breaks about between the MPLA and FNLA.

April-August
The FNLA is expelled from Luanda by the MPLA in July after heavy street battles, and UNITA becomes fully involved in the fighting in other parts of the country.

The first Cuban military advisors to the MPLA arrive. Zairian units enter northern Angola in support of the FNLA in August. South African Defence Force (SADF) troops occupy the Cunene region bordering Namibia.

September
MPLA control in Luanda is secured when the last remaining UNITA officials leave for central Angolan towns with some 10,000 supporters.

October
SADF troops fan out northwards from Cunene towards Luanda.

November
On 11 November Portugal formally transfers sovereignty to all Angolans. The MPLA, in control of Luanda while conflict rages across the country, proclaims the People's Republic of Angola. The FNLA and UNITA set up their own government in Huambo, which quickly falls apart.

December
By mid-December South African and UNITA forces are poised 180 miles south of Luanda.

The US Senate terminates covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. This is later extended by the 'Clark Amendment'.

1976
In January, after large-scale Soviet airlifts of materials to the MPLA, UNITA-SADF positions are under massive attack. By February, the MPLA has recaptured Huambo, Benguela, São Salvador (M'banza-Kongo, a FNLA stronghold) and the last FNLA outpost at San António do Zaire (Soyo). The OAU recognizes Angola as a member state.

South Africa withdraws most of its forces in March. The UN recognizes Angola as a full member in November.

1977

An MPLA faction led by Nito Alves attempts a coup in May which is bloodily put down, leading to greater centralization and control by the Neto government and political repression.

At the MPLA's first Congress in December, the party is renamed the MPLA-*Partido do Trabalho* (MPLA-Worker's Party), and formally adopts a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

1978

The SADF attacks Cassinga, Huíla, alleging the presence of a South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) training camp. Hundreds die in what becomes known as the 'Cassinga Massacre'.

1979

President Neto dies of cancer in September, and is succeeded by José Eduardo Dos Santos.

1981

South Africa invades southern Angola again in August, with the declared aim to pursue the insurgents of SWAPO, though most fighting is between the SADF and Angolan forces.

1982

Secret negotiations between South Africa and Angola are held in December in Cape Verde.

1984

In February Angola and South Africa sign an accord in Lusaka, providing for a ceasefire, South African withdrawal, and relocation of SWAPO away from the border region. Implementation takes over a year.

1987

South Africa openly admits its support for UNITA and engages Cuban and Soviet troops in direct confrontations. The Angolan government sends the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) into a full scale offensive against UNITA-SADF to recapture Mavinga and its airfield, but after initial progress is forced back to Cuito Cuanavale. South Africa is castigated by the United Nations Security Council in November. South African forces heavily bombard Cuito Cuanavale in December.

1988

Cuito Cuanavale comes close to falling in January, but the SADF and UNITA are driven back in March and relax the siege in May as negotiations are initiated in London between Angola, Cuba and South Africa.

The FAPLA and Cubans attack the Calueque dam that South Africa had held for years in June. South African forces withdraw across the border.

Following agreements signed in July and August, the *New York Accords* are signed in December; the *Brazzaville Protocol* of 13 December commits the Cuban, Angolan and South African governments to sign an agreement under the auspices of the UN on the withdrawal of Cuban troops. The signing ceremony of the *Tripartite Agreement* (plus the *Bilateral Agreement* between Angola and Cuba) takes place on 22 December.

The UN Security Council creates the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to supervise the Cuban withdrawal.

1989

President Dos Santos and Savimbi sign a ceasefire in June in Gbadolite, Zaire hosted by President Mobutu. The agreement collapses amid differing interpretations of what was agreed.

1990

New rounds of talks between the government and UNITA take place in April, July, August and September in Lisbon. The MPLA drops Marxism-Leninism in October.

1991

March

The Law on Associations (14/91) is introduced, allowing secular and church NGOs to be registered and operate independently of the MPLA.

April

A 'non-stop session to peace' is announced by Portuguese mediators on 4 April.

May

One-party rule is abolished by law on 11 May. The *Bicesse Accords* are signed in Portugal. The last Cuban troops leave and UNAVEM II is established.

November

Various factions of FLEC meet in Lisbon and form an ill-fated Supreme Coordination Council of the FLEC.

1992

August

The People's Republic of Angola is renamed the Republic of Angola.

September

Although the requisite demobilization levels have not been achieved, the FAPLA and UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA) are formally combined into the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) on 27 September. The FALA Generals abandon it a week later.

Elections are held on 29-30 September and are deemed "generally free and fair" by international observers including the UN. With a 92 per cent turnout, the MPLA wins 54 per cent of votes for assembly seats, UNITA 34 per cent. Dos Santos wins 49.6 per cent of votes in the Presidential elections, Savimbi 40.7 per cent, requiring a second round to be scheduled.

October

Savimbi claims the elections were characterized by fraud and irregularities. On 5 October UNITA withdraws from the FAA. On 7 October, speaking for the 'Angolan Democratic Opposition', UNITA warns it will reject any announcements regarding results before the end of investigations into the irregularities. On 16 October, the UN confirms that the elections were free and fair.

On 31 October, UNITA and MPLA army and militia units confront each other in street battles in Luanda, beginning the return to violence and the slide towards Angola's 'third war'. In the next few weeks, many people die in fighting between armed partisans in the cities. UNITA's leadership in Luanda is virtually wiped out and many supporters killed. The government later describes this as the actions of angry civilians, rather than of demobilized soldiers, 'ninjas' (riot police set up by the government) or secret service agents.

1993
January

UNITA begins full offensives in areas outside the capital.

On 22 January dozens of people are killed in riots against Zairians and Angolan returnees from the Congos in Luanda.

MPLA and UNITA officials meet in Addis Ababa under UN auspices to try and revive the peace process. The discussions are inconclusive.

March

Huambo falls to UNITA following a 55-day siege.

April

The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) is established.

UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee conducts negotiations in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

May

The US grants the MPLA government full diplomatic recognition.

The Abidjan talks stumble over the issue of whether UN peacekeepers would arrive before or after a ceasefire. The UN refuses to approve Anstee's request for a

symbolic force of 1,000 peacekeepers in order to break the deadlock. The talks collapse.

June

The UN condemns UNITA for continuing the war. Alioune Blondin Beye succeeds Anstee as the Secretary General's Special Representative.

September

The Security Council imposes an oil and arms embargo against UNITA. At this stage. UNITA controls about 70 per cent of Angola's territory.

October

On 6 October UNITA issues a 7-point communiqué reaffirming the validity of the *Bicesse Accords* and its acceptance of the 1992 elections. At proximity talks in Lusaka, MPLA and UNITA officials agree to resume negotiations on 15 November.

December

In Lusaka, the negotiating teams fail to agree on the numbers of troops from each side to be included in the integrated armed forces. A government bombing raid on the outskirts of Kuito leads UNITA to accuse the government of trying to assassinate Savimbi.

1994
February

The government bombs Huambo, and UNITA responds by shelling Malanje.

March-May

Negotiators and observers at Lusaka focus on government positions to be offered to UNITA without reaching agreement. To break the deadlock, the Troika mediation team makes a revised proposal on 17 March, which the government eventually adopts on 28 May with some minor changes.

June-August

UNITA responds to the 28 May proposals by demanding that Huambo be added to their list of provincial governorships. Under threat of UN sanctions, UNITA renounces this claim in August, but the government objects to UNITA's continued insistence on approving the selection of governor for Huambo, and attacks the town on 31 August.

September

In a new letter, UNITA accepts the 28 May proposals without reservations.

October

Despite escalating military confrontations, the *Lusaka Protocol* is initialled on 31 October.

November

The government captures Huambo, UNITA's headquarters, on 10 November, an action condemned by the Security Council and US government.

On 14 November, a UNITA military team discusses a nationwide truce with the government, which comes into effect two days later.

Amidst continued reports of government military advances, and five days later than planned, the *Lusaka Protocol* is signed on 20 November. Savimbi does not attend, and Eugénio Manuvakola signs on behalf of UNITA.

1995
February

UNAVEM III is established.

May

President Dos Santos meets Savimbi in Lusaka for talks hosted by Zambia.

August

A second meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi is held in Franceville, Gabon hosted by President Omar Bongo. It temporarily reduces the tensions that had arisen since January regarding violations of the ceasefire and the slow deployment of peacekeeping troops.

November

The quartering of UNITA soldiers officially commences on 20 November.

December

UNITA suspends the quartering process after the FAA occupies localities around Soyo.

1996
February

By the end of the month UNITA has quartered around 16,500 troops. The pace slows further after this, and UNITA blames a lack of progress by the government in arranging an amnesty

March

A fourth meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi is held in Libreville, Gabon. They agree to complete the quartering process by June. Savimbi is offered the post of Vice President.

May

A new Amnesty Law is approved on 8 May, following on from amnesty laws from July 1991 and December 1994.

June

UNITA has quartered 52,000 troops by the end of June deadline, short of its 62,500 declared total strength.

August

At an extraordinary session of its Congress, UNITA declines the offer of the post of Vice President for Savimbi, despite a seemingly positive response earlier in the year.

September-November

The Joint Commission's 20 September deadline for the completion of military tasks is not met. In the on-going debate over Savimbi's special status, UNITA proposes he should be given the status of 'Leader of the Opposition', and made number two in the protocol ranking. The government rejects the proposal.

December

The UNITA Generals are incorporated into the FAA.

1997
February-March

Angola sends two battalions into Zaire in support of Laurent Kabila's insurgency.

In March the Joint Commission approves a text giving Savimbi the title of 'President of the Major Opposition Party' with certain privileges in public acts and state protocol ceremonies. The government had rejected Savimbi's previous suggestion of: "Principal Advisor to the President" with special responsibilities for rural development and national reconciliation.

April

The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) is launched with four ministries held by UNITA, but Savimbi does not attend.

June

Amidst increasing tensions, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), headed by Alioune Blondin Beye, is established with 1,500 troops.

August

The UN Security Council bans UNITA officials from international travel, orders the closure of UNITA offices in foreign countries, and prevents flights to or from UNITA controlled areas.

September-October

Angolan troops cross the Cabindan border with the Republic of Congo to assist General Sassou-Nguesso against President Lissouba, alleging the latter's involvement with UNITA.

November
The government takes control of UNITA towns in the diamond-rich Lundas.

1998
January-February
The parties agree a timetable for remaining tasks necessary for the implementation of the *Lusaka Protocol*, but it expires with some tasks still outstanding. The deadline for completing the peace process by 28 February is not met.

March
UNITA becomes a legal political party and formally demobilizes, but is widely believed to have retained its elite fighting units and 20,000 troops.

June
Beye dies in plane crash in Côte d'Ivoire on 28 June.

July
President Dos Santos says that UNITA's armed attacks in the last two months are obliging the government to "adopt adequate measures to confront what is an undeclared state of war".

August
Issa Diallo replaces the late Beye as Special Representative to Angola.

Angolan troops re-engage in fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire) in support of President Kabila.

UNITA ceases cooperation with the Troika of observer nations because of their alleged bias. The government claims this means the end of the Lusaka process and suspends the four UNITA ministers from the GURN. By the end of the month UNITA has seized back a third of the area ceded to government control under the *Lusaka Protocol*.

September
The government announces it will deal only with the newly-formed UNITA-Renovada, a breakaway faction of UNITA. The FNLA also splits into two factions, one led by Lucas Ngonda, and the other by founder Holden Roberto.

November
A new UNITA faction emerges, led by Abel Chivukuvuku, rejecting both UNITA-Renovada and the armed struggle waged by Savimbi.

December
At the MPLA's fourth congress, the government announces a return to full military strategy: 'peace through war', calling for the end of the Lusaka process and the withdrawal of MONUA.

1999
January
The second of two UN aircraft is shot down over UNITA territory, leaving no survivors.

Despite being specified in the Constitution, the post of Prime Minister is abolished, having been vacant since June 1996. Dos Santos becomes both head of state and head of government.

February
The UN withdraws its remaining peacekeeping forces on the grounds that there is no peace to keep.

May
The UN Security Council sets up expert panels to look at how UNITA is breaking UN sanctions, and how the international community can tighten the sanctions.

July
A Manifesto for Peace in Angola calls for an immediate ceasefire, dialogue between the belligerents and opening of humanitarian corridors. It is signed by hundreds of well-known Angolans from all walks of life and then circulated for endorsement by the population.

August
As UNITA reportedly steps up its attacks on towns and villages, Savimbi gives radio interviews calling for fresh negotiations, but insisting that "Lusaka is dead, completely dead".

September
The FAA launches a counter offensive, pushing out from Malanje, Kuito and Huambo.

October-December
The UN authorizes an office in Angola in October (although no head is appointed until July 2000).

The FAA captures many towns in the UNITA heartland of the Central Highlands, including Bailundo and Andulo.

2000
March
A UN sanctions report exposes the individuals and countries that helped UNITA build up its arsenal through diamond trading and other means.

April

The Security Council sets up a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing sanctions against UNITA, and paves the way for additional sanctions and action against states that flout them.

The Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) is formed.

July

The *Congreso Pro Pace* (Congress for Peace) held under the auspices of the Catholic Church, calls for an immediate ceasefire.

September-October

The FAA continues its successes, capturing Cazombo in Moxico. A UN report estimates that the number of IDPs has risen to 2.7 million since January 1998.

December

The final report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions is released, recommending the continuation of sanctions.

2001
April

In an addendum to its December report, the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions submits a report claiming that although UNITA is still actively conducting guerrilla warfare, the UN's monitoring of sanctions has been effective against UNITA's supply lines.

June

The government establishes a Commission for Peace and National Reconciliation comprising 24 parliamentarians.

The FAA reports taking several towns, and repulses a major UNITA attack on Uige.

August

UNITA attacks a train on 10 August in Cuanza Norte, reportedly killing over 440 people.

September

The Catholic Church and the Open Society Foundation-Angola launch a campaign for a negotiated peace. It aims to stage a mock referendum on peace.

December

Government troops embark on an offensive against UNITA. Civil society groups again demand an immediate ceasefire. The UN Under Secretary for

African Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, announces that the government is ready to allow the UN to resume its role as mediator, and to get UNITA back to the negotiating table.

2002
February

Savimbi is killed by government forces in Moxico on 22 February. UNITA Vice President António Dembo dies three dies later, allegedly from illness.

March

The government makes a unilateral declaration of a truce on 13 March and reveals a peace plan promising to allow UNITA to reorganize and integrate into national political life, proposing an amnesty, and offering to work in consultation with churches and civil society.

Commanders of the FAA and UNITA meet on 15 March in Cassamba, Moxico for a pre-negotiation meeting. They agree to continue negotiations in Luena, where an agreement is reached on 30 March.

April

Following two weeks of negotiations, the *Luena Memorandum of Understanding* is formally signed on 4 April in Luanda by the two Chiefs of Staff, by the UN's Ibrahim Gambari and by the Ambassadors of the Troika of observer countries.

May

UNITA's military commander says 85 per cent of his troops are gathered at demobilization camps, but there are concerns over food shortages.

August

UNITA officially scraps its armed wing.

The UN authorizes a new six-month Mission in Angola (UNMA).

The Open Society-Angola conference on 'The Agenda for Peace and Reconciliation in Angola' calls for more civil society participation.

October

The FAA launches a "final" counter-insurgency campaign in Cabinda, reportedly using newly-incorporated UNITA soldiers. By the end of the month it has destroyed Kungo-Shonzo, the main base of one of the FLEC factions, FLEC-FAC. President Dos Santos suggests autonomy for Cabinda will be part of a peaceful solution.

November

The Joint Commission that oversaw implementation of the agreement is formally dissolved with remaining issues to be dealt with bilaterally between the government and UNITA.

The various UNITA factions agree to join together under a single authority, the Political Commission, as UNITA-Renovada agrees to dissolve itself.

December

Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nandó" is sworn in as Prime Minister as the position is reinstated.

The UN Security Council lifts the remaining sanctions on UNITA.

2003
January

UNITA Political Affairs Secretary Abílio Camalata "Numa" asks the people to pardon UNITA for the errors committed and the deaths that occurred during the war, insisting the armed struggle was propelled by a "political project" and "wasn't one person's personal adventure".

FLEC-FAC leaders reportedly meet government officials in Paris in exploratory talks.

February

Information Minister Hendrick Vaal Neto accuses the Catholic broadcaster *Rádio Ecclésia* of serving as a "vehicle of offences, defamation and false propaganda against Angolan individuals and institutions".

UNMA's mandate is not renewed by the Security Council.

Aníbal Lopes Rocha, Governor of Cabinda, announces that the government is preparing a plan to resolve the Cabinda conflict by peaceful means. The plan does not materialize.

April

A FLEC-FAC representative says that although independence is a "desirable solution" to the ongoing conflict, they remain open to negotiation over the future status of the province.

May

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees begins repatriating 150,000 Angolan refugees mainly from Zambia and the DRC.

June

UNITA hold their ninth Congress, electing their former representative in Paris, Isaías Samakuva as their new leader.

August

UNITA complains that its offices in Huambo have come under attack by youths in MPLA t-shirts. Other offices had allegedly been looted.

October

18 former FLEC-FAC officers, most recently surrendered, join the FAA.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) reports that the Gathering Areas have all been closed.

2004
January

The Angolan government announces that elections are likely to take place in 2006 to allow for the adoption of a new constitution and electoral law, and for there to be a national census and registration. UNITA and the opposition parties criticize the repeated delay.

The Technical Commission of the National Assembly's Constitutional Commission presents its draft of the new Angolan Constitution, proposing a semi-presidential system with greater devolution of power.

March

Sporadic street protests against abuses of power and lack of socio-economic progress take place in a number of towns – some violently repressed by riot police.

Open Society-Angola and around 30 other civic organizations and political parties launch a Campaign for a Democratic Angola, pressing the government to speed up the democratization process and set a date for elections.

A new civic association called *Mpabalanga* is launched in Cabinda, advocating renewed dialogue as well as respect for Cabindan identity and development.

April

The two FNLA factions reunite.

June

UNITA cautiously welcomes the President's announcement that the Council of the Republic, a consultative body, would begin discussions on possible dates for elections.

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- Extensive guide to Angola on the internet: www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/angola.html

Additional materials (including Portuguese language texts) can be found at www.c-r.org/accord/ang

An exhibition about peace in the Luanda offices of Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA)

conciliation
resources

Conciliation Resources (CR) was established in 1994 to provide an international service and act as a resource in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. CR's principal objective is to support the activities of locally-based groups working at community or national levels to prevent violence or transform armed conflict into opportunities for social, political and economic development based on more just relationships.

In striving to attain that objective, CR:
- assists organizations in developing innovative and sustainable solutions to short- and long-term problems related to armed conflict;
- involves previously marginalized groups in community and national peacemaking and peacebuilding processes;
- helps strengthen civic capabilities for dialogue, problem-solving and constructive action locally, nationally and regionally;
- contributes to the local and international development and dissemination of conflict transformation practice and theory

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In addition to the *Accord* programme, CR has recently worked with:

- civic groups in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria
- *Kacoke Madit* and its partners in northern Uganda
- journalists and media organizations in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda
- the Angolan non-governmental organization ADRA and its local partners
- the Citizens' Constitutional Forum in Fiji
- non-governmental organizations and officials in Georgia and Abkhazia

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The Accord series

Accord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrative and analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resource for reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.

The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996

Issue 1 | 1996

The Liberia issue documents the lengthy and fractious Liberian peace process and provides insight into why thirteen individual peace accords collapsed in half as many years.

**Safeguarding Peace:
Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge**

Issue 5 | 1998

This publication documents issues around the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements which officially "brought to an end" Cambodia's long war and the violent collapse of the country's governing coalition in July 1997.

**Negotiating Rights:
The Guatemalan Peace Process**

Issue 2 | 1997

The signing of the peace agreement in 1996 brought an end to 36 years of civil war in Guatemala. The publication analyses issues of impunity, indigenous rights, political participation and land reform.

**Compromising on Autonomy:
Mindanao in Transition**

Issue 6 | 1999

The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was a milestone in many ways. The publication analyses features of peacemaking in Mindanao and examines the challenges of implementation.

2003: Supplement issue

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The Mozambique issue documents the diverse initiatives which drove the parties to a negotiated settlement of the conflict as well as illustrating the impact of changing regional and international dynamics on Mozambique.

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**Demanding Sacrifice:
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**Striking a balance:
the Northern Ireland peace process**

Issue 8 | 1999

Accord 8 explores the factors that led to the negotiations resulting in the Belfast Agreement, describing the complex underlying forces and the development of an environment for peace.

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**Paying the price:
the Sierra Leone peace process**

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The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought to bring an end to one of the most brutal civil wars of recent times. Accord 9 explores earlier attempts to bring the conflict to an end and in doing so seeks to draw valuable lessons for Sierra Leone's transition.

Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process

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
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Thematic project: engaging armed groups in peace processes

In situations of internal armed conflict, those seeking to find a peaceful solution often need to engage with non-state armed groups involved in violent struggles with the government or, in situations of inter-communal violence, other non-state armed groups. International diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches are often challenged by the complexities and controversies surrounding these groups, particularly in the context of the global 'war on terror'. The second Accord thematic project will explore some of the dilemmas, successes and obstacles of engaging armed groups in political dialogue processes, documenting particular experiences and highlighting lessons learned.

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Accord 15

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From military peace to social justice?
The Angolan peace process

Angola's long war formally ended in April 2002 with the signing of the *Luena Memorandum of Understanding* between the government and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Marking the successful completion of the government's drive to achieve 'peace through war', the *Luena Memorandum* built on a series of previous failed peace agreements and cleared the way for the demobilization of thousands of UNITA combatants.

This *Accord* issue asks 'what next?' for a nation that has reached a 'military peace' but still faces huge challenges in post-conflict peacebuilding, not to mention an ongoing secessionist war in Cabinda. It provides an overview of the lessons to be learned from Angola's history of conflict and peacemaking, reviewing past peace processes and the roles of actors such as the United Nations and Angolan civil society. The authors also identify key challenges faced in working towards greater social justice, including the need for deeper democratization, more accountable management of resource wealth and a positive role for the media and women in Angolan society.

The publication also contains summaries of peace agreements, profiles of key actors and a chronology of the peace process.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programme

Conciliation Resources (CR) was established in 1994 to provide an international service in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. CR's Accord programme works collaboratively to support those engaged directly in reducing the number of lives affected by armed conflict and transforming situations of violence into opportunities for sustainable human development. The programme seeks to promote for learning from past and comparable peace processes, by documenting specific conflicts and peace processes, as well as looking comparatively at cross-cutting issues in peacemaking experiences worldwide.

"The whole series is a really valuable tool for people who do practical work on conflicts... I particularly appreciate the fact that a variety of viewpoints are included, not only political but also civil society, refugee, etc., and that the series works with local authors and researchers."
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From military peace to social justice?
The Angolan peace process

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