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Centre for  
Humanitarian  
Dialogue

*Mediation for peace*

## Women at the Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the contributions of women to conflict resolution



Report and policy recommendations  
with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences

Women at the Peace Table **Indonesia**

# The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre)

## “Mediation for peace”

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) is an independent mediation organisation dedicated to helping improve the global response to armed conflict. It attempts to achieve this by mediating between warring parties and providing support to the broader mediation community.

The HD Centre is driven by humanitarian values and its ultimate goal to reduce the consequences of violent conflict, improve security, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflict.

It maintains a neutral stance towards the warring parties that it mediates between and, in order to maintain its impartiality it is funded by a variety of governments, private foundations and philanthropists.

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An activist from West Papua protests against violence in front of the vice presidential palace in Jakarta, Indonesia, 16 October 2000. AP Photo/Dita Alangkara

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#### Images (back cover)

Internally displaced persons inside a refugee tent, Beto Timur, Timor-Leste, 3 July 2008.

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# Contents

<b>Contributors to this report</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Summary</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>8</b>
Challenges to the greater participation of women in Indonesian peace processes .....	10
<b>The role of Indonesian women during the New Order era</b> .....	<b>13</b>
‘State Ibuism’ .....	15
<b>Making and building peace in Indonesia</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>The roles of women in conflict resolution</b> .....	<b>21</b>
Case Study One: Violent Conflict in Maluku .....	22
Case Study Two: Violent Conflict in Papua .....	28
<b>Norm building</b> .....	<b>33</b>
National action .....	33
International action .....	34
<b>Recommendations</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>Annex 1. Representation of men and women in the 2009 legislative elections, and the percentage of female parliamentarians</b> .....	<b>42</b>

**A report by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and  
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences**

**November 2010**

## Contributors to this report

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Verification of information and additional contributions were made by Shienny Angelita, HD Centre and Lidya Christin Sinaga, LIPI. The report was reviewed in August–September 2010 by Shadia Marhaban from Aceh Women's League (LINA) and Latifah Anum Siregar from Alliance of Democracy for Papua (ALDP).



## Summary

Over the last decade, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre) has highlighted the low level of women's participation in peacemaking, regardless of the region or type of conflict. Through the 'Women at the Indonesian Peace Table' project, the HD Centre seeks to contribute to strengthening the contributions of women to conflict management. It is part of the larger project, "Women at the Peace Table – Asia Pacific" which includes a wider regional focus.<sup>1</sup>

The Indonesian project is undertaken in partnership with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and with the co-operation of the Indonesian State Ministry for Women Empowerment and Child Protection. It is funded by SERASI, an Indonesian affiliate of the United States Agency for International Development.

The HD Centre believes that sustainable peace can only be achieved when there is robust and holistic participation in peace processes. Particularly this means more women need to be included in peace negotiations. 'Women at the Indonesian Peace Table' aims to document the experiences of women directly involved in Indonesian conflict resolution from various spheres (including the government, NGOs and rebel groups). It also seeks to identify women who can be considered for facilitation or mediation roles in the future, in Indonesia and elsewhere. While women have played an extensive part in managing violent conflict at the community level, they have been virtually absent from involvement in conflict resolution and decision-making at higher political levels. Thus, the principle goal of the project is to elevate women's involvement in conflict resolution by ensuring that those with experience at the community level are identified and given opportunities to use their skills and develop new ones, as needed, and utilised as resources for peacemaking.

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1 For more on this work, see [www.hdcentre.org/projects/gender-mediation](http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/gender-mediation)

# Introduction

In all areas of a peace process — cessation of hostilities, sustainability and credibility of peace on the ground, security and violence reduction dimensions, power-sharing, justice and truth-seeking processes, redressing the impacts of violent conflict — the participation of women is vital for ensuring that any agreements reached include the views of half of the population. Yet to date there has not been a peace process where gender parity, or anything approximating it, has occurred.

In Indonesia, only a handful of women have been involved in formal peace processes in recent history. During the final round of peace talks on Aceh (the Helsinki process and agreement) one woman — Shadia Marhaban — was involved, as a member of a support group to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).<sup>2</sup> In the peace process in Poso (Malino I) aimed at drawing down the violence, there were two female pastors from the Christian community who participated in the process — Nelly Alamako and Lis Sigilipu — and a Muslim woman — Ruwaida Untingo.<sup>3</sup> In the Malino II process in Maluku, a female pastor — Margaretta Hendrik — and two Catholic women — Sister Brigitta Renyaan and Ety Dumatubun — were chosen as representatives of the Christian community. There was no female Muslim representative in the Malino II process.<sup>4</sup> (See ‘Case Study One: Violent Conflict in Maluku’).

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2 The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement can be accessed at [www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf](http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf).

3 The Malino Declaration on Poso can be accessed at [www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument)

4 Malino II Peace Agreement on Maluku can be accessed at [www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64CDMA?OpenDocument](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64CDMA?OpenDocument)

Even in Papua, where women have been more actively involved in informal peace talks to resolve conflict or calm tension between Papuans and the Indonesian officials (or between different elements of civil society) their presence at formal talks is limited.<sup>5</sup> Efforts to involve women in peace talks are mainly driven by women's groups, such as Papua Women Solidarity (Solidaritas Perempuan Papua-SPP). (See 'Case Study Two: Violent Conflict in Papua').

Peace agreements in Indonesia have been consistently insensitive on gender matters. Unsurprisingly, the limited presence and participation of women



Peace agreements in Indonesia have been consistently insensitive on gender matters.

in peace talks in Indonesia has been a key factor in this, inhibiting the possibility of women's and gender concerns being raised at the peace table. Though of course, it is not just up to women to raise gender 'issues'. Seemingly, the preoccupation with security and the reduction of violence overshadows other important issues. For example,

not a single article in the Helsinki agreement that concluded hostilities in Aceh in August 2005 touches on gender.<sup>6</sup> The same applies to the Malino I and II peace agreements.

Evidence suggests that in Indonesia, as elsewhere in the world, the resolution of violence and war is predominantly the domain of men. This is despite the fact that women are actively involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding at the level at which such violence is occurring (locally, within and between communities, and at the 'grassroots'). Indeed the Indonesian experience tallies with the dismal global picture; in 2009, after reviewing 21 major

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5 The use of the word 'Papua' in this report refers to Papua and West Papua provinces. The area was previously known by various names, including Netherlands New Guinea (1895–1962), Western New Guinea (1962–May 1963), West Irian (1963–1973), Irian Jaya (1973–2000) and Papua (2001–2003). In 2003 the western-most third of the region was split into a separate province, called West Irian Jaya, which was renamed Western Papua province in April 2007. Indigenous people refer to Papua and West Papua province as West Papua.

6 According to Shadia Marhaban, the only woman involved in the talks, Martti Ahtisaari's strategy was to spend five months on core issues such as security, political arrangements and re-integration. Not only was the issue of gender neglected but that of human rights as well. However, it was promised by the Indonesian government that those issues will be accommodated in the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) as stipulated in the Helsinki MoU.

peace processes since 1992, UNIFEM concluded that only 2.4 per cent of signatories were women.<sup>7</sup>

Even though women also play critical roles in perpetrating violence (as combatants, commanders, logisticians and messengers), the focus of this report is on the roles of women in conflict resolution including formal and informal peacemaking.<sup>8</sup> This report will highlight some of the main challenges that women face in conflict situations and the obstacles which prevent them from participating in peace processes and the political arena. The report will conclude with recommendations targeted at Indonesian local and central government, as well as key stakeholders, to encourage them to pay greater attention to the issues of women's participation in peace processes and related fields.

## Challenges to the greater participation of women in Indonesian peace processes

In Indonesia a range of factors influence the exclusion of women from formal, and semi-formal, conflict resolution. Even though some parts of Indonesia have a strong matrilineal tradition, this has been affected by certain religious interpretation of women's roles and place in society.

For example, Minangkabau in West Sumatra is famous in Indonesia for its matriarchal social system. However, according to one observer, "viewed from the Minangkabau perspective, matriarchy is not about 'female rule', but about social principles and values rooted in maternal meanings in which both sexes work together to promote human well being".<sup>9</sup> Additionally, this system places great value on accommodation and consensus when handling conflict. In 2005,

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7 UNIFEM, *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, Brief (New York: UNIFEM, 2009) p. 1.

8 In many of the meetings and discussions led by the HD Centre and LIPI with Indonesians, the term informal peace process is commonly used to refer to a process led, or initiated by, non-governmental actors, often at the grassroots level, with no official support or involvement and where decisions taken often have little influence at the official level. In contrast a formal peace process refers to a process led or initiated by the local or central government with strong official support and where decisions taken are able to influence, to varying degrees, actions on the ground and among elites. It is based on this understanding that the terms formal and informal peace process are used in this report.

9 Sanday, Peggy Reeves, "Matriachal values and world peace: The case of the Minangkabau", *Societies of peace: 2nd world congress on matriarchal studies* (2003) Available at: [www.second-congress-matriarchal-studies.com/sanday.html](http://www.second-congress-matriarchal-studies.com/sanday.html)

women in West Sumatra expressed concerns about a 'Bill on Social Ills' issued by the regional authorities that contained an article banning women from going out at night without a guardian. This was aimed at eliminating prostitution but, by forcing women to stay home at night, this left men free to seek the services of prostitutes. This an example of how the introduction of Shari'a law under regional autonomy arrangements has eroded the position of Indonesian women even when a traditional matrilineal culture has underpinned their active engagement on public issues.<sup>10</sup> More recently, Shari'a has also been used in Aceh in an



Before we talk of enhancing women's participation in formal peace process, we need to ensure there is a ready stock of potential and capable women.

Comment made at a roundtable discussion organised by the HD Centre and partners in Jakarta, 2010.<sup>12</sup>

attempt to remove a woman who is a sub-district head from her position. According to Ridwan Muhammad, the Bireuen district council chairperson, "According to Shariah, a woman is prohibited from becoming a leader."<sup>11</sup>

The quote to the side was by a male participant (and echoed by several women) at a roundtable meeting, organised by HD Centre and its

partners, held in March 2010 in Jakarta. This view is prevalent among many in Indonesia, who tend to see women as incapable and lacking the necessary qualifications to be included and consulted on important matters. However, it is a view challenged by the strong voice of women in civil society in areas like Poso and Maluku which are affected by violent conflict.

The single greatest challenge to women's robust participation in Indonesian public life, and peacemaking in particular, remains patriarchy. This is reinforced by cultural and religious values that persistently view women as inferior and unfit for public office or prominent positions.<sup>13</sup> According to Member of

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10 Munir, Lily Zakiyah, Islam, gender and formal sha'ria in Indonesia Available at: [www.lfip.org/laws718/docs/lily-pdf/Islam\\_\\_Gender\\_and\\_Forma\\_Sharia.pdf](http://www.lfip.org/laws718/docs/lily-pdf/Islam__Gender_and_Forma_Sharia.pdf)

11 "Women Unfit to Lead' Says Acehese District Council Chairman", *The Jakarta Globe*, 8 October 2010.

12 March Roundtable meeting on 'Women at the Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the roles of women in conflict resolution,' 24-25 March 2010, The Sultan Hotel, Jakarta.

13 "Women in politics ignored by legislators, parties: Experts" *The Jakarta Post*, 14 June, 2010.

the national Parliament, Eva Kusuma Sundari, woman legislators must be twice as smart and work twice as hard to be acknowledged.<sup>14</sup>

Quite simply, capable women are not given the opportunities to participate in conflict resolution at the higher level as access is stymied by the male dominance of decision-making at all levels. The presence of female leaders in the community, as well as local and central government, who are gender sensitive has helped to open up access to other women. This was the case in Maluku when Paula Renyaan was the region's deputy governor. However, women, as well as men, sometimes limit opportunities for other women by citing their 'lack of training' or 'education'.<sup>15</sup> This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that some women often have low levels of awareness of their right to equality and participation. This is particularly the case in rural areas. As a result, many women are not familiar with political issues, nor do they see it as a domain they should, or could be, involved in. This is despite the fact that they may be local community leaders in their own right.

Women in Indonesia, as elsewhere, also predominantly have responsibility for caring for families. These responsibilities pose logistical and emotional challenges for the prolonged involvement of women in peace processes, particularly if they are not taking place in the participant's local area. Additionally, some women, who have been denied participation outside the domestic sphere due to cultural constraints or other factors, in turn blame and reject the political system that they view as dominated by men which makes them reluctant to be involved in peace negotiations.

Lack of political will is another significant contributing factor to the absence of women from peace negotiations. In Indonesia, 'gender mainstreaming' (or taking gender into account systematically) is a relatively new concept and there is a lack of awareness around the concept. Political apathy, lack of confidence, as well as low levels of education all combine to reduce the involvement of women in peacemaking processes.

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14 Dewi, Mariani, "Eva K. Sundari: 'You are measured by whether your presence has an effect'" *The Jakarta Post*, 8 February, 2009.

15 Interview conducted with Ledia Hanifa Amaliah, head of public relations for the Indonesian Parliament Caucus for Women, and a member of the People's Representative Council (DPR) on 22 April 2010 in Jakarta. This was also a view repeatedly expressed at the March Roundtable meeting on 'Women at the Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the roles of women in conflict resolution,' 24–25 March 2010, The Sultan Hotel, Jakarta.

## The role of Indonesian women during the New Order era

Patriarchal values in Indonesia are deep rooted. This is particularly evident in the status and roles that were circumscribed to women by the New Order regime. Some background about this period is crucial for both understanding how current conflicts are managed, as well as women's involvement in conflict resolution.

The New Order era emerged in 1966 when General Soeharto overthrew President Soekarno (the founder of the Indonesian Republic), claiming to save the nation from communism. Soeharto was the country's longest serving president until his dramatic fall from power in 1998.

The New Order era placed a heavy emphasis on the state ideology of *Pancasila* which consists of five principles:

1. Belief in the one and only God;
2. Just and civilised humanity;
3. Unity of Indonesia;
4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives;
5. Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.<sup>16</sup>

Civil society, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had to subscribe to *Pancasila* in order to be allowed to register. Students from high schools to tertiary institutions had to undergo long hours of indoctrination in order to understand and embrace this ideology.

Press freedom was heavily suppressed. The only nationwide TV station was *Televisi Republik Indonesia* (TVRI) and it inevitably became the mouthpiece

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16 Shigeo Nishimura, "The development of Pancasila moral education in Indonesia" *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (1995) pp 303–316.

for the government. National elections were held every five years and political participation was greatly limited with only three political parties allowed to contest them.<sup>17</sup> The Functional Group or Golkar<sup>18</sup> essentially became the government's bureaucratic machinery which mobilised civil servants and state-supported organisations. During the New Order, 'development' was heavily promoted as a modernising process and goal. Dissent was prohibited, and understood to be a threat to the country's development. The politicised emphasis on development led to stark wealth disparities, widespread corruption, as well as nepotism with the frequent use of violence to quell challenges to the state.<sup>19</sup> Soeharto also expanded an earlier policy of transmigration, which exported people from overpopulated Java to the outer islands, aggravating relations between the migrants and the indigenous population.

Most of the conflicts that erupted in the Soeharto era were sudden, very violent, and centred on issues of injustice and human rights. They generally occurred in the late 1990s although the 1980s were not spared either. For example, in 1984 in Tanjung Priok (a district in north Jakarta), fighting occurred between the military and Muslim protestors after a non-Muslim military sergeant behaved disrespectfully in a mosque. Two days later, a local cleric spoke out in his sermon against the *Pancasila* state ideology which later led to further clash between Muslim protestors and the military. Many protestors were shot dead while others

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17 Those parties were the Functional Group (Golongan Karya); the United Development party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), an Islamic based party; and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI), a secular/populist ("Abangan") party.

18 Golkar was formed on October 20, 1964 under the name Sekber Golkar. It was a federation of 97 NGOs which grew over time to 220 organisations. Although it claimed to be apolitical, Sekber Golkar was formed with the backing of senior army officers to counter the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). It was the ruling party during Soeharto's regime (1966–1998). It was also the ruling party during Habibie's presidency (1998–1999), and is part of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's ruling coalition (2004–2009).

19 The New Order regime undertook numerous executions of petty criminals or people suspected of crimes. These so-called mysterious killings (commonly referred to as *petrus*) were concentrated in the years 1982–1985. Between five and ten thousand petty criminals were shot without trial and the bodies were disposed of in public places, where they invoked much terror. Many of the dead bodies were found with tattoos to mark them as criminals. Eventually President Soeharto himself acknowledged the *Petrus* murders were the work of military forces. See, Freek Colombijn, "Explaining the violent solution in Indonesia" in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Spring 2002, Vol. IX Issue 1 (1998); Vatikiotis, Michael. R.J (1998), *Indonesian politics under Suharto: The rise and fall of the New Order* (London: Routledge, 1998) pp. 92–118; Nordholt, Henk Schulte, *A Genealogy of Violence in Indonesia* (Portugal: CEPESA, 2000) pp. 1–33.



were arrested. In 1996, the riot in Tasikmalaya (a city in West Java) was allegedly triggered by police brutality and corrupt government officials prompting the burning of several churches and Chinese-owned businesses. In 1996 in Ujung Pandang (the provincial capital of South Sulawesi), in what later became known as ‘the bloody tragedy of Makassar’, three students were killed in a clash with the military during a protest against the hike in the cost of transportation.<sup>20</sup>

In May 1998, Soeharto fell from power. This followed mounting public pressure, and increasing demands for democracy which were compounded by the 1997 Asian monetary crisis.<sup>21</sup> After thirty years of military dictatorship, Indonesia rapidly slipped into political chaos. Violent conflicts began to erupt across the nation. Secessionist demands grew across Aceh, Papua, and East Timor while communal conflicts, pivoting on religious and ethnic issues, broke out in Central and West Kalimantan, as well as Central Sulawesi and Maluku. These conflicts had been brewing for many years, and it was only heavy-handed repression that had previously kept them from spilling over. Conflicts were often quickly suppressed during the New Order period for fear of triggering ‘SARA’ (tension stemming from ‘ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations’). Ultimately this policy of suppression is blamed for the violent outbreak of communal conflicts after 1998.<sup>22</sup> This violence led to the loss of thousands of lives and the internal displacement of millions of people.

## ‘State Ibuism’

The New Order developed an official gender ideology that saw the role of women as supportive wives to men in their pursuit of ‘development’, emphasising their duties as a mother or *ibu*. Labelled colloquially as ‘state ibuism’, this defined women as “*appendages and companions to husbands, as procreators of the nation, as mothers and educators of children, as housekeepers, and as members of Indonesian society*”.<sup>23</sup> Women were often mobilised into organisations like Dharma Wanita (Civil Service Wives Association), a leading women’s organi-

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20 Supriatna, A. Made Toni (Ed), *Tahun Kekerasan Potret Pelanggaran HAM di Indonesia*, (Jakarta, Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia/YLBHI, 1996) pp. 41–48.

21 British Broadcasting Corporation News, “Rise and fall of strongman Suharto” 28 September, 2000.

22 Gershman, John, “Indonesia: Islands of conflict”, *Asia Times Online*, 26 October, 2002.

23 Suryakusuma, Julia, “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia”, in Laurie Sears, (Ed), *Fantasying the Feminine in Indonesia* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996) p. 101.

sation; the Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK, Family Welfare Movement) which functioned from the village to national level; and, Dharma Pertiwi, an organisation which included the wives of men serving in the military.<sup>24</sup> The New Order interpreted politics as 'men's domain' making it difficult for women to hold formal positions in the field of politics.

By emphasising a women's place in the household, the state endeavoured to override alternative gender discourses, produce citizens gendered in a particular way, as well as control the private and public spheres. Dharma Wanita was mandatory for the wives of civil servants and women participated in it according to the ranks of their husbands. Among Dharma Wanita's more popular programmes were those aimed at instructing middle-class Indonesian women on the suitable expression of femininity: how to dress, how to choose jewellery and appropriate etiquette. Dharma Wanita also controlled the lives of civil servants by, for example, requiring male civil servants to get permission from superiors to divorce wives. The PKK was established to improve standards of living in rural areas through literacy programmes and health services. It has been widely criticised for helping implement the New Order's authoritarian family planning programmes that advocate two-child families which saw members undertake door-to-door outreach on the use of contraceptives. By the last decade of the New Order, women (particularly well-educated, middle class women) grew restive under the restrictions of the regime. They began setting up overtly feminist organisations using support from international sources.

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24 Robinson, Kathryn and Sharon Bessel, (Eds), *Women in Indonesia, Gender, Equity and Development* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002) pp. xvii and xxi.

## Making and building peace in Indonesia

The Government of Indonesia's (GoI) approach to internal conflict has historically revolved around containment as was evident in how the armed forces were often used to quell violence during the New Order era. This continues to influence how violent conflicts are managed. For example, in 2001 a special autonomy law was passed in Aceh to address problematic relations between Aceh and Jakarta. However, the law was poorly developed and ineffectively implemented. Prior to the passing of the law, the HD Centre had undertaken several rounds of confidential talks between the GoI and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). As a result of the talks, an agreement for a three month humanitarian pause was signed in June 2000 and renewed in September 2000. Eventually the two sides signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 9 December 2002, after months of bilateral negotiations. However, by April 2003, the security situation deteriorated and, after failing to find middle ground between the GoI and GAM at a meeting in Tokyo in May 2003, the Indonesian Government declared martial law in Aceh and the military offensive resumed.<sup>25</sup> Following the tsunami that hit Aceh in December 2004, there was growing international pressure on the GoI and the GAM to reach a peaceful settlement. Following previous mediation efforts, the Helsinki agreement which was facilitated by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, was forged in August 2005.<sup>26</sup> Aceh received special autonomy (an expanded form of the special autonomy status in 2001) and government troops were withdrawn from the province in exchange for GAM disarmament. In addition, Law No. 11/2006 on the governance of Aceh was

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25 For further information on the HD Centre's roles in Aceh see [www.hdcentre.org/projects/aceh-indonesia](http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/aceh-indonesia).

26 This was co-ordinated through the Conflict Management Initiative, of which Martti Ahtisaari is the Chair of the board. See [www.cmi.fi/home.html](http://www.cmi.fi/home.html) for more information.

implemented. Significantly, this law allowed for the formation of local parties to compete in elections but there was still no mention of gender issues. In December 2006, elections were held for local government posts in Aceh. A former GAM strategist, Irwandi Yusuf, was elected as the governor and remains in power. Women who bore the brunt of atrocities during the conflict are still being left out of key decision-making processes – just as they were from the peace process. Acehnese women, for instance, were unable to critically react against the discriminative implementation of the so-called Sharia law.<sup>27</sup>

Special autonomy status was also introduced in Papua in 2001. The law was enacted in a move to assuage the desire of the Papuan community for independence. Autonomy was (and still is) regarded with deep suspicion by Indonesian nationalists, and the armed forces, who see it as a bridge to independence. Having already been stung by the loss of East Timor, conservative nationalists regard special autonomy as an unwarranted gift to Papuan separatists. However, West Papuan nationalists were also not satisfied with special autonomy. They counter that the law fails to meet their demand for independence.<sup>28</sup> To date, the government has managed the region through a combination of the special autonomy law on the one hand, and militarisation on the other. Critics argue that special autonomy did not change the patronising and unequal treatment Papuans feel they receive from Jakarta. Additionally, far from strengthening the quality of the implementation of the special autonomy law, the Gol launched government regulation No. 77/2007 which prohibits the use of historically deep-rooted Papuan symbols such as the morning star flag and Mambruk bird symbol.<sup>29</sup> The Indonesian Government also imposed Presidential Decree No. 5/2007 on Acceleration of Development which, instead of giving more local authority to determine development in their areas, gave a mandate to several ministries to implement development programmes in Papua. The involvement of civil society in peacemaking in separatist conflicts in Indonesia is limited as a result of intimidation by officials or difficulty in getting a permit for sanctioned activity. However, some members of civil society including women have

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27 Shadia Marhaban. "Aceh: The maintenance and dividends of peace", *Opinion, Women and Peace*, 20 August 2010, Available at <http://peacetalks.hdcentre.org/2010/08/aceh-the-maintenance-and-dividends-of-peace/>

28 Budiardjo, Carmel, "The Prospects for Papuan-Indonesian Dialogue", *Peace Magazine*, (Jan–Mar 2010) pp. 16–18 online.

29 Budiardjo, Carmel, pp. 16–18 online.



Muslim gang members carry makeshift rifles as Christian homes burn, rear, in sectarian violence-wracked Poso, on Sulawesi island, about 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) northeast of Jakarta, Indonesia, Thursday, Dec. 6, 2001. © AP Photo

played important roles in initiating peace dialogues and bridging the gap with the central government (see also ‘Case Study Two: Violent Conflict in Papua’).

In contrast to the arena of separatist conflict, members of civil society (an arena where women’s involvement is more visible) have played an active role as peace and reconciliation actors at the grassroots level in the communal conflicts of Central Sulawesi and Maluku (see ‘Case Study One: Violent Conflict in Maluku’). In these conflicts the local community has been very critical of the role of the security forces, blaming them for taking sides and failing to control the situation.

In fact, central and local government played a limited role in conflict resolution until late 2001. Central government led the Malino peace declaration in Poso in December 2001 (Malino I) and the Malino peace agreement in Maluku and North Maluku in February 2002 (Malino II). These initiatives were led by former Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and former Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Jusuf Kalla (later elected President and Vice-President respectively in 2004). Both Malino I and Malino II were seen as political announcements to mark the end of conflict which were followed by dedicated recovery and development programmes. However, the affected communities heavily criticised the implementation of the Malino I peace declaration and the Malino II peace agreement, predominantly because their terms were hammered out without consulting the local commu-

nity. Moreover, the few women who were present at the peace talks were unable to raise issues that were of concern to women as they had to submit to the broader agenda of the talks. There was also little substantive follow-up once the agreements were signed. In addition, the lack of co-ordination of peace-building efforts among the different levels and types of government agencies, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors, was also significantly criticised.<sup>30</sup>

To complement these peace agreements, the central government also implemented a Presidential Instruction (Inpres) to facilitate conflict recovery in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. Funds were allocated to the violence-affected areas for rebuilding after the conflict. However, working groups created to implement the terms of Malino I and II were not sufficiently funded. They also did not have an adequate mandate to follow through some aspects of the implementation. Over the years, members withdrew and the working groups became smaller in size.

In Central and West Kalimantan, which were also affected by communal conflicts, the central and local government's reconciliation efforts have been less effective. They have tended to focus on physical recovery, reconstruction and the provision of emergency aid to internally displaced people.

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30 HD Centre, "Conflict management strategies in Indonesia: Learning from the Maluku experience", *Workshop report*, 30 November, 2009. Available at: [www.hdcentre.org/files/Conflict%20Management%20Strategies%20in%20Maluku%20010320\\_0\\_0.pdf](http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Conflict%20Management%20Strategies%20in%20Maluku%20010320_0_0.pdf); HD Centre, "Conflict management strategies in Indonesia: Learning from the Poso experience", *Workshop report*, 3 March, 2010. Available at: [www.hdcentre.org/files/Conflict%20Management%20Strategies%20in%20Poso%2001032010.pdf](http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Conflict%20Management%20Strategies%20in%20Poso%2001032010.pdf)

## The roles of women in conflict resolution

In violent conflicts, women quickly become ‘victims’ in need of protection. In fact women and children are frequently conflated into one concept; ‘women-and-children’. This obscures the unique needs of boys and girls, as distinct from women. For many women, the loss of their men-folk (husbands, fathers, sons) to fighting forces also decreases, or removes entirely, their key sources of income. Despite the negative impact of conflicts on women, it can also be empowering for some women, leading them into public life where they engage in activities

“ Women occupy an influential role in the family. As wives, women can persuade their husbands not to engage in the (Maluku) conflict and as mothers, women can educate the children not to have prejudice for other religion.

Sister Brigitta Renyaan, Ambon, 2009.<sup>31</sup>

previously reserved for men. They may take up various responsibilities from being a member of the armed movement; trading in the market for economic survival; or becoming actively engaged in peacemaking. In Ambon and Poso, for example, women led many inter-religious and peace dialogue efforts at the grass-roots level.

In a number of contexts, women’s relative powerlessness can have certain advantages. In some conflict-affected communities, the perception of women as non-threatening means they are able to influence men to put down their weapons. However, in other cases such as Aceh, women have used their non-threatening positions to work for the rebels to supply arms, food and information.

31 Interview with Sr. Brigitta Renyaan in Ambon on 31 August, 2009.

## Case Study One: Violent Conflict in Maluku

Before North Maluku province was carved out in 1999, Maluku was the largest province in Indonesia. Ambon is the provincial capital of Maluku. According to the 2000 census, the local population was estimated at 1.15 million people with almost equal numbers of Muslims and Christians.<sup>1</sup> The migrant population in Maluku comes mostly from Bugis, Buton and Makassar.

### Conflict drivers

Violent conflict in Maluku broke out on 19 January 1999, on the Muslim holiday of Idul Fitri when a seemingly ordinary fight occurred between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and an immigrant Bugis Muslim. This small dispute led to an outbreak of violence between Christians and Muslims that quickly spread throughout Maluku.

The violence had its roots in decades of suppressed grievances. In the 1970s, a large number of Muslims were relocated to Maluku from other parts of the country, displacing the predominantly Christian population and altering the religious balance. The migrant arrivals also began to take up more of the employment opportunities than the locals. In 1979 this situation was compounded when law No. 5 on village administration was passed. This was aimed at standardising local administration and



Ambonese demand the UN intervene in renewed fighting between Christians and Muslims in the Maluku islands during a protest at the U.N. headquarters in Jakarta May 22. Thousands died in violence that spread across the islands after first breaking out in Ambon, 2,300 km (1,400 miles) east of Jakarta, in January 1999. © REUTERS/Darren Whiteside



managing the control of the divisions and sub-divisions of territories in Indonesia. However, it effectively weakened the traditional village alliance system and system of government led by the *raja* (traditional leader) in Maluku. Implementation of the law also resulted in the redrawing of boundaries, affecting the status of *adat* (customary) land. The changes did give more voice to the migrants but also led to *adat* land being freely traded, something which had not hitherto occurred.<sup>2</sup>

The loosening of centralised rule which followed the ousting of Soeharto in 1998 enabled deep-rooted fear and mistrust to emerge. Inter-religious violence and riots also broke out in Jakarta. Ambonese Christians living in Jakarta were among the victims.

Between 1999 and 2002, many churches and mosques were destroyed. A Muslim holy war, *Jihad*, was announced and leading members of a Java-based militia, Laskar Jihad, arrived in Ambon in May 2000. A state of civil emergency was declared the next month. Thousands of security personnel were deployed to the province but military intervention was not successful in controlling the situation. Instead the deployment contributed to an expansion of the violence due to the incompetent and biased nature of the security forces (there were rumours that the security forces supplied weapons to the Christian and Muslim communities); as well as rivalry and lack of co-ordination between the military and the police force.<sup>3</sup>

The violence claimed almost 5000 lives and led to the massive displacement of around half a million people, or up to half of the population of the province. In October 2003, the Indonesian government estimated that there were around 70,000 refugee families in Maluku, or over 330,000 people. Another 160,000 people fled to other provinces.<sup>4</sup>

## Peace process

In February 2002, representatives of the Muslim and Christian community signed the Malino Peace Agreement (Malino II) after the intervention of the central government. Sporadic violence continued but decreased in frequency and intensity. The most serious re-occurrence was in April 2004 in Ambon city but subsided within a week. Minor bombings still occurred until 2006, but failed to provoke a reaction from either side.

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2. Craig Thorburn, "Provincial government and local community endeavours to reform village (negeri) government in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia", *Eleventh International Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property*, Ubud, Bali, Indonesia, July 2006.
3. Sri Yanuarti, Yusuf, Josephine Marieta and Mardiyanto Wahyu Triatmoko, *Konflik di Maluku Tengah: Penyebab, karakteristik dan penyelesaian jangka panjang* (Jakarta: LIPI, 2003) pp. 107–110.
4. Graham Brown with Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi, p. 39.

While Indonesian women have played extensive and varied roles in managing conflict at the community level, they have had very little involvement in talks at the peace table. This was evident in the Aceh peace talks and the Malino I and Malino II peace processes. In the immediate post-violence period, priorities for future political activities are often identified. However, without the participation of women in political decision-making their needs, concerns and contributions run the risk of being overlooked.

In Ambon, local peace and reconciliation processes between women from the two religious communities began in the market place. Women braved the violence to travel to markets, often located in Ambon city, on a regular basis to buy or sell produce. In one example, women selling fish, often referred to as *jibu-jibu*, from the Tulehu village had to use a speedboat to travel to Ambon city in order to avoid passing Christian-dominated areas (Suli and Passo villages). Over time, this mode of transport became too costly. With no other options, the women from Tulehu village contacted their Christian friends in Suli village and negotiated safe passage. The presence of women was perceived as less threatening by the opposing party, making it easier for them to enter and travel through areas dominated by the other religion. While these efforts may have been driven more by survival needs than conscious attempts at conflict resolution, they did lay the foundation for more formal reconciliation initiatives. In addition, due to interaction between the women from different religious communities, they became messengers for their larger communities. This put them in a good position to verify or dispel rumours and prevent acts of provocation.



Driven by concern for basic needs and family, a consensus was reached to organise a meeting between women of the conflicting parties in August 1999. Fifteen Muslim women, guarded by security personnel, travelled to meet with women from the Christian communities to discuss peaceful conflict resolution. Even though the security situation was dangerous at that time, women could not just do nothing.

Sister Brigitta Renyaan, March Roundtable in Jakarta, 2010.

In late 1999, several Maluku women formed the Concerned Women's Organisation (Gerakan Perempuan Peduli, GPP) to address what seemed to be an unending conflict. Muslim, Catholic and Protestant women attended its first meeting. Subsequently, they became actively involved in spreading the message of peace. They organised meetings with government and security officials, religious leaders and youths as well as training women volunteers in the field on mediation and counselling. GPP also co-operated with other women's organisations in Maluku. Women's involvement and leadership in the inter-religious meetings held among displaced people was a notable achievement in Maluku. The meetings not only ensured the distribution of aid to displaced people, but became an avenue for reconciliation between the Muslim and Christian women.

For many of these women, motherhood and family care were instrumental 'drivers' influencing their behaviour. This common identity connected women from the two religious communities as they shared similar concerns including their children's safety and future for their children, food acquisition, education and medical care.

However, when it came time for formal talks, women were woefully under-represented. In the Malino II peace talks, three women were part of the Christian negotiating team of 35 members. There were no women represented on the Muslim side. Some observers blamed the male leaders of the negotiating teams for not being gender-sensitive. Thamrin Elly, the head of the Muslim delegation explained the absence of women in his negotiating team by stating that there were no women who met the requirements needed for inclusion in his team.<sup>32</sup> Among his requirements were good communication skills, conceptual ability and public presentation. Women from the area argued that these skills were held by many capable women but their sex was, in fact, the key exclusionary factor: an ironic echo of New Order 'state ibuism'.

Most of the men involved in the Malino II peace talks were religious leaders, village heads as well as *adat* leaders. These are positions traditionally dominated by men. Moreover, Islamic organisations such as Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah which have women's wings did not have a strong influence in Maluku and were ill-positioned to send women to the peace talks. *Adat* complicates matters for women. A number of inhibitions are placed on women

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32 Input provided by Thamrin Elly at the meeting, "Women at the Indonesian Peace Table: Enhancing the Participation of Women in Conflict Resolution," The Sultan Hotel, Jakarta, 24–25 March 2010.

through interpretations of *adat*. In some villages in Maluku, for instance, women are forbidden from taking part in sacred ceremonies such as the *Sapu Lidi*, a mystical ritual in Mamala village where boys beat each other with a palm frond; and the *Cakelele* sacred war dance in Pelau village where men performed a special dance with the sword. Each of these rituals is associated with manhood and being a warrior.

During the conflict, the position of Deputy Governor of Maluku was occupied by a woman (Paula Renyaan), who was able to help women activist's access (male) government officials and their wives as well as help those at the grassroots level. This is one illustration of the potential of women in leadership positions to open up opportunities for other women to play a greater role in conflict resolution.

Today, both the secretary of Maluku Province and the vice mayor of Ambon city are women. There are many women who are heads of divisions in the municipal and provincial office in Ambon. In 2002, Ambon city ranked second out of 336 districts in the entire country on the gender-related development index (GDI) and ninth on the gender equality measures.<sup>33</sup> The GDI is estimated to have improved since 1996 because of the increase in the participation of women in the labour force.<sup>34</sup> However, the proportion of female parliamentarians in Maluku fell from 6.5 per cent in 1996 to 4.5 per cent in 2002 (the national average is 8.8 per cent). Women in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in Maluku province make up 14 out of the 45 representatives for the period from 2009 to 2014. While this is an increase from six in the previous period, the increase in numbers has not been matched by women making a more prominent contribution to politics due to low levels of understanding of gender issues among legislators. Moreover, many of these women are elected due to their connections to important figures and often have to submit to the political parties' broader agenda.

Women in Papua experience gender inequality in many ways. As a result of the confluence of cultural traditions, the mixed pressures of modernity and a predominantly patriarchal society many Papuan women are excluded from

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33 UN Development Programme, Bappenas and BPS Statistics Indonesia, "The economics of democracy: Financing human development in Indonesia", *Indonesia National Human Development Report* (Jakarta: BPS-Statistics Indonesia, Bappenas, UNDP Indonesia, 2004) pp. 17–18.

34 Brown, Graham with Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi, p. 45.

leadership roles.<sup>35</sup> Papua has numerous ethnic and tribal groups and traditions differ from one clan to the other, thus women's experiences are far from homogenous. However, in most clans, women are viewed as subordinate to men and are expected to perform mostly domestic roles.

Unequal access to economic resources, transmigration and political conflict over forty years has significantly marginalised indigenous Papuans.<sup>36</sup> One of the commonly cited impacts on Papuan women relates to their minimal participation in economic and development affairs.<sup>37</sup> As a leading example, the Freeport mine in Mimika district occupies a vast area of land and women of the Amungme community are consequently denied access to natural resources. Besides losing a key source of income, women (and, to a lesser extent, men) are also excluded from the labour force, as the majority of workers in Freeport are men and mostly foreigners.<sup>38</sup> In addition, traditional markets have frequently been replaced by modern ones, which deprive the poor of access to affordable goods and commodities, and venues for selling produce. In other instances, women and their families are forced out of their homes when their land is cleared for mining purposes. Indonesian military personnel have been known to sexually assault women who have refused to leave their homes.<sup>39</sup> Impunity reigns and there is little evidence of perpetrators being punished, with women ostracised by the men in their community as a result.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, military abuses have discouraged women from carrying out many of their daily activities and this has increased their dependency on men. Women are afraid to go out to collect water or work in the farmlands and forest on their own and they tend to work for short periods of time.

In many cultures in Papua, women are a symbol or object in peace processes. In Biak province, for example, women are given to the enemy as a symbol

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35 Budiardjo, Carmel, "Papuan women victims of discrimination and abuse", *Tapol*, (2009) Available at <http://tapol.gn.apc.org/statements/Carmel%20Budiardjo%20Liberation%20article.pdf>

36 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: "Resources and conflict in Papua", *Asia Report No. 39* (Jakarta/Brussels: 2002).

37 Takege, Petrus, SH, *Perempuan Papua, Dulu, Sekarang, dan Masa Depan dalam Kehidupan Adat dan Fenomena Pembangunan*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan. 2007) pp. 65–71.

38 Abrash, Abigail, *Development Aggression: Observations on Human Rights Conditions in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work Areas With Recommendations*, Prepared for the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, July 2002.

39 Osman, Nurfika, "Women in Papua continue to suffer" *The Jakarta Globe*, 2 December, 2009.

40 Osman, Nurfika, "Women in Papua continue to suffer" *The Jakarta Globe*, 2 December, 2009.

## Case Study Two: Violent Conflict in Papua

Papua is home to 312 ethnic groups.<sup>1</sup> In 2003, the central government created West Irian Jaya from the western portion of Papua, which was later renamed West Papua province in April 2007. Currently Papua Province has one municipal city and 25 districts<sup>2</sup> while West Papua Province has one municipal city and eight districts.<sup>3</sup> Indigenous people refer to Papua and West Papua province as West Papua.<sup>4</sup> The majority of the population in Papua and West Papua provinces are Papuan ethnic (*Melanesia*) with a significant number of Indonesian migrants.

### Conflict drivers

Indonesia's sovereignty over Papua has been contested for much of the period since Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945. It was initially contested by the Netherlands and, since 1961, by many Papuans. The Netherlands and Indonesia failed to agree on the status of Papua in 1949, and Papua remained under Dutch administrative control for a further twelve years. Thus Papuans were part of a different political culture during a critical period of Indonesia's nation-building process. On 15 August 1962, the Dutch entered into the UN-brokered 'New York Agreement' with Indonesia. The agreement provided for an initial transfer of Papua to the UN to be followed by a transfer to Indonesia. An Act of Free Choice would then take place before the end of 1969. The Papuans were not party to the agreement and were not consulted. The UN team was later given a minimal role by the Indonesians in the execution of the referendum. Consequently, over 1000 Papuan traditional leaders voted unanimously to join Indonesia.<sup>5</sup>

One of the symptoms of the poor relations that developed between Indonesians and Papuans was the large-scale resource extraction and exportation from Papua. This involved extortion of land, as well as logging and mining by Indonesian officials. During the Soekarno and Soeharto periods, Papuans formed the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Organisation) although militarised resistance against the Indonesian Government had begun before OPM was founded.

The approach to security in the Soeharto era brought with it widespread human rights abuses, which continue to the present day. Policymakers in post-Soeharto governments inherited a complex situation in Papua, where the New Order's security approach had strengthened the desire for independence. Hundreds of instances of torture, sexual violence, and disappearances have been recorded.<sup>6</sup> There are no fixed numbers of those killed and displaced in this conflict. However, most human rights organisations put the figures for both at hundreds of thousands.<sup>7</sup>

### Peace process

The absence of official support for peaceful resolution of the conflict is a major challenge. Jakarta's policy responses include accommodation and repression. In 1999, the Habibie Government conducted a dialogue with Team 100, a group established by intellectuals, church leaders, traditional figures, and NGO activists but no agree-

ment was reached. Peace talks have been proposed by several elements of Papuan society through the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) in 2000. Throughout President Abdurahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri's tenures, Papuans, through PDP, have tried to open discussion on the issue of dialogue and several informal meetings were held. However, efforts to hold dialogue between the Papuans and the Indonesian Government were hampered by heightened repression of the PDP which saw members captured and detained as well as the kidnapping and murder of the PDP chairperson. Efforts have also been hampered by the issuing of Presidential Decree No. 1/2003 on the Acceleration of the Implementation of Law No. 45/1999 on the division of the Province of Papua into three new provinces. This was issued by President Megawati Sukarnoputri on 27 January 2003.

In 2008, LIPI published the 'Papua Road Map', which advocates dialogue as one of the strategies "to achieve a comprehensive and fundamental resolution to the Papuan conflict."<sup>8</sup> As part of this process, LIPI and a Papuan religious leader, Neles Tebay, have laid down the basic structure for a future dialogue by establishing a group of informal insider facilitators, called the 'Papua Peace Network' (PPN). The PPN is involved in an ongoing process to facilitate dialogue among Papuans and to initiate pre-talks with Jakarta.

Other efforts aimed at alleviating further conflict between Papuans and the central government include the Special Autonomy Status given to Papua in 2001. This was a measure to overcome widespread opposition to, disappointment in, and resentment of Jakarta's rule but has been the subject of considerable contention.

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4. Refer to footnote 5 in the main text for an explanation on the usage of the term Papua and West Papua.
5. Bruce Vaughn, "Papua, Indonesia: Issues for Congress", *CRS Report for Congress*, (2006) p. 20. Available at <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2733.pdf>
6. Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *Policy studies 5: The Papua conflict: Jakarta's perceptions and policies*, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004) pp. 33–36; Elizabeth Brundige, Winter King, Priyeha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck, Xiang Yuan (2004), *Indonesian human rights abuses in Papua: Application of the law of genocide to the history of Indonesian control*, A paper prepared for the Indonesian Human Rights Network by Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights clinic, (New Haven: Yale Law School, 2004) pp. 29–32; Neles Tebay (2005), *West Papua: The struggle for peace with justice*, (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 2005) pp 9–11.
7. Neles Tebay, p. 9.
8. LIPI, *Papua road map: Negotiating the past, improving the present and securing the future*, (Jakarta: Indonesia Institute of Science (LIPI), 2008) p. 3. Available at [http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace\\_conflict/docs/PAPUA\\_ROAD\\_MAP\\_Short\\_Eng.pdf](http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/PAPUA_ROAD_MAP_Short_Eng.pdf)



An Acehese woman who said her husband has been missing for two years holds a sign reading "Victim of a Conflict" during a protest against the Indonesian government in the provincial capital Banda Aceh October 7, 2002. © REUTERS/Murizal Hamzah

of peace. Women are expected to marry men from the warring party and produce offspring to replenish lives lost during the conflict, as well as create family ties to avoid future conflict.<sup>41</sup>

Interestingly though, women's roles as traditional symbols of peace put them in a strategic position to act as mediators in conflict and to assist in reconciliation. Papuan women have proven more inclined to consolidate their strengths by working together regardless of their tribal clan or other affiliations.<sup>42</sup> Women tend to be trusted more widely across various constituencies and play an active

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41 Takege, Petrus, SH, *Perempuan Papua, Dulu, Sekarang, dan Masa Depan dalam Kehidupan Adat dan Fenomena Pembangunan*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan. 2007) p. 28.

42 Email discussion between Irine Gayatri, LIPI researcher, and Latifah Anum Siregar, Chairperson of Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP), 17 May 2010.



role in dialogue at the community level. They have often acted to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violence. They have done this by mediating between conflicting parties in clashes between different tribal groups, as well as between local communities and the logging and mining companies, and between the Papuans and the security forces. In the particular case of conflicts between tribal groups, women contribute to peace by forging and maintaining communication with women of different ethnic groups. This is mostly done informally at the market, in schools, or in churches. Papuan women are active in holding weekly religious meetings or *adat* meetings. At these meetings, issues including the armed conflict and the unequal distribution of natural resources are discussed. Consensus is forged at the meetings and decisions are taken to approach key figures or stakeholders to discuss the matters which concern them. These include sexual violence, particularly (but not solely) committed by security forces and unequal access to economic resources. They aim to get the relevant authorities to address these issues although they are not always successful. Additionally, Papuan women are active in undertaking mass action such as demonstration to protest against state-perpetrated violence, killings of civilians, and even fighting for the rights of women leaders in the face of discrimination and injustice during local elections.<sup>43</sup>

With the recent influx of local NGOs into Papua, more women have become involved in conflict resolution initiatives. Most of the NGOs focus on democracy and human rights issues and are active in capacity-building, empowerment and advocacy programmes. There are also numerous women's organisations. One organisation which has consistently fought for Papuan women's rights and gender equality is the Solidaritas Perempuan Papua (SPP, Papua Women's Solidarity) which has been active in providing political education to Papuan women. Several NGOs have utilised the existing informal women's networks to 'intervene' in local affairs. This has been done to avoid communal violence as well as a standoff between the local community and Freeport. It has also been done to avoid a deterioration of the security situation and violent incidences involving the Papuans and the security forces.

Over the period of Indonesian occupation, a new generation of middle class Papuans has emerged. Several Papuan women have won legislative seats

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43 Email discussion between Irine Gayatri, LIPI researcher, and Latifah Anum Siregar, Chairperson of Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP), 17 May 2010.

in the province, become leading NGO activists and joined local government.<sup>44</sup> Women are also increasingly sent to mediation training and meetings, and to assist in negotiating peace between conflicting parties. These women are often sent by NGOs, women's groups, community leaders and churches. For instance, women activists from the Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP), a prominent local NGO, are often invited by national networks of human rights groups to attend workshops in Jakarta and/or abroad. The groups issuing invitations for such work include Imparsial, Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (Elsam), and the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras). Training also includes inter-ethnic conflict resolution and political education.

Politically, Papuan women received formal recognition in 2004 when the *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (MRP, Papua People's Assembly) was established.<sup>45</sup> It consists of three working groups focussed on customs and tradition (*adat*); women; and religion. The working group that focuses on women or *pokja perempuan* is not only a symbol of women's representation and aspiration, but also a forum to address and discuss a wide range of issues of concern to women in Papua. Its function is limited to providing recommendations and these then require the MRP's intervention. There have also been complaints about the composition of the working group and the fact that it lacks women who are knowledgeable and possess experience of working on women's rights.

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44 Based on the 2009 elections, the members of People's Representative Council (DPR) from Papua include three women: Etha Bulu/ Democrat Party, Agustina Basik Basi/Golkar party and Peggi Patricia/National Awakening Party. DPR members from West Papua include one woman: Irine Manibuy/Golkar party. For the House of Regional Representatives (DPD) Papua and West Papua, there are two female representatives: Helina Murib and Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipai. There were also four women legislators in the DPR from 2004 to 2009.

45 Through government regulation Peraturan Pemerintah, PP No. 54/2004.

## Norm building

### National action

The State Ministry for Women Empowerment and Child Protection and other stakeholders have drafted a law on the management of social conflict. Previous efforts to draft this law were initiated by several NGOs until the Ministry took over the process in 2007. The Ministry has run it in parallel with the discussions on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 National Action Plan (SCR 1325 NAP) which started in the same year, so that the outputs from the SCR 1325 process could feed into the draft law on the management of social conflict. This is particularly important as SCR 1325 calls for governments to include more women in conflict resolution processes, as well as improve gender content in peace agreements.

This work is driven by the realisation that Indonesia does not have many of the appropriate legal procedures in place to manage violent conflicts. It is a step towards recognising the importance of having legal guidelines, as well as the importance of women's contribution to them. The draft law was submitted to the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) where it made number 23 in the list of National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) 2009. However, 2009 was also the year of general elections and a presidential election and hence, there was no progress on the discussion of the draft law. In December 2009, the newly elected DPR, through two meetings between the legislative body (baleg) and the government, agreed and decided on the list for the Prolegnas 2009–2014 and Draft Law Priorities for National Legislation Program 2010 (Prolegnas RUU Prioritas 2010). The draft law on social conflict management was placed number 132 in the Prolegnas 2009–2014 and did not make it to the list of priorities for Prolegnas 2010. It is not regarded as a priority by the current parliament due to the perception that most violent conflicts across the country

have been resolved. However, latent tension still exists in some of these post-violence areas. A law on conflict management is a step towards addressing those volatile situations through a pre-emptive and more comprehensive approach. Hence, it is the responsibility of the ministries, government agencies and NGOs involved in the drafting of the law to maintain their efforts to lobby the legislators to ensure that the debate on the draft law is taken up.

In July 2010, the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (Menko Kesra) held a meeting of stakeholders which included other ministries and government agencies that handle conflict-related matters as well as non-governmental actors. The meeting was held to give a briefing on the draft law on social conflict management and to build support for it.<sup>46</sup> It appears that many ministries were unaware of the draft law. As of November 2010, there has not been any significant progress on the draft law.

## International action

Officially, Indonesia supports SCR 1325 passed in 2000. However, to date, there has not been any reference to the resolution in the government's policy formulation.<sup>47</sup> The State Ministry for Women Empowerment and Child Protection has been active in putting together workshops and seminars to discuss SCR 1325 and other issues related to women with little or no impact on women's participation in actual peace or conflict processes.<sup>48</sup> It is unclear, however, if any of the outputs or recommendations from those workshops and seminars have ever been translated into real policy. This is demonstrative of a bigger problem, the lack of concerted effort and support among other ministries to work together. This is particularly important as the issue of women and conflict is a cross-ministerial matter. The only reference to gender-based policy at the national level is the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimina-

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46 The meeting was held 7 July. Internal source from Menko Kesra.

47 During the 6th anniversary of SCR 1325 in October 2006, the Indonesian delegation, H.E. Mrs. Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative mentioned, "My delegation takes note of measures by various UN entities to implement the resolution at national and community levels. However, it is essential that these endeavors should be taken in full consultation with national authorities". Source: [www.peacewomen.org/un/6thAnniversary/Compilation/National\\_Implementation.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/6thAnniversary/Compilation/National_Implementation.html) accessed February 26, 2010.

48 Corner, Lorraine, *Mapping aid effectiveness and gender equality in Asia Pacific: Regional issues and trends* (New York: UNIFEM, 2008) p. 25.



A woman studies a poster calling for peace in Poso January 5, 2002, at a shelter for Christians whose villages were razed. Muslim and Christian leaders struck a peace deal in late 2001 to halt three years of clashes between the two religious groups which have killed more than 1,000 and forced tens of thousands to flee their homes. © REUTERS/Ahmad Sukarsono

tion against Women (CEDAW) manifested in the Law No. 7/1984 and later Law No. 22/2000 on 'National Development Programmes'.<sup>49</sup> The law consists of 26 gender-sensitive development policies in various sectors including the law, the economy, politics, education, social and cultural spheres, and the environment. In addition, there is the Presidential Decree (Inpres) No. 9/2000 on Gender Mainstreaming in Development. As a result of this, a list of measures and regulations has been put in place to encourage gender mainstreaming in various fields. However, positive results from the government's measures are lacking and these are blamed on the lack of socialisation and political will. The lack of socialisation applies to the SCR 1325 as well.

Indonesia is now in the process of developing a SCR 1325 NAP. This process is being led by the State Ministry for Women Empowerment and Child Protection, with the assistance of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Therefore a SCR 1325 NAP is an encouraging start for mapping out strategic implementation. Meetings with other government agencies have been held to solicit a range of input and a number of concerns have been raised about the need for such a plan in Indonesia at this time.

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49 UU No. 7/1984 on Pengesahan konvensi mengenai penghapusan segala bentuk diskriminasi terhadap wanita (Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women).

Another notable example is the effort by civil society in Aceh to draft a Provincial Action Plan (RAD) on SCR 1325. While this RAD may not be official and has no legal weight, it is nonetheless a good example of civil society engagement with concerns around women, peace and security and can be used as guidelines by government and non-government actors. It could also feed into the drafting of the national NAP.

Despite these efforts, Indonesia has a long way to go before ideas outlined in a National Action Plan can be implemented. There is a strong need to change the mentality of the government, political parties, mass organisations, and others. It is important to campaign for the importance of women's involvement in politics and peace processes and provide education in this area. This is particularly important in areas where there are regulations that are issued in the name of religious morality as an attempt to restrict women's access to stand for elections or participate in public life. Examples of this can be found in Padang Village and Bulukumba District in Makassar, South Sulawesi Province, where the regional regulation (*peraturan daerah, perda*) requires women to wear Muslim clothes. It also grants city officials the power to sweep through public places and punish women who do not abide by the rules. At the village level, there is a village regulation (*peraturan desa, perdes*) No. 5/2006 on "*hukum cambuk*" or caning that is applied if women (or men) are suspected of committing adultery.<sup>50</sup> Other similar regulations based on Islamic laws are also found in Tangerang District, Banten Province, where *perda* No. 8/2005 on prostitution has limited freedom of movement for women as it is often used to arbitrarily arrest women who are still outside their home at night.<sup>51</sup>

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50 Octaviani, Indry and Sri Wiyanti Eddyono, Loly Suhenty, Yenny Widjaya, Risma Umar, Fitriani, Hajar, Sri Rezeki, Wahidah Rustam. "Inisiatif Pemberdayaan dan Partisipasi Politik Perempuan: Studi Kasus Padang Pariaman, Solok dan Bulukumba" (Women's Empowerment and Political Participation Initiatives, Case Study in Padang Pariaman, Solok, and Bulukumba), in Tim WEMC Indonesia (Women Empowerment in Moslem Context, Indonesia), *Inisiatif Pemberdayaan Perempuan* (Women Empowerment Initiative), (Yogyakarta: Amani Press, 2008) pp. 63–65.

51 Octaviani, Indry et al, p.64.

## Recommendations

The recommendations outlined in this report are aimed at enhancing the role of Indonesian women in peace processes. Sustainable peace is likely to be unattainable without the holistic participation of women in decision-making to resolve violent conflict. The absence of women in peacemaking, and in peace talks specifically, tends to result in their needs, concerns, contributions and plight during war and violence being overlooked. Most importantly, it also results in women's future aspirations being diminished and excluded. The recommendations do not claim to be exhaustive, rather suggestive. They recognise the importance of those aspects of government policy (at the central and local level) which support greater participation of women and the principles of SCR 1325; concerted efforts among the various ministries to realise the concept of gender mainstreaming in conflict management and other fields; and co-ordination between the various levels of government, and the different government agencies, as well as between government and non-government actors.

### **Create and sponsor sustainable women's networks**

There are many women's networks in Indonesia but, over time, many are unable to sustain their activities and programmes due to lack of support and commitment. Networks comprising of diverse and talented women who possess knowledge of the various conflict situations in Indonesia as well as experience in peace processes can provide a method of sharing lessons and experiences. They also offer a way to minimise overlap in the respective peace initiatives and, consequently, optimise resources. These networks can also be tapped into by the government and NGOs as a peacemaking resource. During the 2010 meetings led by HD Centre and LIPI, we came upon many women who were (and still are) actively engaged in various peace efforts throughout Indonesia. However,

they lamented that they, their organisations and others like them are often not consulted by officials before a policy is introduced or actions are taken.

## **Finalise and publicise a National Action Plan on SCR 1325**

In Asia, the Philippines is the first country to conclude a SCR 1325 NAP and as such is a good point of reference for the Indonesian process. A NAP is not exclusively the domain of donors or ‘conflict-affected’ nations. Any state can develop one depending on their needs and outlook. Such plans are influenced by a variety of factors. Governments, for example, may want to plan their input to international security decision-making in regional and international organisations. They may also be troop contributors and want to ensure their troops are properly trained to respond to women’s rights and needs in war and violent conflict. They may be contributors to peacemaking and peacebuilding elsewhere, for example, by sending civilians to help rebuild public administration systems. Such plans do not necessarily have to be stand-alone processes (and documents) with high visibility. They can be part of the planning done by the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Justice, as well as part of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Therefore various relevant ministries are encouraged to continue exchanging views and information and collaborating to conclude an Indonesian NAP.

As such, the creation of a taskforce may facilitate the drafting of the NAP as well as oversee its implementation. The taskforce could be comprised of individuals from the government and the non-government sector, from both central and local level, with relevant experience and influence on gender, women and conflict. The taskforce may also create greater awareness of the issue of women’s participation and representation in peace processes and ensure that the necessary attention is given to it.

## **Create a working group (*pokja*) on women and conflict resolution**

The formation of a working group or *pokja* may be able to address some of the problems of co-operation and co-ordination between the work of women’s groups and the government and increase women’s involvement in peacemaking. Co-ordination is often problematic, even within government agencies, and this



is an area where all those involved, or interested, in conflict resolution can be more strategic. Compounding this challenge is the absence of a lead authority to respond to conflict situations. The working group could co-operate with the various ministries to ensure that women are substantively involved, as well as working to bring gender issues and women's concerns to the peace table. Ideally it ought to be a multi-agency working group.

As a first step, the working group could look into the existing regulations and those areas of the law which contain specific provisions for women's participation and representation in decision-making, as well as procedures for implementation. Efforts to ensure a greater gender balance in many areas have been spearheaded by the Indonesian government but the problem lies in the operational procedures. Hence, one of the possible tasks of the working group would be to look at ways to improve the implementation as well as the socialisation of those regulations.

## **Creation of a committee or working group to advise parties to peace talks**

The main agenda at peace talks is often security and the reduction of violence while issues such as reintegration and reconciliation, economic development and others that are of specific concern to women are neglected. In some instances, there may be a provision in the final peace agreement that these issues will be discussed later although the promise may not be fulfilled or the outcome unsatisfactory. The lead mediator or mediation agency can propose for the creation of a special committees or working groups to advise the main parties to the talks on these issues. This has occurred in various peace processes and is a valuable technique for advancing dialogue and understanding on key thematic issues. The committee or working group should not only comprise of the conflict parties (government officials and members of the rebel movement), but also civil society groups and other non-governmental actors. It is one way to reconcile the informal and formal peace process by involving a wider circle of non-governmental actors who possess greater knowledge of peace efforts at the grassroots level and build on the progress of those initiatives. The presence of the special committee helps to ensure that the needs of the immediate conflicting parties are addressed as well as those of the larger affected community, hence making the outcome of such agreements more comprehensive.

## Promote gender-sensitive regulations on conflict resolution

Reinforcement of the importance of gender equality can be achieved through legislation – one form of changing norms and behaviour. A national regulation that stipulates the importance of women’s involvement in peace processes would be an important stepping-stone in this regard. This would also set an example for local government in conflict-affected areas and inform the formulation of local regulations. Encouraging a wide range of actors in these efforts, as well as clearly articulating the process, actions and procedures (as well as when and how the government should intervene) would be valuable.

## Increase access for women’s involvement in politics and decision-making processes

Indonesia has no lack of talented women able to play decisive roles in conflict resolution. However, the main challenge seems to be finding a way for talented women to fill these roles. Across the world, a key place from which peacemakers are drawn is parliaments. It is therefore important that women are actively encouraged to participate in organised politics. This would also have the additional benefit of potentially bringing more attention to the issues of priority to Indonesian women. Indonesia already has one ‘stepping stone’ in place with Law No. 10/2008 (Article 53), requiring political parties to meet a 30 per cent quota of female candidates. However, there are no sanctions for not fulfilling the criteria.<sup>52</sup> For the complete list, see annex 1.

While these figures paint a promising picture of women’s participation in politics, seasoned female legislators bemoan the low levels of capability and capacity among the female candidates. Political parties have been known to field women candidates simply as a formality to fulfil the 30 per cent quota with no real intention to involve them in important political matters and decision-making.

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52 Ani Soetjipto, Sri Budi Eko Wardani, Aditya Perdana, Yolanda Panjaitan, and Wawan Ichwanuddin, *Menyapu dapur kotor: Refleksi perempuan dan politik era reformasi (Sweeping a dirty kitchen: Reflections on women and the reform political era)*, (Jakarta: Pusat Kajian Politik Fisip UI, 2010) p.34. In the 2009 legislative election, out of the 38 political parties, Indonesia Unity and Justice Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI) fielded the most female candidates (45 per cent). Eight parties fielded more than 40 per cent female candidates, 24 parties met the 30 per cent quota and six parties failed to meet the 30 per cent mark.

Hence, many female legislators would gain from further training and capacity-building in order to have their voices heard.

## **Provide dedicated conflict resolution training to women parliamentarians**

Donors are encouraged to support detailed dedicated training on conflict resolution to ensure that a growing pool of women is able to be called upon for future peacemaking in Indonesia, as well as regionally and globally. Additionally female parliamentarians ought to be more actively selected for sitting in parliamentary commissions relevant to peace and security.<sup>53</sup> The Indonesian Parliamentary Caucus for Women which is active in the national parliament has been doing its part to increase awareness of women's involvement in, and capacity for, politics. It regularly conducts training for female parliamentarians on leadership and capacity development. Topics also include constituency outreach and gender-sensitive budgets. Women parliamentarians can also be encouraged to join the Association for South East Asian Nations Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar. Such involvement in the regional arena provides them with the opportunity to interact with parliamentarians from other countries such as Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines; increase their awareness, and learn from the experiences, of other countries dealing with conflicts; and build up expertise which can then be applied to Indonesia.

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53 In an interview with Eva Kusuma Sundari by LIPI and the HD Centre's project team in Jakarta on 4 February 2010, she said that decisions about assigning women legislators to commissions are made by the leaders of their respective political parties. Women are often placed in commissions that deal with economic issues, education, religion and women's affairs. Very few women are placed in Commission I which deals with defence and foreign affairs. She added that the women can appeal to their political parties to switch commission, and the request may be granted depending on the situation.

## Annex 1. Representation of men and women in the 2009 legislative elections, and percentage of women parliamentarians

No.	Political parties	Legislative candidates	Men	Women	%
1	Partai Hanura	605	419	186	30.74
2	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	141	86	55	39.01
3	Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia	279	154	125	44.80
4	Partai Peduli Rakyat Indonesia	288	213	75	26.04
5	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya	396	280	116	29.29
6	Partai Barisan Nasional	276	172	104	37.68
7	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	315	173	142	45.08
8	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	579	367	212	36.61
9	Partai Amanat Nasional	596	419	177	29.70
10	Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru	55	35	20	36.36
11	Partai Kedaulatan	248	157	91	36.69
12	Partai Persatuan Daerah	159	91	68	42.77
13	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	398	264	134	33.67
14	Partai Pemuda Indonesia	278	182	96	34.53
15	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme	115	76	39	33.91
16	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan	402	238	164	40.80
17	Partai Karya Perjuangan	199	131	68	34.17
18	Partai Matahari Bangsa	303	180	123	40.59
19	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	50	35	15	30.00
20	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan	251	248	3	1.20

No.	Political parties	Legislative candidates	Men	Women	%
21	Partai Republika Nusantara	231	162	69	29.87
22	Partai Pelopor	109	68	41	37.61
23	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	641	447	194	30.27
24	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	472	345	127	26.91
25	Partai Damai Sejahtera	323	207	116	35.91
26	Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia	173	115	58	33.53
27	Partai Bulan Bintang	395	262	133	33.67
28	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	627	405	222	35.41
29	Partai Bintang Reformasi	314	187	127	40.45
30	Partai Patriot	117	94	23	19.66
31	Partai Demokrat	671	450	221	32.94
32	Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia	146	99	47	32.19
33	Partai Indonesia Sejahtera	317	194	123	38.80
34	Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama	294	195	99	33.67
35	Partai Merdeka	89	58	31	34.83
36	Partai Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	101	56	45	44.55
37	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	127	82	45	35.43
38	Partai Buruh	221	145	76	34.39
	<b>Total</b>	<b>11130</b>	<b>7491</b>	<b>3639</b>	<b>32.70</b>

Source: General Election Commission ([www.kpu.go.id](http://www.kpu.go.id))

