AFGHANISTAN: Female Suicide Bombers The New Threat in Afghanistan

Amidst the disarray following General McChrystal's interview with Rolling Stone, a much less reported but profound event marked the course of the insurgency in Afghanistan. The recent female suicide operation in eastern Afghanistan reveals not only a paradigm shift in Taliban insurgent tactics, but also a mutation of the organization's founding ideology.

On June 20, dressed in a long-flowing burqa, Bibi Halima walked up to American and Afghan soldiers on patrol in the Sheltan area of Shegal district in Kunar province with the intention of detonating explosives attached to her body. In recent months, soldiers have had reason to be skeptical of burqa-clad pedestrians. Many of the Haqqani Network's fedayeen tactics in eastern Afghanistan have included men disguised in burqas, allowing them to approach or breach heavily cordoned buildings and district centers prior to opening fire or detonating explosives. But as NATO and Afghan counterinsurgency experience heightened, security forces became well adept at reading bodily gestures and cues that distinguished a man from a woman underneath the large Afghan dress. Until June 20th, this was a valuable force protection measure since not one of the over 430 suicide attacks in Afghanistan since 2001, was perpetrated by a woman. In comparison, women have executed nearly one in ten suicide attacks in Iraq. Until June 20th, NATO troops could rest assured that of the many insurgent tactics adapted from Iraq to Afghanistan, female suicide bombings was one that would likely never emerge.

But as in all insurgencies, there is little a counterinsurgent can be certain. The element of surprise is probably the greatest tool an insurgent holds over the parties attempting to glue together the fragile pieces of an orderly society in Afghanistan. However, in the midst of what many skeptics argue is a repeat of Vietnam (be it increasing violence and corruption throughout the country, a change in leadership, or a muddled strategic policy) there is reason to be hopeful over this new paradigm of violent tactics in Afghanistan. The Taliban have just thrown down one of their wild cards by sponsoring and implementing their first female suicide bomber. Not only have the Taliban opened themselves up to a new range of criticism by moderate and fence-sitting Pashtuns, whom the Afghan government increasingly seeks to win over, but they will also likely find cleavages develop within their own ranks that see the inclusion of women in the insurgency as dishonorable and outside the realm of acceptable jihad.

There are plenty of practical reasons the Taliban would want to use women as suicide bombers. Like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey or Chechen separatist movements in the Caucasus, the Taliban have used the tactical elements of the burqa as a disguise since at least 2007—dressing many of their male martyrs in this garb as a way to evade detection. More than disguising a male under a burqa, the female bomber can actually allow insurgents to penetrate deep within hardened security structures where men would otherwise be unable to pass through undetected and unsearched. Given cultural constraints, men are forbidden from searching women, leaving insurgents a gap in security measures that they can exploit. In a recent graduating class of cadets from the Kabul Police Academy, only ten of the over 1,600 graduates were women, thus ensuring that few women will be searched in at least the near future. Thus, women provide a convenient tactical advantage in terms of suicide attacks, because they are unlikely to be suspected or searched.

Until recently, the Taliban and associated groups such as the Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, have largely avoided implementing women in the insurgency for several reasons. First, there are larger social and historical considerations such as norms and collective memory within Afghanistan that have prevented Taliban tacticians from utilizing women in insurgent operations. Female involvement in jihad has largely been absent in Afghanistan throughout history. Some examples exist that serve as motivating stories for male combatants such as the tale of the Pashtun heroine Malalai who rallied Afghans to defeat the British at the Battle of Maiwand in 1880. Like Lady Liberty or the French Marianne, Malalai served more as an iconic image of motherhood and national pride. Few women participated in the anti-Soviet jihad beyond the important, but less combative supportive roles, such as serving as couriers, conditioning weapons, or preparing the dead for burial. Ever since the Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001, women have been relegated to second-class citizenship. Today's young insurgent has grown up inculcated with the beliefs and value systems espoused by ultra-conservative mullahs.

Second, until recently, the Taliban have resided in a fairly permissible environment, controlling large swaths of territory including urban district centers and rural villages throughout the country. They also had considerable cross-border access in Pakistan where they could plan operations, train jihadists and indoctrinate future martyrs. Today, in many respects due to the success of counterinsurgency operations run by General McChrystal and his team, the Taliban have lost vital areas of sanctuary, elements of command and control have been infiltrated and broken down, and operations have been successfully countered and prevented due to a transfer of much needed assets from Iraq to Afghanistan. Thus, whereas deferment of female suicide bombers as a tactic was easier one year ago when insurgent were in much better strategic position, today they look more appealing as the organization becomes increasingly threatened. Compare this environment to 2008 in Diyala Province, Iraq. U.S. Special Forces, under the command of Lt. Gen. McChrystal became exceedingly efficient at liquidating mid-level Al Qaeda commanders, breaking apart the structural alignment of the organization to the point that female combatants became a logical conclusion for a squeezed organization seeking to create space against an offensive U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign. By the end of 2008, female suicide attacks reached 32 in Iraq, as this tactic became a necessary adaptation for insurgents.

Third, a culture of martyrdom has been a powerful aspect of the Taliban insurgency. Martyrdom has been a convenient rhetorical strategy that wraps a variety of economic, political and social grievances around the all-inclusive narrative of jihad. The Taliban jihad has evolved to include narratives of Macedonian, British and Soviet defeat at the hands of warrior Pashtuns. This can be seen through war ballads, poetry, and personal testimonies distributed via 21st century technology—passed from Afghan to Afghan via mobile telephones, compact discs chanting martyrologies, as well as developed websites and monthly publications. A significant difference between the Taliban insurgency and the anti-Soviet jihad has been the absence of women in the martyrdom mythology. Women have always played a significant role in Afghanistan as poets espousing the heroics of their men in combat and as defenders of a family's honor. However, under Taliban tyranny, women were noticeably absent in resistance literature, oral narratives or the Taliban movement in general. Thus, the choice to engage women in violent jihad will soon test the viability of the organization's ideology that has long positioned women as outsiders. If inclusion of women occurs, the Taliban will be forced to evolve and adapt its strict fundamental beliefs to less restrictive standards.

We may never know who the real Bibi Halima was, nor why she chose to kill herself for an organization that would rather hold women in a position of permanent servitude. But the act she participated in will undoubtedly stand as an unrecognized changing point in the Afghan conflict. Will more women follow her lead or resist the temptation of asymmetric violence? U.S. and Afghan forces would be wise to capitalize on this moment to lower that risk and build partnerships with a broader segment of society. First, it presents a significant opportunity to characterize the violent, inhumane nature of the Taliban. Second, it shows there is a deep ideological divide between the Taliban's foundational ideology and what the organization adopts as legitimate conduct today. When approaching options for reconciliation, this can be a notable point of contention between “moderate” Taliban and irreconcilables. Third, there must be a doubled effort to train female Afghan police and intelligence operatives in order to be the eyes and ears preventing future female suicide bombers. Finally, the West should continue to pressure Afghanistan's government to ensure women have a viable voice and opportunity in the new Afghan society. While some women may feel pressured to work with the Taliban, if viable options exist, such as an amnesty or call-in program for potential suicide bombers, the few female bombers who emerge may think twice about ending their life in such a tragic fashion.