WILPF/PeaceWomen themes covered:

General Women, Peace and Security:  1/16

Conflict Prevention:  2/16

Disarmament:  2/16

Displacement and Humanitarian Response:  2/16

Participation: 3/16

Peace Processes: 8/16

Peacekeeping: 6/16

Protection: 4/16

Reconstruction and Peacebuilding: 1/16

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: 1/16

Implementation: 5/16

Justice, Rule of Law, SSR: 2/16

Human Rights: 0/16

N/A 

WILPF/PeaceWomen themes covered:

General Women, Peace and Security: 0/4

Conflict Prevention:1/4

Disarmament: 0/4

Displacement and Humanitarian Response: 0/4

Participation:1/4

Peace Processes: 0/4

Peacekeeping: 2/4

Protection: 1/4

Reconstruction and Peacebuilding: 0/4

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: 0/4

Implementation: 2/4

Justice, Rule of Law, SSR: 1/4

Human Rights: 0/4

WILPF/PeaceWomen themes covered:

General Women, Peace and Security: 0/1

Conflict Prevention: 0/1

Disarmament: 0/1

Displacement and Humanitarian Response: 0/1

Participation: 0/1

Peace Processes: 0/1

Peacekeeping: 1/1

Protection: 1/1

Reconstruction and Peacebuilding: 0/1

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: 0/1

Implementation: 0/1

Justice, Rule of Law, SSR: 0/1

Human Rights: 0/1

N/A 

Though China did not offer any new commitments, it did emphasise progress made on the WPS agenda as it relates to peacekeeping: The Chinese Ministry of Defence and UN-Women have jointly hosted international workshops for women peacekeeping officers to encourage troop-contributing countries to actively assign and dispatch female officers to peacekeeping missions, as well as to enhance their capabilities and skills.

Arms Transfer Revenue, Total Contribution in 2018: 1,566,000,000 billion [source: Importer/Exporter TIV Tables, SIPRI] 

UN Women Government Total Contribution in 2018: $2,000,000 [source: UN Women, top donors list]

Military Expenditure in 2018: $250 bn. [source: SIPRI]

as compared to... 

Arms Transfer Revenue in 2017: $1,131,000,000 

UN Women Government Total Contribution in 2017: $1,860,000

In 2017, China was ranked 36 of 189 countries. 

Researcher's note: The 2019 Human Development Report will not be released until November 2019, as it is being significantly re-envisioned in order to "go beyond the dominant discourse focused on income disparities."

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Contingent Troops: 2355 men, 63 women, 2418 total. 

Experts on Mission: 30 men,  2 women, 32 total. 

Individual Police: 18 men, 0 women, 18 total.

Staff Officer: 51 men, 0 women, 51 total. 

Total, peacekeepers provided: 2519 (65 women, 2454 men).

N/A 

Discussions surrounding the extent of the Chinese government's "partnerships" with civil society - particularly women's civil society - must be founded on an understanding of the (fairly recent) history of China's civil society sector.  Though there is a rich history of Chinese lineage organizations or benevolent societies (stemming from Confucian ideology), the concept of "charity" - that of giving to strangers without expectation of reciprocation - is a Western import (introduced by Western missionaries in the nineteenth century) for which the Chinese had to invent a new term. Between 1949  and the early 1990s, "charity" was so successfully suppressed due to its Western origin that the term fell out of use.

When the concept of "charity" re-emerged in the 1990s, People’s Daily (the mouthpiece for the Chinese government) emphasized the need for it's ‘rehabilitation’ for Chinese society. (As described by Dr. Carolyn Hsu, "in Chinese Communist parlance, ‘rehabilitation’ refers to the transformation from politically condemned to politically acceptable," as in, for example, that of "Bourgeois enemies" who were "'rehabilitated’ into communist comrades before they could return to society.") Since the 1990s, civil society in China has been under the firm grasp of the Chinese government: the government restricts and contains the civil society, reaping the many benefits (among them the alleviation of social problems, channeling of civilian concerns, and influx of international funding) whilst limiting their freedoms to conduct activities considered "dangerous" or destabilizing," and enforcing these limitations through arrests, censorship, and evictions. As Dr. Hsu explains, the government plays "a long-term strategic game where, ideally, it exploits NGOs to help it meet its goals." Analysis of the state-civil society relationship is therefore less a matter of analysing state partnerships than of analysing of state control.

There are several steps that the Chinese government can take to strengthen its partnerships with women civil society organizations. For example, China has emphasized the involvement of and its "consultation with" women and NGOs surrounding the "Belt and Road Initiative." However, while the Chinese government gains positive publicity from these statements, the groups with which it consults are rendered invisible. The Chinese government should increase the visibility of and protections surrounding freedoms of expression and assembly for the women civil society organizations with which it consults and render more transparent the "consultation" process (ie: to what extent, and on what issues, do women consult?).

There is limited data available on gender-specific training of security and law-enforcement personnel. However, research indicates that gender-sensitive trainings and objectives are not in place in China. 

As of 2018, China had not yet drafted a 1325 National Action Plan nor had it expressed its intentions to do so. 

The Chinese government has never prepared, drafted, or signalled its intention to prepare and draft a National Action Plan on the Implementation of 1325. 

In 2017, China's military expenditure was estimated at around $228 billion. 

2018: 24.9%

2017: 24.2% 

This represents a slight increase. 

N/A. 

N/A. 

It is of note that, as of 2010, there were approximately 45,000 women judges (25% of all judges) in China. By 2013, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the number of women judges increased to approximately 57,200 (28.8 % of all judges). In 2017, two out of the top seventeen leaders (11.7%) of the Supreme People's Court were women.  

China should take the necessary steps to ensure the public availability and accessibility of gender-disaggregated data on its judiciary. 

N/A. 

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Chinese women won suffrage rights in 1947 with the implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of China, and China's Constitution guarantees women “equal rights with men in all spheres of life."

The Revised Law of the People’s Republic on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women remains a particularly significant indicator of China’s perspective on gender.

Though women are technically guaranteed the right to equal pay for equal work, in practice women earn a fifth less than men for the same work (and the gap is increasing).

While women and men are guaranteed equal property rights under national law, legal advocates say that enforcement mechanisms for guaranteeing women’s land rights are lacking. In practice, women in China are routinely denied their rights due to a combination of discriminatory policy implementation and adherence to patriarchal cultural values. Rural women in particular are affected by these practices. In 2018, many were deprived of land rights due to village-level policies and customs that deny women rights to collectively owned land if they marry outside of the village, divorce, become widowed, or remain unmarried above a certain age. Women's inequal rights to command over property were also apparent within the household: according to a sample survey conducted by the state-run Research Center for Rural Economy, 80.2% of rural women were not registered on residential property certificates.

China has a long history with "family planning." In 2018, for its third year, the Chinese Communist Party and government authorities implemented the ‘‘universal two-child policy’’ that allows all married couples to have two children (an increase from it's previous "one-child policy"). Forced abortions continue to occur. The government increased the birth limit due to demographic concerns of a declining birth rate, an aging population, and a shrinking workforce (rather than rights-related concerns).

Women and men do not have equal rights with regard to their choice of spouse, and LGBTQI women and men are not guaranteed protections under the law.

After years of advocacy, China recently passed its first anti-domestic violence law. The Chinese government’s implementation of this law, however, remained weak in 2018.

Equal access to formal legal dispute systems and the right to legal representation. The Chinese constitution guarantees that the "accused has the right to defense." To ensure a person’s right to defense, China’s Criminal Procedure Law contains a number of essential fair trial guarantees, including the right to pre-trial access to counsel. However, though China takes efforts to ensure equal access and continues to develop its justice system, access issues remain. Geographic inaccessibility remains particularly problematic: though technically available in both urban and rural areas, access tends to be better in urban and eastern coastal areas (where more lawyers/firms are located) than in Western and inland areas.

Non-discrimination law. Though frameworks exist to prevent discrimination against women (ex: the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests Law of the People's Republic of China), the framework is not strong enough (both in its interpretation/definition of discrimination and application) to prevent all women from discrimination.  Crucially, LBGTQI women remain largely unprotected before the law. Employer discrimination against women remains problematic as in, for example, the barring of women from performing certain jobs (in some cases depending on whether they are menstruating, pregnant, or breastfeeding) despite laws in place. Enforcement of these laws is exceedingly rare and negligible.   

Existence of courts and judicial bodies. The legal and justice systems of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are defined by the government as a “socialist legal system" established in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (the highest law within China).  There are four levels of the court system in China: the local, intermediate, higher and supreme people's courts, in addition to special courts (including military, maritime, railway and forestry courts).

Financial affordability of access to legal proceedings and/or legal aid. State-funded legal aid is available at national, regional and local levels. Legal aid is provided upon request from the person who wants legal aid, or from the police, the prosecutor, or the institution that oversees appointment of legal aid providers. The court presiding over a case must also inquire and assess eligibility during the first appearance of the parties.

Free access to an interpreter during legal proceedings. Court support services, such as interpretation and translation of documents, are provided only in some proceedings.

Victim protection. Provisions for protecting witnesses have been in place for some time in China, though they’ve lacked clear guidelines for implementation. The revision of the criminal law in 2012 provided for the safeguarding a witness’ personal information, altering their voice and not showing their face in the courtroom, and preventing certain people from being in close proximity to them. As of 2018 -- despite notorious shortcomings of these laws (especially surrounding evidentiary requirements) which frequently result in rejection of cases and social norms which often prevent initial reporting-- 3,718 protective orders were issued to protect survivors of domestic violence. However, protective orders have little immediate impact on survivor's immediate safety needs without enforcement.

Judicial data shows that between 1-10% of all witnesses actually show up for trial, with most opting to submit written testimony rather than face the possibility of intimidation or abuse.

Existence of gender units within justice institutions. As of 2018, gender units do not exist within justice institutions.

The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not meet the minimum standards* for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.

*Researcher’s note on applied standards: Our minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons reflect those outlined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, and the United States' Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPRA), which aims to improve implementation of and fill national policy gaps related to the elimination of human trafficking. The United States' State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons reports, the primary source employed in our evaluation, assess the efforts undertaken by nation states surrounding the central aims of the TVPRA: protection, prevention and prosecution. For more detailed discussions concerning these standards, check out our resources below.

China implemented its first domestic violence law in 2016, and has increased efforts to bring awareness to the issue. It is notable though, that these efforts have coincided with a clamp-down on civil society.

The Ministry of Justice operates "148" hotline for legal services and established a legal aid station for battered women. The All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) operates a national legal assistance center, coupled with women's rights hotline "12338" and the domestic violence hotline "16838198." The CEASE Crisis Centre operates a 24-hour hotline for sexual violence "18281."

There exists a single sexual violence crisis centre in Hong Kong, operated by RainLily, and one on the mainland, the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals CEASE Crisis Centre. As of 2015, The Ministry of Civil Affairs reported the establishment of domestic violence shelters in around 100 cities in nearly 20 provincial-level jurisdictions. However, due to the limited availability of data, we have -- as noted by Equality Beijing -- "only... [a] few individual reports [concerning the establishment of women's shelters] rather than a comprehensive picture."

The Chinese government has demonstrated willingness to cooperate on the issue of domestic violence. However, in recent years, the extent of the Chinese government's actual engagement with civil society has decreased while the limitations and constraints that are associated with government partnerships have grown.

There are several areas to which the Chinese Government could turn its attention to strengthen national law enforcement's capacity for gender-sensitive crime prevention and response. For example, to combat law enforcement official's persistent hesitation to interfere in cases of domestic violence, women's advocacy groups successfully pushed for the introduction of protection orders (a touchstone policy across the globe for addressing domestic violence) in 2008. (It is of note that Chinese women’s rights lawyers, through their concerted efforts, sparked the pilot project on protection orders in a limited number of courts across China.) Later, in 2016, China passed the landmark Anti-Domestic Violence Law.  Coupled with protection orders, the Chinese government has a framework through and by which it can respond to domestic violence complaints. There is a clear need for action. As of 2018 -- despite notorious shortcomings of these laws (especially surrounding evidentiary requirements) which frequently result in rejection of cases and social norms which often prevent initial reporting-- 3,718 protective orders were issued to protect survivors of domestic violence. However, protective orders have little immediate impact on survivor's immediate safety needs without enforcement. Creating gender-sensitive training objectives bolstered by gender sensitivity trainings, with the input of women's civil society (who have made clear both their expertise and willingness to work with the government despite the limitations/constraints it enforces), surrounding this issue would be a solid step in the right direction.

In 2018, China established a central body for veterans affairs (the Ministry of Veteran's Affairs). This was largely viewed as responsive to the long-held grievances of veterans, particularly surrounding inadequate pensions and benefits. 

In 2018, China's 123 centrally-administered state-owned enterprises have mobilised and offered around 15,000 job positions to veterans. China's Ministry of Veterans Affairs also granted preferential policies to ex-servicemen who set up businesses, including financial and tax benefits.

Regional veterans offices exist, but it is unknown whether they provide specific services and resources for women veterans. Officially, all veterans receive the same benefits from the State, including women veterans. However, very little additional information exists.

National Crisis Hotline. The Chinese Ministry of Justice operates "148" hotline for legal services for domestic violence, and the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) operates a women's rights hotline "12338" as well as a domestic violence hotline "16838198." The CEASE Crisis Centre operates a 24-hour hotline for sexual violence "18281."

Women's shelters and Women's Rape Crisis Centres. As of 2015, The Ministry of Civil Affairs reported the establishment of domestic violence shelters in around 100 cities in nearly 20 provincial-level jurisdictions. However, due to the limited availability of data, we have -- as noted by Equality Beijing -- "only... [a] few individual reports [concerning the establishment of women's shelters] rather than a comprehensive picture." Our research suggested that there exists a single sexual violence crisis centre in Hong Kong, operated by RainLily, and one on the mainland, the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals CEASE Crisis Centre, that provide rape crisis services. 

Counseling services and support groups. The Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, Rain Lily, CEASE Crisis Centre, and the All-China Women's Federation are among a number of CSOs that provide counseling services and support groups for survivors of sexual violence.

National sex-offender list or website. As of 2018, there was no centralized, national sex-offender list or website in China. There are, however, growing calls to establish a national child sex offender registry (with at least two provinces in China experimenting with adopting pilot programs). 

In 2018, the government's commitment to implementing dedicated programmes for survivors of trafficking decreased. (2018 was also characterized by a decreased in access to relevant data and reporting.)

The government reported maintaining at least 10 shelters specifically dedicated to care for trafficking victims, as well as eight shelters for foreign trafficking victims and more than 2,300 multi-purpose shelters nationwide that could accommodate trafficking victims. Victims were entitled to shelter, medical care, counseling, social services, and—in some cases—rehabilitation services (available by way of the Ministry of Civil Affairs), the All-China Women's Federation, and other civil society organisations. Access to specialized care varied signficantly. The efficacy of the government’s previously reported victim assistance—including its eight border liaison offices with Burma, Vietnam, and Laos, victim funds, hotlines, and government-to-government agreements to assist victims—remained unclear. Foreign embassies in China reportedly provided shelter or other protective services to victims.

Despite the existence of procedures, new policies and an increase in training, law enforcement officials continued to arrest and detain foreign women on suspicion of prostitution crimes without screening them for indicators of sexual exploitation—sometimes for as long as four months—before deporting them for immigration violations.

Though victims are legally entitled to request criminal prosecution and claim financial restitution through civil lawsuits against their traffickers, we do not have access to the data that would allow us to determine whether this occured.  

As of 2018, the legal landscape (that which is required for the implementation of dedicated programmes to support refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) seemed improved (albeit lacking in consistent implementation). Combined with China's apparent growing interest in refugee issues, there are positive indicators suggesting China's willingness to increase its efforts surrounding refugee protection in the future. (It is of note though, that to a significant extent, the nature of this interest is in development.) 

Yet the fact remains that the Representative Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in China continues to play an outsize role in service provision (whilst continuing to engage China in the global discourse on refugee protection).

In 2018, the total refugee population was 321,756, down from 322,439 in 2017. 

There are opportunities for China to make significant improvements. For example, China has aceded to the Refugee Convention and Protocol - a step in the right direction - but has incorporated few of its provisions into its domestic law. It has not established a national mechanism or consistent policy surrounding refugee status determination. As such, domestic Chinese law contains no provisions on who qualifies as a refugee, which organisation or government body is responsible for refugee status determination, or how an application for refugee status can be made. China should translate its emergent interest in refugee interests into (and call upon its nascent legal framework in) the establishment of a national body or domestic policy to clarify these concerns -- ideally, accompanied by or founded upon a national refugee/IDP strategy.